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
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SOMEBODY has said that history for the last three or four centuries is only a grand conspiracy against truth, and we are every day more and more convinced, that, whether its authors have been Catholics or Protestants, believers or unbelievers, it needs to be rewritten from the original documents. Certain it is, that Catholics have never yet done justice to the defenders of their cause in troublous times, and that, when the full historical truth comes to be told, it will be altogether more favorable to them than they have dared to believe.

Nearly all our popular histories, even those circulating among Catholics, especially in England and this country, have been written from the point of view of the secular order, by unbelievers, misbelievers, or at least by men whose devotion to the state was more lively than their devotion to the Church. The truly orthodox have seldom written history; and if men of unimpeachable faith have sometimes written it, they have done it, not primarily as Catholics, but as Italians, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Germans, Poles, or Englishmen, in whose hearts for the time being their country predominated over their Church, and their patriotism got the better of their religion. Even ecclesiastical history proper, in so far as adapted to popular reading, has fallen into the hands, when not of open heretics, of Galli-

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cans, — if we may use the term without implying or intending to imply any peculiar reproach to France or to Frenchmen, for the thing we mean has been confined to no nation, — or at least of men moved by Gallican tendencies, and more intent on vindicating the conduct of their political sovereigns towards the Church, than on placing in its true light the character of the Popes who were forced from time to time to resist them. We have met with no history circulating among the people, civil or ecclesiastical, written from the true Catholic point of view, with that deep love and reverence for the chair of Peter which every Catholic ought to entertain, and which are invariably warranted by the facts in the case.

This may, perhaps, be easily accounted for. History is a record of the past, and its proper subject is the dead, not the living. The Church has never been numbered with the dead. Always and everywhere present, immutable and immortal, she has, and can have, strictly speaking, no past, and is and can be no proper subject of history. She has no need of history for her own instruction and edification. They who partake the most of her spirit, and have the most lively sense of her Catholicity in time as well as in space, must always be precisely those who are the least disposed to devote themselves to the long and wearisome study of the chronicles and monuments of past ages. They live in the present and the future, and all of the past of interest to them is present in the Church, which is one in time and space, teaching all ages and nations, and maintaining all truth. They have for themselves no motive to study history. They have no need of its lessons. The Church teaches them, here and now, all they need to learn, and they have only to learn and understand what she teaches to be able to perform well their part either as churchmen or statesmen.

Moreover, the sincere, earnest-minded Catholic, whose faith is firm, who knows that his Church is indefectible, that she is founded upon a rock, and the gates of hell cannot prevail against her, that she is sustained by God himself without the aid of the puny arm of man, has always other and more pressing work than that of poring over the records of the past, — that of relieving present suffering, and of inducing men to live for the glory of God and the salvation of their souls. He finds always, here and

now, more than he can do, and has no time or thought to spare for any thing else. He cannot, therefore, consent to devote himself either to the study or the writing of history, any farther than he finds it necessary in order to refute or repel contemporary heresies. As far as necessary for this purpose, he will, indeed, study it, and even write it; but all beyond is to him a matter of comparative indifference. He is prepared to let men read history in their own way, so far as their reading leaves him room to defend the dogmas, the unity, catholicity, apostolicity, and sanctity of the Church. He therefore lets much pass that he might well dispute, and concedes much that a little closer study of documents would prove to be false; because he sees that to concede it does not really affect any thing he holds it necessary to defend. Nothing is, then, more natural, than that popular history, from the half-Arian Eusebius down to Fleury, from the Nestorian Socrates down to the Gallican Lingard and the infidel Voltaire, Gibbon, or Hume, should be written by men without faith, by misbelievers, or at best by men whose affections for the Church, especially for the Holy See, are cold and languid, if they even exist.

In this way, too, we must explain those numerous unwarranted concessions and uncalled for apologies made in regard to historical personages and events, by professedly Catholic writers, and which constitute the chief difficulty the modern Catholic encounters in his controversies with Protestants. These concessions have passed into history as undisputed and indisputable facts, and have misled Catholics as well as their enemies. Hence we find even Catholics apologizing for men in whom they should glory, and resorting to much narrow and unsatisfactory special pleading to explain away events which demand only frank acknowledgment and warm admiration. How many among us have felt it necessary to apologize for the acts of the sainted Hildebrand, the illustrious Innocent the Third, the noble Boniface the Eighth, and the heroic Julius the Second, — acts among the most admirable recorded in history, and which endear these great Pontiffs to every truly Catholic heart! What Catholic needs to be told that the Sovereign Pontiffs most censured by the world are always those most dear to the celestial Spouse of the Church? Whom does the world more deeply hate, or more bitterly persecute, than our Blessed Lord and Master, whom it cru-

cified between two thieves, and continues to crucify afresh every day? If they call the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more them of his household? Always will the most worthy Popes be those most hated and calumniated by men of the world, by heretics, unbelievers, temporal sovereigns, lukewarm, and, as we say to-day, *liberal* Catholics. Whom God loves, the world must always hate.

The causes which have operated to throw the concocting of popular history into the hands of the unorthodox or the worldly-minded, have operated also to render all general, or, as it is not inaptly called, *profane*, literature uncatholic and heathenish. In no age or country has popular secular literature been truly catholic. The popular literature in what Digby calls the "ages of faith" was unchristian in its substance, and breathed the spirit of Græco-Roman gentilism, Celtic and Scandinavian superstition, or Arabic and Moorish sensualism. The songs of the Troubadours, the Trouvères, Minnesingers, minstrels, and bards, the ballads of Spain, Armorica, and England, which are sometimes adduced as specimens of Christian literature, were as little Christian in reality as the Arabian Nights' Entertainments, the odes of Horace, Pindar, or Anacreon. Not a few of the popular tales of our own day, written by Catholics for the especial instruction of our Catholic youth, are surcharged with carnal Judaism. They feed their amiable little boys and girls with sugar-plums, and reward them with sugar-kisses. They may be passably sound in their didactic chapters, they may contain some wholesome commonplace morality, and abundance of fine sentimentalizing about piety and devotion; but their practical influence on their readers is to enervate their minds, to render their hearts weak and their imaginations morbid, to confine their aspirations to this world, and to induce them to look for an earthly recompense,—a happy marriage, riches, or worldly distinction. Seldom does the author, or rather authoress, dare propose spiritual consolation here, and eternal life hereafter, as the adequate reward of suffering virtue and patient piety.

This all lies in the natural course of things. No matter who creates it, all secular, general, or popular literature, when sundered from sacred letters, is sure to be heathen in its spirit and tendency. It is so when created by a Dante, a Tasso, a Racine, as well as when created by a Boccaccio,

a Pulci, an Ariosto, an Alfieri, a Rabelais, a Montaigne, a Voltaire, a Goethe, a Schelling, a Carlyle, or an Emerson. The sincere, the firm, the devout believer, the moment he so far forgets himself as to leave sacred letters and devote himself to profane or secular literature, becomes for the time being practically a heathen. It cannot be otherwise, because the secular sundered from the spiritual, and cultivated by and for itself, although in an inferior sphere, is the very essence and source of heathenism. Our Lord has defined heathenism for us, and shown us that its essence consists precisely in seeking the secular order as an end, or in seeking secular or earthly goods for their own sake. "For after all these things do the heathen seek." (St. Matt. vi. 32.) Impossible is it then to waive the spiritual, and fall back on the secular, without lapsing into heathenism. Even Digby's pious bishops, whom he praises for having cultivated polite literature in their youth, seldom fail to tell us in their old age that they regret having done so.

We do not set our faces against all literature, as not a few will allege; but against all profane literature, sundered from sacred letters, and cultivated separately and for its own sake; just as we reprobate philosophy separated from Catholic theology, and the whole secular order, emancipated from the spiritual, and cultivated as a separate and independent order, subsisting morally by and for itself. What, indeed, on this subject, is the Christian law? Is it simply that the secular should be held inferior to the spiritual? Not by any means. The Christian law demands that the secular should be morally subordinated and made subservient to the spiritual, and recognizes in it no right, no legitimacy, except in so far as so subordinated and made subservient. Prior to sin, the body, represented by the secular order, physically subsisted, indeed, but in complete subjection to the rational nature, and moved only at its bidding, with no original or independent motions of its own. It was in all respects subject to reason, and moved only in subordination and subserviency to it. This is the normal relation of the spirit and the flesh, and the exact type of the normal relation of the spiritual order and the secular. In consequence of sin, this normal relation has been disturbed; the body has escaped from its original subjection; the flesh has rebelled against the spirit, and now claims to be recognized as independent, and treated

as subsisting by and for itself. It cannot now in this life be reduced again to its original subjection, but remains rebellious even in the saint till death. Hence, to maintain the spiritual integrity to which through the grace of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ we are restored, we must resist its motions to independence, and mortify its original and independent desires, — subject it, morally, to the spirit, and, in obedience to the law of the spirit, sternly resist all its importunities, and in no instance suffer ourselves to yield to its demands as a separate and self-subsisting power. We may use the body for spiritual ends, but never suffer the body to use the spirit for bodily or carnal ends.

The same is to be said of the secular order in general. We cannot and should not physically annihilate the secular, for we have bodies as well as souls ; but we must annihilate it morally, as we must the flesh. We may consult and use it for spiritual purposes, as a means to spiritual ends, but are not to cultivate it for its own sake, or as having its end in its own order. The secular does not subsist morally by or for itself, and was never created by God for its own sake. It was created and subsists only for the spiritual, and in so far as it can not be used for, or made subservient to, a spiritual purpose, it has no moral, or, if you prefer, no Christian significance, and is to be ignored, resisted, or mortified. This world, the men and women in it, states, kingdoms, empires, the Church herself, all the works of nature and of grace, are for no other purpose than that of the spiritual order, the glory of God in his saints. The right, the legitimacy, of the secular order is in its subordination and subserviency to spiritual ends, themselves subordinated and referred to the glory of God as ultimate end of creation and of grace. For this end, the ultimate end of all, the spiritual order may use the secular, has dominion over it, over all nature, and may press it into its service, and so far as so used or so pressed it is honorable, is sacred, is holy ; but beyond, in so far as it refuses to be so used or pressed, and claims to be respected for itself, it is the principle of heathenism, opposed to the Christian law, and to be resisted, mortified, morally annihilated. Hence whoever so devotes himself to the secular beyond its use for spiritual ends, or to it for its own sake, is at least an incipient heathen, and needs only time and opportunity to become a full-grown heathen.

Now all strictly profane or secular literature has its principle and end in the secular order, as subsisting by and for itself, not as a means to a spiritual end, and therefore is and must in the nature of the case be really heathen in its principle and tendency. The more we have of it, the more highly we prize it, the more assiduously we cultivate it, the farther are we removed from the spiritual order, the more averse do we become to Christianity. The enemies of our holy religion understand this full well, and hence their loud praises of profane literature, and their perpetual ranting and canting about popular education; hence do they never cease to charge the Church with being opposed to the education of the people and hostile to intellectual light and culture. But it is never intellectual light, truly such, nor Christian education, that the Church opposes, for these she labors unweariedly to promote; it is, as these enemies themselves know, only the false light of heathenism, which dazzles to blind, and shines only to lure men to destruction, and the heathenish education, which educates for the world, the flesh, and the Devil, instead of God and heaven, that she sets her face against and anathematizes.

Protestants are fond of claiming the revival of classical studies in the fifteenth century as one of the most active and influential causes of what they call the Reformation. They are no doubt right in this; not indeed, as they pretend, because these studies marked or effected an intellectual progress, not indeed because the people were or became more generally educated or more truly enlightened than they had previously been; but because these studies tended to draw off the mind and heart from sacred literature, and to turn them from the spiritual to the secular, from the Christian to the heathen. It is very possible that the people, or at least the learned men, of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, were better educated, as heathens, and better instructed in heathenism, than they were in the Middle Ages; but this does not in the least imply that they were more generally or better educated as Christians, or that they were better able to appreciate moral and religious truth, or better prepared to discharge the various duties of their respective states in life, and to attain to the end for which man and all things are created. Quite the reverse is the fact. He who should pretend that Luther and Calvin, Melancthon and Beza, were more enlightened theo-

logians, and better understood moral and religious truth, than St. Anselm and St. Bernard, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventura, or that Philip of Hesse and Henry the Eighth of England were more enlightened Christians than St. Henry of Germany and St. Louis of France, would need to be shut up in a mad-house, or at least to be subjected to physic and good regimen. That the chiefs of Protestantism were superior in light and cultivation as heathens to the mediæval doctors and princes, may be conceded ; that they were superior as Christians, in the discipline of grace, in the knowledge of God, of the divine law, of duty, it were ridiculous to pretend.

It is easy to understand, on principles quite creditable to the Church, why the revival of letters, the *renaissance*, as the French call it, was influential in preparing Protestantism. It was an effect and a cause of the revival of the secular order. It threw men back on the order outside of the Church, back on nature as unelevated by grace, and made them prefer the city of the world to the city of God. It was a revival of heathenism, not, indeed, solely because it revived a literature actually created by ancient Gentiles, but because it emancipated the secular order from the spiritual, and left men to their corrupt nature, the inexhaustible fountain of all heathenism. Heathenism is nothing but the expression of fallen nature, neglecting grace and following out its own instincts and tendencies,—following its own inherent law, and acting out itself. It has its source in the natural heart, in the flesh, which subsists in every man, though mortified and kept under by grace in the saint. When faith is strong and active, and the Church and her ministers are free to fulfil their mission, it is in a measure kept down, and prevented from displaying itself on a large scale ; but whenever, whether through increased worldly prosperity, or other causes, faith sickens or dies, and the Church is impeded in her free action by the tyranny of the state, whenever the affections are turned away from the Church, and the restraints of the spiritual order are disregarded or but slightly heeded, it spontaneously revives, and becomes predominant ; because aside from the Church, whether before or since its institution as the *Christian* Church in distinction from the Patriarchal religion and the Synagogue, there is nothing but fallen nature, of which it is the natural expression. Heathenism is

natural to man in his fallen state, and consequently whatever throws him back on his fallen nature, or stimulates it to vigorous and energetic action, necessarily draws him off from Catholicity and plunges him into heathenism. Ancient heathenism, Eastern or Western, was nothing but the natural result of the falling away of the nations from the patriarchal religion, and modern heathenism is nothing but the natural effect of breaking away from the Church and following corrupt human nature ; as the Transcendentalists say, acting out ourselves. The revival of classical literature in the fifteenth century tended naturally to strengthen the corrupt tendencies of the human heart, and therefore to bring up the secular order, and thus to weaken the hold of religion on the intellect and the heart. In doing this, it necessarily prepared the way for Protestantism.

Protestantism is, no doubt, a heresy, but all heresy is at best only inchoate heathenism, and needs only time and freedom to become fully developed heathenism ; for it is the assertion of the natural against the supernatural, the secular against the spiritual, the human against the divine. Protestantism is civilized heathenism in its natural form, since the Church, as ancient Assyrian, Chaldean, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman gentilism was the natural form of civilized heathenism before her. It is only the Church that introduces into the world another than a heathen element ; remove her, and nothing but heathenism does or can remain. The essence of all heathenism, whether before or since the Christian Church, is in the emancipation of the flesh, of the secular order, and the subjection of the spiritual. Protestantism, whatever its pretensions, is therefore really heathenism, and nothing else ; or, if it please its friends better, since it professes to believe in the Messiah, we will consent to call it carnal Judaism, which holds the Messiah to be a temporal instead of a spiritual prince, the founder of an earthly instead of a heavenly kingdom, places the secular above the spiritual, and puts the creature in the place of the Creator,—the essential principle of all heathenism and of all idolatry. It bears the same relation to Christianity that carnal Judaism bore to spiritual Judaism.

No doubt, there are Protestants who will not recognize the truth of this statement ; no doubt, there are many who have no suspicion that, in being Protestants, they are neces-



sarily heathens or carnal Jews ; but this amounts to nothing. They who crucified our Lord between two thieves, and cried out, " His blood be upon us and our children," had no suspicion that they were carnal and not spiritual, and knew not what they did ; but this did not alter the fact ; and as they were not excused for crucifying our Lord because they knew not what they did, so will not our modern Protestants be excused, because they know not what they are. They might know if they would, and they would know if they were not, like their prototypes, wedded to the world, and blinded by their lusts.

It is easy, then, to understand why the revival of classical studies, which was the revival of profane or secular literature, must have favored heresy, and helped to prepare the Protestant apostasy, and even without supposing it to have effected or indicated any advance in true intellectual culture, in the love of virtue, or the knowledge of truth. It is easy to understand, also, why Protestants cannot taste the literature of the Church, and always seek to depreciate the learning and intellect of her great doctors, and to wrest from her the education of youth, — to establish everywhere a system of secular education in schools exclusively under the control of the state, the representative of the secular order, — the real significance of their much vaunted common-school system, a system fitted and intended only for the propagation of what is really heathenism.

Ever since the prevarication of Adam there have been, in the language of St. Augustine, two cities, the city of the world and the city of God, and all history resolves itself into the history of the mutual hostility of these two cities. The city of the world is founded in corrupt nature, the city of God in supernatural grace. The latter is represented by the Catholic Church ; the former, in the main, by the state, although the state, rightly considered, and faithful to its mission, holds from and is included in the spiritual order, and has no other office than the application to secular affairs of the law of God, natural or revealed, as promulgated and declared by the pastors of the Church. Its true position is that of the secular agent of the spiritual order ; but as the flesh in the individual has a perpetual tendency to rebel against the spirit, and to declare its independence, so has the state a perpetual tendency to rebel against the spiritual order, to emancipate itself from the Church, and

to assert its right to treat with her at least on the footing of perfect equality. In point of fact, then, the state or civil authority almost always represents the city of the world, and therefore, as against the Church, it is always sure to be supported by corrupt human nature, and by all who are emancipated from the religious order, or who feel but lightly the restraints of religion, and of course by all the cultivators and lovers of profane or secular literature.

It consequently happens, that, in the struggle between the two cities, the whole force of the state and of general literature, and especially of popular history, both civil and ecclesiastical, is thrown on the side of the city of the world, and, in the struggle between the Church and the state, general literature and popular histories are thrown on the side of the state. In history, facts are suppressed, warped, or colored to exonerate the chiefs of the state, and to throw the blame on the chiefs of the Church. As the Church succeeds only supernaturally and by violence to nature, and as the state succeeds naturally and always triumphs over the Church unless God interposes supernaturally to defeat it, the voice of those who side with the state finds always a response in every natural heart, and with the public at large is ordinarily sure to prevail over the voice of those who side with the Church and attempt the defence of her chiefs. Many are called; few are chosen. The bulk of the people in every age and nation, at least for the greater part of their lives, have only a dead faith, and walk after the flesh, not after the spirit, — pertain to the city of the world rather than to the city of God. They are thus predisposed to listen to the partisans of the secular order, and to credit whatever they may find it convenient to allege in its defence. It requires no virtue, no intelligence, to credit them, and hence their accounts of the struggle become accredited history, and form the basis of all popular historical judgments. The true account, being unacceptable to the secular order and to the natural heart, is discredited by all except the enlightened and devout few, on the same principle that a tale of divine and supernatural love touches only few hearts, while a tale of mere human love commands universal sympathy.

What we allege is exemplified in all modern history. The truth has indeed been written, but the works in which it has been written are not in general circulation. They

are buried in public or private libraries, unread, or, if read, unheeded, by all except a few old-world students, whose statements have no weight with the multitude. The chiefs of the secular order have told their story, given in the evidence on their side, and all the world has heard and believed it; the chiefs of the Church have had no public hearing, and their story and their evidence are known only in private, and to a few. Kings have had their historians, their defenders, their flatterers, but there is no work, to our knowledge, in general circulation, that does justice, or any thing like justice, to the chiefs of the Church, the Supreme Pontiffs. Even those works which profess to defend them against their calumniators are written, for the most part, in a secular spirit, and dwell on their secular rather than their spiritual virtues. The Popes, according to their popular advocates, are to be loved and revered because they were the patrons of literature and art, fostered material civilization, and promoted the temporal prosperity of nations. If their heroic resistance to civil tyrants is not timidly apologized for or explained away, if by some miracle it is commended, it is because thereby secular liberty was defended, not because thereby the freedom of religion was asserted and vindicated, and the Church saved from becoming the slave of the state. The defence of the Church is rested on her services as a secular rather than as a spiritual institution,—on her services to modern civilization rather than on her services to the souls of men. St. Gregory's alleged condemnation of all merely secular literature is humbly apologized for, and any amount of special pleading is resorted to in order to prove that the Holy Pontiff could not have meant what he said. Gregory the Sixteenth, of immortal memory, is harshly treated because he devoted himself to the interests of the Church, rather than directly to those of the state, and thought more of saving men's souls than of pampering their bodies. The same thing is happening to our present Holy Father, since the silly notion that he was to place himself at the head of European Liberalism, and to bless its banners, is clearly seen never to have had any foundation.

Kings and princes, no doubt, have been censured by popular historians, and censured beyond all reason; but not for their gravest errors and crimes. We rarely find them condemned for seeking to emancipate themselves from the

spiritual order, and to enslave the Church,—for refusing to recognize her freedom and independence, and laboring to make the secular order independent and supreme. We hear much of the insolence of priests, the arrogance of churchmen, the pride and ambition of Popes in face of the civil power; very little of the insolence of statesmen, the arrogance, pride, and ambition of kings and princes in face of the Church. Secular princes and statesmen, poor souls! have been the meekest and humblest of men, always laboring for the good of the state, and prevented from succeeding only by the interference of wily priests, haughty prelates, and ambitious Popes! The severest critics of secular princes seldom blame them—unless they fail—for attempting to oppress the Church, to confiscate her goods, and to suppress her religious houses. To do such things is meritorious, and has gained for many a crowned monster the praise of being enlightened, liberal, wise, and just. Popular sympathy, to-day, is far more active in favor of the court of Turin than that of Vienna, and Kossuth and Mazzini are our heroes, not Windischgrätz and noble old Radetzky. Louis Napoleon is a tyrant because he has not oppressed the Church, and has refused to persecute her ministers; and his government must be overthrown because it has respected religion. The great princes of popular history are those whose policy has been the most hostile to the Church, and the most successful against the city of God. If any body doubts it, let him read the interesting and instructive work named at the head of this article.

We do not suppose it likely that the heathenish judgments of historical personages and events, already rendered and accepted by the public, can be reversed in the minds of the great body of the people; but the appearance of this work by M. de la Tour, and various other recent publications, does lead us to hope that something may and will be done to disabuse the great body of Catholics, and to correct the false notions current in the historical works on which they have generally relied. The histories they have read have all been written from the point of view of the secular order, the earlier from the point of view of the court, the later from the point of view of the mob; but there are some indications that hereafter they may read histories written from the point of view of the Church. Such histories have become necessary, in some degree, to refute

contemporary heresies, and good and loyal Catholics may therefore find it their duty to produce them. Events and prevailing doctrines make it important (for the defence of religion that history be reëxamined and rewritten, and it is certain that, in so far as it is, the traducers of the Church and of her defenders will appear, as they are, unworthy of the least credit. As far as the work has been prosecuted, whether by Catholics or by Protestants, the characters of the Supreme Pontiffs and devoted Catholic princes who had been painted in the darkest colors have come forth cleared of the principal charges against them, and worthy of the reverence and affection of the Catholic heart. The Protestant Voigt has prepared the vindication of the great Hildebrand, St. Gregory the Seventh; Hurter has done the same for Innocent the Third; Roscoe, as far as he goes, for Leo the Tenth and Lucretia Borgia; Ranke, in his History of the Popes of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, has refuted much Protestant calumny; and M. de la Tour, in the brief work before us, has triumphantly vindicated the Guises, cleared the princes of the house of Lorraine, whether of the elder or the younger branch, of the aspersions cast upon them by Protestant malice and the jealousy of rival princes, and, Frenchman as he is, has passed a severe judgment, whether deserved or not, on the kings of France, both of the family of Valois and that of Bourbon, and on those able statesmen, Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin.

The natural tendency of all civil government, as of the corrupt human heart, is to assert and maintain the supremacy of the secular order. It naturally adopts heathen maxims, and applauds itself for directing its power to the promotion of temporal prosperity, as man's chief good. In its view, man's supreme good, at least so far as it has any concern with it, lies in this world, and its duty is to shape its policy to its realization. It therefore necessarily comes into conflict with the spiritual authority, or the Church, and therefore with the Pope, as supreme visible head of the Church; for the Church teaches that our supreme good is not in this world, and that the inferior temporal good which is permitted us in this life is attainable only by not seeking it as an end, and by living solely for the world to come,—the glory of God and the salvation of the soul. The policy proper on the assumption that our good is tem-

poral must in the nature of the case be repugnant to the policy proper on the assumption that it is spiritual, and out of this world. The civil authority, therefore, must either yield to the spiritual, and use its power to further the ends proposed by the spiritual authority, or else the two authorities must come into conflict with each other; for the spiritual authority cannot yield to the civil without ceasing to be spiritual. The state ordinarily refuses to yield, and so ordinarily the relation between the two authorities is that of mutual hostility.

In the contest between the two powers, if the Church is free, and able to exercise her spiritual discipline without restraint, and if the clergy are independent of the state, and accountable only to the spiritual authority, she can maintain faith in its vigor, and make certain of victory. This the state knows as well as she does, and hence its constant endeavor is to subject her to itself, by controlling her temporalities and making it necessary for her ministers to obtain its permission to exercise their sacred functions; that is, by reducing her from the Catholic to a national church, from an independent spiritual kingdom to a function of the state, and converting the clergy into a branch of the civil police. This is the real meaning of the famous quarrel with the Emperors about investitures. The state claimed the faculty of investing the pastors of the Church, and if it could have obtained that faculty, it could and would have filled the churches with creatures of its own, and been able to force them to act according to its pleasure. It would have had a national, and therefore a state church, the submissive slave and obsequious tool of its will. We should have seen in process of time in every country what we early saw in the Greek empire, and what we see now in Russia, England, and every Protestant kingdom.

The grand obstacle to the success of the state in its efforts to enslave the Church, and convert the clergy into mere parish constables, was and is the feeble old man who occupies the chair of Peter at Rome. Not Aman was more troubled to see Mardocheus sitting in the king's gate, than the temporal sovereigns were to see that feeble old man sitting in that chair. The Papacy is the keystone of the arch; it is a centre of unity and authority, essential to the very idea of Catholicity, for Catholicity without unity is a metaphysical impossibility. They who talk of Catho-

licity without the Papacy, talk very foolishly, very absurdly. Without the Papacy the Church could have no organic unity, could not hold together for a moment, but would break into national churches, and each national church would be bound hand and foot, as Anglicanism is, by the temporal sovereign. But so long as the Papacy remains intact, the Church is and must be Catholic, and cannot be national. By virtue of the Papacy it is one in all nations, over every particular nation, and therefore under the control of none. When the civil authority attacks it in any one nation, it attacks it in every nation, and the clergy and faithful of all the other nations can be summoned to its defence. The thing, then, to be done first of all by the civil authority in order to effect its purpose, is always to attack the Papacy, and make war on the Pope. This the temporal sovereigns have always done, save when they chanced to be truly pious, as St. Henry of Germany and St. Louis of France, and not always even then, or when they needed the Papal authority to protect them against a foreign or a domestic enemy; well knowing that, when the clergy are withdrawn from their dependence on Rome, they also lose the protection of Rome, and fall an easy prey to the prince, with no power to refuse to aid his projects of usurpation, oppression, or temporal aggrandizement.

Moreover, hostility to the Papacy was precisely the kind of hostility to the Church that could be carried on with the least risk of alarming the faith or the conscience of the faithful. Courtly prelates and the more worldly of the secular clergy, not always too regular in their lives, would seldom be absolutely unwilling to be released from the discipline of Rome, and placed in dependence on the state, for they knew well that their irregularities would receive no rebuke from the temporal prince so long as they flattered his passions, or applied themselves to the furtherance of his interests. Hence we have in our own days seen Austrian prelates oppose the repeal of the infamous Josephine laws, even after the government had become willing to repeal them. The universities would also be willing to have the state rather than the Church for their sovereign, for it would trouble itself less with their rash, and often heretical speculations. The great body of the faithful in the humbler walks of life could understand very little of the controversy. They had no immediate and direct relations with the Pope,

and no clear or definite notions of his powers and prerogatives. They knew their king, their bishop, and their parish priest, and if these sounded no note of alarm they could take no alarm, and must naturally conclude that all was right. They could not be expected to see, because inconceivable without the Papacy, that the blows aimed at the Pope were necessarily aimed at the Church herself, or feel obliged to refuse to assist their sovereign in a war which they were told was in no sense a war against the Church, but against the ambitious and nefarious Pontiff who abused his spiritual power to violate the rights of their nation and of their prince. Hence, even when, if he had made open war on the Church, his subjects would have resisted him almost to a man, the sovereign was rarely unable to bring the whole material, and even moral, force of his kingdom to bear against the head of the Church; and if he sometimes was unable, it was in general owing to the regular clergy or the poor monks, who mingled with the people, and, holding immediately from the Pope, were almost always indefatigable defenders of the Papal rights. This is wherefore the monks or regular clergy, after the Popes, have been the principal objects of that secular hatred, of which we saw a striking example in the last century, in the hostility of all the so-called Catholic sovereigns to the illustrious Society of Jesus, and which became so violent that Clement the Fourteenth was obliged, as a measure of peace, to suppress the order. Erasmus, Ulrich von Hutten, and others, who prepared the way for Luther and Calvin, began by showering ridicule on the monks, and by endeavoring to destroy their influence with the people. So the demagogues preparatory to their recent revolutions in Europe began by suppressing the Jesuits in France, expelling them from Switzerland and Italy, and making war everywhere upon all the religious orders that remained active and living, and that retained any considerable public influence.

Such from the first was the policy of secular sovereigns. As long as the feudal constitution of Europe remained in its vigor, and the power of the monarchs was limited by the feudal nobility, the Church, save in the East, — where the Emperor was absolute, and the government a centralized monarchy, that is, a monarchical despotism, — could in general maintain the more essential rights of the spiritual order, and through the nobility when the aggressor was the



monarch, and through the monarch when the aggressors were the nobility, compel, after a longer or shorter struggle, the secular authority to respect the Papal rights and dignity. It could obtain from the chivalry of Europe, whether they were always governed by as pure motives as might be wished or not, soldiers able and willing to defend her. But when the feudal nobility, after having suppressed the insurrection of the peasants, and defeated at Rosebecque, in 1382, the movement of the communes to revive the municipal *régime* of ancient republican Rome, were themselves suppressed by the combined power of the king and commons, as in France under Louis the Eleventh, and the political order tended to centralized monarchy or despotism, she lost her principal political support, and the monarchs were in a condition to pursue their policy against her with fairer prospects of success. They assumed a bolder tone against the Sovereign Pontiff, denied his infallibility in deciding questions of faith and morals; distinguished not only between the Pope and the Court of Rome, but between the Papacy and the Church; asserted the superiority of the Council to the Pope, broached the doctrine that the Pope holds his authority from the appointment of the Church, not immediately from God as the successor of St. Peter; and even contended that the acts of the Supreme Pontiff do not bind by their own force, and to become binding need to be confirmed or accepted by the Universal Church. These doctrines, which they took good care to have widely diffused among their subjects, stripped the Sovereign Pontiff, theoretically, of all real authority as head of the Church, reduced his primacy to a mere primacy of order, and made his bulls and constitutions matters of no moment, since it was always easy, where these doctrines were held, for the sovereign to prohibit their publication in his dominions, to prevent the national Church from accepting them, or to induce it to declare them null and void. M. de la Tour tells us that "the Fathers of the National Council of Tours, assembled by Louis the Twelfth, declare null the excommunications which Julius the Second might fulminate against that monarch, prohibit the sending of money to the Holy Father, and all recourse to Rome on any matter whatever, and of their own authority, without consulting the Pope, grant the king a hundred thousand crowns from the goods of the Church.

They prepared, moreover, the Council of Pisa, by which Louis, and the Emperor Maximilian, then allied with him, sought to depose Julius, and gave 'the Code of Gallican Liberties' to Matthew Lang, Bishop of Goritz and envoy of the Emperor, which, diffused in the German universities where Luther was studying, did immense evil." (p. 2.) It is easy to see that, with such anti-Papal doctrines accredited, the monarchs could force the Church in their respective states to consult their pleasure, and to refrain from interfering with any of their projects.

We have spoken of the influence of the revival of letters in preparing Protestantism; but in point of fact, the monarchs in the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth had a far greater share in preparing it than had the old Humanists. The Wars of the Roses had extinguished the feudal nobility in England, and prepared the centralized monarchy, that is, the despotism of the Tudors; Louis the Eleventh, with his crafty and cruel policy, had decapitated them in France, and Maximilian had done much to weaken their power in the Empire. The tendency throughout all Europe, it is well known, was to the Byzantine or centralized monarchy, and nothing prevented the complete triumph of that political system but the Pope, seconded, indeed, to some extent, by Italian and Spanish feudalism and republicanism. In fact, Julius the Second, that heroic Pontiff, whom revolutionary movements and duty to the Church compelled to be a soldier, was in his time wellnigh the only defender of European liberty and Christian order then remaining in the world. Nothing, therefore, is more natural, than that such a Pontiff, who knew well how to wield with effect either sword which God had given him, should be an especial object of the hatred of ambitious kings and princes, or than that they should load him with calumnies, use all the arts that malice could invent to render him personally odious, and make him the occasion of attacking the Papacy itself. This is only what the Red Republicans have done in our own day in regard to Gregory the Sixteenth and Pius the Ninth. Gallicanism—not, indeed, then known by that name, for it was rather of Byzantine than of French origin, and has prevailed no more in France than it has in Germany, England, and even Italy—was, in its most exaggerated form, everywhere preached by their sovereigns and their minis-

ters, and the people were taught to look upon the Holy Pontiffs as rapacious, ambitious, the enemies of the rights of sovereigns and of nations, and the disturbers of the peace of the world.

“In France,” says a French writer, who on this point need not be distrusted, “the quarrels of the kings and the Popes had from a distance prepared the way for Luther. Julius the Second, for example, had recently leagued all Italy against Louis the Twelfth, to despoil him of all his Italian possessions; and, not content to conquer him with temporal arms, had employed spiritual arms against him, excommunicated him, placed his kingdom under interdict, and absolved his subjects from their oath of allegiance. Such conduct (*félonie*) had exasperated many minds. Louis, on his side, used every means to render the Pope odious to France and to Europe. Is it astonishing, then, that so many seigniors embraced the Reformation, which broke out a little after? Its cause was in many respects that of the monarchy itself. Hence its partisans found refuge in royal houses, of which they were, so to speak, the loyal servants. This explains how it was that Margarine of Navarre made them a rampart of her states, and Renée of France, daughter of Louis the Twelfth, and Duchess of Ferrara, sustained them with all her power in Italy. There exists on this point a curious letter from this last-mentioned princess to Calvin, which shows very clearly the intimate alliance of the royal cause with that of the Reformers. She thanks Calvin for having sent her a gold coin (*ecu d'or*) of Louis the Twelfth, which that king had caused to be struck against Julius the Second, with the legend, *Perdam Babylonis nomen*. ‘I assure you,’ says she, ‘that I have willingly seen and accepted it, and I praise God that the king, my father, took such a device. If the grace of executing it was not vouchsafed him, it was, perhaps, because it is reserved for some one of his descendants to accomplish it in his place.’ The kings called Rome Babylon before she was so called by the Reformers.”\*

Whoever has studied with tolerable insight the history of the fifteenth century, is well aware that the question involved was then, as it is now, the supremacy of the secular order, or the administration of civil government on purely

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\* *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*, Art. *Calvin*.

heathen principles. The supremacy of the secular order was asserted against the Popes by kings in favor of monarchical absolutism, just as it is asserted against Pius the Ninth by demagogues in favor of democratic absolutism. The sole difference between the two epochs is, that kings then played the part now played by demagogues, and that the kings labored to centralize despotism in the throne, while the demagogues labor to centralize it in the mob. The Papacy is now attacked on the pretence that it is hostile to democracy; it was attacked then on the pretence that it was hostile to monarchy. The principle of the attack at either epoch is the same, namely, the supremacy of the secular order; and the aim was, at the former as it is at the latter epoch, not precisely to throw off all religion, at least not directly, but to destroy the Papacy, so as to nationalize the Church, and to subject her to the national sovereignty, and therefore is the same, whether you suppose that sovereignty to be vested in the king or in the people. Society in the fifteenth century was undergoing, as it is now, throughout nearly all Europe, a radical revolution, only kings and princes were then, as demagogues now are, the revolutionists; and revolutionists, whether kings or demagogues, always find the Pope in their way, and must either fight him, or desist from their iniquitous attempts to overthrow the legal order of things.

Louis the Twelfth failed in his attempts against the Papacy, submitted to the Church, and received from her the title of *Christian King*, and from his subjects that of *Father of his People*; but he had produced a profound impression on the mind of Europe, and had raised up a strong public opinion against the Papacy. His doctrines and measures, as well as those of other princes of his time, had so weakened its moral influence throughout Christendom, that when Luther appeared and declaimed against *Babylon*, and the Pope as Antichrist, there was appeared strange in his language, or that induced the minds of his auditors any settled purpose of leaving the Church. It was not till he went farther, and attacked the authority of General Councils, that he began to shock the consciences of the faithful. Maximilian, said, aspired himself to the Papacy, was favored to him, and instructed his ambassador at Rome that no harm befell him; "because," he added,

"we may yet have need of him." There is little question that the German princes protected Luther at first, not out of sympathy with his doctrinal innovations, but with a view of using him, and the party he might form, as a means of extorting concessions from Rome in their favor. We find his Catholic opponents refuting his doctrinal innovations, but only feebly and very timidly rebuking his violence towards the Pope. Henry the Eighth of England ably defends the Seven Sacraments against him, but, if we recollect aright, not very heartily, to say the least, the Papal authority. Indeed, the opinion seems to have very generally prevailed throughout France, England, Northern Germany, and several other states, that the Papacy, as including any thing more than a mere primacy of order, was an excrescence on the constitution of the Church, and that its institution was, in fact, a blunder. It is only on this supposition that we can, for instance, account for the facility with which Henry the Eighth separated his kingdom from Rome, and caused himself to be acknowledged as supreme head of the Church in his dominions. Evidently he obtained the support or acquiescence of the great body of his subjects only on the ground that there was little in his measures which appeared to them to be directed against the Catholic Church. They may have thought he was in some respects going too far, but they looked upon him mainly as asserting the rightful independence of his crown and kingdom against the ambitious and unwarrantable pretensions of an Italian priest, who was little or nothing to them. He was only asserting the rights of England and of Englishmen, and therefore to be supported by his loyal subjects.

What may have heretofore seemed mysterious to some in the rapid rise and progress of Protestantism is now easily explained by what we have just seen in our Liberal Catholics, that is, Catholics who sympathize with the revolutionary movements of the Mazzinis, Kossuths, Ledru-Rollins, Heckers, Struvés, and other Red Republican chiefs. These Liberal Catholics have, in general, no intention of renouncing the Church; they have no suspicion that they are really making war on Catholicity, or that there are any grounds for calling in question their orthodoxy. Once and awhile one of them will even go to confession and to communion. Yet did they throw up their caps and hurrah lustily

when the Roman Republic was proclaimed; they were not unpleasantly affected when the Holy Father was driven into exile,—were really delighted when he was stripped of his temporal dominions, and became indignant only when the Triumvirate were driven out, and the Pope was restored to his rights by the intervention of France. These men wished no harm to the Holy Father; they may have respected him personally; but they were democrats; first and last they were democrats, and held it far more important to establish democracy throughout Europe than to retain the Papacy. Now just understand that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a revolution was going on against the feudal monarchy and nobility of the Middle Ages, and that the passion for centralized monarchy was then as strong and as universal as the passion for centralized democracy is now, and you have the whole secret of the success of the Protestant rebellion explained. There was no intention in the outset of breaking with the Church, of rushing into schism, or of setting up a new religion; but the public feeling was, that the Papacy was hostile to the policy of monarchs, and that the monarchical cause should be sustained against it at all hazards, and that the complete emancipation of sovereigns and the whole secular order from the authority claimed by the Italian priest should be effected. The heresiarchs, regarded as mere doctrinal innovators, counted for nothing, or next to nothing. Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Cranmer, and Knox were only the fly in the fable, tugging at the wheel to assist the horses to roll the heavy coach through the ruts, and might have bellowed in High or Low Dutch, good or bad Latin, good or bad French, good or bad English, or in broad Scotch, until doomsday, with no other effect than that of making themselves puny leaders of contemptible sects, had not their heretical movement been prepared and sustained by the political passions and revolutions of their time. Protestantism, as a religious movement, deserves not a moment's consideration; its whole strength always lay, and still lies, in its character as a political or purely secular movement. The age had become rich; luxury had become general; the world had resumed its mastery over men's hearts; kings, no longer impeded by the nobles, resolved to centralize their power and reign as absolute monarchs, which they could not do without declaring the state su-

preme, and subjecting the Church to the temporal order, which in its turn could not be done without destroying the Papacy. Much progress had been made in reproducing the heathen order, and the world, without precisely knowing what it was about, determined that its reproduction should be complete, and so rebelled against the Pope, turned Protestant, and pulled down and trampled on the cross, the symbol at once of man's salvation and of the supremacy of the spiritual order, or of the subjection of heathenism.

The movement was strong throughout all Europe, and for a moment there did not appear to be a single secular power on whose fidelity the Holy Father could rely. Princes and people were everywhere in rebellion and in arms against him, and his enemies everywhere predicted the speedy destruction of the Papacy. But God had promised to be with his Church all days unto the consummation of the world, and that the gates of hell should not prevail against her. In vain did the heathen rage and the people imagine a vain thing. In vain did the kings and princes of the earth stand up and conspire against the Lord and against his anointed. The Lord himself defended his Spouse, and delivered his chosen Pontiffs. The human instruments he used in defending the Church, our author labors to show, were the princes of the House of Lorraine, the only royal house, he would persuade us, that has uniformly remained faithful to its Catholic engagements. He espouses with a noble zeal the side of the Lorraine princes, of the elder branch in Lorraine itself, of the Guises in France, and of the Hapsburgs in Austria, and holds up their conduct in favorable contrast with what he alleges to have been the policy of the kings and ministers of France. He represents the policy pursued by the French court, from the time of Henry the Fourth down to our own times, to have been uniformly that of humbling the Pope on the one hand, and the Lorraine princes, or more especially Austria, on the other. Having assumed that the Lorraine princes of both the elder and younger branch were uniformly on the side of Catholic interests, he denounces the French policy as rationalistic, or, as we should say, heathenish, and leaves on his readers the impression, that, if there is Protestantism in Europe to-day, we have to thank the French government, and especially Cardinal Richelieu, who, while he humbled

the Huguenots in France, secured, by his hostility to Ferdinand the Second, their triumph in Germany.

Certainly we are not prepared to approve the policy of Henry the Fourth, which was, to some extent, adopted by Cardinal Richelieu, and the attempt to justify it on the ground that it was necessary to the preservation of a due balance of power has never seemed to us successful. There is something which strikes us unpleasantly in seeing a prince of the Church leaguering with the determined enemies of his religion to humble her friends, and without meaning to indorse the severe judgment of the defender of the House of Lorraine, we must confess that we have never seen a valid excuse for the strange conduct of the Cardinal in intervening against Ferdinand, — who, as far as we are informed, had done no injury and offered no insult to France, and was only engaged in a war in defence of the just rights of his empire and of the Church, — and forcing upon him a peace in which were sacrificed the Catholic interests of Germany, and in some measure of Europe and the world. Such intervention would be much more intelligible, to say the least, in a Protestant, than in the minister of a Catholic sovereign and a prince of the Church. But though we have not seen it, we are not prepared to say that the Cardinal had no valid excuse, and we do not doubt that, if M. de la Tour had set himself as heartily at work to defend this able, though certainly not faultless statesman, as he has to defend the Lorraine prince, Joseph the Second of Germany, he would have found it no difficult matter to very much soften the judgments he has rendered against him.

The author apparently sees nothing to commend in any thing French, and he has no mercy on a single French prince or statesman. If good has ever been done in France, it has always been by a Lorraine prince, an Austrian princess, or by a Bas-Breton prince, princess, or nobleman. The author is a native of Bretagne, and has served in the Austrian army. This is too one-sided to be true. France has committed great faults, great wrongs, but we think a sharp eye might find some redeeming traits in her character, and that she has had some virtues derived neither from the Bretons nor from the Lotharingians. We find much to censure in Louis the Fourteenth, yet we are not willing, when pleading the interests of the true faith, to



join with heretics in condemning him for his energetic treatment of rebellious Huguenots. The author, we hope, will forgive us, if we say that we have detected in him, as in several others of our good friends in France, whom we highly esteem, and with whom in most things we warmly sympathize, a slight tendency to the whimpering sentimentalism, characteristic of our times, over the punishment of great criminals, and which is no mark of real benevolence of heart or of true Christian charity. If the Huguenots of France had demeaned themselves as loyal subjects, if they had been contented with holding and practising their heresy for themselves, and had suffered Catholics in their neighborhood to practise unmolested the true religion, the state might have permitted them to damn their souls, as they insisted on doing; but when they abused the liberty secured to them by the Edict of Nantes, to disturb the peace of the state, to persecute Catholics, to sack and burn Catholic villages, to destroy Catholic churches and convents, to murder women and children, or carry them away captive, it was the right, it was the duty, of the civil authority to intervene, and reduce them to subjection; for the first duty of every civil government is to protect the Church, and maintain the freedom of religion,—of religion, we say, not of heresy and infidelity, which, as far as we could ever learn, have not, and never had, and never can have, any rights, being, as they undeniably are, contrary to the law of God. After providing for the freedom of religion, and fully securing to every one the right to profess and practise it without let or hinderance from any quarter, it may be wise, just, and even necessary, for the government to leave heresy and infidelity to take care of themselves, and to go for what they are worth. We are no friends to severity, and we are perfectly well aware of the folly of trying to force men into heaven. God himself forces no man to receive his bounty, but leaves all men to the freedom of their own choice, subject only to the penalty of eternal damnation for choosing wrong; but we should be wanting in common sense, if we did not recognize the right and the duty of the civil government, when heresy and infidelity undertake to propagate themselves by carnal weapons, by fire and sword, to intervene, and by physical force, if necessary, to coerce them into peaceable subjects and harmless neighbors.

But passing over French politics, we cannot assent in all

respects to the author's unqualified praise of the Lorraine princes. We quite agree in his vindication of the noble Guises, and thank him for it; we think highly of the Dukes of Lorraine, especially of the good Anthony and Charles the Fifth. The Austrian princes certainly have often deserved well, not only of their country, but of the Church; yet we cannot say that they have always been loyal sons of the Church, and always true to Catholic interests. Maximilian united with Louis the Twelfth in calling the Council of Pisa to depose Julius the Second; Charles the Fifth, his son, labored to establish centralism in his Spanish possessions, was very lukewarm in suppressing the Protestant rebellion in Germany, was not very Catholic in his bearing towards the Holy Council of Trent, and it was he, we believe, who made war on Clement the Seventh, and they were his troops who, under the Constable Bourbon, took and sacked Rome, and from whom the Eternal City suffered more than it had in early times from the Goths and Vandals. Maria Theresa was a party to the infamous partition of Poland, a crime and a blunder which must make the sovereigns dumb before the crimes and blunders of the demagogues; and her son, the half-crazed Joseph the Second, was undeniably one of the worst enemies the Church in modern times has had, and he all but threw the Church in his hereditary dominions into schism. The well-known Josephine laws, so called from him, were a scandal to Christendom, and far surpassed any thing attempted by Louis the Fourteenth, or any other monarch on the throne of St. Louis. In no country in Europe—in the world, we may almost say—was the Church less free than she was in Austria from his time down to the accession to the imperial throne of the present young Emperor, who promises to revive the early glories of the house of Lorraine, and to rival the fame of the pious Godfrey of Bouillon. Personally, the Austrian princes have been, for the most part, pious and exemplary Catholics; and though in general less irreligious in their policy than most other princes of Europe, they have not escaped the besetting sin of all secular princes, that of seeking to subject the spiritual to the temporal, of treating religion as a civil function, and its ministers as a branch of the civil police. They have almost always insisted on religion, but pretty uniformly on having it under their own control. The Sovereign Pontiff has

generally had as much to fear as to hope from them, for they have seldom been unwilling to take the administration of religion from his hands into their own. Not much more can be said against the kings of France.

M. de la Tour is an Ultramontane, but he will pardon us, we hope, if we hint that his Ultramontanism is not ultra enough for us. He doubtless concedes the Papal infallibility, and the Pope's supreme authority in all ecclesiastical matters; but he does not seem to have very well understood that the secular order exists only for the spiritual, personified in the Sovereign Pontiff, and should in all respects be subjected to it. We try all princes and secular powers by their relations to the spiritual order, and care not a fig for any of them any farther than they serve it. The Church is all and in all to us, and she is to us only through the Sovereign Pontiff. Our Lord founded his Church on Peter, and we are submissive to her only as we are submissive to Peter in the person of his successors. The Sovereign Pontiff is, under God, the fountain of all the authority we respect on earth, and we have no praise for those who offer him insults, or withhold from him the loyalty of their hearts. The saddest page of all modern history is that which records the ingratitude of individuals and nations to the holy Pontiffs who, for these eighteen hundred years, have ruled the Church of God, and labored for the eternal welfare of mankind. They have borne the brunt of the battle; they have been the mark for every arrow; they have been the peculiar objects of the wrath of man and the assaults of hell; they have often been insulted by their own children; and scarcely one drop of consolation have they during these long ages been permitted to taste, except that consolation which is vouchsafed them by the interior visits of the Holy Spirit. O, how the world has wronged them, and how slow and how loath are we ourselves to make them some little reparation! O, let us away with our cold, half-heretical reserve, away with our ungenerous distrust, and let our hearts gush forth in warm and pure love to the Vicegerent of God on earth, and never for one moment suffer a mere secular prince to weigh in the balance with him!

We do not pretend that the Popes are personally impeccable, nor that every Pope has been a saint; but we have yet to see full evidence that any one of them, during

his pontificate, has been a very bad man. Nearly all we read against some few of them is mere calumny, invented by men whose projects they had thwarted, or by party, political, or sectarian spite and vindictiveness. We are slow to believe any thing against a single Pope, and we have little doubt that even Alexander the Sixth, after he became Pope, would be found, if the truth were known, to be, even as a man, worthy of our respect. We place no confidence in Italian lampoons and pasquinades, and when we find a Pope painted in very black colors, we always take it for granted that there were very wicked men in his reign, whose schemes of wickedness he defeated, and whose pride and ambition he offended. With this feeling with regard to the Popes, the cold respect or courtly patronage shown them by the house of Austria does not satisfy us. We can honor as a truly Catholic government only that government which recognizes cheerfully the supremacy of the Pope, obeys him as a sovereign, and loves and reverences him as a father. Such a government Austria, let M. de la Tour say what he will, never has been, and in reality no secular government of much importance ever was or ever will be.

Yet we concede most cheerfully, that, upon the whole, the princes of the house of Lorraine and of Lorraine-Hapsburg are honorably distinguished among the princes of Europe, and that Austria has been, for the most part, the least uncatholic of the great European powers, though, unhappily, always, while laboring to preserve her subjects Catholic, inclining to the policy of the Byzantine emperors, which finally destroyed the Church in the East. There is no doubt, that, at the present moment, she is the most reliable Catholic power of Europe, and about the only one to which the friends of social order and Christian liberty can now look with hope for the future. Spain has been distracted, impoverished, and weakened by her revolutionary struggles and anticatholic policy for the last thirty or forty years; Portugal, of whom it was first said, "The sun never sets on her empire," has become a mere dependency of Great Britain; France, with generous impulses and Catholic instincts, is drunk with demagogie; Sardinia is under the control of the demagogues, and her whole influence is thrown into the scale of heathenism; the other Italian states, no longer what they were in the fif-

teenth and sixteenth centuries, have at least as much as they can do to protect themselves from the ravages of Red Republicanism ; Russia, a schismatic power, advances slowly, but surely, as the representative of the old Byzantine despotism, or monarchical absolutism ; and our own country, losing its constitutional character, advances as surely, and far more rapidly, as the representative of demagogical absolutism ; and where, if not in Austria, is, under God and his Church, the hope of the Christian free-man ?

Speaking with an eye to the immediate future, there are but three great powers of the first order in the world, — the United States, Russia, and Austria. These are three great representative nations, each representing a distinct and peculiar political system. The other states of Europe and America, owing either to internal dissensions or to external weakness, become important in the political order only in the direct or indirect alliances they respectively form with some one or another of these three. Russia represents the old Byzantine monarchy, and her progress is the progress of monarchical centralism, or absolutism. The other Northern kingdoms of Europe must revolve around her as their centre, and throw their influence into her scale. The United States, having practically abandoned English constitutionalism, after which their own institutions were originally modelled, represent centralized democracy, or democratic absolutism, and head the demagogical revolutionary movement of the age. Great Britain does and must act in concert with us, and throw her influence, be it more or less, on the side of American democracy. English constitutionalism, which has for over a century played a conspicuous part in the policy of the world, and which seems still to be the idol of many statesmen, is after all as good as defunct ; for in all, except perhaps a few minor states and principalities, the balance between the three estates, the king, lords, and commons, essential to its harmonious workings, has been lost, and cannot now be restored. Constitutional monarchy is now in reality but the dream, and the very silly dream, of a past age. Modern revolutions have rendered it impracticable. In all the great states of Europe, either the king is too strong for the lords and commons, or the commons are too strong for the king and lords. The balance has been lost even in England her-

self, and the British constitution may before one thinks of it cease to exist. Great Britain, then, really represents no system of her own, and must ally herself with us. She is not able to subsist within herself, and could not hold her present rank a single year if she were to lose her trade with the United States, while we could lose our trade with her, not indeed without inconvenience, not indeed without much individual suffering, but without any permanent detriment to our national strength or national prosperity, for we are able to subsist entirely within ourselves. England cannot afford to break with us, and if she were to do so, and to refuse to join us, avowedly or unavowedly, in furthering the designs of Continental Red Republicanism, she would speedily fall a prey to a Red Republican revolution herself. She, then, can remain politically important only by uniting with us, and throwing her influence on the side of democratic absolutism. These two absolutisms thus represented and supported, the Russian and the American, are the two aggressive powers of the age, and they threaten ere long to meet in China or India, and, on the plains of that old Asiatic continent, to dispute the empire of the world, and the triumph of either will be the triumph of heathenism, and the oppression of the Church of God.

Between the success of one or the other of these two absolutisms or despotisms stands Austria, with the other Catholic states of Europe, and the hope of social order and of Christian freedom, under God and the Church, rests now on saving her from throwing herself into the arms of either despotism, and of so strengthening her by union within and alliances without that she can resist and repel both the American absolutism and the Russian. Austria properly represents what remains of feudal Europe, and from the federative character of her empire, uniting, as it does, under one sovereign many nations, differing in language, manners, customs, and local institutions, she is naturally the representative of centralism tempered by federalism,—the very system with which we, under a republican form, professedly set out, but which we have hopelessly abandoned for democratic centralism,—and by her central position in Europe and her vast resources she is naturally fitted to take the lead in resisting and repelling the two advancing despotisms. She should therefore be supported by all the Catholic states of Europe, for their liberties and

salvation are bound up with hers. We wish, therefore, to see her enter into the Germanic Diet with all her non-Germanic states, that she may be able to protect all Germany both from Russian and demagogical centralism; and we quite agree with M. de la Tour, that France should lay aside her hereditary policy of humbling Austria, and form with her an intimate and honorable alliance. Such an alliance would secure to social order and Catholic freedom the firm support of both the Spanish and Italian peninsulas, and put a stop to the further advance of despotism under either of its forms. It would protect Austria and the other German states; it would neutralize the demagogical influence which the United States and Great Britain might attempt to exert on Continental affairs, and enable France herself to reestablish order, to recover from her demagogical *delirium tremens*, and to reassume her rightful rank among the nations of the earth. Such an alliance is evidently for the interests of both France and Austria, of Catholic Europe, and therefore of the whole world.

The great crime, nay, the great blunder of modern politics, was the monarchical revolution against the feudal monarchy and nobility of the Middle Ages, and which prepared the way for the democratic revolution of our times, nay, in some sense necessarily involved it. Kings and ministers, not the people, were the first revolutionists of modern Europe, and the people are now only making revolutions against them, as they had made revolutions against the feudal barons. The true policy for all the friends of order and liberty is now to attempt, by safe and honorable alliances, to check both revolutions, and to repair, as far as possible, the wrongs inflicted by both, by restoring, as far as the altered circumstances of the times will admit, the old feudal order, that is, under some form, as we express it, centralism tempered by federalism. This order has certainly been greatly weakened in Austria, but its elements are preserved there with more life and vigor than elsewhere, and therefore is she best fitted to assume the lead in reconstituting fallen Europe. Assisted by all the Catholic states of Europe she can easily do it, and with advantage to their separate independence and internal prosperity. Let these states, then, all form a league with Austria, and with one another, to resist both the Russian and the American despotisms, and to repair the wrongs of past

revolutions, and let them recognize anew the Holy Father as the divinely appointed arbitrator between sovereign and sovereign, and between the sovereign and his subjects, and something like order and liberty may again flourish on the earth. Will they do it? We know not. Very likely they will refuse to do it; and if they do refuse, all that remains certain is, that heathenism will triumph anew, and the Church will be obliged to take refuge once more in the catacombs.

But it is time to draw our somewhat desultory remarks to a close. The reader will find much information and much food for useful reflection in M. de la Tour's unpretending little work, and we very sincerely thank the author for the pleasure and profit we have derived from it. We have had no intention of giving it a regular review, and have merely used it, as our readers will have perceived, as a peg on which to hang some disconnected but matured reflections of our own. France has inundated the world with bad books, and worse theories, but her Catholic sons seem now laboring in earnest, and we trust not without effect, to repair the wrongs she has done to literature, politics, and religion; and although Catholic Germany is awaking from her long sleep, and beginning to make energetic war on paganism, and although even Catholic England shows some symptoms of reviving life, and appears to suspect that there is something else to be done than to show that Catholicity, after all, is about as good as Anglicanism, it must be owned that our ablest workmen and our most effective soldiers are Frenchmen, who are sure to be foremost in every battle, whether against the armies of the city of God or against those of the city of the world. Singular people, that old Franco-Celtic race, always preëminent alike in good and in evil! Well has it been said, that for a Frenchman there is no purgatory, and that when he dies he either goes straight to heaven or straight to hell. Well, better be either cold or hot than lukewarm.

The chief point we have wished to bring out is, that there are only two systems in the world, Catholicity and heathenism. All that is not of the one is of the other. There are but two causes that we can espouse, but two masters that we can serve. Disguise it as you will, all who are not Catholics are heathens, and all who are not heathens are Catholics. Heresy and infidelity may assume a thousand shapes, but always at bottom are they heathen-



ism, and nothing else. Catholicity asserts the supremacy of the spiritual order, and allows the secular order to be sought only in subordination and subserviency to it, in like manner as it asserts the supremacy of the spirit, and commands us to subject the flesh to it, and to deny and mortify it in so far as it cannot be so subjected. Heathenism asserts the independence of the secular order, proposes it as an end to be sought for its own sake, and finally declares it supreme and exclusive, the only end to be sought, or that can be conceived of as worth seeking. Here are the two systems, the two causes, the two cities, old as the prevarication of Adam, and always disputing for the empire of the soul of man. The dispute between these is the only dispute there ever has been or ever can be. Our situation is no novelty. The thing that has been is, and shall be, and there is nothing new under the sun. We have no new enemies, no new controversies, and for us as for the old Patriarchs, as for the Synagogue, as for the Apostles and early Christians, the battle is with gentilism, heathenism, or carnal Judaism. In the individual the battle is between the spirit and the flesh, in the intellectual order it is between orthodoxy and heresy, in society between the Church and the state, order and anarchy, liberty and license. It is always the same controversy in principle, always the parties to the combat are the same.

Heathenism is natural ; Christianity is supernatural. To be heathens demands no training, no self-denial, no effort ; we have only to follow nature, and, as we have said, act out ourselves ; to be Christians demands supernatural grace to elevate us above nature, — instruction, discipline, self-restraint, self-denial, constant vigilance and effort. All natural action tends to heathenism. Hence all men are naturally heathens, and naturally heathenism always triumphs over Catholicity. As nature survives in all men, even in the saint, all men, even though Catholics, have a natural tendency to lapse into heathenism, and are held in the Christian order only by supernatural grace and supernatural effort. It is easy, then, to comprehend why in all ages and countries heathenism more abounds than Christianity, and evil gains the victory over good, save when supernaturally prevented. In no age or nation has the victory of Christianity over heathenism been complete, and in the individual Christian it is never complete, save in the

moment of his death. Only in dying do we conquer. Hence our life is called a warfare, and the Church in this world the Church Militant; and hence, too, the true Catholics are always in the minority, in a worldly sense, the weaker party, and always oppressed, and the high places of the world are occupied by their enemies. The power, the dominion, and the honors of this world, whether in the political, the military, the literary, or the scientific order, are never theirs. Their enemies are of the world, and the world loves them, and bestows on them its dignities and honors. True Catholics the world knows not, for their life is hid with God. The day for them to reign never comes in this world. As far as the world heeds them, it hates or despises them. Their glory commences only when this world and the fashion thereof pass away. "Then shall the just stand with great constancy against those who have afflicted them, and taken away their labors. These, seeing it, shall be troubled with terrible fear, and shall be amazed at the suddenness of their salvation, saying within themselves, repenting and groaning for anguish of spirit: These are they whom we had sometime in derision, and for a parable of reproach. We fools esteemed their life madness, and their end without honor. Behold how they are numbered among the children of God, and their lot is among the saints. Therefore we have erred from the way of truth; and the light of justice hath not shined unto us; and the sun of understanding hath not arisen upon us. We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity and destruction, and have walked through hard ways; but the way of the Lord have we not known. What hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us? All those things are passed away like a shadow, and like a post that runneth on, and as a ship that passeth through the waves, whereof when it is gone by the trace cannot be found, nor the path of its keel in the waters. . . . . So we also, being born, forthwith ceased to be; and have been able to show no mark of virtue; but are consumed in our wickedness. Such things as these the sinners said in hell. For the wicked is as dust, which is blown away with the wind; and as a thin froth, which is dispersed by the storm; and as smoke, which is scattered abroad by the wind; and as the guest of one day that passeth by. But the just shall live for evermore, and their reward is with the Lord, and the care of them with

the Most High. Therefore shall they receive a kingdom of glory, and a crown of beauty at the hand of the Lord ; for with his right hand will he cover them, and with his holy arm he will defend them."\*

Such is the fact. The two systems stand opposed one to the other, the one triumphing naturally and in this world, and the other supernaturally and in the world to come. We must take Catholicity, and with the grace of God struggle as we can, triumph in dying, and reign with the just for ever hereafter, or take our side with heathenism, flourish for a moment here, and be depressed hereafter with sinners for ever in hell. There is no other alternative. We must make our election, and take our side. There is no compromise possible, no neutral position conceivable. He who is not on the side of the Church, let him call himself by what name he may, is by that fact a gentile, a carnal Jew, and on the side of heathenism. Let us understand this, and thus understand that the only enemy we have to fight is paganism, the old enemy which the early Christian saints and martyrs fought before us, and also that, if we take the side of the Church, we must do so bravely and unreservedly, and be prepared at all times and in all things to assert her supremacy, and therefore that of the Holy Father, the representative on earth and the personification of the spiritual order.

The real test of a man's Catholicity, the criterion by which to determine whether he is a true Christian, or at best following heathen tendencies, is his position in regard to the Pope or the Papacy. "Where Peter is, there is the Church," and where the Church is, there is God our Redeemer. Whoso disregards the Papacy, or stints his love and reverence for the Pope, has little reason to count himself one of the elect of God ; and whoso, embracing the cause of the Church, yet postpones her claims to those of the world, or seeks to effect a compromise between the spiritual and the secular, is very far from having fought the good fight and won the victory. If we take the Lord's side, we must take it, and look to the Lord for support, and trust that he will sustain us while we devote ourselves to his service. We must cease to lust after the flesh or the world. We must trample the world and all its prom-

ises beneath our feet, and live for God alone. It is only in this way that we can carry on our war with heathenism successfully, and in dying obtain the crown of victory. If we do so, the world, no doubt, will hate us, the men of the world, the lukewarm, and the liberal will jeer or denounce us, the strong will persecute us, and the secular will seek to destroy us; but so let it be. The soldier of the cross has no promise of peace in this world, and he is a poor soldier who fears the face of the enemy. His business is to fight, and to fight bravely, and to die with his harness on,—only the weapons of his warfare are spiritual, not carnal.

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ART. II. — *Willitoft, or the Days of James the First. A Tale.*  
Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1851. 12mo. pp. 294.

WE have heard this little work improperly ascribed to an estimable and well-known clergyman of our neighborhood, but who is really its author we do not know, and we presume he does not wish us to know. But be that as it may, we have read the book with much pleasure, as an interesting and valuable contribution to our American Catholic literature. The author has a cultivated mind, a high order of ability, and a dash, at least, of real genius. His style, though slightly inclining to the florid, and sometimes deficient in flexibility and naturalness, is that of a practised writer, and not surpassed in force and beauty by that of any of our popular writers. In its graver parts it is marked by a calm and subdued strength, which is refreshing in these days, when almost every writer scorns repose, and is perpetually striving to appear stronger than he is. The introductory chapter gives a general view of the subject of the work, and we copy it entire.

“ If there be one truth more strongly enforced than any other by the history of England for the last three centuries, it is the folly of attempting to crush the Catholic religion by the sword of persecution. Wise, indeed, was the saying of Gamaliel the Pharisee, to those who would have punished St. Peter and the Apostles for preaching the Church of Christ, ‘ If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to naught: but if it be of God, you cannot overthrow it.’

"Through what dangers, what persecutions, has not the Catholic Church passed unharmed? The Roman Empire threw itself with its gigantic power against it: but the blood of the Martyrs was the seed of Christians. And after three centuries of fearful persecution, the despised emblem of the cross shone, resplendent with jewels, upon the Imperial Crown of Constantine, and from the silken folds of the Labarum floated over his victorious Legions; while throughout the mighty city, thenceforth destined to be the seat and centre of Christianity, that same glorious emblem rose above the countless temples of false gods, which had been purified and consecrated to the worship of the one true God.

"The history of the Church, from that day, has been but a succession of dangers and persecutions, followed in each instance by increased energy and renewed success. The fires which her enemies have heaped up around her have only purified her, and she has always come forth like gold refined by the furnace, brighter and more glorious. She has stood the test of Gamaliel for near two thousand years, and she has not been overthrown. She has not been overthrown, but she has gone on increasing in efficiency and spiritual energy, and spreading her missions and her teachings to every quarter of the world: and the number of her children is greater now than it has been at any former period. 'If it be of God, you cannot overthrow it,—lest perhaps you be found even to fight against God.'\*

"History has verified these words.

"The commencement of the Reformation in England, its history, and the causes that produced it, are too well known to be repeated here. It is an old story, it is long, and there are few who have not read it well. The tyranny of Henry the Eighth was only aimed at the supremacy of the Pope, who had refused to sanction his divorce from the wife of his youth, when, disgusted with her fading beauty, his wandering eye had fixed upon the lovely form of an ambitious lady of the court. He punished with death those who admitted the spiritual supremacy of the Pope, and those who denied the other doctrines of the Catholic Church. Upon his death, the power of the crown passed into the hands of the Reformers, and in the name of Edward the Sixth, severe laws were passed against the Catholics, which, executed by Mary in a few instances upon those who had aided to frame them, won for her the name of 'Bloody,' while Edward and Elizabeth, who made the land red with Catholic blood, received the titles of 'sainted' and 'good.' Such is the justice of Protestant historians. The laws which were put in force against Catholics and Dissenters would have added to the reputation of a Nero or a Caligula, and were only erased from the statute-book which they disgraced long after they had been

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\* Act. v. 39.

rendered inoperative by the controlling power of public opinion. Yet in their day, executed by bigots or by designing men, they formed perhaps the most terrible and effective system that was ever adopted to crush out a national faith or feeling from the hearts of a people.

"It is not strange, therefore, that, in the course of a few generations, the proscribed and persecuted Catholics diminished in number, although the faith of the few, and the zeal of their pastors, never drooped nor faltered. In the northern counties, in particular, and throughout the retired districts, the pure faith of their fathers was preserved by the children, in spite of fines, and penalties, and death.

"In the old English manor-house, the farm-house, and the humble dwelling of the cotter and day-laborer, the persecuted and hunted priest found food, and rest, and refuge. By day he lay concealed wheresoever a kind Providence afforded him shelter, and by night he went forth upon his duty of love, girt like a pilgrim, with his staff in his hands, traversing on foot the weary paths and by-ways that connected the solitary dwellings of his scattered flock.

"The exercise of his priestly functions, nay, his very presence in England, rendered him liable to banishment or death; and the same bloody guerdon awaited those who dared to give him shelter and comfort. Yet never were there wanting laborers in this fearful vineyard, and never did the fire of the true faith go out in the darkest days of persecution. No sooner did one holy priest expire upon the scaffold or in the dungeon, a martyr to his religion, than others, as devoted, landed on the shores of England to supply his place, to cheer his saddened and drooping flock, to tread in his footsteps, and to die perhaps like him upon the scaffold. Thus, when the light of faith had been extinguished upon the cathedral altar, and in the stately minster and gorgeous chapel, it was rekindled with brighter and purer flame in the lowly and secluded dwellings of the scattered faithful. Thus, too, did it happen, that, in spite of the severest penalties and the most constant persecutions, many Catholic families were still to be found in that scourged land at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

"Yet it was always necessary for the Catholics, even in those periods of repose, when the laws against them were permitted for a time to slumber, to act with great circumspection and to conceal their compliance with the requisitions of their faith. Even when it served no purpose of the government or of parties, to excite against them the prejudices of the people and to enforce the full power of the penal laws, there were always upon the watch artful and unscrupulous men, who were ready to seize upon those laws to turn them to their own emolument. And a still lower class, the mere informers, were prompt to detect the signs and tokens of the proscribed faith, for they fattened on the ruin of their victims.

"Those gentlemen, therefore, who still adhered to the old Church felt that it was their interest to live secluded and maintain as little intercourse with their neighbors as was consistent with prudence ; for too great a degree of retirement might have tended to excite the very suspicion and inquiry which they desired to avoid.

"By adopting this course, some of the least prominent Catholics were for a considerable period enabled to escape the fines and penalties which were the usual fate of the bolder, less prudent, or perhaps wealthier and more prominent of their brethren. Others, again, were protected by the influence of powerful friends from the persecution which generally awaited those who remained firm in the practice of their faith. There were many instances of devoted zeal and cordial and hearty assistance, on the part of Protestant gentlemen, towards their Catholic relatives, and to friends not bound to them by the ties of blood. But the protection thus afforded was precarious, and liable at any time to be withdrawn, or to become powerless at the very moment when most needed. Living thus in constant dread of searches and visitations of the most unpleasant character, the Catholics found it necessary to secure around them every means of concealment or escape, and there are few of the old houses, occupied by them in those stirring times, that have not their hiding-places and their secret passages, as reminiscences of times past we hope never to return.

"During this long season of persecution, at times, the power of the laws was allowed to slumber, and, by a sort of connivance, the Catholics were permitted to remain unmolested. The rapidity with which the faith spread during these periods of repose soon re-awakened the jealousy of the enemies of the Church, and again called into action the power of law to sustain the church which had been established by law.

"But public opinion, at length, began to revolt against persecution. Toleration was granted to Dissenters, and, by degrees, its effects slowly and gradually extended towards the Catholics. The struggle for religious liberty as involved in the question of Catholic emancipation, long and doubtfully sustained, and at length in part successful, proved how strong was the intolerant feeling of the dominant power. But the Church had already begun to recover from her wounds and to recruit her strength, and with comparative freedom came renewed energy and abundant success. The Established Church saw with dismay, not only the poor and lowly, but the high and noble, and the choicest spirits of her own ministry, hastening to return to the fold of the ancient faith. She beheld a new hierarchy about to rise up in place of the ancient bishops who had, long ago, been martyred or exiled. She feared the unity and power which the spiritual reaction would thus obtain ; and she appealed once more to the power of the government to restrain by force what she felt herself unable to prevent by reason and argument.

But it was too late to return to the rack, the scaffold, and the axe. The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill was the result : a law intended to destroy, as far as possible, at this day, the existence of the Catholic Church in the British dominions.

“ It is not strange that a church established by act of Parliament, sustained by the scaffold and the sword, should now, in its decline, have recourse to an act of Parliament to perpetuate its existence, and call in the power of the law to maintain itself against the power of truth.

“ But fines and confiscations cannot now effect what the dungeon, the torture, and the scaffold failed to do in times gone by. The milk-white hind, though often doomed to death, is still fated not to die.

“ In conclusion, it is only necessary to add, that this little book is addressed to the Catholics of England, to picture the sufferings endured in other days for their faith, to remind them of the patient courage of their forefathers in the midst of persecution, and to warn their persecutors how vain and impotent must always be the efforts of those who ‘ are found even to fight against God.’ ” — pp. v. — x.

The work is dedicated by an American, we are told, to the Catholics of England, “ to remind them of the constancy of their forefathers in the midst of persecution.” It is a tale of tragic interest, designed to show the persecutions to which Catholics and their Protestant friends were subjected in the days of James the First of England, and the evil passions which combined with the laws to harass them. It portrays in lively colors the labors, sacrifices, and martyrdom of the devoted clergy, who braved the laws and the hostility of the people to bear to the faithful the succors of religion, and to keep alive the embers of faith in once Catholic England. We cite a passage, which will give the reader some faint conception how matters then stood with both the faithful and their clergy.

“ ‘ There is a Catholic house on our road, Father Maurus,’ said Edward Hurlstone, as they walked in the direction of Oxford, ‘ which we shall probably reach towards noon. There we can obtain refreshments and a moment’s rest.’ ”

“ ‘ Nay,’ replied Father Maurus, ‘ I will not enter the house of these people to bring destruction upon them. Thou shalt lead them to me in the fields, where I will catechize and instruct them while we rest.’ ”

“ ‘ They are poor people, Father, and few will think of persecuting them.’ ”

“ ‘ But thou knowest that of late the poor, as well as the rich,



have been persecuted, and I would not willingly expose these good persons to danger.'

"They continued their journey steadily, until the sun rose high in the heavens and the day was half spent.

"At length, as they were ascending a little eminence, the summit of which was crowned by a wood, Edward Hurlstone said:

" 'We are now within a mile of the house of which I spoke. From the summit of this hill we will see its pretty thatched roof, with its chimney sending up a clear column of smoke into the cold March air.'

"In a few minutes they reached the top of the ascent, and could plainly see the little cottage surrounded by leafless trees and shrubbery, but every thing seemed silent and deserted around it. No cheerful column of smoke played above its desolate roof, — but the same cold, lifeless, wintry aspect hung over the little valley.

" 'It is strange,' said Edward Hurlstone; and the two travellers quickened their steps, and soon reached the little gateway that opened into the cottage yard. Edward Hurlstone called out from the gate, but no answer was received, and they entered the yard. The door was ajar, and they went through the house: it was deserted and empty. Nothing but the bare walls were left.

" 'Alas, what can have befallen these unfortunates?' said Father Maurus.

" 'The fate of the faithful,' replied his companion sadly.

" 'Then let us pray for them. Prayer alone must now refresh us,' said the priest.

" 'I am not unprovided,' replied Hurlstone, 'I still have in my wallet some of the provisions which good Mrs. Wells pressed on me. She knew well we might soon need them.'

"They knelt down then, beside the cold and forsaken hearth, and, making the sign of the cross, commenced a silent prayer. Cautiously and silently a door leading to the cellar now opened a little; a pale, wan, but youthful face appeared from behind it. The boy, at length, glided quietly out and knelt beside them.

" 'My poor lad,' said the priest, rising as soon as he perceived him, and placing his hand kindly upon his head, 'what has befallen this house?'

" 'They have taken them all to the prison!' said the boy weeping.

" 'Why have they taken them?'

" 'Because they would not go to the parish church. The parson said they had not been going, but that now all must go and conform or pay the fine. And father could not pay the fine, so they sold all the furniture in the house: and threatened him, if he did not go to church the next Sunday, they would fine and imprison him. We did not go the next Sunday, for father and mother said it was better to go to prison and die there Catholics, than to become

Protestants for all the money which the parson or the magistrate had, and be punished in the next world for ever. Then the constables came and seized on father and mother and brother, and took them away to jail, for where could father get money enough to pay the fines? \* I hid myself and have kept in the cellar ever since.

“ ‘Where did they take your father and mother?’

“ ‘I heard them say they must go to the jail at Needham.’

“ ‘It is not very far from here,’ said Edward Hurlstone.

“ ‘You are right; I must visit them,’ replied the priest. ‘But this poor boy. You are hungry, — are you not?’

“ ‘I have had some bread and some food which were left in the cellar: this has lasted me till this morning, and I was praying to the Holy Virgin for assistance, for I did not know what to do when that was gone.’

“ ‘You shall share our meal,’ said Edward Hurlstone, as he drew out the provisions from his wallet and spread them on the floor. ‘Your prayers have been heard. It is providential that we have come, for I know where you can find a home, till your parents may be free once more.’

“ ‘Follow the noble example of your pious parents, my child,’ said Father Maurus, ‘be faithful to God, and he will not desert you. If he do not relieve you from the persecutions and trials of this world, he will give you, if you persevere to the end, a glorious place among his saints in heaven. Be firm and faithful, my son, and God bless you,’ said the priest, making the sign of the cross over the brow of the young sufferer for the faith.

“ ‘There is a good and charitable Catholic residing not far from Needham, who will, I doubt not, take charge of this youth,’ said Edward Hurlstone.

“ ‘We will see him, then,’ replied the priest: and after a frugal meal upon the cold provisions, Father Maurus and his companions turned their steps towards Needham. Edward Hurlstone was right. The Catholic farmer, whose house they reached before sundown, gladly received his reverend visitor and his two followers, and cheerfully consented to take the youth into his household. It now remained for Father Maurus, before resuming his journey toward Oxford, to visit if possible the poor souls who were confined for their faith in the neighboring jail of Needham. Edward Hurlstone promised to secure the means: and they both set out for the town as the shades of evening began to fall.

“The jail of Needham was a building not erected for the purpose of a prison, but sufficiently adapted to it, without possessing those ample guards and defences which were common to the castles and donjons of other times, which, now that their military use

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\* £20 a month for a man over sixteen. £ 10 for a married woman.

had seemingly passed away, were applied to less chivalrous objects. It was a large, square building, large for the town, with grated windows and surrounded by a high wall.

“ ‘It will be difficult,’ said Father Maurus, ‘in one night to ascertain where they are confined.’

“ ‘There is a Catholic in the town, who beyond all doubt can give me some advice as to that,’ said Edward Hurlstone : ‘I learned this from our entertainer. I will go to his house. In the mean while, you will await me in the neighborhood.’

“In a short time Hurlstone returned with the desired information. The persons charged with recusancy, of whom there were a number, were confined in a portion of the prison where the outer wall approached to within ten feet of the building.

“ ‘We must wait until it is later,’ said Hurlstone, ‘when we will be joined by this person, who will bring what we need for our purpose.’

“The time wore slowly on. At length silence reigned throughout the town and over the prison where sad and innocent hearts were mourning almost undistinguished from the guilty, save as patient sorrow is divided from reckless hardihood. They were now joined by their expected assistant, who brought upon his shoulders a ladder some twelve feet long, which was of sufficient height to enable a man to reach the top of the wall. After carefully reconnoitring the premises to discover if the keepers were at repose in the jail, for there were none upon the walls, the ladder was placed, and Edward Hurlstone first ascended to the top. Grasping the little battlement at the summit with his muscular hands, he drew himself up by a powerful exertion, and soon stood panting on the wall. Father Maurus next ascended the ladder, and Edward Hurlstone, planting his knee firmly against the battlement, drew him up to the summit. Their assistant below now raised the ladder, and Hurlstone, grasping it from above, brought it to the top of the wall. Then bracing one end against the projection of the battlement, he dropped the other gently against the wall of the building immediately under the window of the room in which the recusants were confined. Lightly springing upon it, he traversed the rounds until he reached the window. He looked through the grated bars. A dim light, furnished by the unwonted kindness of one of the keepers, was burning in one corner, by which knelt a prisoner praying in a low voice beside a form stretched out in severe illness upon a miserable bed of rags and straw. The sunken eyes, the hollow cheeks, and thin lips of the sufferer told the tale of approaching dissolution : and Edward Hurlstone said, as he looked :

“ ‘Happy coming ; it is in time for good.’

“Then he glanced round the miserable cell. Several were sleeping, as if overcome by fatigue and watching ; others were kneeling in fervent, but silent prayer. The windows were unglazed, — and he whispered cautiously :

“ ‘ Hope ! brothers ! ’

“ The whisper penetrated in the cell, and the silent kneelers turned their heads towards the window. Then one of them quietly arose, approached it, and said :

“ ‘ Who art thou ? ’

“ ‘ A friend ! be of good cheer. Let your brother pray on. Be silent the rest. There is one here who will bring you comfort ! ’

“ ‘ Thanks to God ! Thanks to God ! In our need he has sent us aid ! Oh, how we prayed for it, but almost despaired of it, ’ replied the man.

“ ‘ God is powerful and merciful, ’ said Edward Hurlstone reverently. ‘ Is the sick man in immediate danger ? ’

“ ‘ He will not live over to-morrow ! ’

“ ‘ Bring him tenderly to this window : and prepare him for what he will receive : awaken the sleepers : — you may all confess and be absolved. ’

“ The sleepers were awakened : four stout men silently raised the sick man and bore him to the window. Edward Hurlstone returned to the side of Father Maurus, explained to him what he had done, and cautioned him to step carefully upon the frail causeway. Father Maurus reached the window, passed his hand through the bars, and, making the sign of the cross, said :

“ ‘ The blessing of God be upon you, faithful Christians ! ’

“ Then the head of the dying man was placed closer to him, he heard his confession, pronounced the absolution, administered the viaticum, and anointed him with the holy oil of Extreme Unction. At length his office with the dying man was finished, the sufferer was borne back to his place, saying, ‘ Now, come, O Lord, for I am happy to die ! ’ and the priest turned to the living. One by one, the prisoners confessed and were absolved : and with a parting blessing and a short exhortation to faith and perseverance, the missionary turned away and rejoined Edward Hurlstone upon the wall. The ladder was again lowered against the wall, Father Maurus descended, and was followed by the faithful Edward Hurlstone. Their assistant in this charitable deed of Christian daring pressed them to tarry in his house till morning, but they returned in the dark to the dwelling of their previous entertainer, where he promised to visit them in the morning to hear mass.” — pp. 244 – 250.

This is no exaggeration, and the reader must remember that it is a scene from Protestant England, the bulwark of Protestantism, which claims to have been an uprising of the human race in favor of religious liberty. But we must usually interpret Protestantism as old women do their dreams, by the rule of contraries, and, when it talks of religious liberty, understand it to mean not the freedom of religion, but freedom from it, and liberty to oppress it.

A considerable portion of the work is taken up with an account of the conversion, labors, and martyrdom of William Scott, a real historical personage, we are told. He was an Anglican law-student, but, being converted to the Catholic faith, became a Benedictine monk, was placed on the mission in England, and finally hanged, drawn, and quartered for daring to exercise in the land of his fathers the functions of his ministry. We copy the closing scene.

"The indictment against him was read, and the clerk demanded whether he pleaded 'Guilty or Not guilty?'

"'It containeth falsehood,' said the priest calmly, 'and therefore I say, "Not guilty"!' "

"'Are you a priest or not?' said the Recorder, taking up his words.

"'Whether I am a priest or no, I am not called on to say. Let those who accuse me make out that I am a priest.'

"'Then you impliedly admit that you are a priest, and therefore you are guilty,' said the Lord Chief Justice Cook. 'And in cases of *præmunire*, it hath been adjudged sufficient to find a man guilty that he neither admitted nor denied the charge.'

"'My Lord, if that hold in cases of *præmunire*,' replied Father Maurus, recalling his old studies to mind; 'it is certain that in cases of life and death you are only to proceed according to what has been made out legally by witnesses.'

"'If you were no priest, you would not hesitate to avow it,' said King, the Bishop of London.

"'It doth not become your Lordship, nor any one of your cloth, to mingle in cases of life and death,' replied Father Maurus quickly.

"'Still thou dost not answer the question. Art thou a priest or no?' persisted the Bishop.

"'My Lord,' replied Father Maurus. 'Art thou a priest?'

"'No!' replied the prelate indignantly.

"'No priest — no bishop!' said the priest *sententiously*.

"'I am a priest,' said the Bishop, 'but no *massing* priest.'

"'If you are a priest, you are a sacrificing priest; for sacrifice is essential to priesthood, and if you are a sacrificing priest then you are a *massing* priest. "For what other sacrifice have the priests of the new law, as distinct from mere laics, to offer to God, but that of the eucharist which we call the mass?" If then you are no *massing* priest you are no sacrificing priest, if no sacrificing priest, no priest at all, consequently no bishop.'

"'This is sorry trifling, Sir!' said the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. 'It is plain enough to my mind that you are a priest.'

"And certain circumstantial matters having been testified to, the court directed the jury to find the prisoner guilty.

“ ‘My Lords,’ said Father Maurus, ‘I am sorry to see my cause confided into the hands of twelve ignorant men, who know not what manner of thing a priest is. For you, gentlemen of the jury,’ he said, ‘I grieve for you that my blood shall fall upon your heads! But that you may avoid the sin of putting to death an innocent man, let me bid you remember, that no evidence has been brought against me to prove me guilty of the matters whereof I stand indicted: that nothing but mere presumptions are laid before you; and that, by the law of England, I stand before you as an innocent man, until my accusers shall prove me guilty. For your own salvation, let me pray you, gentlemen, to weigh this solemn matter well.’

“ Nothing more said the priest, and the jury withdrew. In a few moments they returned with their verdict.

“ ‘Guilty!’

“ ‘Thanks be to God!’ exclaimed the holy priest, throwing himself upon his knees. After a moment he added: ‘Happy message! Joyous tidings! How have I sighed for the privilege of suffering for so glorious a cause!’

“ Then, arising and turning to the people, he exclaimed:

“ ‘When I was charged with being a priest, I was silent, for I would have the law take its due course, and I wished it to be seen whether they would condemn me upon bare presumptions, without any witness. It is done! Wherefore, now, to the glory of God and all the saints in heaven, I do confess that I am a monk of the Order of St. Bennet, and a priest of the Roman Catholic Church. Herein do I glory! But be ye all witnesses, I pray ye, that I have committed no crime against his Majesty or my country. I am only accused of priesthood, and for priesthood alone am I condemned!’

“ ‘Prisoner, have you any thing to say, wherefore sentence of death should not pass upon you?’ asked the Recorder impatiently.

“ ‘What I have to say will not prevent that which you have already resolved upon,’ said Father Maurus mildly. ‘Yet, perhaps, I may not without sin give up my life without a struggle. I am condemned for receiving orders, and returning to England. Now it can be no crime to receive orders, for it is a sacrament of God’s Church, bestowing grace upon him who receives it; and neither can I be condemned rightfully for returning into England, which is an act innocent in itself, and what, as a free-born Englishman, I had full title to do. Now, therefore, thou canst not of two innocent and praiseworthy acts make a crime. Nay! an’ thou addest as many good and innocent acts together as thou wilt, thou canst not thereof compose a crime!’ —

“ ‘Tush! Sir! this is Jesuitical cant,’ said the Recorder, interrupting him.

“ Father Maurus was silent; but the joy of his heart was displayed

upon his beaming face. When the Recorder drew on his black cap preparatory to passing sentence of death, he smiled sweetly and sadly. How that mild beaming countenance stole upon the hearts of the crowd around ! They melted, — they sympathized ; at length they applauded, carried away by the sublime disregard of death and suffering which the martyr displayed. But their applause only drew from the Judge a severe reprimand upon the forward bearing of the prisoner.

“ Sentence was pronounced. ‘ Hanged ! drawn and quartered ! ’

“ Bound hand and foot, heedless of chains, sorrow, death, the rejoicing priest was borne back to his dungeon, only to leave it again for the scaffold and the knife.

“ On the morrow marched out from Newgate one of those dark processions, then not unfrequent in England’s capital, with its victim bound to the hurdle. Slowly it crept along, until at length it reached the bloody hill of Tyburn. It passed along under the gallows, and paused as the hurdle reached its foot. The victim was unbound, and with a firm step he mounted to the scaffold. In the open space in front a large fire was burning, and all the horrid instruments of execution were ranged around. Down upon the scaffold floor knelt the doomed priest and prayed ; then he arose with a glowing countenance, stepped forward, and addressed the multitude.

“ ‘ Good friends, I would have you that are here bear testimony to the manner of my death, that I have been a true and faithful liege unto my king and country, and that with my dying breath I have prayed for his Majesty and for his kingdom. I am about to die the death of a traitor, — bear witness, ye, that my treason lieth in this, that I have observed the laws of God rather than of men. My offence is, that I have had at heart too much the spiritual regeneration of England, that I have come to preach the truth to my brethren who are in that darkness out of which the spirit of God hath led me happily, as this hour and this presence bear me witness. O good souls ! I have prayed daily that God would avert from this realm his stripes and punishments which impend over it for the blood of the saints which it has poured out : but I fear me the time shall come when your children shall groan under his hand ; when the evils of that system of individuality resulting in worldliness, which hath been established in England by the new religion, shall work out its appointed destiny ; when the poor shall toil, and groan, and sweat, and starve ; when mammon shall reign in this blessed land, where once Christ and his Church held sway. When your descendants shall be the slaves of gold, and the gold-power, tied to wheels, and harnessed to the draught, and broken to the yoke like oxen. Then, O Englishmen ! will ye turn back yearning to the faith of your fathers, — that faith which made England great and her people free and happy ! For the honor and glory of my

Master, in the regeneration of England I have labored. Oh, may my blood arise to heaven as a prayer for the accomplishment of that hope!

“O God, who didst preserve thy Church for three hundred years amidst the darkness of the Catacombs, making the blood of martyrs fruitful of Christians, and didst at length bring forth her, thy holy Spouse, triumphant over the powers of evil, to guide, enlighten, and save; in thy unspeakable mercy hear our prayers to thee, and in thy chosen time send down thy grace upon England and restore her to the faith!

“O my countrymen, there is no treason in my heart! If my death would benefit my sovereign either in soul or body, I would not be less willing to lay down my life than I now am for God’s honor and the testimony of the truth!”

“Then, with his outstretched hands, he bade farewell to all such in that crowd as might be his friends, and bade them to bear to his family, if any there knew him and them, his parting words, his last prayer for the salvation of their souls.

“At this instant, a choking voice arose from the crowd.

“‘Brother, die happy! thou hast conquered!’ and the speaker darted away from the cruel scene.

“The condemned raised his hands towards heaven in thanks; for he knew the voice of his brother.

“The executioner approached him and adjusted the cord around his neck, and, at the same time, asked his forgiveness.

“‘Forgive thee? Yes, and thank thee!’ exclaimed the priest. ‘Thou art about to bestow on me a great favor, to bring me to exceeding happiness.’

“Then he knelt and prayed silently and fervently. The sheriff waved his hand in signal to the executioner: the trap fell: in the midst of prayer the victim was hurled into the death-struggle. Then the cord was cut, and the yet living man fell to the earth. The butchers rushed upon, held fast his convulsed limbs, and the knife of the executioner ripped open his body. Then while the hangman’s hands were grappling with the throbbing heart, the voice of the martyr still faintly prayed that God would send down his mercy upon England and bring her back to the true faith. Ere the prayer died upon his lips, that true heart was consuming in the flames!

“Not in death did the horrid tragedy pause. The limbs of the senseless corpse were severed and fixed upon poles set over the city gates, — to blacken and wither in the winds of heaven. Reader, such sad beacons looked down from many a city gateway in Old England then, to greet the traveller on his journey’s end, to warn the wavering of the fate of those who listened to the faith their fathers had believed, — bloody sentinels around the strong-holds of heresy to keep within its walls its unwilling servitors, — terrible



apostles, preaching the new gospel faith and uprooting the old. For ever?

"Oh, no! For there is a God!

"Thus triumphed a Martyr!" — pp. 279–285.

The polemical portion of the work is given in the form of conversations between Scott and Father Tichbourne and young Alton, who tries to persuade him to give up all religion. The conversation with Alton is brilliant, and the argument for infidelity is put with great eloquence and force; but, we are sorry to add, is not very thoroughly refuted. Scott, indeed, exposes one of Alton's sophisms, but he is far enough from meeting the real point of the argument. It strikes us that, in these times of doubt, when the tendency is not to simple heresy, but to the rejection of all religion, the author would have done well not to have put the argument of the infidel so strongly, unless he had allowed himself more space, and undertaken more seriously to refute it; for in the minds of more than one of his readers that argument will tell as much against all religion as against Protestantism. Few men in these days, unless orthodox and devout Catholics, are much shocked by the grossest infidelity, and there are few Protestants who would not renounce all religion sooner than become Catholics. Indeed, the tendency of the age is to approve Protestantism precisely because, in principle, it is the rejection of every thing the Catholic understands by religion. Believing firmly ourselves, we very naturally suppose that, when we have shown that Protestantism involves the total rejection of Christianity, we have offered what in Protestant minds must weigh heavily against it; but, unhappily, we have only offered what not a few of them will regard as a capital argument for it. It seems to us, then, that when we put the infidel's argument in its strongest form, and its most dazzling light, we should at the same time point out clearly to even ordinary capacities its utter fallacy.

The controversy between the young student and Father Tichbourne is, upon the whole, much more satisfactorily conducted. Father Tichbourne's argument is unhackneyed, ingenious, and perfectly conclusive against the Anglicanism professed by Scott; but that, we apprehend, is an Anglicanism seldom, if ever, found in an Anglican mind. Anglicans are Protestants, and as really Protestants as Puritans or Unitarians are, and, with all their talk about the

Church, no more admit the Church, in the Catholic sense, than does any other class of modern Protestants. Some of them may affect great respect for the Church's teaching, but it is all affectation. No Anglican believes in a Church Teaching. The very essence of Anglicanism, under the point of view from which we must here consider it, is to make doctrine the test of the teacher, and not the teacher the test of doctrine. It obtains somehow or nohow, without the Church, what it calls Orthodoxy, and then calls this or that the true Church because it professes to believe it. It is always a great mistake to suppose that the real question between a genuine Anglican and the Catholic is ever, as the author supposes, whether the Anglican or the Catholic is the Church our Lord instituted. No Anglican is so great a simpleton as to rest his cause on the decision of that question. The Anglican's radical conception of what the Church is, and was designed to be, is fundamentally different from the Catholic conception, and till you have compelled him to admit the Church in the Catholic sense, it is idle to enter into any discussion with him as to which organized body is the true Catholic Church. The truth is, Anglicanism never acknowledges that our Lord instituted a teaching church, in the proper sense of the term; and hence evidence of the identity of our Church as a corporate body with the Apostolic Church is no evidence to him that it is the true Church, out of which salvation is impossible. It is not till the Anglican is more than half converted from his Anglicanism, that arguments tending to identify our Church as a corporation, or an organic body, with the Church of the Apostles, will have any real weight with him. Father Tichbourne's reasoning, it strikes us, is, therefore, much better adapted to those who are nearly prepared to abandon Anglicanism than to Anglicans in general.

The author's good Anglicans, his conscientious Anglicans, seem to us, also, to be adorned with more Christian graces and virtues than we can reasonably expect in the adhering members of any heretical establishment. Does the author award to Anglicanism the note of sanctity, and hold that all the change a true Anglican needs is a change in belief on a few points of doctrine? We are at a loss to understand why the author, and, indeed, our English and American Catholic popular writers generally, are accustomed to

manifest a respect for Anglicans which they never show to those whom Anglicanism denominates Dissenters. All our author's good Protestants, and especially all his converts, are Anglicans, while all his villains are either renegade Catholics or Puritans. For ourselves, we confess that we have less respect for Anglicanism than for Puritanism. The Puritan, of course, has always a bad minor, but he sometimes has a good major, and his conclusion is generally logical; the Anglican, on the contrary, has a bad major as well as minor, and his conclusion never follows from his premises. Anglicanism is the most absurd and ridiculous, as well as the most haughty and cruel *ism* to which Protestantism has given birth. Puritanism in New England was never so intolerant as Episcopalianism was in Virginia and Maryland, and if Puritans persecuted us in England, the laws they put in force against us were all enacted by Anglicans. It is idle, however, to draw comparisons between sect and sect, and the proper course is to regard all Protestants, taken generally, as gentiles, or as apostates, and to predicate of them only such virtues as are possible in the natural order. Hence it perhaps would not be amiss if our novelists, who can convert whom they please in their romances, should convert some wicked people as well as those good and pious souls who are only innocently in error, and insist on conversion to Catholicity as the conversion of sinners, not merely as the conversion of the just. They would thus do something to check the pride of us who are converts, and bear some slight testimony against the Pelagian tendency of the age.

In one instance our author raises a delicate question, which, we think, he had better not have done, unless he was prepared to answer it differently.

“ ‘I would know first,’ a new idea starting up in his mind as he was about to warn the priest of his danger, ‘whether you hold that the Pope can absolve citizens and subjects from their allegiance to their king and country.’ ”

“ ‘*As I live, it is no doctrine of the Catholic Church,*’ said Father Tichbourne, solemnly. ‘Popes have stood up as umpires between the sovereign and the people, — but they have ever been found upon the side of liberty. They have excommunicated the licentious tyrant, — they have proclaimed the point where obedience ceased to be a virtue. And there,’ continued the old man, rising up to his full height, ‘there the duty of obedience ceases.’ ”

“ ‘ Whilst you are discussing this point with me, a danger hangs over you ; — perhaps the officers of the law, of our common sovereign, are seeking you as a violator of that law, — as a traitor to your country. Will you submit to that law, or will you avoid or resist it ? ’ ”

“ ‘ I am a man of peace,’ replied Father Tichbourne, calmly, ‘ I can resist no force. I may well avoid the hand of unrighteous violence. The law of God is more binding than the law of man ; therefore the law of man forbids me in vain to obey the law of God. I will suffer its penalty without complaint ; that is the only obedience I will yield to it.’ — pp. 43, 44.

Father Tichbourne comes very near being forsworn, and saves himself only by a special pleading more ingenious than satisfactory. The Popes, in some circumstances, *can* depose sovereigns and absolve subjects from their allegiance, for they have frequently done so, and the argument *ab actu ad posse*, we believe, is allowed to be valid. An author may, if he chooses, observe the *disciplina arcani*, and no doubt sometimes should, for we live in a wicked world, in which we are to be as wise as serpents, while we are as harmless as doves ; but he has no right to raise a question and give it an untrue or only a partially true answer. His duty is to answer truly. How far the power of the Pope extends, it is for the Pope himself, not for us, his spiritual subjects, to determine. We know he has exercised the deposing and absolving power, and we cannot reconcile it to our Catholic conscience to say that he has exercised that power without possessing it. That he has ever deposed a sovereign or absolved subjects except in accordance with the law of God, or ever will, or ever can, we do not believe, for he does not make the law which binds sovereigns and subjects, he only keeps and administers it. That he always in regard to sovereigns and subjects exercises the powers with which God intrusts him on the side of right, of justice, and therefore of liberty, we of course firmly believe, for we hold him to be the Vicar of Christ on earth, and under the especial protection of the Holy Ghost, and because we have, and can have, no better evidence of what is right and just than his decision. The author himself says the Popes “ have excommunicated the licentious tyrant and proclaimed the point where obedience ceased to be a virtue, and there the duty of obedience ceases.” What more do we say ? What is the use of quibbling on

terms? Do the Popes proclaim or declare with judicial authority for the Catholic conscience where obedience ceases to be a virtue, and therefore where the duty of obedience ends? If no, then all you say is mere verbiage; if yes, then he does absolve the subject from his allegiance, and has authority to do it, and you might just as well have said so in so many words, as to have begun by solemnly denying it, and to have ended by explaining away your denial.

We know how offensive the Catholic doctrine on this point is to statesmen and men of the world, but nevertheless, if we mean to be Catholics, we must stand by it. We did not make the doctrine, and are not responsible for it. God will take care of his own doctrine; all we have to do is to be faithful to it through good report and through evil report, in life and in death. Catholicity asserts the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and its right to resist the secular order whenever it encroaches on that independence, or by its acts denies that supremacy, and it personifies the authority of that order on earth in the Supreme Pontiff, the successor of St. Peter. This is the simple fact, and there is no use in shrinking from saying so, or in timidly seeking to disguise it. We should be neither afraid nor ashamed of God's truth, or of God's institutions. Martyrdom is an evil only to those who inflict it; for their sakes, from charity to them, we should seek to avoid it as far as we can conscientiously, not for our own sakes. Why praise we the martyrs, if we think martyrdom an evil? We cannot serve two masters, and we cannot, as good Catholics, serve the state any farther than it conforms to and subserves the spiritual order; and what conforms to and subserves that order the Church is established to teach us, and does teach us through her pastors, more especially through her chief pastor, the Pope. He is no loyal Catholic who denies this in word or deed, and he is a very timid Catholic who seeks to disguise or explain it away. It is the truth, and are we afraid to stand by the truth and take the consequences? What have English Catholics ever gained by their denials, equivocations, or special pleadings on this point? They have never gained a moment's credit with their Protestant enemies, and they have been stripped of their estates, imprisoned, exiled, or hung, drawn, and quartered, just as they would have been if they had

proclaimed the supremacy of the Pope in the fullest and least equivocal terms. The history of English Catholics—who for three hundred years have done all they could do, but absolutely give up their faith, to prove their loyalty to Protestant princes, and who have during all that time been punished as traitors to the government—should teach us a lesson, and make us refuse hereafter to burn one single grain of incense to Cæsar, that is, the temporal power. If we must suffer persecution, let us at least have the consolation of knowing that we have not in the least prevaricated; it is too bad to sacrifice a portion of God's truth to please the state, and be persecuted into the bargain.

As the subject of the work before us is Protestant persecution, we are naturally led to ask why it is that Protestants, wherever they have had the power, have invariably persecuted Catholics. The fact is notorious, and the history of Catholicity in all Protestant countries is only a reproduction in substance of the history of the Church under the Pagan Emperors. Some ascribe Protestant persecutions to bigotry and fanaticism, and these may have had their influence; our author hints that they were not unfrequently owing to the desire to get possession of the estates of Catholics, and in this he may be right; but we are inclined to think the principal cause lies in the very fact that Catholicity asserts the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and teaches that the secular should in all things be subordinated and made subservient to it. Protestants have, indeed, sometimes persecuted Protestants, but only in the heat of passion, from the love of power, or to save themselves in the eyes of Catholics from the reproach of being divided into sects, and unable to maintain even the appearance of unity. But persecution of Protestants by Protestants has long since virtually ceased. Sects the most widely separated from each other in doctrine and rites are very good friends, and meet together in a World's Convention, not in perfect harmony indeed, but without cutting each other's throats. Laws against Protestant dissenters have nearly everywhere been repealed, or have fallen into desuetude, and the struggle between sect and sect has dwindled into a mere worldly rivalry. But the hostility of Protestants to Catholicity has hardly suffered any abatement. To the genuine Protestantism of the age Catholics are as much an object of hatred and of persecu-

tion, so far as it has the power to persecute, as they were in the days of Elizabeth and James the First. In the early Colonial days, Massachusetts set a price on the head of Father Rale, and sent out an armed band that shot him down at the head of his flock. If similar things are not done now, it is not because Protestantism has grown one whit more tolerant of Catholicity. Our Irish friends complain, and often justly, of the prejudices they have to encounter, and suppose it is because they are Irishmen. It is no such thing. Their being Irishmen is nothing against them in the eyes of the American people. Their offence is that they are Catholics. Though Catholics in this country outnumber the most numerous Protestant sect, they are hardly recognized publicly as an existent body. Little attention is paid to their bishops and clergy, and in public measures seriously affecting them; no public authority thinks of consulting them, as would be the case if they were Protestants. Secretly every thing is done that it is supposed can be done with prudence to oppress us, and to prevent Catholicity from becoming naturalized in the country. This secret hostility is preparing to become, and assuredly will become, open and even violent persecution, the very moment that the Protestant community becomes convinced that Catholicity has really taken root in our soil, and, if suffered to grow in freedom, must become the dominant religion of the country. If it has been heretofore tolerated, it has been because it was despised, because it was supposed to serve the purposes of a police for Irish laborers in our towns and on our public works, and because it was not believed to be capable of making any serious inroads upon the native American population.

Now whence comes this inveterate hostility of Protestants of all sects and classes, sorts and sizes, to Catholicity? Why is it that Protestants are more hostile to us than one Protestant sect is to another? It certainly is not from purely religious motives, for Protestantism does not care, and never did care, enough about religion, properly so called, to persecute any body for its sake. It is not because Protestants feel that our souls are in danger, for they have always conceded that salvation is attainable in our Church; and all they contend for, as any one may see by reading their great English defender, Chillingworth, is, that Protestantism is a safe way of salvation; that is, that a Protestant

can be saved as well as a Catholic. They only claim, in regard to the world to come, to be as well off as we, and never as a body think of questioning our chance of eternal salvation. It is not zeal for the honor of God, or profound love of truth, for we see them fraternize with infidels, and men who scoff at all they call truth. The English government, which persecutes Catholics, contributes, or lately contributed, to the support of Hindoo idolatry in India, and we have never heard of its persecuting Hindooism and its adherents, or Mahometanism and its professors. The most numerous class of British subjects are Pagans, and the next largest class are Mahometans; and yet she enacts, as far as we are aware, no Ecclesiastical Titles Bills against them. It surely, then, is not zeal for the honor of God, or the love of religion. What, then, is the cause?

The cause is undoubtedly secular. This, in fact, is always the cause alleged. Protestantism always denies that she persecutes for religious causes. In England she executed the clergy as traitors, and prohibited the ancient religion because dangerous to the state. Lord John Russell, in his recent legislation against Catholicity, professes to respect religious liberty, and to legislate only to protect the prerogative of the Queen. In this country, what is the great argument against us? It is, that we owe allegiance to a foreign potentate, and cannot be loyal to the republican institutions of the country. In England, Catholicity is said to be opposed to the prerogative of the crown; here, to the prerogative of the people. Always and everywhere are Catholics burned, massacred, hung, drawn, and quartered, their estates confiscated, or the profession and practice of their religion subjected to vexatious restrictions in the name and alleged interests of the secular order. This is the uniform pretence of the Protestants themselves, and we may well take them here at their word, and believe that in this they are honest.

There must, then, certainly be something in the Catholic religion, essential to Catholicity, that is repugnant to the Protestant view of the rights of the secular order; for if it were not so, Protestants would finally have softened towards us, and become as willing to tolerate us as they are to tolerate downright infidels. Protestantism may vary its forms, but it cannot change its essential nature and live. It professes to be an uprising of the human race in behalf of liberty.



This profession, in any respectable sense of the word *liberty*, is ridiculous, for it is notorious that Protestantism everywhere favors despotism, now of the throne and now of the mob. Yet there must be a sense in which what it professes is true. Catholics must not suppose that Protestants use our terms in our sense. Protestantism was an uprising in favor of what Protestants mean by liberty; but they mean by liberty, not freedom from all restraints not imposed immediately or mediately by God himself, but freedom from all religious authority, from all religion except that which man concocts for himself. In politics, as against us, they mean by liberty the absolute independence and supremacy of the secular order, and the subordination and subjection of the spiritual. Protestantism, therefore, was an uprising in favor of liberty, indeed, but of the liberty of the flesh, the world, and the devil, — the three powers which Catholicity labors incessantly to restrain and reduce to subjection.

The hostility to Catholicity is not that it is, as some pretend, incompatible with this or that form of civil government, but that it holds civil government in every country, whatever its form, as much bound to obey the law of God as the meanest of its subjects. It is not merely that it teaches this, for nearly every Protestant sect teaches the same, so far as words go; but it is that Catholicity is a church, a corporation, a kingdom, extending through all nations, with its centre of unity and its supreme chief. If the Church had no visible centre of unity, if it had no supreme ruler on earth, if it were broken into national churches, each confined to a particular nation, and complete within itself, it might teach all the doctrines and observe all the rites it now does, without ever being the object of fear to Protestant governments, or the subject of Protestant persecution. Hostility is excited against it, and the secular order strives to extirpate it, because, having such visible centre and supreme ruler on earth, it has the power, when the people of any particular nation sincerely and firmly believe it, to render its teaching effectual, and to force the government to regard it, and desist from its attacks on the spiritual order, or its acts against the law of God. It is the Papacy that is dreaded, and we are persecuted, not because we are supposed to believe error, but because we are *Papists*. Catholicity without the Papacy,

if such a thing were conceivable, would be no object of persecution, nay, would be even acceptable to almost every secular government, as an auxiliary to the civil power. The war is against Peter, on whom Christ founded his Church, because Peter is the keeper and administrator of the supreme law of nations as of individuals. As long as Peter sits in his chair at Rome, no state is free to practise injustice, to violate the rights of its neighbors, to oppress its subjects, or to trample on the law of God with impunity. Peter must, then, be dethroned, and war to the death be declared against him, and all who own him as the vicegerent of God on earth. Here is wherefore Protestant governments and people wage such deadly war against us, and wherefore they never tolerate us, or leave us to enjoy our rights, where they are predominant, and we are, or are likely to be, strong enough to exert any important influence on public affairs.

Here is the main secret of that unrelenting hostility with which Protestants pursue Catholics. And what is our remedy? How are we to disarm this hostility? By denying the supremacy of the spiritual order, and asserting the absolute independence and supremacy of the state, that is, sacrificing to Cæsar? In the first place, to do so would be to give up our faith as Catholics, and to become to all intents and purposes Protestants; and in the second place, were we to do so, and still profess to be Catholics, it would conciliate us no favor, for no Protestant would believe in the sincerity of our disavowal of the hated supremacy. Shall we solemnly protest that we are loyal subjects, and are bound in conscience to obey the civil authority in all things not repugnant to the law of God? To what end? Protestants care nothing for our protestations; for they have a theory that a Catholic will stick at no lie where his religion is concerned. Moreover, what we solemnly protest, in so protesting, is precisely what they object to us, and in protesting it we only aggravate our offence. Protestants entertain no doubt of our loyalty as subjects, that we will always uphold the constituted authorities in all things not repugnant to the Divine law; but this is precisely what they do not want us to do, and what they oppose us for. What they want is the power, when they have the state, to do what they please with it, and when they have not, to make a revolution in order to get it,—

two things which our doctrine of loyalty to the powers that be, and of the supremacy of the law of God, directly forbids them. It is not because Catholicity does not favor wise, just, and stable civil government that Protestants oppose it, for that they know it does, but because it condemns both civil despotism and revolutionism. Protestantism in power is civil despotism, — the despotism either of the monarch or of the mob; and Protestantism out of power is revolutionism. When we limit our obedience to the state to those things not repugnant to the law of God, and add, with the Apostles, We must obey God rather than men, we deny the civil despotism it would establish, and assert the principle of civil and religious liberty; when we assert our duty to obey the powers that be, our obligation in conscience to demean ourselves as quiet citizens and loyal subjects, never resisting authority save when it commands us to do what the law of God forbids, we deny the right of revolution, we condemn “the sacred right of insurrection,” which Protestantism asserts when out of power. Catholicity interposes and protects the subject when the prince attempts to tyrannize, and also interposes and protects the prince when his subjects are disposed to rebel; precisely what Protestantism wars against, for it must always have either despotism or anarchy.

It is clear, then, let us do our best, we cannot commend ourselves to the Protestant world, or convince them that, if we are good Catholics, we are not the enemies of the supremacy of the secular order which they always assert. The truth which we must as Catholics hold, and the virtues which we must insist on, are necessarily at war with what they as Protestants do and must seek as the supreme good; and if we are strong in a country, the Church through us will prevent civil tyranny on the one hand and rebellion on the other, keeping both prince and subject, both the state and the citizen, within the sphere of their civil rights and duties, and therefore will be able to defeat them. What Protestantism uniformly seeks is intrinsically false and unjust, and therefore in proportion as we are faithful to our religion we must be odious to Protestants, and in a greater or less degree be persecuted by them. Protestantism cannot afford to leave us in peace. It is for this world, and makes men live for this world alone; it is, as we have shown in the foregoing article, essentially heathenism, and

as such asserts necessarily the supremacy of the secular order. Catholicity, on the other hand, asserts the supremacy of the spiritual order, and makes religion the only real business of a man's life. How, then, can we commend ourselves to Protestants, or remove their objections to us, without abandoning our religion? How, then, can they ever regard our prosperity otherwise than as dangerous to them?

It is always labor lost for us to attempt to prove to Protestants that we are their very good brothers, and, *in their sense*, as good as they are. We are even disgusted when we find Catholics in one country urging their religion because favorable to monarchy, and in another because favorable to democracy; citing the examples—quite too numerous—of the uncatholic conduct of our ancestors in disobeying the Church in order to satisfy the civil tyrant, whether king or people, that in a conflict between Church and State we may be relied on to side with the state, and plunge our sword into the heart of our spiritual mother. It is to such conduct on the part of our Catholic ancestors, it is to their readiness to side with the secular against the spiritual authority, that we owe the despotism and anarchy, the schism and heresy of our times, and the almost universal lapse of the modern world into heathenism. To approve this conduct is as useless as it is uncatholic. The true policy for Catholics is not to seek to commend themselves to the lovers of the world, but to calculate always on being persecuted. All who will live godly in Christ Jesus must suffer persecution. If we are good Catholics our home is not in this world, and this world does and must hate us. There is no help for us. Heresy will persecute orthodoxy, error will persecute truth, and the secular will persecute the spiritual. It has always been so from the beginning, and will be so unto the end. All we can do is to love our enemies, pray for them who persecute us, and bless them that curse us, and proceed on our way in the path marked out by our religion, without turning to the right hand or the left, looking for no peace on earth, and seeking none till we arrive in heaven, our home. Our business here is to prepare for heaven, to love, obey, and bear witness to the truth, and therefore to that which condemns the world. There is no compromise or conciliation practicable, or to be thought of. We must either be true

to our religion, and thus have all who are not of it for our enemies, or we must be false to it, and have God for our enemy and hell for our doom.

We know we are told that the age of persecution is past, that advanced civilization has rendered it henceforth impossible to renew old penal laws, and to disturb a man for his religion. Even some Catholics, and Catholic journals, join in the disgusting cant as to religious liberty, toleration, and the liberality of the age. Where are our eyes? Have we forgotten the arrest of the Archbishop of Posen, and the imprisonment of the Archbishop of Cologne, a few years since, by the king of Prussia? Have we not seen, within the last four or five years, the Jesuits and other religious orders persecuted in almost every country of Europe, the Holy Father driven into exile, pious and devoted priests and religious massacred or assassinated, and are not the illustrious prelates of Luxemburg, Lausanne and Geneva, Turin, and Cagliari still in exile, and their flocks a prey to the spoiler? What age was more civilized, in your sense of civilization, than that of Nero, Domitian, and Diocletian, or what people in modern times have come up in civilization to that of the people of the Roman empire under the Pagan Emperors? Who so ignorant of history as to rely on what is called civilization as a protection against persecution of the true religion? Who knows not that, the more advanced that civilization is, the more hostile it becomes to the Church, and the more cruelly does it persecute the true believers. Do not deceive yourselves. The age is not one whit more tolerant of religion than was that of Nero or Decius, and the religious liberty which Protestants talk about is, as we have often told you, only the liberty of heresy and infidelity, freedom from religion, and the liberty to oppress it, to subject it to the state or the mob. Open your eyes, and see the whole so-called liberal party throughout the world mad against religion, and combining to destroy its organization, and to deliver men to the tender mercies of the unrestrained despot or the lawless mob, and then repose in the liberality of the age, and our enlightened civilization, if you can. The age claims to be philanthropic, and who knows not that the characteristic of a professed philanthropist is to have a heart harder than the nether mill-stone? No, my brethren, join not in the cant of the day, trust none of the professions of religious liberty you

hear, come they from what quarter they may; and above all, put no confidence in our cold, material, selfish, heartless modern civilization. Read the New Testament, read your tract on Grace, and rely no longer on the liberality of heresy or infidelity, on the world or its children. Recall what you have seen in England during the last two years, and learn that your sole reliance is on the truth your Church teaches you, and on her celestial Spouse. We are persecuted, we shall be persecuted, and we must make up our minds to be persecuted, and to thank God we are accounted worthy to suffer for his sake; for if we suffer with him, we shall reign with him.

These considerations explain why it is Catholics are always the object of Protestant persecution, and why they always must be, as long as Protestantism in any form survives; they should also serve to show how idle it is, by any prevarication or disguise of Catholic truth, even if it were not sinful, to attempt to conciliate Protestants. Catholics and Protestants stand opposed to each other as the spirit and the flesh, and there is and will be war betwixt them, as long as the world stands. We cannot help it, and all we have to do is to cling fast to the faith, stand by the Church with true and heroic courage, and suffer without complaint whatever we may be called upon to suffer, trusting that our good God will abundantly reward us hereafter for all we may suffer for his sake here.

We have been carried away so far by this discussion that we have wellnigh forgotten our author. He has written his book to show the folly of attempting to put down Catholicity by persecution. We agree perfectly with him that it is folly, because the wisdom of the world is always folly with God. But the world cannot reign unless it can put down Catholicity, and therefore it must always attempt to put it down, either by seducing or forcing Catholics from their allegiance. It can never succeed, for it fights against God; yet never will you persuade it that it is not wise, or induce it to desist from its folly. It is in its nature to fight against God, for it hates him, and it always will renew its bootless war. But we wish our readers here to bear in mind that it is not religious bigotry, that it is not zeal for religion, that chiefly lights the fires of Protestant persecution, but zeal for the world, and determination to subordinate religion always and everywhere to the secular power.

And therefore we lose all the breath we expend in declaiming against bigotry and intolerance, and in favor of religious liberty, or the right of every man to be of any religion or of no religion, as best pleases him, which some two or three of our journalists would fain persuade the world is Catholic doctrine. Such declamations only tend to render Catholics indifferent to their faith, or to inoculate them with a false and fatal liberalism, as experience every day proves. They produce no effect on Protestants, save so far as they may be regarded as indications of a tendency amongst us to abandon our religion, and turn Protestant or infidel. It is always folly to talk or reason of Protestants, taken as a body, as if they had religion, or cared a pin's head for religion of any sort. Set them down always as modern heathens, and go and preach to them as the Fathers did to the Gentiles, or you will never touch them. They will persecute you, if they have the power and regard you as of sufficient importance to be persecuted, until you succeed in convincing them that heathenism is false and Catholicity is true, and that they are to live for heaven and not for earth. The great error into which we fall is that of considering Protestantism as a form of religion, and adhered to from religious motives. If such was ever the case, it is not now. With here and there an individual exception, Protestants constitute not a religious, but a political and social party, and what they say in reference to religion is said only in furtherance of their secular movements or desires, whether they themselves are distinctly conscious that it is so or not. We do it too much honor when we condescend to dispute with it as a form of religious error; and the great reason why we do not dispute it more successfully is, that no small portion of us sympathize with it in its political and social views, that is, are ourselves Protestants, without knowing it. The atheistical politics which are the essence of Protestantism have pervaded the modern Catholic world, and are nearly as rife amongst us as among Protestants themselves. Our first work should be to unprotestantize ourselves,—a thing we shall not very readily do, if our popular writers take care to deny or suppress Catholic truth as applicable to the secular order. Atheistical politics are wellnigh universal, and till we abandon them ourselves, we shall make poor headway against Protestantism. When we ourselves are afraid to

assert the supremacy of the Church, and the subordination of the state, and to maintain that the secular is for the spiritual, and not the spiritual for the secular, — when we are afraid to acknowledge the supremacy of Peter in his successors, and deem it the part of prudence to explain away or half deny the Papacy, — what have we got to say to Protestants? We yield every thing to them that they care for, and what have we to oppose to them? We tell our readers again and again, that the theological matters discussed between Protestants and us are not the real questions at issue. They care nothing, as a body, for doctrines. They have no doctrines that they cannot give up at a moment's warning, if necessary to secure their secular success. The whole question turns on the unity and catholicity of the Church, as the means of maintaining the supremacy of the spiritual order. As that unity and catholicity are effected and secured by the Papacy, the real object of attack is the Pope and his spiritual authority, under God, over the whole secular order. The whole question is here. Give up or deny that authority, and you give up or deny all that Protestantism really opposes, and embrace practically all that is living in it, and are Protestants in the only sense in which Protestants are worth counting. We must therefore, if we mean to be Catholics, be truly — we like the word — *PAPISTS*, and fearlessly assert the Papal supremacy. We shall then get rid of our Protestant, heathen, or atheistical politics, and have a Catholic ground on which to oppose Protestantism. This is the first thing necessary for us. This done, we become politically and socially, as we are in faith and worship, a united body, able to move in one solid and unbroken phalanx against Protestantism, and to produce some effect on the minds and hearts of Protestants. The question will then be discussed on its merits, and we may hope that God will bless our efforts to persuade our Protestant brethren that they should no longer abandon themselves to the world which satisfieth not, but make it their sole business to live for God and heaven.

However, we must never forget that every age is a martyr age, and that the martyr spirit is the only spirit worthy of the true Catholic. We like, therefore, the little book before us, as showing how men can even in modern times die martyrs. It is well fitted to make us love the faith for



which our fathers suffered so much, and to strengthen us to endure whatever persecutions for it the enemy shall be permitted to institute against us. Notwithstanding the few criticisms we have ventured on it, it is an excellent little book. Our objection to it is, that it takes too favorable a view of Anglicanism in regarding it as a form of religion, and is not quite Ultramontane enough to suit our taste. Aside from these objections, it is a good book, written with great power, serious intention, and in the true Christian spirit. We thank the unknown author for it, and hope he will not let his pen lie idle. These are times when none who can speak for the truth are permitted to be silent, and especially none who can speak so well as our author.

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ART. III. — *The Piratical Expeditions of American Citizens against the Island of Cuba, and the Relations of the United States with Spain resulting from them.*

It is well known that our government and people have long been desirous of taking possession of the island of Cuba, the Queen of the Antilles, and annexing it to the Union. Spain having very naturally refused to sell it, and no plausible pretext having offered itself for taking possession of it by the avowed authority of the government, efforts have been made to induce the inhabitants to rebel against their sovereign, and, under assurances of assistance from this country, if not from the government, at least from its citizens, to declare themselves independent, and to form themselves into a democratic state, with a view to future annexation. The most false and calumnious reports of the tyranny and oppression of the Spanish authorities have been circulated to excite our democratic and monarchy-hating citizens, and to prepare them to fly to the assistance of the Cubans, as to the rescue of an ill-used and oppressed people, and false and exaggerated accounts have been forged of the disaffection of the Cubans, and of their readiness and determination to resist and declare themselves independent of the mother country.

Disaffected or speculating Cubans, chiefly residing in this country, good patriots only in leaving their country, in

concert with certain American speculators and European refugees, have been induced to form what they call a provisional government, to contract loans, to enlist troops, and commission officers in the name of the imaginary people or Republic of Cuba. This appears to have been done with a double object; first, to secure to these excellent patriots and their American advisers the plunder of the island, and in case of success the power to oppress its inhabitants, and second, to remove any scruples our citizens might feel as to engaging in an avowedly piratical enterprise. Our people hold that they have a right to assist any band of rebels, who profess to be rebelling against monarchy, in favor of democracy. They hold that all authority emanates from the people, and they never take the trouble to inquire whether what they call the people are a perfect people, complete and independent, or are only a mob. They outlaw monarchy and monarchists, and hold any number of the inhabitants of a given country to be the sovereign people, if they are only opposed to monarchy and in favor of democracy, although in point of fact they are not more than one in a thousand of the whole population. God has given the dominion of the world to democrats, and they have the right, whenever they please and are able, to oust the old proprietors and to take possession of it. A self-constituted provisional government, having no authority even from the people, no authority, indeed, but what its individual members assume, is for them the sovereign authority of any country subjected to the monarchical form of government, and in it are vested all the rights of a sovereign state, the power to form alliances, to declare war, and to make peace. Recognizing thus the self-styled provisional government of Cuba, and General Lopez as its chief, they could feel that, in enrolling themselves under his banner and making piratical expeditions against a colony of Spain, they would engage in a legitimate war, and in killing and plundering Spanish subjects be only obeying a legal authority and performing meritorious acts. Under the pretended authority of this pretended government, an expedition was set on foot in 1849, in this country, for invading and taking possession of Cuba. That expedition was prevented from sailing by the interposition of the Federal government; but the adventurers, collected at Round Island, were suffered to disperse with their arms, without

even so much as a reprimand for the violation of the law of nations, our treaty with Spain, and our own municipal laws. Emboldened by the impunity, they with others assembled again the following year, and this time succeeded in making a descent upon the island, whence they were soon forced to reëmbark for the United States. Again no punishment was inflicted upon them by our government. A few indictments were found, but they were all finally withdrawn by order of the government, and no one was prosecuted to conviction.

The checks hitherto experienced from the government, or from the resistance of the Spanish authorities, only served to stimulate the zeal of the so-called liberators. During the last summer a new expedition was fitted out, and embarked in an American steamer, which cleared in open day at the custom-house at New Orleans for Cuba, where, to the number of some five hundred, the majority American citizens, they effected a landing, and commenced their work of liberation. After several engagements with detachments of the Spanish troops, in which several Spanish officers and soldiers lost their lives, they were defeated, and to a man either killed or taken prisoners.

Before the whole band were dispersed, while the contest with the invaders continued, and reinforcements from the United States were threatened, a party of fifty, designated as Colonel Crittenden's party, apparently attempting to effect their escape from the island, were discovered and captured by a Spanish war-steamer, and, on their confession of having formed a part of the gang which had landed, and of having shared in their piratical acts, were executed, in obedience to an order of the Spanish government, and in accordance with a proclamation of the Captain-General of Cuba, issued before the sailing of the expedition from New Orleans, and with the unquestionable legal rights of Spain. When the news of the execution of this party was confirmed in this country, the friends of the expedition were highly exasperated. A mob collected at New Orleans, attacked the Spanish consul and forced him to seek refuge for his life in a prison, seized the Spanish flag, dragged it through the mud, and afterwards burnt it with every mark of indignity and insult, destroyed the office of the Spanish newspaper *La Union*, and plundered the shops and dwellings, we believe, of nearly every Spanish resident in the

city. Another mob on the same occasion collected at Key West, and entered and plundered the houses and shops of the Spanish residents. At Mobile the mob attacked and threatened to lynch sixty-seven persons belonging to the Spanish brigantine Fernando VII., wrecked near our coast, and who sought refuge in that port, and escaped with their lives only through the extraordinary exertions of the Spanish vice-consul, Sr. Don Manuel de Cruzat. The Spanish consul, the Spanish residents in New Orleans and Key West, and the poor shipwrecked women and children at Mobile were guilty of no offence against either our government or our citizens, but that of being Spanish subjects. The atrocious outrages committed upon them were all directed against Spain, who was all along the sole injured party, and whose sole offence was, that she would not suffer without resistance American citizens to invade her territory, and murder and plunder her subjects, and that she did not choose to treat a gang of captured pirates as ordinary prisoners of war. Her offence was, that, when attacked by a robber, she knocked him in head, instead of keeping quiet and suffering herself to be robbed.

Here are a few of the outrages committed by American citizens against Spain and her unoffending subjects. For these she very naturally complains to the Federal government. That she has suffered gross injustice, and that she is entitled to indemnification, there is no room for doubt; and we should suppose that our government could not hesitate to admit it. For years our citizens have been suffered to labor to excite revolution in Cuba, to keep that province in a state of perpetual uneasiness, essentially hurtful to its prosperity, and compelling the Spanish government to maintain itself there in a manner extremely expensive and more embarrassing than war. They have been suffered to invade the territory of a friendly state, to murder and plunder her subjects on her own soil, to outrage her consul, under the protection of his *exequatur* from our government, to insult her flag, and to plunder her subjects peaceably residing amongst us, and, in violation of express treaty stipulations, to attempt the lives of her shipwrecked sailors seeking refuge in our ports; and we cannot easily conceive that the government can be so insensible to the claims of justice, or to its own honor, as to refuse to acknowledge these wrongs and to make just reparation for

them. Yet we are told that it has peremptorily refused to make any reparation. It takes the ground, it is said, that it did all that any government is bound to do to prevent the acts complained of; that it is in no sense responsible for them, and therefore owes Spain neither compensation for wrongs nor apology for insult; and if Spanish residents have been wronged, our courts are open to them, and they are free to bring suits and recover damages against those who have wronged them.

We hope, for the honor of our country and the credit of our institutions, that there is some mistake here, and that before our Review issues from the press our government will have retrieved its character and complied with the too moderate demands of Spain. Spain has been most grievously wronged, and, although the press seems generally to take the ground said to be taken by the Secretary of State, we cannot accept the statement that our government owes her neither apology nor indemnification. To pretend it seems to us to be simply adding insult to injury. It is not true that our government did all that any government is bound to do to prevent the outrages complained of. It was bound both by the law of nations, and by the obligations of treaty, not only not officially to authorize or to approve the wrongs committed, but to do its best to prevent them. The acts done were in violation of both international law and of our own municipal laws, and the government was bound by the former to Spain, and by the latter to its own citizens, to prevent them, if in its power. No government fulfils its obligations to a foreign power with which it is at peace, by simply disavowing the injuries done by its subjects to that power, and leaving it, if their authors chance to fall into its hands, to deal with them as it pleases. Peace between two states is not simply a peace between their respective governments, as governments, but also peace between their respective citizens or subjects, and this peace between their respective subjects each state is bound to maintain to the best of its ability; and if either fails to prevent its breach, it is bound to punish the offenders, or to deliver them up to be punished by the other; and when the peace has been broken through the carelessness or neglect of the government, it is bound to make a just compensation to the injured for the wrong done.

This is more especially true in the case between us and

Spain, because we are bound to her by special treaty obligations. By the first article of the treaty of 1795, still in force, it is stipulated that "there shall be firm and inviolable peace and sincere friendship between her Catholic Majesty, her successors and subjects, and the United States and their citizens, without exception of persons or places." By the fifth article of the same treaty, "both parties oblige themselves expressly to restrain, *by force*, all hostilities on the part of the Indian nations living within their boundary; so that Spain will not suffer her Indians to attack the citizens of the United States, nor Indians belonging to their territory; nor the United States permit these last-mentioned Indians to engage in hostilities against the subjects of her Catholic Majesty, nor her Indians, in any manner whatever"; and in the fourteenth article it is laid down that no "citizen, subject, or inhabitant of the United States shall apply for or take any commission, or letters of marque for arming any ship or ships, for the purpose of harassing the subjects of her Catholic Majesty, or taking possession of their property, from any prince or state with which her Catholic Majesty shall be at war; and if any person of either nation shall take such commission, or letters of marque, he shall be punished as a pirate."

It is clear from these stipulations, that the United States are obliged to maintain firm and inviolable peace and sincere friendship between all their citizens and those of Spain, to restrain by force the Indian tribes within their borders from violating it, and that they have declared any citizen, subject, or inhabitant of our country, who shall take any commission or letters of marque with a hostile purpose to Spain from any power with which she is at war, to be a *pirate*, and to be punished as such. The provision with regard to the Indian nations throws light on the first article. The importance of restraining our citizens or subjects from committing acts of hostility on the subjects of Spain cannot be less than that of restraining the Indian tribes, and the introduction of a special clause restraining the latter, who are not precisely either citizens or subjects, but *quasi-independent*, and therefore not necessarily included under the denomination of citizens or subjects, proves that the high contracting parties considered the obligation of restraining the former as sufficiently expressed in the first article. The prohibition to any citizen, subject, or inhabitant of the

United States to take any commission or letters of marque from a power with which Spain is at war, to prey upon her subjects or her property, can hardly be restricted simply to a commission to arm privateers, but, in its spirit at least, extends to any commission from any power with which Spain is at war to commit any kind of acts of hostility against her or her subjects. If no such commission can be accepted from a recognized prince or state, then, *a fortiori*, none from an unrecognized revolutionary chief like Lopez, or a mere sham government like the so-called "Provisional Government of Cuba."

The expedition of Lopez, which was fitted out in and sailed from the United States, was clearly a violation of that "firm and inviolable peace and sincere friendship" between the subjects of her Catholic Majesty and our own citizens established by the first article of the treaty of 1795; and as the government by entering into that treaty became specially bound for itself and all its citizens or subjects, without exception of persons or places, it was specially bound to prevent it, and having failed to do so, it is responsible for it. It was bound to do this, even under the general law of nations. "The nation or the sovereign," says Vattel (Lib. II. § 72), "ought not to suffer its citizens to do an injury to the subjects of another state, much less to offend that state itself; and this not only because no sovereign ought to permit those who are under his command to violate the precepts of the law of nature, which forbids all injuries, but also because nations ought mutually to respect each other, to abstain from all offence, from all injury, from all wrong, — in a word, from every thing that may be of prejudice to others. If a sovereign who might keep his subjects within the rules of justice and peace suffers them to injure a foreign nation either in its body or its members, he does no less injury to that nation than if he injured it himself. In short, the safety of the state and that of human society requires this attention from every sovereign. If you let loose the reins to your subjects against foreign nations, these will behave in the same manner to you; and instead of that friendly intercourse which nature has established between all men, we shall see nothing but one vast and dreadful scene of plunder between nation and nation." Certain it is, then, the United States were bound to prevent the piratical expedition against Cuba, and they

cannot, since they did not prevent it, plead that they did all that they were bound to do, if they were able to prevent it.

Now, we are quite sure that our government would not take it as a favor to be told that it is unable to fulfil the duties imposed by international law, or that it lacks power to enforce upon its subjects its own laws. The notorious and undeniable fact is, that it did next to nothing to prevent the atrocious outrages against Spain and her subjects. It, indeed, issued some tardy orders to its officers, most of which came too late to be of service, even in case they had been obeyed; sent forth certain proclamations, forbidding all such expeditions, and informing those American citizens who should engage in them that they would be liable to punishment by the laws of their own country, and out of its protection if they should fall into the hands of the Spanish authorities. The proclamations were worded well enough; but they were about as valuable as so much waste paper, and well known before they were issued to be worth not much more. Who in this country retains respect enough for any public authority, to refrain in consequence of a proclamation from any act to which he is impelled either by his passions or his interests? Presidential or any other proclamations, except issued by rebels or pirates, are of no value here, unless they are backed up by an armed force adequate to compel their observance. Some vessels of war were indeed, after the sailing of the expedition, ordered to cruise in the Gulf, but apparently less to protect the rights of Spain than to protect our own, — less to prevent the pirates murdering and plundering Spanish subjects, than to prevent the Spanish authorities and the Spanish war-vessels from violating the rights of peace against us, or to find some pretext for the government itself to interfere against Spain, and, perhaps, take possession of Cuba and Porto Rico. Call you this discharging your duty to Spain? Do you pretend that having done this much authorizes you to wash your hands of the whole affair, and to tell Spain that she has no ground of complaint against you for her soil invaded, and her subjects murdered and plundered by your citizens?

The government cannot plead ignorance of what was going on. The proceedings of the so-called Liberators were not carried on in private; they were open, proclaimed



through the public journals, friendly and unfriendly, and known to the whole country. The adventurers were enrolled and drilled publicly in New Orleans, and they hardly even affected to conceal their purpose and destination. The Pampero, on which they embarked, and on which they were well known to be embarked, cleared publicly at the custom-house for Cuba. Where was the vigilance of the government? Where were its lynx-eyed officers? It is folly to pretend that the government was not well informed, long before the departure of the expedition, of what was in preparation. It must have known at least some of the principal actors, and might at any moment have put a stop to the proceedings, by simply arresting Lopez and Sigur, Quitman and Houston, and a few others. If it could not otherwise prevent the expedition, why did it not order the Home Squadron to the Gulf to intercept it, or to keep on the look-out near the Cuban ports for which it was likely to sail, to prevent its landing? The government either was or was not able to prevent an expedition attempted or renewed for three successive years, and avowed and defended by many of the journals of the country. If it was not, then it is incompetent to the duties of an independent nation, and has no right to pretend to negotiate or to enter into treaty obligations with other nations on the footing of equality. But we will not make the humiliating confession that the government is unable to discharge fully and promptly all the obligations of an independent state, whether imposed by the law of nations or by special treaty. A tithe of the vigilance and activity it has displayed in watching and defending its own rights against Spain, who has shown no disposition to violate any one of them, employed in watching and defeating the machinations and guilty measures of its own citizens against her, would have nipped in the bud every hostile expedition attempted within or from our territory against her. It had the whole force of the nation at its command, and could have used it for this purpose if it had chosen. If it could have prevented the expedition, it has not done its duty, and is responsible to Spain for whatever wrongs she has suffered from it.

We are not willing to concede that the United States are less able to fulfil on their part the obligations imposed by the treaty of 1795, than Spain is to fulfil them on her part. The obligations of that treaty are reciprocal, and

Spain on her part has religiously fulfilled them. Even in the early part of 1845, as soon as it became apparent to her that war must soon break out between this republic and that of Mexico, she from her own sense of duty hastened to issue instructions, that, throughout all her dominions, and by all her subjects, the strictest neutrality should be observed, and when our Minister at the Court of Madrid notified her, in July, 1846, that war existed between the two republics, and demanded that her subjects should be prevented from taking out Mexican letters of marque, she was able to inform him that all necessary steps for that purpose had already been taken. The want of confidence in Spain manifested by our government, its unwillingness to be satisfied of her good faith without actually inspecting the orders she had issued, and its sending of a ship of war to Cuba to watch her and see that she violated none of the laws of neutrality, and other matters of this sort, insolent in themselves, and hard to bear by a high-minded and honorable nation, on which much might be said not creditable to the Federal government, we pass over. Only one case of infraction by Spanish subjects of the neutrality enjoined, that of the bark *Unico*, occurred during the war with Mexico. That bark, indeed, put to sea with Mexican<sup>r</sup> letters of marque, in violation of the treaty, their owners having availed themselves of pretended letters of Mexican citizenship, and other stratagems, to conceal their crime. When we consider the facilities for eluding the vigilance of the Spanish government afforded by the similarity of language, manners, customs, and even names, between Spaniards and Mexicans, it speaks well for that government that only this one case occurred; but notwithstanding all the difficulties of the case, and all the arts resorted to, the criminal parties, without any agency of ours being needed, and solely through the action of the Spanish authorities, were arrested and compelled to observe the laws of their country, which of course include the treaty of 1795. The bark was sequestered by virtue of a judicial sentence, its crew were condemned to a punishment which they are, or lately were, still undergoing, and the Carmelite, belonging to the United States, detained for a short time at Barcelona, was declared to have the right of claiming indemnification against its owners for whatever injuries or losses it had sustained in consequence of a brief detention. In no instance, since the

treaty of 1819, has Spain given our government the slightest cause of offence, and she has, notwithstanding numerous and grievous insults from both our government and people, religiously fulfilled all her treaty obligations entered into with our republic. To do this she has had only to enforce her own laws upon her own subjects; and all our government would have had to do, in order to have fulfilled its obligations to her in a manner equally satisfactory, was simply to enforce the observance of its own laws upon its citizens or subjects. Is our government, which claims to be a model government for all the world, prepared to say that it is not bound, or that it is less able, to enforce its own laws on its subjects than Spain is to enforce her laws upon her subjects?

No doubt there are cases in which, notwithstanding the loyalty and utmost vigilance of the government, its citizens will break its laws, and do injury to a foreign state, or to its subjects; but in such cases it is bound either to punish them or to give them up to the justice of the injured party. Unhappily, our government, in the case before us, has fully and faithfully done neither. It has wellnigh quarrelled with Spain for punishing those of the pirates who fell, without any agency of ours, into her hands. It sent a vessel of war to Havana, with orders to make an insulting investigation into the circumstances of the execution of Crittenden and his fellow-pirates, taken by a Spanish war-steamer, and confessedly guilty of piracy; and we have not blushed to solicit Spain to liberate the pirates whom she detains as prisoners, but whose lives her clemency has spared. We have in reality, at least in regard to the last two piratical expeditions, used no force to repress them, and we have punished no individual implicated in them. We have neither by our vigilance prevented our own laws from being broken to the injury of Spain, nor by our justice vindicated their breach. We have failed utterly to execute the laws against men within our jurisdiction, notoriously, we may say, ostentatiously, guilty of the most grave offences against them. A vessel or two may have been confiscated; a few prosecutions have been commenced against individuals, all ending in smoke; a couple of custom-house officers have been dismissed; and this is all, as far as we can learn, that the government has done in the way of punishing those of its citizens guilty of violating

its own laws, of insulting the majesty of Spain, and of being accessory at least to the piratical invasion of her territory, and the murder of her subjects. True, it arrested at one time Lopez, Quitman, Henderson, and a few others ; but, notwithstanding these men really avowed their guilt, the indictments found against them were withdrawn by order of the government itself, and they were suffered to go at large, Lopez to head a new piratical invasion of Cuba, and to receive his reward from the Spanish authorities. Does the government call this doing its duty ? Is this the way Spain treated the crew of the *Unico*, or those of her subjects that violated her laws to our prejudice ?

It will not be pertinent for our government to plead that it has done all that it was bound to do, because it has done all that it could do under its internal laws and the forms of its judicial tribunals. Were this, as it is not, the fact, it were nothing to the purpose. Spain has the right to demand of us the exact fulfilment of our treaty obligations, and if we cannot fulfil them with exactitude under our internal laws, the constitution of our courts, and their rules of procedure, that affects neither her right nor our duty. We have in such case no right to assume the rank of an independent nation, and must pay the penalty of assuming to be able to perform the duties of such a nation when we are not. Other nations have the right, in such case, to treat us as a false pretender, and to insist on excluding us from the family of independent states, and placing us under guardians. In fact, no plea of inability will avail the government. It has never ceased to assure Spain that her province of Cuba was in no danger of being invaded from our territories ; it has from the first sought to quiet every alarm she expressed, and assured her that it was both able and willing to execute the laws, — that it both could and would prevent their violation to her prejudice. We know it had the power to keep its promise. The treaty of 1795, as are all treaties formed with foreign nations, is the law, and the supreme law, of the land, and the government has the whole power of the nation at its command to enforce it. It was its duty to employ all the force necessary to that purpose, and if it had so done, no man can doubt that it would have succeeded. The simple fact is, the government did not lack the ability, but it lacked the courage, to do its duty. It trembled before the influence the pirates and

their friends might exert on the election of 1852. It personally wished, no doubt, to fulfil its treaty obligations and do justice to Spain, but it considered it safer to wrong her, and brave the scorn of the civilized world, than to run the hazard of losing the support in the coming election of the pirates and their sympathizers. The loss of votes would be irreparable, but refusal of justice to Spain could at worst only lead to war with that power, and that would afford, perhaps, the opportunity to take possession of Cuba and Porto Rico and annex them to the Union, — the very thing desired by our government and people, and unsuccessfully thus far attempted by the piratical expeditions complained of.

The government, we say, therefore, and in saying it we are only repeating its constant assurances to Spain, could have prevented the piratical expeditions against Cuba, if it had been sincerely and earnestly disposed to do so. We have already proved that it was bound to prevent them, and therefore, not having done so when it could, it is responsible for them. Both our government and people seem to labor under a mistake as to the extent of the responsibility of the state for the injuries done by its citizens to foreign nations. It seems to be supposed that it is responsible for no expedition or acts of its citizens against foreign nations, unless it formally approves or ratifies them, and that its official disavowal of them is sufficient to exonerate itself in the eye of international law from all blame. But this is by no means the fact. Vattel, indeed, says,\* that, "if a nation or its sovereign approves and ratifies the act of the individual, it then becomes a public concern, and the injured party is to consider the nation as the real author of the injury"; but he does not say, and there is no respectable authority that does say, that the nation is answerable for only those acts of its subjects which it *expressly* approves and ratifies. A nation, being bound in natural justice to prevent its subjects from committing any injury as far as it is able, is responsible for all the injuries they commit, whether against their fellow-subjects or against a foreign state or its subjects, in which it directly or indirectly concurs, or in which it coöperates either positively or negatively. The rule here for nations is the same

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\* Lib. II. 74.

with the rule for individuals, for both are alike bound by the principles of natural justice, and those principles are the same for both. The general principle applicable to individuals, by which they may be held responsible for the injuries done immediately by others, and for which they are bound to make restitution to the injured party, as universally held, is summed up by a respectable living authority in the following rule: "*Principium generale est eos teneri ad restitutionem, quando efficaciter influunt in damnum, sunt que illius causa, licet non unica; vel quando non impediunt damnum quod ex justitia impedire tenentur.*"\*

We have already proved that a sovereign is held *ex justitia* to prevent his subjects from doing injury to any one, and we may therefore lay it down that the sovereign who might, but does not, prevent them, is answerable for the injury they do. The nation itself stands in this respect under the same obligation that the individual does, and is bound to restitution under precisely the same conditions that the individual is. The individual is not, indeed, always bound to make restitution for the injury to another which he might, but does not, prevent; he is so bound only when he is held to prevent the injury *ex justitia*, or by virtue of his state, charge, or office. "Hi vero," says Billuart, "tenentur impedire ex justitia, qui tenentur ex contractu aut quasi-contractu, hoc est, ex officio; quia qui suscipit officium, implicite se obligat ad præstanda ea quæ sunt illius officii. Hinc inferes, principes, magistratus, gubernatores, prælores, et alii quibus incumbit ex officio invigilare tranquillitati communi et indemnitati civium, tenentur ad restitutionem omnium damnorum quæ ex sua negligentia sequuntur," &c.† Silviu, as cited by Billuart, says, "*Si princeps aut prætor videat suos subditos nocere aliis non sibi subditis, et non impediat cum potest, tenetur ad restitutionem, etsi non teneatur procurare bonum illorum non subditorum,*" because, as Billuart himself adds, "*inter principes et consequenter eorum prætores interveniat virtualis contractus seu tacita conventio pro bono et tranquillitate communi, ne sui subditi subditis alterius noceant. . . . Unde principes ex justitia obligantur non solum erga suos subditos, sed etiam erga alienos.*"‡

\* Carrière, *De Justitia*, 334. See, also, *St. Thomas*. Summa, 2. 2. a. 7, who maintains the same doctrine.

† *De Jure et Justitia*, Diss. VIII. Art. 13, § 7.

‡ *Ibid.*

These authorities, to which we might add indefinitely were it necessary, fully sustain us in saying that the principle of natural justice, as applicable to the question under consideration, is, that the individual is bound to restitution for any injury which he is held *ex justitia* to prevent, but does not prevent when he might; consequently, that a nation, always bound to prevent its subjects from doing any injury, is accountable for all injury done by its subjects, which it might and did not prevent, and therefore is bound to indemnify the injured party. The rule our government appears disposed to follow, and which Great Britain also asserts when it suits her convenience, must, then, be restricted, and the nation be held to have approved and ratified implicitly those injurious acts of its subjects which it might have prevented, but did not, for it is through its fault as well as that of its subjects that they have been committed. A restriction of this sort is absolutely necessary, especially in a composite government like ours. If the individual citizens of the Union may injure our neighbors by invading their territory without implicating the Federal government any farther than it avows or does not formally disavow their acts, nothing prevents any one of the States of the Union from doing the same, and making war with its whole moral and material force on a foreign state or its subjects, without necessarily disturbing the peace relations between that power and us. The Federal government would only have to disavow the act of the State, and then we might see the edifying spectacle of one of our own States making war on a foreign nation while the Union remained at peace with it. This would be a great injustice, because the foreign nation could not retaliate on the hostile State without making war on the Union, which it could not do, because, according to the doctrine set up, the Union would have given it no just cause of war. It would be very convenient for us to carry on our wars in this way; the State could do all the fighting, and the Union would have nothing to do but to employ the Federal forces in holding the nation attacked to the rights of peace against us. Something like this we have already seen, although the aggressors were not a State, but its citizens. Our government has suffered these citizens to carry on hostilities against Spain, and employed its force, as far as it has with much effect employed it at all, in compelling Spain to de-

send herself against them without violating the rights of peace; thus securing to its citizens the rights of war against her, and allowing her only the rights of peace against them. Under the doctrine we oppose, a nation might remain at peace with a foreign power, while through its citizens, acting on their own responsibility, officially disavowed by the government if you will, it robbed that foreign power of province after province, till it had annihilated its independence, and annexed its whole territory to its own dominions, as was seen in the case of Texas. Our citizens literally stole that province from Mexico, as they are hoping to steal some more provinces from the same republic, and as they still hope to steal Cuba from Spain. To say that the crime of that theft is not imputable to the nation is to outrage common sense. Who does not know that the citizens of a country cannot be at war with a foreign power and its government remain at peace with it? A rule that would allow one nation by the hostile acts of subjects to destroy a foreign state, without disturbing its peace relations with it, is and can be no part of international law.

We consequently reject this rule, which seems invented only to give us virtually all the rights of war against our neighbors, while we hold them to the rights of peace against us, and assert that an injury committed by the subjects of a nation which it might by the proper exercise of its power prevent, but does not, is imputable to the nation itself, for which it is bound to indemnify the aggrieved party. If we may believe our government itself, it could have prevented the injuries that Spain has received from the hands of American citizens. It is therefore responsible for them, and bound to make just and ample reparation to Spain for them; and it will be guilty of gross injustice, and forfeit the respect of the civilized world and every decent man among its own subjects, if it does not.

Thus far we have considered the ground, said to be taken by our government, mainly as to its tenableness under international law; but the question itself between us and Spain is to be decided under the treaty of 1795. Under international law, even in the absence of treaty stipulations, we should be bound to indemnify Spain for whatever injury she has received from the piratical expeditions against Cuba, because we could have prevented them with



due diligence ; but under the treaty we should be bound to indemnify Spain, even in case we had done all that a government could reasonably be expected to do to prevent them, and perhaps, also, even under international law in the absence of treaty. By the treaty the government expressly stipulates, not merely that there shall be peace between itself and the Spanish government, but also between its citizens and the subjects of Spain, without exception of persons or places. It thus binds itself specially, and under the express and solemn obligation of treaty, for each one of its citizens, and pledges its faith for the peace of each one of them. Neither the express nor implied condition here is that it will do it if it can. It must do it, or if it fails, even though unintentionally and unavoidably, it must make just satisfaction to the party injured. It has entered into an express contract, and the peace of all its citizens, without exception of persons or places, is what on its side it has contracted. This peace is a debt which it owes and has bound itself to pay to Spain, and it must pay it in the form stipulated, or the damage the creditor suffers from its not paying it in that form. There is no escaping this conclusion. We have broken the treaty, broken the contract, and even if we have not done so designedly, we must still repair the injury we have done, and make a suitable apology for it so far as not reparable. The damage we have done to Spain is only in part reparable ; we can repair only the pecuniary damage ; we cannot repair the depravation of those of her subjects we have seduced from their allegiance. We cannot restore to life the brave officers and soldiers, to mothers the sons, to wives the husbands, we have murdered for loyally defending her rights, and for these and other irreparable wrongs we ought to express our deep regret, while we make ample indemnification for the public and private property we have destroyed, and for the very heavy expense she has necessarily incurred in guarding and defending her possessions against the machinations and invasions of our citizens. It is in this way Spain herself interpreted her own obligations to us under the treaty, as is evident from the case of the privateer *Unico*, and her interpretation of the treaty obligations to her own disadvantage deserves as much respect as our interpretation of them in our favor. She arrested the offenders against us, punished them, and indemnified the injured party. She

did this of her own accord, from a sense of justice, and we all know that our government would have been satisfied with nothing less. It would never have considered it a valid answer to its reclamations against the fitting or sailing of the *Unico*, that the Spanish government disapproved it, and abandoned the bark and crew to their fate if taken by one of our cruisers. If we insisted, as we certainly should have insisted, if Spain had given us an opportunity, on her arresting the piratical expedition of her subjects, punishing the guilty party, and indemnifying our citizens for the injuries they suffered from the offences committed, or threatened to be committed, against them, we cannot understand why less is due from us to her. The obligations of the treaty are reciprocal, and it cannot be to the credit of the United States to hold a double balance, and to adopt one rule for interpreting the obligations of Spain to us and another for interpreting our obligations to her. Surely the Secretary of State is lawyer enough to understand, that, when one of the contracting parties breaks the contract, though by no fault of its own, it is responsible for the damages the other party has suffered in consequence. The only difference between the case of a breach of contract through the moral fault of the failing party and that of a breach without any such fault is, that in the former there is a case for vindictive justice, or exemplary damages, and in the latter a case for simply commutative justice, or remuneration for the actual damage suffered, although the peremptory refusal of the remuneration would give to the party wronged the right of vindictive justice, which, between nations, is the right of war. Now, as the injuries done were not only a breach of the general law of nations, but of express contract, it is undeniable that our government owes Spain full indemnification for them, even supposing them to have been committed through no bad faith, complicity, or remissness of our government.

The other questions arising out of these piratical expeditions need not detain us long. These are,—1. The injury to the honor of Spain in the attack on her consul and the insult offered to her flag in New Orleans; 2. The outrages committed on sixty-seven shipwrecked persons seeking refuge in the port of Mobile; and 3. The destruction of the property of Spanish subjects by the mob in New Orleans

and Key West. A grave injury to the fame or the honor of a nation has in all ages and countries been held a justifiable cause of war, and even light injuries become so, if the party committing them refuses to make satisfaction for them; for such refusal is a denial of justice, and the denial of justice is always a justifiable cause of war, at least as against the party denying it.\* A consul, indeed, has not the inviolability of person or effects of an ambassador; but in his official capacity he has in some sense a representative character, and to injure him as consul is to injure his nation; and the government granting him his *exequatur* is bound to make reparation for the injuries he receives. The national flag is the symbol of the nation, and to insult it is to insult the nation itself. Clearly, in the attack on the Spanish consul and the Spanish flag at New Orleans, the honor of Spain was wounded, and our government owes her reparation and apology. Nations are accustomed to guard their honor with great jealousy, and it is proper that they should. A nation that suffers its honor to be attacked with impunity confesses thereby either her insensibility to her own honor or her inability to vindicate it. In either case she exposes herself to insult and invasion, which, since it is an injustice to her subjects, she is bound to prevent, if in her power. It is also against the general peace and welfare of nations that any one nation should be constantly open to insult and invasion from her neighbors, and therefore every nation is bound to its own subjects and to the general family of nations to respect, and, as far as in its power, to cause to be respected, its own honor. No nation is more ready than our own to resent insults to our national honor. Who knows not, that, if the cases had been reversed, and our consul and flag had been insulted at Havana or Barcelona, instant satisfaction would have been demanded, and, if refused or delayed, the whole press of the country would have called upon the government to declare war against Spain. The evils of war are great; but the loss of national honor is greater. Yet we may do well to remember that we may lose our honor by refusing to respect the honor of others, as well as by being remiss in vindicating our own. It is well to demand nothing but justice,

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\* *Vide* Suarez, *De Bell. Tract. de Charitate*. Disp. XIII. sect. iv. Also, 2 Reg. x.

and to submit to no injustice, but it is better to adopt for our rule, Do no wrong, and submit to none. This last is the rule, not for individuals, for they are often required to submit to injustice ; but for states, because the mission of the state is to protect and vindicate the rights and interests of its subjects.

The Spanish brigantine Fernando VII. was wrecked last August on our coast, and the persons on board, to the number of sixty-seven, sought refuge in the port of Mobile, and were there attacked by the mob, inhumanly treated, and, as we have said, escaped being lynched only through the extraordinary exertions of the Spanish vice-consul. The outrages upon them were in violation of the laws of humanity, of the international law of all Christian nations, and of the treaty with Spain. We will here simply cite the sixth and tenth articles of the treaty of 1795, confirmed by that of 1819.

“ART. VI. Each party shall endeavor, by all means in their power, to protect and defend all vessels and other effects belonging to the citizens or subjects of the other, which shall be within the extent of their jurisdiction by sea or by land, and shall use all their efforts to recover, and cause to be restored to the right owners, their vessels and effects which may have been taken from them within the extent of their said jurisdiction, whether they are at war or not with the power whose subjects have taken possession of the said effects.”

“ART. X. When any vessel of either party shall be wrecked, foundered, or otherwise damaged, on the coasts or within the dominion of the other, their respective subjects or citizens shall receive, as well for themselves as for their vessels and effects, the same assistance which would be due to the inhabitants of the country where the damage happens, and shall pay the same charges and dues only as the said inhabitants would be subject to pay in a like case : and if the operations of repair would require that the whole or any part of the cargo be unladen, they shall pay no duties, charges, or fees on the part which they shall relade and carry away.”

What has our government to say to this ? Will it pretend that it owes no satisfaction for these outrages ?

The government owes indemnification to the Spanish residents for their property destroyed by the mob. In justice, and we believe, in most civilized states, in law, the state is held to indemnify its subjects for the destruction of their property by mobs ; for the state is held *ex officio* to

prevent all mobs and riotous assemblies of its subjects. This is one of the principal ends of government itself, and its obligation in this respect is the same to foreigners residing on its territory and under its protection as to its own subjects. It will not answer for the government to say that it could not prevent the mob, and therefore is not answerable for its consequences, for it was its duty to prevent it, and if it could not, though free from moral blame, it would still be bound, as far as able, to repair the evil, by pecuniary indemnification of the sufferers. But the fact is, the government in the present case did not try to prevent the mobs. No efforts were made by the authorities in either place to prevent or quell them. In this case, it matters not whether the authority bound as between ourselves to prevent or quell the mob was the Federal authority or the State authority; for the Federal authority is the only public authority in the country that foreigners are permitted to know, and it is answerable to them for whatever the public authority of the country can be held answerable for. For internal and domestic purposes the public authority with us is divided between the Federal government and the several State governments, but in regard to foreign powers it is not divided, and the Federal government is the supreme and only public authority of the country. Hence Mr. Jefferson was accustomed to say, Internally and in relation to ourselves we are many independent governments; externally and in relation to foreign powers, we are one government or state. The Federal government is as answerable to foreign governments for the public delinquencies of the States as if they were its own. There certainly was public delinquency, and therefore as to Spain on the part of the United States, though in fact, as a domestic question, chiefly on the part of Louisiana and Florida. Then, again, is our government, which, as we have said, proposes itself as a model to the whole world, prepared to concede that it cannot prevent or quell mobs, nor maintain either the external or internal order and tranquillity of its subjects? The citizens of New Orleans and Key West were no doubt exasperated, though unjustly exasperated. But were not the Cubans also exasperated? Spain had given American citizens no cause of exasperation; all the wrong had been done by them against her, and all the causes of exasperation were of their own creating. Yet,

not content with doing foul injustice to Spain, they rise in wrath, and wreak their fury on unoffending Spanish residents. How was it on the other side? The press of this country was teeming with abuse of Spain and the Spanish authorities of Cuba. Men from this country, enrolled under officers who had served in our army, connected with men high in office under the Federal government, cheered on by the press and the people of the United States, were on the island murdering and plundering Spanish subjects, without the least right and without the least provocation. And yet there was no mob, no rising of the populace; the laws were strictly enforced, and not a single outrage was committed on the American consul or a single American resident. Had our government less power to enforce its laws and to protect the Spanish consul and Spanish residents against its citizens, who had no cause of exasperation but their own crimes, than Spain had to enforce her laws and to protect the American consul and American residents against her subjects, who had so many just causes of exasperation against Americans? If so, pray tell us in what consists the boasted superiority of American republicanism.

We call the Spaniards cruel and bloodthirsty; but how favorably does their conduct contrast with that of the Americans? The latter are willing, unprovoked, to carry fire and sword into a country with which their government professes to be at peace, to murder innocent people with whom they have no cause of quarrel, and, when checked, they wreak their unprovoked wrath on the peaceable subjects of the unoffending country within their reach, plunder them of their property, and threaten and endanger their very lives. Turn now to your cruel and bloodthirsty Spaniards. The Spanish troops, it is proved to you on all hands, after they had received orders to grant quarters, treated the prisoners they took, whose hands were still red with the blood of their murdered officers and comrades, with the greatest kindness and humanity, sharing with them their humble pittance, and doing all in their power to solace their sufferings. The sick and wounded were carried to the hospitals and tenderly nursed; the others were imprisoned in airy rooms, and every indulgence was allowed them compatible with their safety; their friends were permitted to visit them, and all their little wants were carefully attended to.

Surely words have lost their meaning when we call Spaniards cruel, bloodthirsty, and vindictive, and ourselves mild, humane, and forgiving. A more cruel, barbarous, or vindictive people than our own, when their passions or interests are excited, it perhaps would be hard to find among civilized nations. We are vain boasters, and boast always of the virtues which we lack.

It is reported that our government has suggested that it may be a question whether Spain herself has not given us offence, under the seventh article of the treaty of 1795, in executing Crittenden and his associates without the formalities of trial, as secured by that article to American citizens seized for committing offences against her within her jurisdiction. We can hardly believe this. It is undeniable that we had previously violated that treaty, and the violation of any article of a treaty by one party dispenses the other. We cannot suffer our citizens in violation of treaty and of international law to wage war against her, and hold her to the rights of peace against us. We cannot own those who from our territory wage war against her, and claim for them any rights secured by treaty to American citizens, without avowing ourselves responsible for their deeds. Our citizens, when they turn pirates, cease to be citizens, and when it is once evident that they have turned pirates, our government can claim for them no right of citizenship. If the fact of piracy is sufficiently established against them, our government, unless it would avow itself their accomplice, has not a word to say, and no question can arise under the treaty as to the formality of their trial, or the tribunal before which they are tried. Crittenden and his party were undeniably pirates, the moment they embarked in the *Pampero* for the invasion of Cuba, or at least the moment they landed on the island, and from that moment ceased to be citizens of the United States; they were outlawed by the law of nations; and Spain was free to capture them within her own jurisdiction or on the high seas, and to deal with them according to her own pleasure, without offence to us or to any other state, because pirates are of no nation, but the common enemies of mankind. The most our government had any right to do was to ascertain the simple fact whether they did or did not land on the island as a part of the piratical expedition, an inquiry not under the treaty, but under the law of na-

tions, and that inquiry could be answered affirmatively at once, by their own confession. That fact is certain, undenied, and undeniable, and nobody pretends to doubt it. The government can go no further. To claim for them after this any right secured to American citizens by treaty is to make their crime its own. The government, therefore, we must believe, since it has disavowed their crime, has not suggested the possibility of any question of the sort alleged.

It is also said that our government has interceded or is interceding with the government of Madrid to liberate the pirates whose lives she has spared, but whom she retains as convicts. This we suppose must be true, but we are sorry to believe it. These convicts were criminals under our laws, and we were ourselves bound to Spain to punish them; and now we beg Spain, against whom they have committed the most grievous offences known to the law of nations, to oblige us by pardoning them. Nay, we have, if reports can be trusted, almost demanded their liberation as a right, by making it a condition of our consenting to make some slight acknowledgment of our wrongs to her! This is carrying impudence to its extreme, and places our government in the most mortifying light. It proves it deserving the scorn of the civilized world, for it proves that, whatever its professions, it sympathizes with their crimes. Indeed, we fear that the government, though it would appear to be just, really applauds their deeds, or would have done so if they had been successful. For her own security and our honor, we hope Spain will refuse to listen to the intercession. She has treated the pirates too leniently; and if she supposes that by leniency she will make a favorable impression on our countrymen, and make them less hostile to her, she entirely mistakes their character. Is she not a monarchy? Does she not profess the Catholic religion? As long as she is the one, or professes the other, and has any territory on which we can speculate or which we can annex to the Union, let her be assured that her only security from piratical attacks is in her power to enforce her rights, and in her not suffering a single hostile invader of her soil to escape with impunity,—we would say with his life.



Message of the President to both Houses of Congress, which treats the Cuban question at some length. It confirms the report of the intercession of our government for the liberation of the pirates, and the insincerity or the imbecility of the administration in regard to the proceedings we have been discussing. We have, even taking the account of the Message as strictly correct, only one statement to modify. We have stated that the *Painpero* cleared at the custom-house in New Orleans; the Message says that it "left New Orleans stealthily and without a clearance." It was stated in the journals at the time, and, as far as we are aware, has not been before contradicted, that the steamer did depart with a clearance, and that the collector of the port was in consequence removed from his office, and a new collector appointed.

The Message throws no new light on the subject, and relieves the government from none of the charges against it. The President acknowledges the illegality of the expedition, but seems to think there was nothing discreditable to the government in it, and that the government has a scrupulous regard for the rights of other nations, because we have very good laws against such expeditions. With all respect to the chief magistrate of the Union, we must remind him that the complaint is not that the laws are not good, but that they have not been enforced. We are well aware that Congress has enacted laws to prohibit, under severe penalties, even the beginning to prepare or to set on foot such expeditions, and that under international law, and our treaty with Spain, which is the supreme law of the land even in the absence of special acts of Congress, they would be prohibited; but we are not aware that those laws have ever been fairly executed. The President knows far better than we do that they have remained for the most part a dead letter, and that our citizens have repeatedly, and in the most open and shameless manner, violated them with impunity. The President would more effectually prove the American respect for the rights and honor of foreign nations by showing that these laws have not been violated, or, if violated, not with impunity, than by simply showing that we have such laws. The laws prove nothing, if they are not enforced.

The President expresses great sympathy for the relations and friends of the pirates, and for the criminals themselves,

but he expresses none for the relatives and friends of those Spanish subjects murdered by these piratical invaders of the Spanish possessions. We know no reason why he should reserve all his compassion for pirates and their friends, and have none for their victims. He tells us the government has interceded for the liberation of the invaders whose lives have been spared, but adds, with charming simplicity, if it be not downright hypocrisy, "It is to be hoped that such interposition with the government of that country [Spain] may not be considered as affording any ground of expectation that the government of the United States will, hereafter, feel itself under any obligation of duty to intercede for the liberation or pardon of such persons as are flagrant offenders against the law of nations and the laws of the United States." Wherefore did the government "feel itself under any obligation of duty" in the present case? Was it not its duty to punish these "flagrant offenders against the law of nations and the laws of the United States"? On what ground was it obliged in duty to intercede for their liberation and pardon? Was it the first, the second, the third, or the fourth time that American citizens had been guilty of the like offences? And what reason can the government have now for interceding that it will not always have in like cases? It is not the first, nor will it be the last time the government will intercede for flagrant offenders against the law of nations and the laws of the United States, and it is folly to suppose that our citizens will not regard it as a precedent.

The President undertakes to throw the blame of the expedition on foreigners, and to excuse our own citizens. This is ridiculous. The foreigners engaged found on their coming here our own citizens preparing for the invasion of Cuba, and were rather enlisted by American citizens than American citizens by them. Then what class of foreigners were those engaged in it? They were the President's favorites, the Hungarians, the companions of that very Kossuth whom he sent a ship to bring here, and who laughs at our simplicity, or hopes to cajole us into active measures for the dismemberment of the Austrian empire. It is cruel in the President to undertake to throw all the blame on his dear Hungarians. Does not the President know that foreigners were put forward in the expedition as a screen to the shrewder and less open and frank Ameri-

cans, who wished to secure all the advantages of the expedition without exposing their own breasts to Spanish bullets, or their necks to the halter? No, for very shame's sake let us not attempt to make foreign refugees, who have sins enough of their own to answer for, the scape-goat of our own delinquencies. For the expeditions fitted out from our country the Anglo-Americans are alone responsible; for if we had shown ourselves a law-loving and a law-abiding people, foreign rebels and traitors would never have dared come here to organize expeditions against powers with whom our government is at peace. We must ourselves bear the shame of these piratical expeditions, and our wisest way is to suffer the shame to lead us to repentance and reformation.

The President half hints, and the country generally, if we may judge from the press, holds, that if the Creole population had been in a state of revolt, and really fighting for independence of the mother country, it would have excused, if indeed it would not have fully justified, the invaders. Here is the root of the evil. The United States, government and people, hold that in such cases it is perfectly lawful for who will to interfere in behalf of the rebels. Nay, they go further, and hold that they have a perfect right to interfere to establish popular institutions wherever they please, although they may be restrained from doing so by prudential reasons; and the Message clearly hints that the government is preparing to enlist in a Jacobinical war for the propagation of democracy, under the pretext that the sovereigns of Europe are preparing to attack our principles,—a pretext without the slightest foundation. The sovereigns of Europe have the right of self-defence, and our conduct may force them to combine to resist our lawless and revolutionary interference in their domestic affairs, but not to make any attack on us. Mr. Webster's letter to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires was of course a declaration of hostility to all Continental monarchical governments, and was intended to advertise them that this country and all its influence would be thrown on the side of their rebellious provinces and subjects. That was no after-dinner letter; it was the expression in an official form of the long entertained and settled hostility of its author to the monarchical institutions of Europe, excepting always the *quasi*-monarchy of Great Britain. The interposition of

the administration and of Congress in the liberation of Kossuth, and the opportunity thus afforded him of aiding the Red-Republican conspiracy organized throughout all Europe, proves that the government and people of the United States take that letter as the official expression of their convictions and resolution. The conduct of the American Minister at the Court of St. James, in relation to the reception of Kossuth, although his opportune sickness prevented him from directly committing his government, and the speech of ex-Secretary Walker at the Kossuth banquet at Southampton, indicate that the English government is expected to coöperate fully with ours. This it is expected will provoke Austria and Russia to take precautions against us, and these precautions which we provoke are to be made, as is more than hinted in the Message, pretexts for active interference in behalf of European rebels, more especially, we presume, in behalf of Hungary, although the battle must be fought in France or Germany.

Now, so long as both government and people hold these views and such a course just, it is in vain to expect that our people will, any further than they deem it prudent, respect the rights of nations. It is idle for the President, avowing principles, as he does in his Message, identical, although less broadly expressed, with those of the letter of the Hon. Secretary of State to which we have referred, to talk against such expeditions as that against Cuba. He must, if he would speak with effect, condemn the principle on which the American people justify it. As long as he proclaims, whether through his Message or the official correspondence of his Secretary of State, that principle, he only sanctions the expeditions he condemns. The grand error of our government and people is that they outlaw, in their own minds, all monarchical governments, and therefore render it lawful for who will to make war on them or their subjects, — subject only to prudential restraints. This serves our people as a pretext for any scheme of robbery and plunder they choose to undertake. It is not that in general they care whether other countries are monarchical or democratic, but that they must have some sort of cloak for their depredations upon the possessions of others. The real motive is the sordid thirst for gold, or the insane desire to extend the territory of the Union, for the

sake of the wealth that fortunate speculators may acquire. No check to their land-stealing can be put till every pretext is removed, and they are obliged to call their acts by their real name. Then, perhaps, there will be found honest men enough in the country to make them desist.

But we have exhausted our space. We have spoken strongly, and have not spared our countrymen; we have done so, because as a Christian and a patriot we could not do otherwise. We love our country, but we blush for the immorality of our countrymen. We have been severe on the government, but, culpable as it has been and is, we believe it far better than the active and influential portion of the people it represents. The active mass of our people, those who influence public affairs and give tone and character to the country, we believe to be utterly destitute of all sense of religion or morality, and capable of any iniquity demanded by their interests or their passions. They are ingenious, skilful, energetic, but in transferring the property of others to themselves. The boasted skill and energy of the Anglo-Saxon race on this continent have been most strikingly displayed in land-stealing. The word is hard, we know it, but it is true. We started with fair and honorable principles towards foreign nations, for then we were weak, and must solicit, not command. Now we fancy ourselves strong, and we *are* strong, and there is no nation that could have a war with us without suffering severely. We are strong, and we believe ourselves even stronger than we are, and we become overbearing and aggressive, especially to our weaker neighbors. We are strong, and we are preparing to use our strength, in defiance of honor and justice, against the peace of the world. We know that we gain no friends by saying this; we know that we war against our own interest in saying it; but it is true, and it is true that it was said by an American, not in wrath or exultation, but in true love and deep sorrow. It is not yet too late to amend our faults, and to return to the paths of justice and honor. At present both are abandoned; law receives no respect; the most sacred obligations are thrown off, and we are heedless of every duty that it does not please us to perform. Can things continue thus with us, and we not rush to speedy destruction?

We claim to be an order-loving and a law-abiding people; yet no law here can be enforced that is not backed by

public sentiment. What you call your neutrality laws are every day violated with impunity. Your Fugitive Slave Law, have you fairly executed it in a single locality where public opinion was strongly against it? Have you succeeded in convicting a single one of those who have notoriously conspired to resist its execution? Let us, my countrymen, cease boasting, and endeavor to see ourselves, for once, as we really are. Be assured that we have ample reason to humble ourselves collectively and individually, as really the most lawless and shameless people on the globe, that claims to be ranked among civilized nations. We have forgotten God, we have bowed low at the shrine of Mammon; and in vain do we trust to our riches and our material prosperity. These will not save us. The pride and selfishness, the insensibility to honor, the indifference to all lofty moral principle, because so universal, are dangerous enemies, not merely to our virtue, but to our national existence. Let us remember that justice exalteth a nation, and sin is a reproach to any people. Let us remember that no nation can long prosper that disregards virtue, and that gives loose reins to every base or sordid passion of corrupt nature. It is to recall these things to the remembrance of our countrymen that we have written as we have, and it matters little what they do or say to us if they will only profit by what we have written. Their own consciences will bear us witness that we have spoken nothing of them that is not true, and which may not be said without malice.

Let not our readers, however, suppose that we believe our countrymen are the only people in the world that deserve to be censured. Other nations have their faults, as well as we ours, but it is our business to ascertain and correct our own faults, not theirs. We are a young people, and seldom is it that a people grows more virtuous as it grows older, stronger, and wealthier. There are, no doubt, large numbers of our countrymen who abound in the human virtues, but, unhappily, they have little to do with public affairs, and it is the lawless, the grasping, the vicious, that give a tone to our national character, and determine our public policy.

- ART. IV.—1. *L'Italie Rouge, ou Histoire des Révolutions de Rome, etc.* Par LE VICOMTE D'ARLINCOURT. Paris. 1850.
2. *République et Royauté en Italie.* Par J. MAZZINI. Paris. 1850.
3. *Glances at Europe, in a Series of Letters from Great Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, &c., during the Summer of 1851.* By HORACE GREELEY. New York: De Witt & Davenport. 1851. 8vo. pp. 350.
4. *Westminster Review*, January, 1851. Art. VII.

"Cæs. The ides of March are come !  
 "Sooth. Ay, Cæsar ; but not gone !"

EUROPE is again in labor. She will again bring forth a mouse, but not without dealing death among the people who stand near to witness the event. Curious by-standers at a riot are commonly the first victims when the order to fire is given. The authors of the troubles of 1848 are safe, in London, with full purses, and with full confidence in their ability to replenish them, and to creep out of danger in 1852, as they did before. Meanwhile the innocent or indifferent inhabitants are left to pay the taxes, and to repair their ruined dwellings or fortunes in season for the second coming of Mazzini.

Europe is apparently on the eve of another general outbreak. It is probable that only the accidental circumstance that the French Presidential election will not take place until May, 1852, has prevented the signal-trumpet from sounding until now. The revolutionary forces are well drilled, and, as they are at present a defeated party, they are obedient to their leaders. Mazzini has borrowed large sums of money, and he has chosen an ingenious method for increasing those sums. He reaches the bottom of purses, as less distinguished highwaymen do, through the mortal fears of their owners. His is a life insurance company for the coming struggle. Who-soever takes stock will have reasonable security that his life will be spared by the revolutionists. All others are at the mercy of Mazzini, and, if they be good Christians or loyal subjects, their doom is spoken. The borrowed money will be repaid when the Triumvirs once more sit in their chairs on the Capitoline Hill. Wherefore Mazzini,

in a recent proclamation, warns Europe that the hour is beginning to strike.

Kossuth, at the present moment the revolutionary idol of falling Europe, repeats the antiphon chanted by the Italian conspirator. He, too, in a recent speech, assured his delighted English hearers that the hour had come, and the man. This quiet confidence of the leaders and the silence of their men may possibly be only a thing designed to frighten the kings and their peaceable subjects. The cry of Wolf! may be raised when the wolf has no serviceable claws or teeth. But it is more likely that the conspirators are confident of success. Their secret clubs are organized in every town and hamlet. The elements in their favor are numerous; the adverse elements are either unknown or omitted in their calculations. The governments appear to be satisfied that the boasting language of the revolutionists is predicated on men, money, and arms, a good basis for boasting. Louis Napoleon, in his message to the representatives of France, tells them plainly that the cloud is bigger than a man's hand, and that France must get ready, seeing that the storm is near. The other great powers of the Continent have their soldiers, by hundreds of thousands, prepared to march to any point, at any moment. Upon the whole, there is sufficient evidence to warrant the belief that 1852 will be the prophetic year of blood.

France, Hungary, and Italy have been selected as the fields of battle, and the conspirators in each country claim the privilege of opening the fight.

It is true that a powerful, restless, and disappointed minority in France is in favor of a new revolution. But the aspect of French politics is not very disheartening to a cool observer. The present government was elected by an overwhelming majority, a circumstance which democrats are accustomed to regard as an authoritative decision of the nation. The opposition of the French Reds to the will of the majority proves that they are not even democrats, but terrorists. The majority of deputies sent to represent the French nation are pledged to the conservation, at least, of what is left of France. The President seems to be fully aware of the dangers which beset France, and convinced that his government is able to solve any doubts or difficulties which Ledru Rollin and his companions may have



prepared for the consideration of the French army. Ledru Rollin may be strong, but the nation is stronger, and the President is strongest. His recent by-play with the revolutionists, with reference to the electoral law, is an exquisite movement in its way. Louis Napoleon is a better man than most persons were willing to admit, and it is very possible that 1852 will develop in him things for which few are disposed to give him credit now. In the mean time, he is a cautious statesman, and he has the majority of Frenchmen, if not of their representatives, ready to support his measures. The only real obstacle is the constitutional check upon the permanence of his government. But a constitution in France does not mean what constitutions mean in other countries. It was made to order during a revolution, and before the mob of Paris had ceased to claim the right to speak for the nation.

And in enumerating the grounds for hope in the triumph of law over terrorism in France, we must not lose sight of the fact, that every one of the anarchists is also an atheist, an enemy of the Church of God, and that the incense of sacrifice and of prayer daily ascends from France to the Ruler of nations, that he may deliver the people from enemies who never sowed any thing but evil, and never reaped any thing but a harvest for themselves. Upon the whole, the prospects of France are not very dark.

Hungary would not move if she could, and could not if she would. There are disaffected persons in Hungary. There are men who yet look upon Kossuth as a hero. These are a portion, perhaps a small majority, of the half-spurs, the untitled Magyar nobles, the greater part of whom are Protestants. They are the race which betrayed Hungary to the Turk three times. It was their fault that Hungary is a country now twice conquered by Austrian arms. The whole Magyar race are a minority in Hungary. The Slaves, who are the majority, are not disposed to rebel against a government which liberated them from the Magyar domination of a thousand years. The Magyars themselves have no cause for complaint, and it is a significant circumstance that the radical press has not even invented a story to tell against the Austrian administration of affairs during the last two years. It is not unsafe to hazard the conjecture, that the inhabitants of Hungary have never been governed in a manner so satisfactory to

themselves as they have been since the victory of Austria over Magyardom. And there are other considerations which may serve to induce the conclusion that Kossuth will be, for the third time, a disappointed demagogue. Austria has made her peace with Rome. This one circumstance is worth considering. She is a strong power. The great majority of her subjects are loyal. And in the work which Kossuth promises her, she will receive the assistance of Russia, if she think proper to request it. Notwithstanding the threats of Kossuth, the empire is not in mortal peril. Indeed, his recent conduct seems to prove that he has no great confidence in his followers, and that he bases all his hopes upon the chances of English and American intervention. He is certain to have the coöperation of the Continental democrats, notwithstanding whatever praise he may choose to bestow upon constitutional monarchy, because Austria is in their way as well as in his. If they can do nothing in France and Italy, he can do nothing in Hungary. Meanwhile he has trimmed his course so as to suit every conceivable circumstance, but with all his caution, and he is a consummate politician of the tricksome school, he has found that the maxim, All things to all men, can be successfully reduced to practice only by a servant of God, a character which he is far from sustaining. The consequence has been that even his friends, we mean his English friends, have found him out, as the phrase is. He will be seriously aided only by those persons or parties to whom a revolution in Catholic countries is desirable, no matter by whom, or by what means brought about. The noisy demonstrations in honor of the Hungarian traitor can have no influence worth mentioning upon European politics. They afford a holiday, a little newspaper gossip, and little else. Of course, for the little men who get them up, they are great events.

Italy is not, so far as internal sources against anarchy are concerned, in the same precise category with France and Hungary. The revolutionists there have chances of success which are wanting in other countries, and it may be that Mazzini's boast that Italy will be the first to rebel was not an unconsidered menace. Italy is divided into several kingdoms, and it is not difficult to conceive that several arms directed by one head, or centre, will prove, in certain important respects, more efficient than the same

arms directed by several heads. Unity of action is a powerful means of success in any operation, but it is not commonly obtained where different governments are interested in the same policy. Mutual distrust, or jealousy, diversity of opinion, as well as rivalry among the captains, combine to make unity and energy of action more desirable than easy in the day of battle.

One of the states of Italy is already in Mazzini's hands. It is Sardinia. This kingdom is at variance with the Holy See; it has broken its faith with the Pope; it has interfered in a violent manner with ecclesiastical rights and immunities, guaranteed by the laws of the state and sanctioned by the canon law; it has exiled bishops for their fidelity to the Church; it has erected houses for Protestant worship, and it has generally placed itself in a schismatical attitude towards Rome. In this respect, it is nearly all that Mazzini professes to desire. It goes by the name of a constitutional kingdom, and, like some other states governed under that form, it is chargeable with more real despotism than obtains in Christian countries governed according to absolute forms. The young king may be well meaning, but he began his reign under unfortunate auspices. The Sardinian armies had been defeated for the second time; the road to Turin was open to Radetzky; the nation was liable to a severe punishment for its breach of faith towards Austria; the king had abdicated in despair; Turin was filled with hot-brained enthusiasts; Genoa was in the hands of democrats, and the other states of Italy were in a revolutionary tumult. The young king found himself in a difficult position, and his solution of the problem was a fatal one. He resolved to maintain the patchwork constitution which the democrats had improvised in a week for his father, and he threw himself into the arms of the Liberals, as they are called, where he still remains. He is a mere cipher in the hands of his ministers, some of whom are able writers, but all atheists. Their programme for Italy is substantially the same with that of Mazzini. The young king, like his father, is made to work his own ruin in behalf of Young Italy, and, like his father, he will be most liberally betrayed. Mazzini declared his policy as early as September, 1846. The sovereigns were to be used until it became possible to do without them; they were to be urged by prayers, threats, and praises, to grant reforms, and

when it should become evident that they had granted every reform at all consistent with the essential rights of the throne, they were to be urged to grant a suicidal measure. They would refuse. Then the cry of a United Italian Republic was to be raised, and the sovereigns would find, when too late, that they had been all along in the hands of sworn enemies. If the frightened monarch should beg for mercy, and offer to grant at least a part of what was asked, even to the manifest detriment of the rights of the crown, the cry was to be raised, "*Troppo tardi!*" "It is too late!" These were the tactics prescribed to the liberals by their exiled chief. The unfortunate king of Sardinia is the dupe, perhaps the willing dupe, of a similar plot.

Mazzini has yet other grounds of reliance upon success. He has his followers in Italy. Numerically considered, they form an inconsiderable minority of the inhabitants; but circumstances combine to make them a powerful minority. They are scattered over the whole country, not a city or village is without them; and, through the complicated but efficient machinery of their secret societies, they form a united body, governed with a rod of iron, governed with an inflexible despotism which has no parallel in the history of tyrannies, which extorts blind obedience from the initiated, requires them to do any deed, no matter how devilish, when bidden to do it, and punishes disobedience, faint-heartedness, or a returning conscience with speedy and violent death. These men are found in every walk of life. They meet in palaces, in hotels, and in hovels. They are in the army, both as officers and as soldiers. They are to be found among the courtiers, and other persons admitted upon an intimate footing with the unsuspecting sovereigns. They are to be found even among priests, as Gavazzi, and others who might be named, prove too well. This organization is powerful in Italy, inasmuch as it is absolutely at the command of its chiefs. Darkness, silence, and mystery make it more terrible to quiet people than it really is, or need be. No one can tell who or how many are initiated, where they meet, how they communicate, who will be their next victim, when or where they will raise the bloody flag. All this, of course, increases the efficiency of the society. Occasionally the chiefs show their power. A prime minister, a zealous priest, or other person obnoxious to them, is in their secret meetings doomed to die.

The assassins are selected, and at the appointed moment the murder is done. Not long since, the chiefs issued an order that no member should smoke tobacco, or allow others to do so if they could prevent it. The order was scrupulously obeyed, and the dealers in tobacco lost some thousands of their best customers. Some persons called the order a whimsical one, others supposed that it was a scheme devised to diminish the revenues of the government. It is more probable that the chiefs simply meant to frighten the sovereigns and all peaceable citizens by showing them that there were such things as wheels within wheels; governments within governments; that, as there were in Italy thousands of men who obeyed their chiefs implicitly in the matter of abstinence from smoking in public, so the same men would follow their leaders until the Italian republic, the object of the organization, should be a European fact.

The plans of Mazzini may also look more feasible when the Italian character is attentively considered. He who says that the Italians are cowards judges them too hastily. Yet it is certain that they do not like to fight. This dislike, however, may arise from a lazy habit, a *dolce far niente* disposition, which has a place not only in the national vocabulary, but also in the national manners. That the Italians can fight well was proved in 1848 by the Neapolitan troops, who behaved nobly in the Sicilian, Calabrian, and Neapolitan insurrections. Yet the Neapolitan soldiers are, even in Italy, accused of cowardice. But it is not easy to arouse the spirit of warfare among Italians. No people in Christendom are more disposed to sit quietly under their own vines and their own fig-trees, with no one to disturb them or make them afraid. It is easy to conceive that even a small, but resolute, body of men would awe a population of this character into submission, particularly if the vines and fig-trees were spared, and only kings, priests, and such things were swept away. "*M'importe niente; non mi seccate!*" are exclamations quite as common among Italians as any others. "It is nothing to *me!* Pray, don't disturb me!" Two facts illustrative of this *m'importa niente* feeling fell under our observation at Rome in 1848. Gioberti had accomplished his base purpose, and the Jesuits had been driven out of the city by Mazzini's society. On the eve of their departure we met a friend of ours, a Jesuit, and we asked him what would become of

certain interests which required the presence of the fathers at Rome. "*M' importa nientissimo ! non seccate l' anima mia !*" was the response. "I know what I will do. *Charitas incipit ab ego*. I have a coat, boots, breeches, Lombardy hat, and a pair of false whiskers. If the mob come to the house to-night, I will take care of myself. I am willing to be a martyr, but only when there is a *causa*. The Society has seen worse days than this, and it lives. It will live, in despite of Mazzini. God will take care of the Society if the Church needs it, and if she does not, *Requiem æternam dona ei Domine !*"

That father has since risked his life in a difficult mission among barbarians, but here he had a *causa*. The coat, hat, and whiskers were needful to the Jesuit in those days. A Jesuit in the garb of his order would have been torn to pieces in June, 1848. We saw several who barely saved their lives by assuming the most improbable disguises. We saw two chased by a detachment of the National Guard. Happily, they escaped.

The other fact is this. We have seen Rome, we mean its 190,000 inhabitants, placed in what the French call a state of siege by a very small body of men, some two or three hundred hired fellows. In February, 1848, if we remember rightly, a few companies of the National Guard imprisoned the Cardinals in their houses, and permitted no one to go out of the city. But on one occasion Rome was placed in a state of siege, and there were no besiegers. Some rumor, originating with the clubs, passed from mouth to mouth, and the next day the streets were deserted. When evening came, and no signs of a tumult had been detected, the quiet inhabitants began to unbar their doors, and, snail-like, to look cautiously out from their shells. "What is to become of the government, if you honest citizens do not support it?" we asked of one of them. "*M' importa niente !* The government has no life to lose; I have. It can rise again in the world; I cannot. The Pope and his government are in better than mortal hands, and has a better defender than the S. P. Q. R. History shows that. I know that we Romans could drive these fellows out of the city, but, *caro voi !* I have but one life to lose, and I don't wish to expose it until I am obliged to do so. *Lasciate mi stare ! Non mi seccate voi !*"

In fact, when the subjects of Mazzini wished to show

how much power their master had in the city, they more than once resorted to this expedient. They would spread a rumor that something terrible, *qualche cosa tremenda*, would be done to somebody or something the next day. So the next day quiet people would bar their doors and stay at home. The cowardice of the *Papalini*, the Pope's friends, would be the subject of laughter at the clubs.

All this shows that the programme of Mazzini, so far as it is predicated upon the gentle disposition of the Romans, betrays a very mean sort of cowardice. A brave man *may* run from danger, but only a coward attacks the defenceless. There is the Pope, and the Cardinals, with the prelates composing the civil and ecclesiastical government of Rome, all priests, and therefore men of peace by virtue of their order, and most, if not all of them, men who would not shed blood to save their own lives; men who are so merciful to murderers, even, that, if any excuse whatever can be found to commute the sentence of the convicted man into imprisonment, they gladly seize the excuse. There are the priests, and religious of both sexes, who form no small portion of the inhabitants of Rome, and whose influence in making the Romans practical members of the peace society is very great. And another cause of the gentleness which is so evident in the genuine Roman this side of the Tiber is commonly overlooked. There is scarcely a family which has not a member, whether son or brother, daughter or sister, or some relation, in holy orders or in a convent. This state of things has obtained for centuries, and it is one of the principal causes of the quiet, peaceable manners which characterize the Romans of our day. The soldiers,—no one ever saw such gentle soldiers. No doubt but that they are brave,—bravery is quite consistent with gentleness,—but the government does not often permit them to prove their valor. The Swiss Guards who were stationed at the Quirinal might have cleared the square, and saved the city, in November, 1848, but his Holiness would not suffer them to defend even him from the murderous assaults of his ungrateful people. He might have remained at Rome, but a few lives would have been lost. He chose rather to fly. Of course, it is not for us to criticize any thing which the great and holy Pontiff may think proper to do. It is a pity that the commander-in-chief did not first clear the square, as a thing in the ordinary routine of

his duty, and then ask permission from the Holy Father to do it. We like the story told of a Cardinal, who was obliged to stay in Paris during the worst season of the Revolution, when it was a capital offence to be a priest. A ruffian burst into his room with a drawn sword in his blood-stained hand. The Cardinal sat at his table, reading, and two pistols flanked the book. When the fellow entered, the Cardinal quietly took up one of the pistols. "Go, vile priest! and say your next mass in hell!" roared the Liberal, brandishing his sword and preparing to strike. "Very well," said the Cardinal, "but go you first, and prepare the wine and water!" The bullet was surer than the Cardinal intended, and the ruffian dropped, dead. The servants carried the body out, and the Cardinal resumed his reading.

To complete the enumeration of the means regarded by Mazzini as reliable for the Italian tragedy of 1852, we have only to refer to his loan, to his hatred of the Church, or of the Pope, which is the same thing, and to his secret alliances in other kingdoms. If his friends are to be believed, he has at his command a great sum of money, collected for revolutionary purposes, and hypothecated upon the property now owned by the Church, and by the friends of the Pope in Italy. The failure of his plans for regeneration forms no part of his programme. He repeats the boast of Cæsar, *Veni, vidi, vici*, but in the future tense. The events of the campaign, from the first simultaneous rising to the moment when he will again survey his Rome from his Capitol, and when he will repay the borrowed moneys with usurious interest, are almost circumstantially laid down in his letters. How can men help giving him money, how can any Italian refuse, particularly when the collector tells him very significantly that his money will save his life, as his name will be inscribed in the list of patriots! But suppose the government find his name inscribed as a holder of Mazzini stock? It is cruel to place a poor Italian, who so loves his *dolce far niente*, between two such warm fires. But when were the tender mercies of a liberal other than cruel?

A great portion of this money comes from British and Continental Protestants and atheists, from that indescribable horde which is united upon one thing only, — to hate the Pope, and to leave no means untried to drive him from



Rome. The Evangelical societies, particularly, are very useful to Mazzini, inasmuch as they can easily raise money, circulate falsehoods, and excite the crowd. The Italian revolutionists rely greatly upon Protestant aid. They promise to encourage the growth of Protestantism in Italy, and more especially in Rome, the only city in the world in which heresy never had a public meeting-house; in which it was never necessary to chant the Nicene Creed, and in which it was not chanted, as some say, until the eleventh century. Indeed, they did promote the spread of Protestantism, as far as they dared, in the face of a Catholic people. So they circulate stories of the Italian willingness to receive the Bible. So they encourage the distribution of a notoriously corrupted Bible among the people. When a midnight meeting of conspirators is visited by the police, and the ringleaders arrested, the prisoners are always sure to be hopeful Protestants, whose only crime is that of meeting with a few friends to read the word of God. No lie told by the Italian liberals is so disgusting, so clearly indicative of the utter want of one spark of honor and of honesty in them, as their lie concerning the rarity of the Bible in Italy. If they had said that it was to *them* a book unopened, unheard of after they ceased to be Roman Catholics and became liberals, their story would have been nearer the truth. To those who know any thing about Italy, the story of the Italian refugees at New York who met to read and cry over the Bible, a book heretofore sealed to them, is a source of great merriment. Colonel Forbes attempted to profit by the ignorance and superstition of Protestants in these matters. He went about borrowing money, which is to be faithfully expended, during the coming revolutions, in printing and circulating tracts, and similar revolutionary devices. Messrs. Baird and Kirk, Pasquino and Marforio, were his sponsors. It is quite unnecessary to say, that the Bibles prepared for Italian use are corrupt and condemned versions. Of course, the authorized edition would never be distributed, or even mentioned, by the cunning regenerators of Italy. It would not be safe to allow simple Protestants, who contribute the moneys, to know any thing about its existence.

The policy of Mazzini, in this matter, is remarkably cunning. Probably he despises Protestantism heartily; he cannot well help it, for he is of an old and honorable Italian

family. But he is aware that the introduction of spurious Bibles, and of a spurious religion, will grieve his Holiness, and all good Christians, while it will secure to him the active influence and assistance of Protestants everywhere, and possibly of Protestant governments; certainly of the English administration, which is quite as much interested as he is, not only in grieving the Pope, but in driving him from Rome. For the rest, it is difficult to conceive such a thing as a Protestant Italy. Protestantism may be acceptable to an illogical race, like the Anglo-Saxon, and it is. Protestantism is a system of contradictions, of negative conclusions from affirmative premises, and of affirmative consequences from negative principles. Hence the bad logic, materialism, analytic and inductive philosophy, apotheosis of steam and machinery, and the Protestantism of Anglo-Saxondom. None of these things are chargeable to the Italian. Even the materialists of Northern Italy, who sometimes appear to advocate the introduction of these English peculiarities, handle their subject like awkward apprentices. The Italian does not understand such tools. What England has reduced to practice was matter of speculation, and only of speculation, in Italy, ages ago. The theories of Bacon were known to Italians before Bacon was born. But it is of no use to plant the institutions of the Anglo-Saxon in the Peninsula. It is with the rest of the institutions as it is with the steam-engine. The Italian understands the theory of steam-power as well as the Englishman does, but when a real steam-engine is to be used in Italy, an Englishman must bring it and take care of it. And the Protestant must bring his heresy and take care of it, for the Italian will not lift a finger in its behalf, unless some immediate interest, like that of revolutionizing Italy with Protestant help, may induce him, for a time, to give it such countenance as the starving Irish Catholic gives to it when it brings him food and clothes. The Italian mind is more logical than the French, notwithstanding the assertion of Arlincourt in the book cited at the head of this article. Where it requires three hundred years for the Englishman to see through Protestantism, the Italian understands it at once. He is fully aware that it is atheism, disguised in rags which the Italians cannot wear. So, when he ceases to be a Roman Catholic, he pushes his negation at once to its logical terms, he

finds that they are atheism, and an atheist he accordingly becomes. The Italian atheist, however, is in full communion with Evangelicals, because he hates the Pope. A coalition on that basis makes him a hero in the Protestant world.

Finally, the programme of Mazzini indicates great reliance upon the coöperation of secret societies throughout Europe. Now that Kossuth is at liberty, they are ready for action. A simultaneous rising in every Continental nation is to be effected by the societies when the signal shall be given. This policy is necessary on their part, for it would not be prudent to have the movement successive in different countries. A simultaneous outbreak will keep each government busy at home, it will prevent French or Austrian interventions in Italy, and it will spread universal terror. The members of the societies will be compelled to fight somewhere, for the common cause. Their terrible obligations preclude cowardice or escape. According to the thirtieth and four following articles of the constitution of the association, the coward, the disobedient, he who divulges any secret, and any person not of the society who is judged dangerous, be he prime minister, general, or ecclesiastic, shall be judged by the secret tribunal, two assassins shall be named, and if they refuse to commit the murder, their own doom is sealed. The victim, says article thirty-third, shall be pursued with unrelenting rigor; no country shall be to him a refuge; he shall be poniarded, even were he in the bosom of his mother, or on the altar of Christ.

Such are Continental prospects, so far as they appear favorable to Mazzini and his companions. It cannot be denied that they afford to revolutionists some grounds of confidence, and to the friends of true liberty some cause for uneasiness. Yet there are some reasons which justify the opinion that the defeat of the terrorists will be more signal in 1852-53 than it was in 1848-49. We will briefly sum them up, as most of them have been insinuated in the foregoing paragraph.

The legitimate governments are in possession, and they are fully aware of the danger with which they are threatened. Mazzini has taken such pains to publish to the world what he intends to do, that his intended victims are forewarned, and, in a great measure, forearmed.

The circumstance that Italy is divided into several kingdoms, if it be favorable to the revolutionists in so far as it deprives Italy of executive unity, is adverse to them inasmuch as it also imports a want of unity among the people. Indeed, no better sign of Italian popular discord can be imagined, than the fact that Italy, with the brief exception of the Roman domination, never was, and never could be, brought under one government. Even then there was no Italian nation. The philosophy of the remark of Napoleon, that Italy is a geographical expression, is profound. The distinction of the Italians into separate and antagonistic national elements is founded upon something intrinsic to the Italian character. What that may be we leave to the speculation of others, but it is certain that this one fact outweighs all the brilliant theories of the unfortunate Gioberti, in his *Primacy of Italy*. The Italian primacy must always be *in fieri*, and he who sees it *in facto esse* will see the ninth wonder of the world. This adverse fact paralyzed Young Italy in 1848. Mazzini complains of it bitterly in the book cited at the head of this article. The patriots could agree upon nothing whatever. The Piedmontese, Lombard, Florentine, Neapolitan, and Roman troops were in distinct camps; the generals would not obey the royal commander-in-chief, they would not or could not forget national antipathies, their soldiers fought one another more zealously than they fought the Austrians, and, to make the matter worse, the secret societies directed almost all their attention to the supposed ambitious movements of Charles Albert, and threw every obstacle in his way which craft could devise without the appearance of openly siding with the Austrian troops. His was an unfortunate position, inasmuch as Mazzini had determined that he should be dethroned if he did not declare war against the Austrian sovereignty in Italy, and that he should be dethroned at any rate, after he had done for Young Italy all that a king and a soldier could do. Mazzini, in his address to the young men of Milan, bewails the want of Italian unity in his rhetorical way. He complains that the war had already lasted four months, and had accomplished nothing. "I look around," he says, "and I see the struggles of desperate populations, . . . . but the heart of the country, where is it? What unity is there in this unequal and manifold movement. I hear about the Italy of the

North, of leagues, of federative compacts, but ITALY, where is it?"

What else could be expected. There were the secret societies for a Red Republic. There were the moderate republicans. There were the national republicans, and the advocates for independent republics. There were the friends of Charles Albert and of his Italian crown. There was the party which asked for Italy as one kingdom, under some foreign prince. There were the constitutional monarchists. There were the advocates of a federative league of sovereigns, with the Pope as supreme moderator. And all these discordant elements were in arms on the plains of Lombardy, jealous of one another to the last degree of intolerance, without experienced captains, and headed by a king who knew that the chances were nine in ten that he would be ruined, whichever way the campaign might end. There were the national camps united only upon one thing, which was, that whatever might be proposed by one should be rejected by the others, on the ground that it was a Roman, a Florentine, or a Neapolitan proposal. Even Greeley, who halted in Italy for only a few days, was long enough in the country to despair of Italian nationality and independence, and he expresses his opinion very fully. "Genoa," he says, "is jealous of Turin, Turin of Milan, Florence of Leghorn, and so on. If Italy were a free republic to-day, there would be a fierce quarrel, and I fear a division, on the question of locating its metropolis. . . . . And I should hardly be surprised to see some of the states, chagrined by an adverse decision, leaguings with foreign despots by way of avenging their fancied wrongs. . . . . There are brave and noble Italians, but the majority are neither brave nor noble." Greeley thinks that Italy will never be a nation until Italians learn to look more coolly at cannon in the daylight, and to be less handy with their knives in the dark. He echoes the usual story that Rome is heartily republican, but he doubts whether three republican and effective regiments could be raised among the Romans. He admits that the greater part of the fighting done at Rome was done by other than Roman citizens. We all knew that before. From these evidences of an utter want of unity among Italians, it is reasonable to infer that Mazzini will not be able to do much in 1852, and that the notable unity of his clubs cannot control the discordant

mass. There will be an insurrection here and there, much innocent and some guilty blood will flow. Religion will be outraged, private and public property will suffer, provisional governments may endure for a short time, the leading patriots will fill their purses, but if foreign intervention do not destroy Italian nationality, Italian discord will dispose of it at a cheaper rate.

The liberalism of Sardinia may favor the plans of Mazzini in some respects ; but when the revolution begins, that kingdom will be of little or no use to him, unless it send the king after his father, and become a republic. That consummation is a part of Mazzini's programme, and the court of Sardinia, no doubt, deserves ill-fortune ; but it is quite an open question whether Mazzini will not be disappointed. In that event, Sardinia will be in his way. The king will employ all his resources to save his crown, and, if his soldiers be as loyal as they were in 1848, he will be likely to succeed. In that case, the Italian republic will certainly obtain no assistance from him, and it will, perhaps, have to meet his troops. It is scarcely possible for him to be a spectator of the event, inasmuch as the republic would not treat his crown with much regard. Should Mazzini affect to make an exception to his programme of an Italian republic in favor of the young king, and should Sardinia repeat the alliance of 1848 with republicanism, internal animosities, jealousies, and sectional differences are as potent now as they ever were. It must be confessed, however, that Sardinia has adopted a policy which must end in a republic. Perhaps the government will make its peace with Rome. Late advices seem to indicate that this may occur.

Perhaps as unfavorable a circumstance as any other to the republic is, that Italy does not want a republic, and does not know what to do with it. This circumstance should induce even democrats to let her manage her own affairs. It is an extraordinary circumstance that a secret association, composed of less than a twentieth of the inhabitants, should be in a position to overrule the majority, and to overturn established governments. Yet secret societies, even in America, are very powerful, and there is no question but that they control our own elections in several States. It is true that the liberals say that the Italians are republicans at heart ; but lying is a part of their trade. Our

Cuban hunters said the same thing of the loyal inhabitants of Cuba. Italian history contradicts them at every step. The Italian genius inclines the government to an elective monarchy based upon aristocracy and tempered with democratic forms.

Moreover, the republic is too costly an affair. The people are thoroughly convinced of it since the experience of 1848. The damage done to public and private property will not be repaired for many years, and in some cases never. Commerce and trade are paralyzed, of course, and general distress ensues. The Roman troubles once reduced the population to 13,000, and the republic would and did, even in its short time, begin to depopulate the city. The revolutionists always contrive to take care of what funds they find in the treasury, to raise more by taxation and by robbing churches of their sacred vessels and bells, and to keep a bank-note press going night and day, in order that the conspirators may keep the silver and gold, and flood the country with paper money which they promise to redeem, of course failing to keep their promise. They leave that to increase the embarrassments of the returning government. On the whole, it is a good speculation for the liberals to get up a revolution every few years, even at the hazard of their lives. The insurgent chiefs must expend vast sums upon their secret emissaries and street-rioters. We find in a report of the Florentine commission, that 200,000 francs were distributed, in 168 days, among petty officers and street-rioters. Colonel Forbes figures in this list for 600 francs. The list of expenses is very long. Upwards of 200,000 francs were expended in Paris, to bring rioters to Italy, and to convert them into Roman patriots. Among other items, there is one of 400,000 francs against the revolutionist Mordini, who sent the money to his own banker, at Paris. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The cruelty of the terrorists is beyond description, and it is not likely to make their enterprise successful. It is a fearful thing to know that your life is at the mercy of a secret, irresponsible club; that your servant, companion, or friend may be a spy, bound to report your words and actions to his leaders; that your enemy may, at any moment, falsely denounce you, and that your death may already be decreed by the invisible tribunal. The republic is not likely to be benefited by the knowledge that persons assassi-

nated by its order are never atheists and conspirators, but always good Christians or useful and loyal citizens. We cannot dwell upon this subject. Suffice it to say, that the number of persons assassinated in cold blood at Rome will never be known on earth. It is in evidence that upwards of a hundred and twenty priests were used as targets by the Roman patriots at the convent of St. Calixtus, and that their bodies were sown in the garden. After the entrance of the French, the bodies received Christian burial.

The gross impiety of the liberals is not calculated to prejudice the Italians in favor of the republic. We have not space to dwell upon this head, nor is there need. The robbery of Church property, the burning of confessionals, the scandalous orgies enacted in the house of God, the infamous lives of some of the leaders, the excesses of the soldiers, the brutal scenes daily witnessed in the streets, and in which abandoned women were actors, the public masses celebrated, under the patronage of the government, by excommunicated priests, the parodies and mockery of the Holy Sacraments and Mysteries in the Corso and in other places, the profanations to which the Blessed Sacrament was exposed, tell the tale with sufficient clearness. The following atrocity has been related to us on good authority. A club of liberals was established expressly to dishonor the Holy Sacrament. It met at night. Twelve abandoned women officiated as priestesses. One of them, habited modestly, would receive at an early mass, and then secure the particle in a handkerchief. At night it was laid upon a sort of stone altar, a fire was kindled, the chief demoniac stabbed it repeatedly with his dagger, and then tossed it into the fire, he vomiting blasphemies the while. The priestesses, nude, danced around the flame.

Among the internal safeguards of Italian legitimacy is the throne of Naples. The Neapolitan soldiers and people have been taxed with cowardice, and the Romans, Florentines, and Lombards were wont to make merry at their expense. Yet they fought well in 1848, and the Sicilian campaign has ranked them with the best soldiers of Europe. The king had three enemies to overcome, his republicans, the Sicilians, and Lord Palmerston. He defeated the three; and Palmerston, in a fit of boyish revenge, circulates through Europe a doleful tale of the tyranny of Naples over her prisoners. The story has proved to be un-



true. So the Neapolitan state may be regarded as a bulwark against the terrorists of 1852.

Another powerful bulwark is seldom noticed. It is the incense of prayer and sacrifice offered from the altar and from humble souls. It is, of course, impossible to estimate the precise effect of these holocausts, for God does not always answer our prayers in the sense in which we offer them. That they are answered is certain, that they have an influence upon the course of human events is also indubitable; hence, the Christian statesman always considers them in his calculations, knows that they will be effectual in some way, and believes it possible that they may be answered in their direct sense. Three months before the fall of Espartero, no one could have foreseen the event. In October, 1848, no one could have predicted the resurrection of Austria; in December of the same year, no man would have foretold the French expedition to Rome. Yet these things have happened, and it is notorious that the prayers of Christians were offered for each event. Such things have taken place in every century. Hence it is easy to account for the hatred with which terrorists pursue pious Christians. Their instinct tells them that prayers are not good for their plans.

The calculations founded by Mazzini upon aid and comfort from the Continental populations may not be verified. The great powers are ready for battle, and their troops are even now in the field. It is by no means certain that the Red Republicans will triumph in Germany and France. Louis Napoleon appears to be equal to the difficulties of his position, and his late measures are adapted to deprive the terrorists of all excuse for rebellion. The races subject to Austria exhibit no grave signs of disaffection, and the Magyars are less in a condition for successful revolt than they were in 1848. And since that year a new element has appeared in European life. Three *nations* have found where their strength and where their weakness lay. We refer to Austria, France, and Spain; particularly to the two former powers. The Church of God, through whom kings reign, was never more free in those countries than she is now.

And we do not believe that Mazzini need hope much from the alliance between England and America in behalf of revolutions, about which so much is beginning to be said.

England has enough to do at home. In America, the Irish and Catholic element is of some weight. England must do justice, full justice, to Ireland, and she must ask pardon for her penal laws, before America is likely to be drawn into any alliance with her, and the Catholic element in America will not be disposed to listen to it on any terms, inasmuch as it is devised for the annihilation of the Church in Europe.

In conclusion, we are Catholics. Then we know that the Church is in God's keeping. She has not withstood, in Italy, the storms of eighteen centuries, to be moved by this little tempest. Blood may be shed, thrones may be overturned, even the Pope may be again driven from Rome. What then? A mightier hand than that of Mazzini shapes the course of events.

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ART. V.—*Sick Calls: from the Diary of a Missionary Priest.* By the Rev. EDWARD PRICE, M. A. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1851. 24mo. pp. 388.

THIS is an American reprint of an English work by the Rev. Edward Price, formerly editor, we believe, of *Dolman's Magazine*. It appears to have been suggested by a work which enjoyed some popularity a few years since, entitled *Passages from the Diary of a Physician*. It is written with more than ordinary literary taste and ability, and the several scenes it sketches, most of them undoubtedly drawn from the life, are intensely interesting. They could have been sketched only by a missionary priest, of large experience among the poor and the vicious of our modern commercial cities, although it is evident that the author has borrowed much of the grouping and coloring from his own lively imagination.

The author has laid bare the moral wounds festering in our modern overgrown cities, and perhaps has given us even too vivid a picture of the vice and immorality with which the faithful missionary necessarily becomes acquainted in the discharge of his duty. But he seems to have done it from pure and praiseworthy motives, for the purpose of showing the power of religion to heal the

worst moral maladies, to triumph over the hardest hearts, and to relieve and console the most miserable of our race. He manifests great tenderness to the fallen, and suffers no moral leprosy to disgust him with a soul for whom our Lord has died; and he everywhere shows a tendency to excuse the depraved, and to find in the most abandoned some tokens of grace. He has no sourness, no harshness; but, as is invariably the case with the true priest, the deeper the wounds, the greater the sinner, the more does his heart open to him, and the warmer flows his charity, to rescue him from his degradation, to cleanse his soul, to make him whole, and prepare him for the banquet of divine love. This is as it should be. Sinners are gained by love, and won over to our Lord, not by severity, but by the infinite tenderness of the Gospel.

Some of our occasional readers may be surprised to hear *us* say this, for we are supposed by not a few to have no bowels of compassion, to be dry, hard, severe, unrelenting. Perhaps we are, and whether so or not is of no importance to the public. Yet there is an obvious distinction between severity in the enunciation of principles, and harshness in their application to individuals. Principles, Christian doctrines, dogmas of faith, are not ours, they are our Master's, and are strict, unbending, and immutable. When we are called upon to proclaim these, we have no option with regard to them; we have no right to harden or to soften them; we must proclaim them as they have been taught us, with unswerving and scrupulous fidelity, let them condemn whom they may. If it is our office to declare the law, we must declare it according to the mind of the Law-giver. But in the application of the law to the condemnation of this or that individual, we must always lean to the side of mercy, and give him the benefit of every extenuating circumstance; and even when we must condemn him, we cannot be too careful to show that it is the law that condemns him, not a poor, frail mortal like himself.

As laymen and reviewers, we have nothing to do with the application of the law to individual cases; we are only permitted to defend the truth against error, to speak, under correction of our pastors, of the law, and its condemnation of those who break it. We may say, Out of the Church there is no salvation, because the Church has herself so defined; we may pronounce Protestantism a damnable here-

sy, for the Church has anathematized it, and even natural reason rejects it; we may assert that no Protestant, living and dying a Protestant, can ever see God, and therefore declare all who are Protestants are out of the way of salvation, because the Church says it, and we, in being received into her communion, promised to say as much. To say this, and to add that none but Catholics can under any circumstances be saved, is in these days regarded as harsh, even cruel; and if we do so, it is supposed by many Catholics as well as heretics, that we forget the charity of the Gospel, and neglect that mercy with which we should always temper judgment. But it should be borne in mind, that in saying this we are not judging, but simply repeating the revealed and declared judgments of God, which are not our judgments, but the law or rule according to which we are to form our judgments. Whether the truths we repeat are harsh or not, the responsibility does not rest on us; but we know no right that any man has to suppose it possible for God to be harsh, severe, or unkind. St. Peter says, expressly, that there is no other name than that of Jesus under heaven given to men whereby we must be saved. Neither is there salvation in any other. God was not obliged to save any man, and all salvation is the free gift of God, for we are saved by grace. God could, without any right of complaint on our part, fix the conditions on which he would or would not save those who had sinned against him. If he has fixed those conditions, and declared that he will save none who are not joined to the communion of his Church, it is not harshness, but simple charity, to tell the truth, and say distinctly and energetically, Out of the Church there is no salvation. We should be wanting in charity if we did not.

The charge of severity against those who insist on the doctrine of exclusive salvation, which the Church unquestionably teaches, arises from confounding the stern and unflinching statement of what the law is with its application to individuals. "Other sheep have I," says our Lord, "who are not of this fold; them also must I bring." The Lord knoweth them that are his, and we are never at liberty to say that none are elected but those already in the Church. Nor are we at liberty, without supernatural revelation, to pronounce on the future fate of even those who have *apparently* died out of the Catholic communion. If

they really died out of that communion, we know they are lost; but whether they did so die or not, in all ordinary cases, it is not for us to judge. We know the law, and we know it admits in this case of no exception, of no dispensation; but we do not know but this or that individual, whom we supposed obnoxious to its penalty, may not, in a way we know not, have been brought in reality into the fold before the soul was separated from the body. We may, indeed, have no reason to believe it, but as it was possible, we cannot say that it was not so, and therefore we cannot pronounce on its doom. As long as there is life there is hope, and therefore we can never say of any living man that he will certainly go to hell; and as we know not the actual state in which any particular soul has left the body, we cannot say that any particular departed soul is damned, although we may have strong reasons for believing, and none for not believing it. Our judgments here must be conditional, not absolute, and we must stop with saying of the living, if they die heretics or infidels they cannot be saved, and of the dead, if they have died in heresy or infidelity they are damned.

In regard to sin of every description, in teaching, in laying down the law, we must always be most rigid, for the law knows no compromise, and the judgment is certain if the sin is incurred; and here is as far as we can go. The priest, indeed, can go farther; he is appointed to judge those sinners who come to him and confess or accuse themselves of their sins. But in judging them, while he holds the law in its strictness, he takes note of all the circumstances of the acts confessed, and is careful to give the self-accused the benefit of whatever may tend to extenuate his offence. He tempers his judgment with mercy, and takes good care that he does not pronounce a heavier penalty than has been actually incurred. Moreover, knowing the frailty, the rottenness, of human nature, the seductions of the world, and the temptations of Satan, he will even when he must condemn, and it would seem even in proportion as he must condemn, melt in tenderness to the poor sinner, and clasp him to his bosom with a supernatural charity. We apprehend that confessors feel the greatest tenderness for those penitents who have had the greatest sins to confess, the deepest and most loathsome moral wounds to disclose. The penitent, all polluted with sin,

who has nothing but a long catalogue of the most loathsome moral diseases to lay bare before his confessor, is the least likely to be rudely repulsed, and is the most sure of being treated with tenderness, and having the most favorable construction put upon his sins that they will bear. The tribunal of Penance is established in mercy, and solely to heal the wounds of the soul, and to cleanse it from its pollutions; and God gives to his ministers the graces that fit them to make it not only effectual, but even attractive to those who need and will frequent it.

In our various degrees, we all in judging, not of sin itself, not of its inherent malignity, but of individuals, are to aim at the same supernatural charity, and to overflow with real love and tenderness towards those whom we regard as sinners. Our Lord did not refuse to eat with publicans and sinners, for he came to call not the just, but sinners, to repentance. The humble publican, who smites on his heart, and exclaims, "God be merciful to me a sinner!" is preferred to the proud Pharisee, who stands and enumerates his virtues, and thanks God that he is not as other men. Not always are those the world brands with infamy the most guilty before God; and who are we that we should be harsh and unrelenting to our fellow-men, however depraved they may be? Who of us has not had, and has not had every day, nay, a hundred times a day, to say, "God be merciful to me a sinner"? We may not have fallen so low as this poor brother or sister, but dare we say that we should not have fallen even lower, if we had been equally tempted, or equally exposed? Alas! no one can boast over another, and no one has any thing whereof to glory, but the cross of Christ which redeemeth from sin. Severe, then, as we ourselves are and must be in the work we are permitted to perform, and perhaps in our personal disposition, for no man thoroughly knows his own heart, we like that tone of tenderness to sinners, and even aggravated sinners, which pervades this little volume. The author contrives to make us love the sinner, and ready to die for him, without making us in the least tolerant of his sin. He makes us weep with the sinner, and rejoice with him as the waters of penance wash away his pollutions and permit us to see his soul, resplendent through the grace of the Sacrament with supernatural purity and loveliness.

Yet perhaps the author makes a little too much of the

merely human sentiments. The distinguishing mark of the disciples of Christ is love ; and this love a large portion of the uncatholic world translate into philanthropy, and another portion into mere family affections, and not a few, we fear, into a lower species of love still. We have these errors to guard against. The love which is the badge of the Christian is not sensual love, is not merely a human sentiment, whether called philanthropy or any thing else, but charity, a supernatural love, not possible save in a heart that has been regenerated and elevated by Divine grace, and which consists in loving God supremely, and our neighbor as ourselves in and for him. It presupposes faith, therefore belief of the truth, and is never found out of the Church of God. The human sentiments, which are not elevated by grace, and which are purely within the natural order, are of no value in relation to our final destiny, and, even though not sinful in themselves, seldom fail, owing to our corrupt nature, to become a temptation and a snare to those who indulge them. Philanthropy, as we see it now displayed, serves only to suggest vague and impracticable schemes of reform, and to convulse the world with rebellion and revolution, ending only in anarchy or despotism. Sentiment is almost sure, if indulged, to become lust, and to pave the way for wide-spread licentiousness and impurity. We have, therefore, to be extremely cautious, in these times, how we appeal to the natural sentiments of the human heart, and use words which the world will apply to them, though we may apply them in our own minds to truly Christian affections and virtues. Our great danger is from naturalism, and we must, therefore, be careful, in season and out of season, to insist on the supernatural affections of the Gospel.

The author, in this work, though by no means indifferent to exterior refinement and the supposed advantages of wealth and worldly cultivation, leaves an impression on the reader most favorable to the poor, and especially, Englishman as he is, to the Irish poor. In studying his sketches, we feel of how little value is this world and what pertains to it, even in relation to our positive comfort and enjoyment in this life. Faith, and piety, and trust, seem to have no little power in sustaining our physical as well as spiritual existence, — a power to multiply the widow's handful of meal and cruse of oil to an abundance far more

precious than the rich in general possess. How these poor, pious people live is a marvel to us ; yet they do live, and often render large assistance to others of their own class. They never repine, never murmur, and seem to live constantly in the presence of God. We cite here a few pages from "Death-beds of the Poor."

"God bless the poor Irish ! Their hearts warm to their clergy ; there is a rough sublimity in their attachment to their faith, in their deep reverence for its ordinances, in their almost impassioned welcome of its ministers, that throws a halo of religious beauty over their too often met with squalid poverty. I feel at home with them at once. I feel at the instant their father and their friend.

"Though Judy Flannagan may be nothing more than a poor Covent-Garden basket-woman, yet when the asthma is bad,—brought on from her tramping sturdily, and in all weathers, under a load of vegetables that would make the strongest porter pause ere he encountered its enormous weight,—still Judy Flannagan is one of nature's gentlewomen, frank, blithesome, and merry ; patient, resigned, and most devout ; vulgar-looking, certainly, to some fastidious tastes, in her half-male, half-female attire, her crushed and faded old bonnet, and her short dudeen, ever pendant from her large and eloquently-formed mouth. Judy smokes ; small blame to her. She works like a horse, and in all weathers. It is her only luxury, save a strong cup of tea. She has taken the pledge, and kept it faithfully. Judy is a childless widow ; her boys and girls have all died ; but she has reared an orphan child, whom she picked up one night half dead with the cold and the hunger, and has given it all a mother's warm and affectionate tending. Judy has also a little pusheen, whom she rescued, when a kitten, from some wicked urchins, who were worrying it to death with a costermonger's spiteful terrier. Pussy is now a fine, handsome, well-behaved cat, and Judy is not a little proud of her favorite ; and nothing pleases the old lady better in her evenings of rest, after her day's gallop under her heavily-freighted basket, than to sit sipping her tea with pussy in her lap, and the little orphan child at her knee, reciting with sweet and serious earnestness his page of catechism for the ensuing day. She sends little Tim to our large and well-conducted school ; and she bids him pray, morning, noon, and night, for the good ladies and gentlemen who subscribe to such an excellent charity.

"Judy is now eight-and-fifty years old, but is hale and hearty, barring an occasional touch of asthma, and an impression on her heart, which comes on periodically upon the anniversary of her deceased husband's death. She then invariably stays at home, sports a bit of well-preserved crape about her cap, and says her beads all



day, and most devoutly, for the repose of his soul. On that night she gives a solemn lecture to the light-hearted, laughing little Tim, as he cuddles up to his 'granny's' knee, and whose curly-pated little brow she kisses, with many a tear, with many a fond Irish phrase of endearment. Her fondness for that child is wonderful. She knew his history. He was a child of shame. He was the offspring of a farmer's daughter of her own town-land in Ireland, who was betrayed and ruined by a villain, who had promised her marriage, but who never fulfilled his pledge. The poor girl fled from her home, followed her seducer to London, but all to no avail. She lay-in at a poor lodging-house for Irish tramps, was neglected, and died broken-hearted. The child was shifted about from one neighbor to the other; was alternately starved and petted, until it crawled forth, in the absence of its rough and temporary guardian, to a neighboring court, where old Judy found it; and who, on learning its history, deposited the chubby infant in that well-worn repository, the empty basket on her head, and trudged stoutly home with her precious freight to her little snug parlor in Bedfordbury. I have a faint recollection that, upon this eventful finding of the grandson of her gossip, she rapt out a very auspicious oath, that as long as she had a bit and a sup to share, little Tim should be no ways beholden to any one for his support. Right faithfully has she kept her word. As regular as clock-work Judy comes to my confessional every Saturday night, and receives, each Sunday morning, the Holy Sacrament. She has long made a beautiful preparation for heaven: God grant that she may get there, and pray for her director, if he should survive her.

"Judy has had this last week a bad attack of asthma, is confined to her bed, and consequently out of work. A few shillings this afternoon made the old creature's heart and lips most eloquent with grateful thanks.

"But my ministrations were not confined to her. My list of sick calls was long, and extended to many a remote and squalid locality. In many of these visits, my inner mind was fed with many a thankful thought, with many a prayer of gratitude to God, on beholding the bright evidences of piety in the sick and virtuous poor,—in those who forgot not God in the days of their youth, who persevered through the hard-working days of manhood; and who, in the gray-haired, decrepit day of old age, sick and patient, resigned and dying, have so joyfully received the Church's last solemn and comforting administrations. God's peace and benison be with them! They, and such as they, are my greatest comfort; the holy souls whose last peaceful moments I feel the greatest reverence, the greatest hope, in witnessing. In them I feel most the wondrous power of my sacred ministry. In their upturned, dying gaze of reverential love,—in their deep, sorrowful, and earnest tone of contrition for the past, and entire resignation to God,—commit-

ting, with childlike, most innocent confidence, the departing souls to the God that made them, saved them, preserved them, and sustained them to that terrible hour of nature's dread and last conflict with ever-impending death, — in their last yearning, pitiful look of love to their weeping children, — in their tender and most Christian-like exhortation to them to lead good lives, to love their holy faith, — in their peculiar and most touching piety in receiving the last sacraments of the Church ; — in all this I have great joy, and wonderful compensation for the fatigues, and annoyances, and risks I run in attending the sick-beds of the poor.

“ And even when the dying Catholic has led any thing but a Christian life, but has been favored by God's mercy with a long and protracted illness, — when the mind has had time to enter into itself, — when the great truths of eternity have had time and opportunity to penetrate into that hitherto closed heart, and sow in that hitherto sterile soil the seeds of true repentance, — and when those blessed seeds of repentance have been watered daily, and hourly, and nightly, by tears of true contrition and bewailment, — when the deep and darkened well of ignorance and despair has been sounded and enlightened by the bright and searching rays of God's ineffable faith and grace, and that cold and stony heart been warmed and softened with the merciful influences of the omnipresent, all-merciful Redeemer, — the change is as great and glorious and consolatory as that upon which the two chosen sisters of Israel gazed, — the resurrection of Lazarus from his four days' detention in the grave.” — pp. 274 – 279.

It is the prayers of these poor Irish, perhaps, of that poor apple-woman that sits meekly and uncomplainingly day after day, in all weathers, at the corner of the street, waiting almost in vain for a customer for her scanty supply of fruit, saying as it were her beads from morning to night, that will bring down the blessings of God upon our country, and make us a Christian people. We import rare and costly merchandise from all countries, but the most precious freightage our ships bring home is these poor, pious Irish men and women, who, if they have nothing else, are rich in grace, and have learned every thing worth learning, in having learned to pray.

We glanced the other day into a Protestant newspaper, *The Christian Register*, we believe, in which the editor was contrasting the little labor and large incomes of our clergy with the great labor and small incomes of Protestant ministers. We would recommend him to read the following sketch of “ A Missioner's Sunday Work.”

"Weighed down, frequently exhausted, by his heavy and laborious duties, a London priest is but ill prepared to meet the increased exertions of the Sunday, and especially the duties of the pulpit. I will exemplify this by briefly narrating one Sunday's work, which I went through in the month of May, three years ago.

"I must first premise, that I heard the confessions of nearly a hundred penitents the evening before, and that it was past midnight before I retired to rest, completely fatigued, and longing for a good night's sleep, to set me up for the labors of the ensuing day. I was not, however, thus to be gratified. I had been asleep little more than an hour, when my dreamless slumbers were rudely disturbed by a sick call of an urgent nature. It was one of my penitents, who was dying. Go I must; so, hurrying on my clothes, I got ready my ritual, the holy oil, and the pix, containing the blessed Sacrament. It was a miserable, stormy night, and about two o'clock when I started. The poor dying man resided in a little street near the New Road, that was nearly two miles distant. There was no cab to be found in any of the neighboring stands, so, buttoning my great-coat tight, I trudged on as fast as the gusty wind allowed me.

"At length, after a long and weary walk, I reached my poor penitent. I had attended him a few days previous, and heard his confession. Happy it was I did so. His malady had gained rapidly and fearfully upon him. He was now speechless: he wished to say something more in confession, but could not. A low, inarticulate moaning was all I heard. His countenance, pale, anxious, and bedewed with the agony of approaching dissolution, was at times fearfully convulsed. He clasped and wrung his emaciated hands together, raised himself partially in his bed, and when he could not make himself understood, fell back on his pillow, with anguish stamped on every fading lineament. His hearing, however, was perfect, and to each question I propounded he answered by signs. I remained long with this poor, dying brother. By degrees his agitation lessened; his features lost their haggard restlessness,—a look of calm and holy resignation succeeded his former troubled state of mind; and as I read in a low and distinct tone the beautiful and consolatory prayers of the Church, previous to administering the last sacraments for the dying, big and to me blessed tears flowed plentifully down his wasted cheeks. That heart, so soon to be stilled by the mighty hand of death, was now reconciled to its Father and its God. A look of meek and unrepining resignation, of an entire trust in the merits of his only Redeemer, stole over his face, like a dying sunset on a wasted land, when he received for the last time Him who died for his sins on the cross.

“ He was much spent when I applied the holy anointing, but his lips moved ceaselessly in prayer. The last blessing, and solemn Plenary Indulgence for the dying, completed my ministerial duties; and, with a few earnest exhortations to resign himself with a humble yet pious confidence to the mercy of his God, I returned to my home and my bed.

“ It was long before I got to sleep. I thought again and again on the dying scene I had witnessed. I thought again and again on the folly of those who delay their repentance to their last hour. Happy it was for that poor dying man, that he had repented, confessed in time; for in his death-hour speech was denied him. I thought over, in sadness of heart, of the many whom I had attended in their last hour, who were like him thus similarly afflicted; who had lost the power of confessing their sins, but who, for many years, had lived strangers to their religious duties. They had lived the usual lives of sinners, reckless, unrepenting, confident that all would be well with them at their last hour; but when that last hour came, they sank overwhelmed with that stern and holy truth: ‘ As a man lives, so shall he die.’

“ A shuddering came over me, as I thus reflected on the miserably unprepared state in which a soul, so stained with crime, so unpurified by repentance, is thus hurried suddenly before its God. Four o'clock struck,—then five, and I fell asleep. At seven I was called to hear confessions. I arose, tired and unrefreshed; my head throbbing, and very much inclined to sleep the whole day: but it might not be. Duty, imperative duty, was before me, and the day's toil began again.

“ I heard confessions till nine: I then said mass. Now, I thought, I should have a quiet hour to prepare and recollect my thoughts for my approaching sermon at eleven. No such thing. In the middle of my breakfast there came another sick call. It was a sore trial for my patience; for through a press of business, through being very unwell, I had thought little of my approaching sermon. But the sick call must be attended to, and I went.

“ It was a melancholy, though too frequent case; one of delirium tremens. Drink, miserable drink, had reduced an unhappy man to the last stage of premature decay. He possessed the wreck of once noble features; had been once in affluence, but drink, insatiate drink, had thus prematurely destroyed him. He, too, was on his death-bed, but he knew it not; his consciousness had deserted him. He was in bed, and his wasted form exhibited, in all its hideousness, the staring wildness and restless, unappeasable anxiety that characterize his malady, as well as the universal trembling whence it derives its name. The tendons of his hands and arms were spasmodically convulsed. His knees were sometimes, for a few minutes, drawn up to his chin, and then his feet would be

thrown forwards with extraordinary force, and at times, like the fatal disorder *tetanus*, or lock-jaw, the body would form an arch, resting on the head and the heels. The most mournful and appalling groans would then issue from his dark and crusted lips, — more like the expiring howl of a wild beast, than the voice of agony from a human being. Alas that an immortal being should thus live, should thus die!

"It was a quarter to eleven when I reached home, with my nerves completely unstrung by the terrible scene I had just witnessed. But, nerves or no nerves, I must preach my sermon, and in twenty minutes I had a glimmering of what I intended to say. I entered the pulpit; the chapel was intensely hot, — thermometer at ninety-two. A severe headache, great languor, and mental depression, gave me indifferent grounds of hope that I should make even a tolerable discourse. However, God in his infinite mercy strengthened me for the contest. As I proceeded, and warmed with my subject, my languor left me, my ideas shaped themselves clearer in my mind, and I preached a few home truths on the evils of a death-bed repentance. But if any strangers had been present, they would have little thought on what I had gone through before preaching that sermon.

"Human nature, however, is seldom outraged with impunity. My powers of mind and body had been taxed beyond their strength; for an hour I felt thoroughly prostrate, but fresh duties were to be performed; I had to christen at a quarter past one. I descended to the hot and reeking chapel, scarcely able to stand, and baptized about ten children. This long ceremony over, I played with a bit of dinner, for I was too faint to eat. At three, vespers. After vespers, I heard several confessions. Scarcely had my last penitent departed, when a violent ring at the door-bell told me plainly enough there was a sick call. I was right. Away I had to go, post haste, to a dying woman. She, poor thing, died before I reached her. I found her on her humble bed, the room full of weeping relatives; the bereaved husband bowed down by hopeless grief, and a stillborn infant by the side of its dead mother. This was another trying scene to go through; and it is in scenes like these that the consolatory power of religion is so admirably shown. I made them all kneel down, while I read the prayers for a departed soul; and while they prayed the mercy of Heaven for that departed soul, though they wept much, they were comforted.

"It was now six o'clock, and I had the evening service to perform, and to preach at seven. There was no time to be lost, so I took a cup of tea, and buckled myself to my task. But it is severe mental labor to summon your languid thoughts to their post of duty, when sinking under long-continued and excessive fatigue. But mind triumphed over matter. I got through the long evening ser-

vice, preached as usual, without showing any signs of distress, though I was nearly fainting several times. The evening service over, I had again several confessions to hear, — those of poor servant-girls, who are only allowed to attend their chapel on a Sabbath night.

“The reader may now imagine my hard day’s work was over. No such thing. I had all my office to recite ; for until then I had not a minute of the day to myself. It was eleven when I finished. Then came *another* sick call ; and at twelve I retired to rest, as tired and exhausted as any individual in her Majesty’s dominions.

“Now, in penning this sketch, I entreat the reader to believe that I am uninfluenced by any miserable feeling of vanity in thus publishing the details of a Sunday’s missionary toil. I have selected this Sunday, because the events, from several causes, are better fixed in my memory than others ; but I have passed many such Sundays, and some of them of even much greater severity. I do not even publish it to the world as any thing uncommon or out of the way. Many of my respected brethren in London do usually as much, and some even more, as their average routine of Sunday work. They might, as a body, justly challenge a safe competition for pious, and well-regulated, and persevering priestly exertion, with any ecclesiastics in Christendom. But in humility and silence they have done their appointed work, and they have done it well. They have won, by their own personal piety, by their unwearied zeal and exertions, the respect, the gratitude and unshaken affections, of their flocks. But they look not for their reward on earth ; they humbly expect it in heaven.” — pp. 290 – 297.

What would one of our Boston ministers say to such a Sunday’s work, and yet it is only an ordinary Sunday’s work of many a Catholic priest in our midst. The Protestant minister hardly knows the meaning of “a sick call,” and rarely is he ever required or expected to visit his sick parishioners at unseasonable hours, or when fatigued by other labors, or weary with doing nothing. As for incomes, it is enough to say, that the Church of England alone has a larger revenue than the whole Catholic Church throughout the world. The Protestant minister has, no doubt, to perform much hard work, and endure much wear and tear of mind and body, as well as of conscience ; but it is so not because the work itself is much, but because the poor minister has to do it himself alone, without any of those gracious helps from above which render the heaviest labor light.

Our Protestant editor, in the same article, complains of

our clergy because they visit their people mainly for spiritual purposes, and make more of providing for the soul than for the body. He is greatly scandalized that we have in Boston, for instance, so many poor Catholics, and that our clergy, in visiting them, look after their spiritual rather than their worldly interest. He is of opinion, that the first care of the priest should be to attend to the bodies of his people, remove their poverty, set them up, and help them to become well to do in the world, and look to their souls or spiritual interests, if at all, afterwards. He is displeased that our missionaries in China take so much pains to baptize children exposed by their parents, and near dying, instead of laboring to remove the poverty which causes the exposure. In all this we see that he is a true Protestant, and has a great concern for the body, and very little for the soul. If the body is only provided for, the soul, he seems to think, may be left to shift for itself. We wish he would tell us where our clergy are to get the means to remove all the poverty of the thousands flocking into the country, reduced to want by Protestant oppression and misrule in Ireland; and what our missionaries could do in China, where they have hardly ever been able to appear without being doomed to martyrdom, to improve the public and private economy of that over-peopled empire. But, after all, we do not remember that our Lord ever promised to remove poverty and want from the world, or that he ever gave his Church a commission to make all men rich in this world's goods; we are not aware that the Catholic clergy are under any special obligation to take care of paupers, or that they any more than Protestants can be called upon to relieve the bodily wants even of the Catholic poor. In olden times, when the public made the clergy their almoners, they took care of the poor, and they would do it now and in this community, if it chose to intrust them with the means, and at a tithe of what it now costs. It is the duty of wealth to contribute to the wants of the poor, and the wealth of this community is in the hands of the Protestant ministers and their Protestant friends.

It is worthy of note, that, though the Church has only a spiritual mission, and is charged especially only with the salvation of souls, yet in all countries where she is not oppressed or persecuted the wants of the poor are amply provided for. You will look in vain in Austria, Italy, or

Spain, or even France, for such squalid poverty as meets you in London, Dublin, Glasgow, Boston, and New York. Protestants, even though attending primarily to the body, and perhaps because caring for it at the expense of the soul, are responsible for the greater part of the abject poverty of the modern world. The most frightful poverty to be met with is in countries ruled by Protestants. There may be much of this poverty among the Catholic subjects of Protestant governments, and if so, it is because those governments have never given them an equal chance with their Protestant subjects. The Catholic poor in this country were made poor before they came here, and most of them by the skill and energy, in oppressing and brutifying, of your boasted Anglo-Saxon race, or that "bulwark of the Protestant religion," Great Britain. And, after all, what does Protestantism do for the poor? In Ireland and in this country it is willing to do something for poor Catholics, on condition that they consent to become Protestants, — to sell their souls for a mess of pottage. But in general it has done nothing to increase the wealth or to diminish the poverty of the world. Great Britain and the United States have the appearance of being wealthy, because they have mortgaged posterity; but neither of them is wealthy enough to pay its public and private debts. Let credit be suspended, and there be no longer the means of taxing future generations for the support of the present, and let each be called upon to settle up its accounts with futurity, and they would both be found insolvent, and Great Britain would be unable to transmit as much value to the next generation as she received from Catholic Europe. Both have borrowed more from the future than either has enhanced the capital it inherited. Your vast commerce, and your industrial establishments for the fabrication of luxuries, have done nothing to enrich you, and, in an economical point of view, have been worse than a dead loss. So much for neglecting the soul and living for the body.

But we are very free to confess that our clergy do labor for the soul rather than the body of their flocks, and are far more attentive to their spiritual than to their bodily wants, for they are Christians, not heathens or carnal Jews, and they have a firm faith that, though a man should gain the whole world and lose his own soul, it would profit him nothing. Strange as it may seem to Protestant ministers,



our clergy do not regard their ministry as a sham, and their services as useless. They believe that their ministry is from God, and that their services are really necessary in the Divine economy of salvation. He who, by baptizing one exposed infant just ready to die, has secured the admission of a soul to the beatific vision of God, has thus gained for it an eternity of bliss, which infinitely outweighs all the worldly good of the whole human race from the beginning to the end of time. The loss of one soul is a greater loss than the loss of all the material wealth of the universe; and would you have our clergy devote themselves to the body at the hazard of losing the soul? Do not suppose, because you esteem the world as first, that therefore our clergy do or should.

Nevertheless, our clergy are not indifferent to the physical sufferings of their people, and do more than you can dream of to relieve and solace them. They would also thank you for what you do, if you would consent to aid them without insisting upon conditions destructive to the souls of our suffering poor. We have many children running about the streets, idle, vicious,—criminal occasionally it may be, and we are sorry it is so; but they may retain something of the true faith, and one day be brought to penitence and be saved. Were we to intrust them to your charity, whatever they might gain in worldly respectability, they would be pretty sure to lose their souls. We would rather see them bad Catholics than even good Protestants; for the bad Catholic, as long as he retains a single spark of faith, has something to which the minister of God can appeal, has some relics of a conscience, and may one day be led to repentance, and be saved; but if our children were taken from us and trained up Protestants, or as Protestants would insist on their being trained, there would be as good as no hope at all of their ever seeing God.

Here is the great reason why our clergy cannot do more to relieve the poverty which many of their people suffer. They are themselves poor, and Protestants are not willing to aid them except on conditions that cannot be accepted. We who are Catholics have faith, and with us eternity is a reality. We must train up our children to live for God. We cannot always do it, indeed, and no training will always be sufficient; but we must do the best we can. Protestants have no faith; the world to come is to them a

pleasant or an unpleasant dream, and the only reality they recognize is this world and what pertains to it. They therefore would educate, and do educate, for this world alone. They cannot come in contact with our children without exerting upon them a pestiferous influence, and hence we can hardly ever be grateful to them for their benevolent aid, their well-meant liberality. They can never consent to aid us in saving our children from the evil influences to which they are subjected, in our own way, and in accordance with our own religion; but they must get them away from us under the tuition and influence of their own ministers, who should be termed *Skrälinger*, or the *Black-Death*. Hence we are frequently obliged to repulse their offers of assistance, and to prefer to see our children starve in the streets to their being relieved by Protestant liberality.

After all, it is necessary to be on our guard against the Protestant habit of coupling rags and dirt with vice. The Yankee identifies virtue with external cleanliness and thrift, and wherever these are wanting he can discover nothing but the seal of eternal reprobation. He has no conception that it is possible for virtue to have an unwashed face, to dwell in a dark court and a dirty tenement, or that a man who has no capacity for rising in the world can ever get into heaven. Yet we would rather take our chance with the dwellers in these filthy courts, and dirty garrets and cellars, than with the rich whose palaces front broad and spacious streets, and who are externally so clean and neat. The pious poor are the jewels of the Church; hardly shall the rich enter into the kingdom of heaven. Moreover, we believe the most abject of our poor have even in this world more solid enjoyment, more true happiness, than the rich and the great. We would relieve actual suffering wherever we find it, but we would not make the poor rich if we could, for we do not believe that increase of riches is ever desirable. This world is but an inn; we lodge in it but for a night, and what matters the inconvenience which we may be required to put up with? If we gain heaven it is nothing, and if we fail of heaven, the memory of it will be lost in the presence of an infinitely greater calamity.

## ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *The Annual Message of the President of the United States to both Houses of Congress.* Washington, December 2, 1851.

It is but justice to President Fillmore to acknowledge that the view taken of his Message in a foregoing article is not the one generally taken, and that serious objections of an opposite character to ours have been urged by a portion of the press against it. There is no doubt that the Message professes to lay down a truly neutral policy as that of the government, and we will not take it upon ourselves to say, that the President does not mean to pursue such policy in our relations with foreign states. But we must interpret his professions of neutrality by the acts of the government in regard to the Hungarian Kossuth, and by Mr. Secretary Webster's famous letter of December, 1850, in reply to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires. We will not say that these professions are diplomatic rather than sincere, for that would not be respectful, but will say, that if they are sincere, the government understands neutrality in a very latitudinarian sense.

Of the simple interposition of the government, in concert with the British cabinet, for the liberation of Kossuth, though indefensible on any principle of justice, humanity, or sound policy, we make no complaint; and of Kossuth we should have nothing to say, if he had, on his liberation, retired to private life, and abandoned his revolutionary projects. But the government has really let loose one of the most dangerous characters now living. The President knew in the outset that this man was a traitor, and one to whom it is a profanation to apply the term *patriot*; he knew before sending his Message to Congress that he was a turbulent spirit, that he would only abuse his liberty to stir up insurrections, to teach the people insubordination to their magistrates, and to renew his efforts to dismember an empire with which we profess to have relations of peace. He knew this, for he had official information of Kossuth's conduct in the Mediterranean, — at Spezzia, at Marseilles, and on board the Mississippi, — conduct which the government will not presume to deny was only too favorably represented in the communications in the public journals. The letters containing the official information have been seen and read on file in the Departments of State and the Navy at Washington. The President must have been aware of Kossuth's fraternization with the French Socialists at Marseilles, and his insolent appeal to the French people against the French government, as well as his abuse of the President of France in his letter to the Mayor of Southampton; he could not have been ignorant of his speeches in England, all indicating his revolutionary purposes; and he had every reason to believe, that if he came to this country it would be, not to make it his home, but to excite the enthusiasm of our people in behalf of the revolutionary movements in Europe, and through them, if possible, to induce the government to assist him in wresting Hungary from the house of Hapsburg. All this we must presume the President knew when writing his Message, and yet he orders him to be greeted on his arrival with a national salute, and officially recognizes him as *Governor Kossuth*, which is a virtual recognition of the Hungarian revolutionary government, commends him to Congress, and virtually asks for him an official reception by the nation. Now we are wholly unable to reconcile this with good faith to Austria, with whom we have treaties of peace and friendship, or

with our professions of neutrality, repeated to weariness by the President and his Secretaries. We do not pretend that the Message recommends an armed intervention in the internal affairs of other countries; we give it full credit for sincerity when it says, "Our mission is not to propagate our opinions, or to impose upon other countries our form of government, by *artifice or force*"; but we do maintain that it avows a propagandist policy, and a determination on the part of the government to use all its influence, short of armed intervention, to stir up the people in the several monarchical states of Europe to rebel against their respective sovereigns, and to revolutionize by artifice and force these several states for the sake of introducing a form of government similar to our own. Even in the paragraph in which he asserts the neutral policy of the government, the President implicitly asserts our institutions as the model for all the world, and virtually denies that any state, not constituted on popular principles, is either independent or free. "Our mission," he says, "is to teach by example, and show by our success, moderation, and justice, the blessings of self-government and the advantages of free institutions." Here is the avowal of a mission of propagandism, and the assumption that it is from us the nations are to learn "the blessings of self-government and the advantages of free institutions." Very modest! Self-government, applied to nations, has no intelligible meaning but that of national independence, that the nation governs itself, instead of being governed by a foreign nation or state; and so no nation has ever yet, except our own, been independent, or not subject to a foreign power! Free institutions, if they mean any thing, which is very doubtful, can mean only institutions which favor, protect, or secure freedom, that is, the freedom either of the ruler or the ruled; and so the world has to learn from us, a new people, born within the memory of persons still living, the advantages of such institutions! What is this but denying in reality the lawfulness of all institutions but our own, and pronouncing all governments, not framed like ours, usurpations, tyrannies, despotisms; which whoso will may lawfully attack and destroy, in the sacred name of freedom or humanity! Undeniably, the President asserts that we have a mission, and that this mission is to teach the poor old world, which has blundered along somehow through six thousand years, the blessings of national independence and freedom, that is, to democratize all governments. We are not to do this, indeed, by fleets and armies of our own, but by the force of public opinion; that is, by creating and sustaining in all monarchical states a public opinion strong enough to enable the subjects of those states successfully to rebel against their sovereigns, to overthrow by illegal violence and any amount of crime the monarchical order, and to institute in its place democracy. We are not to use force ourselves, we are only to excite and encourage others to use it, and use it for propagating our opinions, or imposing upon other countries our form of government. So our government is prudent, and chooses to make others fight its battles!

"Let every people choose for itself, make and alter its political institutions to suit its own condition and convenience." Very well; but the right of a people to choose for itself, and to adopt such institutions as it judges best, is simply the right of governing itself, simply its national independence, and it involves the right to maintain the institutions it has adopted, and to punish and repress by force whoever attempts in an illegal way to alter or change them. But this right you deny when you proclaim the "sacred right of insurrection," teach that the people everywhere have the right by rebellion and revolution to overthrow the existing gov-

ernment for the purpose of introducing a new government modelled after your own. You in this deny the very right you pretend to concede, by asserting a contradictory, and, in your judgment, a paramount right. It is impossible for the President to reconcile a strictly neutral policy with his assertion of our "mission," and his recognition of our right to stir up and protect democratic rebellions and revolutions in other states. We need not tell him that to stir up the subjects of any state to revolt against its sovereign authority is forbidden by the laws of nations, and is a justifiable cause of war. Strict neutrality, under the present point of view, requires us to regard all independent nations, whatever their internal constitution, as standing on a footing of perfect equality, and to hold those who transgress the laws of any other independent nation criminal in the same sense as they are who in like manner and degree transgress our own laws. To receive or harbor the rebels against a friendly state, much more to caress and honor them, is an offence against the laws of nations, and the "extradition" clause introduced into the treaty of Washington between this country and Great Britain, for which it is pretended so much credit is due to Mr. Webster, is only a confirmation by treaty of what has always really been international law, only in later times it has been generally disregarded.

No doubt, our form of government is best for us, but that is all that the President has any right officially to say of it. Whether it is the best for other nations or not, they, not we, are the proper judges; and as they, through their supreme authority, for the most part determine against it, we are to presume in our relations with them that it is not. The President must respect those forms of government which they adopt as the best for them. This is the fact that he has overlooked. What we wanted him to disclaim was not merely the intention of propagating our opinions "by artifice or force," but the intention of attempting to propagate them at all; while he firmly asserted, if the occasion required it, the legality of our own institutions for us, we wanted him to recognize heartily, at least so far as we have any relations with them, the legality of governments adopted by other nations, though different from our own, and to deny all right on our part to meddle with them, or to express our sympathy with those who seek to destroy them, although for the purpose of instituting popular forms of government in their place. This is what was due under the circumstances to the monarchical states with whom we have treaties of peace and friendship, and would have been only a just and necessary admonition to our own citizens. But what he has said will be insufficient to reassure those states of our good faith, and will only tend to make our own citizens feel that they are free in their individual character to labor in every way in their power to stir up rebellion and civil war in any foreign state they may wish to revolutionize.

But the President even intimates, that, in certain contingencies, the government will not confine itself to the neutral policy it professes, all-defective as it is. "But," he says, "while we avow and maintain this neutral policy for ourselves, we are anxious to see the same forbearance on the part of other nations, whose forms of government are different from our own. *The deep interest which we feel in the spread of liberal principles and the establishment of free governments, and the sympathy with which we witness every struggle against oppression, forbid that we should be indifferent to a case in which the strong arm of a foreign power is invoked to stifle public sentiment, and repress the spirit of freedom in any country.*" The President is not asserting mere abstract principles without reference to

their application, but defining the policy of the government in relation to the actual state of things in Europe. In words, this policy does not sound very bad ; but to judge of what it really is, we must ascertain what principles the President refers to as "liberal principles," and what sort of struggles he calls "struggles against oppression." The President must be presumed to be well acquainted with the present state of things in Europe. He knows, then, we must presume, that throughout all Europe there is a grand conspiracy, with its central government for the present in London, and its ramifications extending even to this country, — a conspiracy organized avowedly for the purpose of revolutionizing by violence every monarchical, and indeed every legally constituted government in the civilized world. The supreme chief of this conspiracy is not Louis Kossuth, but Joseph Mazzini, an Italian refugee, who lately obtained in England a loan of ten millions for carrying on his revolutionary purposes, and whose agents, we are informed, are in the United States, organizing associations under his authority and that of his colleagues, and collecting funds in aid of the conspiracy. The conspirators of all countries are embraced in the same grand organization, under one and the same central junta, or revolutionary government. The President, no doubt, knows all this, and he further knows, — it would be disrespectful to him not to suppose it, — that this conspiracy is formed not merely against monarchy, but against all legitimate authority, against all religion except an idolatrous worship of what is blasphemously called the God-people or the people-God, against all morality, all law, all order, and indeed against society itself. These are the principles the President terms "liberal principles," and the struggle of this conspiracy to carry out their principles and realize their infamous purposes is what he terms a "struggle against oppression." It must be so, for this conspiracy embraces the whole revolutionary party we hear of in Europe, or to which the President can have any reference.

It is now easy to understand the President's neutral policy. On one side are these conspirators of all nations banded together, and moving in concert, as if directed by a single will, and on the other are the several governments, and the friends of society, civilization, and morality. It seems to be agreed on all hands, that during this 1852 the two parties are to meet in mortal combat, and decide on the battle-field the terrible questions at issue, and on which side victory will incline seems now, even to the most sanguine, to be a matter of doubt. Now the President's neutral policy, as we understand it, is, that if in any particular nation the government is able to sustain itself, and to put down the rebels, and vindicate the rights of authority, we may regret it indeed, but are not to deem it our duty to interfere to save our friends from this sad termination of their hopes ; nevertheless, we are to insist that the rebels shall have fair play, that they shall have the moral influence of our countenance and of our loudly expressed sympathy, and that no third party shall be called in to assist in suppressing them. Austria may whip rebellious Hungary or any other of her provinces into submission, if she can ; but she shall not call Russia in to help her to do it, and Russia is not to be suffered to take part in the quarrel, even if invited by Austria. But suppose neither Russia nor Austria respects our anxiety on the subject, and pays no attention to our protests ? The President says not what we shall do then, but that we shall resort to the "Anglo-Saxon alliance," and shout "England and America against the world," and thus our neutrality become armed intervention, is not impossible. This in certain quarters seems to be contemplated, and possibly

may take place, if Mr. Webster remains Secretary of State, and Lord Palmerston retains his place in the British cabinet.

Now we would most respectfully ask whence it comes that we are to be the second, or the bottle-holder, of universal Rebel-dom? Wherefore is it that our government should be "anxious" for the success of rebels, traitors, assassins, conspirators against God and man? The President either knows the principles and character of the European revolutionary party, or he does not. If he does not, he is inexcusably rash in espousing their cause, and expressing his official sympathy with them; if he does, as it is but decent respect to his official position to assume, then he knows that they are the common enemies of the human race, whose success would be the paralysis of religion, the destruction of civilization, the triumph of anarchy, and the return of barbarism. He must know this, and yet he gives them his official sanction, and goes to the extreme verge of prudence in their defence!

In very deed are our statesmen mad? Do they not see the suicidal policy they are adopting? Is not our government a government of laws, and can it subsist if the government itself teaches its subjects that to break the laws is no crime, and that to conspire to overthrow the supreme authority of a state is an heroic virtue that should call forth the praise of senates and the applause of admiring nations? Is not treason a crime here as well as in Naples, in Rome, in Austria, in Russia, and was not the government, at the very moment the President was expressing his sympathy with foreign traitors, prosecuting men in Pennsylvania for treason? And how will you be able to suppress treason at home if you declare it an heroic virtue abroad, and send out your public ships to import full cargoes of foreign traitors? If the European radical may conspire to overthrow the government of his country for what he calls liberty, why may not the Free-Soiler conspire to resist your Fugitive Slave Law, and to prevent a poor runaway negro from being sent back to slavery? Why shall the former here in this country be greeted with a national salute, and the latter with a halter? Think you the people of these States who detest negro slavery will long respect the authority of the Federal government, if that government through its chief proclaims its sympathy with those who conspire against all laws, and declares itself the natural protector of the traitors and rebels of all lands? Do not flatter yourself that your own government is not attacked as well as that of Austria or Russia by these Red Republican conspirators. You know they publicly disdain our Republic, and declare it no better than a monarchy. Their programme embraces the destruction of both the American and the French republics, and their German confederates in this country have published the list of changes that are to be introduced here, — changes that would leave us scarcely the shadow of a government, and not the least conceivable security for person or property, for freedom of speech or freedom of conscience. The government, we must presume, knows this, and yet it takes the revolutionary movement under its special protection!

Then, again, we demand by what right the government protests against the supreme authority of a nation calling in a friendly power to assist it to put down a rebellion in its provinces, or among its subjects? If you have a right to protest, you have a right to go further and enforce your protest, if you choose; and if you have a right to do that, the friendly power has no right to assist a neighbor to reduce his rebellious subjects to submission. Since when has a nation lost the right to ask the assistance of a friendly

power in quelling a rebellion in its dominions? Since when has it become contrary to the laws of nations for a friendly power to aid, at its request, a sovereign state struggling with its rebellious subjects? The laws of nations, indeed, as now interpreted, allow no intervention to prevent a nation from settling its constitution in its own way, save in the case of necessary self-defence; but they do allow, even yet, a foreign nation to intervene, at the request of the sovereign authority, in a dispute between it and its rebellious subjects, and to aid it in putting them down by armed force. There is no law that forbids a sovereign from invoking the assistance of a neighboring state in enforcing his rights upon his own subjects, and none that forbids the state invoked from granting the assistance required.

If the President refers simply to the first sort of intervention, the intervention to prevent an independent nation, that is, its supreme authority, from reforming or changing its institutions to suit itself, his declaration is idle bravado, for the sovereigns of Europe have neither intervened nor shown any disposition to intervene in such a case, as witness France and Switzerland. If he refers to cases of the second sort, he is wrong in principle, and attacks the rights of sovereign nations. The cases of intervention that have recently occurred are those of Hungary and Rome. Hungary, or rather a portion of Hungary, rebelled against its sovereign, made war on the Austrian empire, to which it was in law inseparably united, and Austria invited Russia to assist her in reducing it to subjection, and Russia did so. Hungary was not an independent nation, was not a complete state. The union of Hungary and Austria is not a *personal* union, that is, the union of two mutually independent states under a common sovereign. "The different states composing the Austrian monarchy," says Wheaton,\* a respectable authority, "is a *real* union. The hereditary dominions of the house of Austria, the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and other states, are all indissolubly united under one sceptre, but with distinct fundamental laws and other political institutions." Hungary had neither the right to make war on the empire nor to separate from the empire. She owed, and her troops swore, allegiance, not merely to the king of Hungary, but to the emperor of Austria. She was a rebellious province, and the emperor had a right to reduce her to subjection, and the intervention of Russia was simply that of a friendly power, called in to aid him in enforcing his rights. The case of Rome, on received principles of international law, even without reference to the claims of the Pope as Head of the Church, was clearly within the rule. A set of foreigners, vagabonds, drove out the sovereign, and set up a government of their own. At the request of the sovereign, France and the principal Catholic nations intervened, suppressed the usurping, or, if you please, the revolutionary government, and restored the legitimate sovereign to his rights. Here was no intervention of one nation, at its own motion, in the affairs of another, but an intervention, as in the case of Hungary, at the request and by the authorization of the supreme authority of the state. The President has unhappily overlooked, in his zeal for rebels and traitors, the well-settled law of nations.

Moreover, the President is too one-sided; he allows intervention in favor of rebels. He protests against intervention in favor of the supreme authority of the state, but he does not protest against the intervention of the rebels of one country in aid of those of another. Poles, Germans,

\* *Elements of International Law*, p. 1, ch. ii. § 18.





Italians, Englishmen, and we know not but Frenchmen and Americans, intervened in favor of Hungarian rebels, and yet the President makes no complaint. Moreover, the President must be presumed to know thoroughly the doctrines of his friends, for we cannot suppose he would press them to his official bosom as his dear and loving friends if not well acquainted with their principles. He knows, then, that they proclaim the *Fraternity*, the *Solidarity*, as Kossuth expresses it, of peoples. Now this means, in the doctrine of the sect, that revolutionists of all countries and nations make but one brotherhood, or are bound together in *solide*, all standing for each, and each for all. Wherever the standard of rebellion is raised, the people of all nations have the right, and are bound, to flock around it and aid their brothers. This is what is meant by the brotherhood or the solidarity of the peoples, and Kossuth, by his free use of the word *solidarity* in his speeches, shows that he has been initiated into the mysteries of the sect. The President is not fair. If he allows the revolutionists of one country to intervene to assist the rebels in another, he must allow, on the principle of fair play, the friends of law, order, religion, morality, and society, to intervene in favor of authority.

The fact is, that our government and our people have adopted principles which are wholly indefensible, and have justly forfeited the respect of the civilized world, and even of the very revolutionists it has favored. Almost the first thing Kossuth did on setting his foot on our shores was to show his contempt for our government, and to tell the people that they, not it, are sovereign. His first lesson to us was that of mobocracy, contempt for constituted authorities, and the right of rebellion. This was precisely as it should be, and we trust that the visit of this illustrious chief of Humbug will not be without its service to us. We have been so long vociferating "the sacred right of insurrection" and "the sovereignty of the people," that we have without suspecting it wellnigh undermined the foundations of our own government, and made us in principle and almost in fact a nation of mobocrats. We have fallen to a fearful depth, and perhaps this new Genet will serve to recall us to the doctrines of Washington, the Father of his Country. Already we see some symptoms of relenting on the part of the government, some indications that it is beginning to ask if it has not gone too far. Certain are we, that they who thought sympathy with foreign rebels and traitors would redound to their glory are doomed to be disappointed. We are sorry for Mr. Webster. He can never be President of the United States. We and our friends have honored Mr. Fillmore for his firm stand in favor of the Union; but we can no longer contemplate his reelection as probable or as desirable. We may not, indeed, obtain a more worthy candidate, but we hope we may find one who is not in favor of an alliance with England for disturbing and revolutionizing every state that respects the Church of God. In a Presidential election no party can afford to lose the Catholic vote, and no party in favor of the "Anglo-Saxon alliance" can obtain that vote. We can support no man who does not give us assurances of his loyalty to the Union, and his respect for the rights of foreign nations. But if we must, after all, take a candidate of radical tendencies, we say, let him be a natural-born Radical, not a Whig turned Radical and Red Republican for the occasion.

As for Kossuth, we care not for him. He is not the man, unless we are greatly mistaken, to make any lasting impression upon Yankees. He is eloquent and clever, and, like all our modern revolutionists, has a great command of words, vulgarly termed "the gift of the gab"; but he is not a

of the higher order of intellect. He lacks the ingredient of downright honesty of purpose, has too much to say of himself, and wears his principles quite too loosely. He will not elect our next President, nor induce us to engage in a war with either Austria or Russia. We shall have a good time with him, feast ourselves, have our own jollification, let him laugh a little at us in his sleeve while we laugh a good deal at him in ours, and then — cast him off.

2. *History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac, and the War of the North American Tribes against the English Colonists after the Conquest of Canada.* By FRANCIS PARKMAN, JR. Boston: Little & Brown. 1851. 8vo. pp. 630.

We regret that our limits do not at present permit us to speak of this work at the length its real merits demand. The title of the work does not give to the mass of the present generation of our people a true notion of its real character, for very few of them have any recollection of the great Indian chief Pontiac, and most of them, in seeing announced a "History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac," will very likely regard it as a history of some conspiracy against a railroad, a bank, or to get money under false pretences, which may have been detected in the village of Pontiac in Michigan. Very few of them will suspect that it is a history of one of the greatest and most distinguished Indian chiefs who ever warred against the English in North America, and of the best concerted and most formidable Indian war recorded in our annals, — in fact, of the last desperate effort made by the Indian tribes to check the advance of the English colonists, and to preserve themselves from utter extinction before the continued aggressions of our Anglo-Saxon fathers.

Too much praise cannot be awarded Mr. Parkman for the fidelity and pains with which he has collected authentic materials for his volume, or for the rare felicity with which he has worked them into one of the most truly historical volumes which has issued from the American press. He has a true historical genius, and deserves a place in the same class with Bancroft and Prescott. His style is richer, more animated and varied, than Prescott's, and less artificial and more flexible, as well as more dignified, than Bancroft's. Mr. Parkman has studied the Indian character, not merely in the narratives left us by our Puritan ancestors, or in the high-wrought romances of Cooper, but also in the Indian's own village and wigwam; and we can safely say, that he has very justly appreciated it, more justly than any other American writer we are acquainted with.

Mr. Parkman is not a Catholic, and cannot be expected to do justice to the motives or to the results of the labors of Catholic missionaries among the Indians; but he appears to have aimed to be fair and impartial, and is as little offensive as any one can be who writes of them from the humanitarian point of view, with no conception of the grace of God or a supernatural religion. With his scepticism as to the capabilities of the Indian for civilization, and his doctrine that it is idle to attempt to convert the Indian from Paganism and incorporate him into the Christian family, we of course have no sympathy. A few things of this sort detract greatly from the religion and judgment of the author; but in the really historical portions of his work he has been eminently successful, and we recommend it as a work of research, and of deep and tragic interest.

3. *The Catholic Offering: a Gift-Book for all Seasons, containing a Series of Pieces in Prose and Verse, for different Parts of the Year.* By the Right Reverend WILLIAM WALSH, D. D., Bishop of Halifax. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1852. 12mo. pp. 550.

THE publishers deserve high praise for presenting us here a volume which, for illustrations, letter-press, and binding, is unsurpassed by any of the fashionable annuals of the country. They appear to have spared no pains or expense to furnish a suitable "Gift-Book" for the holidays, or any season of the year, and with eminent success. As to the series of pieces in prose and verse, the name of the Right Reverend author is a higher recommendation than any thing we could say in their praise. There can be no doubt that the *Catholic Offering* will be a favorite, and meet with ample patronage.

The author of this work, well known for his literary taste and elegance as a writer, is a native of Ireland; and this reminds us that we owe a great debt of gratitude to that island, which we have now the opportunity of acknowledging by contributing of our means to found the Irish Catholic University in Dublin. This University was suggested and urged by the Holy Father, is approved by the Irish hierarchy, and commended by our own prelates. It is what has long been wanted in Ireland, and we can conceive nothing more likely to benefit that oppressed country than a truly Catholic University, that shall train up men able and willing to vindicate her rights and interests in every walk of life, especially in the Imperial Parliament. These are times when a well-educated Catholic laity is highly necessary in all Catholic countries, and especially in Ireland; for the great controversies of the day, to no small extent, have to be carried on in Parliaments, or public meetings, and are mixed up with secular matters or the rights and duties of the secular order. Intimately connected as we are with the people of Ireland, the University cannot fail to have great importance for this country, and Catholics here can have hardly less interest in supporting it than Catholics in Ireland and Great Britain. We hope the collectors in its behalf now in the country will meet a liberal reception, and be able to send home substantial proofs of our American gratitude to Ireland.

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\* \* We send out the first number of the ninth volume of our *Review*, the eighth since it became devoted to the exposition and defence of Catholic truth, and we cannot let the occasion pass without expressing our gratitude to the public for the liberal encouragement we have received. The character of the *Review*, whatever it is, we suppose is by this time pretty well established, and we have every reason to suppose that it meets the general approbation of our Catholic community. Its future course may be judged from the past. We cannot hope to make it more worthy of public support, and we shall do our best that it shall not be less worthy. We hope it will retain its present friends, and if it does, we shall feel quite at our ease. Its circulation is not absolutely large, but is larger than we could expect for a periodical of the sort, and is sufficient to sustain it comfortably. We have no complaints to make, and no pledges but to plod on as we have been doing the last seven years. We feel every day that a sort of personal intimacy is growing up between us and our readers, and we take the liberty to greet them all with the hearty wish of a **HAPPY NEW YEAR.**

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NOTES:

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~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

prove to be Catholicity. They are resolved to be Christians only on condition that they can be Christians without being Catholics. With few exceptions, they hate Catholicity more than they love the Gospel, and sooner than submit to the Church they would reject the whole Christian religion, and deny the very existence of God. Neither we nor they themselves can rely on any concessions in favor of religion they may appear to make, for they make no concessions, however honestly they may make them, which they will not revoke the moment they perceive that they cannot adhere to them without furnishing premises from which the Catholic Church is logically concludable. Were we to take them at their profession, and from their avowed principles conclude the Church, they would not accept her, but would abandon their own professed principles, and seek to escape the conclusion by alleging that we have deduced it from premises that it is necessary to establish. The reason of this is, that they have settled it in their minds, that, let what will be true, the Church is false, and therefore that the fact that any principles imply her truth is a sufficient proof of their falsity.

We are forced, in our arguments with Protestants, to proceed on the supposition that they are Protestants, and Protestants before every thing else, and therefore that they will follow out the principle on which they vindicate their protest against Catholicity, if necessary, to its last logical consequences. That principle, as every body knows, is the unrestricted right of private judgment, which is simply the denial of all authority, and the assertion of the absolute moral independence of the individual. This principle, if principle it can be called, we hardly need add, is purely atheistical; for if there is a God he must be supreme, sovereign lord, and man must be morally as well as physically dependent on him, subject to him, and bound to obey him in all things whatsoever, — in thought, word, and deed. The characteristic principle of Protestantism, in that it is Protestantism, is therefore atheistical, and although all Protestants may not be distinctly conscious that such is the fact, it is really atheism and nothing else that they oppose to the Church. Nothing is more natural, then, than that they should push their denials to the denial of God, to atheism, in case they find that it is only by so doing that they can

maintain their protest against the Church. We cannot, then, construct an argument sufficiently ultimate for the final refutation of Protestantism, unless we make it sufficiently ultimate for the refutation of atheism.

No doubt many of our Protestant readers will object to this statement, and regard it as in a high degree unjust to them. But they must bear in mind that, in our judgment at least, they were never consistent with themselves. They adopt the fundamental principles of two essentially hostile and eternally irreconcilable systems. They are Protestants, and they for the most part profess to be Christians. Understanding by a *Christian*, not merely a baptized person, but one who professes and believes the Christian doctrine, a *Protestant* Christian, or a *Christian* Protestant, is to the Catholic mind simply a contradiction in terms. The distinctive principles of Protestants, in that they are Protestants, if logically carried out, would render them atheists; the principles they profess, in that they profess to be Christians, if logically carried out, would require them to be Catholics. They do not ordinarily carry out either set of principles to their last logical conclusions, and they are far from perceiving the innate hostility of the one set to the other. They usually take it for granted, that, since they hold both sets of principles, the two must be reconcilable one with the other, and both alike Protestant. They consider them both to be elements, under diverse aspects, of one and the same homogeneous system, and that one may, consistently with the assertion of both, be limited and modified by the other. Hence, when we tell them that the principle of their Protestantism is atheistical, and that to be consistent they must deny God, they deny the charge, and bring forward against it the principles and doctrines which they profess to hold in common with us, and on the strength of which they claim to be Christians; and when we tell them that, if they hold these principles and doctrines, to be logical they must be Catholics, they reply by bringing forward their distinctly Protestant principles and doctrines; thus repelling the charge of atheism by alleging certain Catholic principles and doctrines, and evading Catholicity by alleging atheistical principles and doctrines, apparently unconscious that in so doing they act inconsistently, and imply that of contradictories *both* may be true. They alternate between atheism and Catho-

licity, assume atheistical ground to escape Catholic conclusions, and Catholic ground to escape atheistical conclusions. It is in vain that we attempt to bind them by conclusions drawn from either set of principles. They suppose they may reasonably hold both, and will be held to neither, when taken exclusively.

Certain it is that Protestants profess to be Christians only by virtue of what they hold in common with the Catholic Church; for all else in their system is negative, and Christianity, whatever else it be, is something positive, affirmative, resting on its own basis, and intelligible by itself, not merely in that it is the denial of something else. Strip Protestants of what they hold in common with the Church, of what they originally learned and retained from her, and they would have nothing with which to cover their nakedness, or which even they could or would call Christianity. They are even in their own estimation Christians only in so far as they agree with the Church, and do not protest against her. Now they cannot be Protestants in the respect in which they agree with the Church, for it is only in dissenting from her and protesting against her that they are Protestants. Hence their Protestantism is not and cannot be in the Christian principles and doctrines they profess, and in treating them as Protestants these are not to be taken into the account. Their Protestantism is to be distinguished from these, and to be judged without reference to the fact that they who hold it do or do not hold these along with it; that is, their Protestantism is to be distinguished from all Christian principles and doctrines, and to be judged unchristian, precisely as it should be judged in case that Protestants did not, inconsistently with it, profess to hold some portions of Christian truth. It is what they deny in opposition to the Church, not what they hold in common with her, that constitutes their Protestantism, as what they hold in common with her, not what they deny in opposition to her, that constitutes their sole claim to be regarded as Christians. It follows, therefore, that we cannot treat Protestantism in any respect as Christian, nor Protestants in that they are Protestants as Christians. As it is not the Christianity they profess, but the Protestantism which they hold, that it is necessary to refute, and as the principle of this is atheism, we must, in all our arguments intended to be a final refu-

tation of Protestantism in its principle, begin with a refutation of atheism, on which the majority of Protestants will unhesitatingly fall back, if they find it necessary to do so in order to avoid Catholic conclusions.

Undoubtedly Protestants generally recognize the existence of the Supreme Being, but we apprehend that, although many of their ministers have written much to prove that God is, comparatively few of them have that clear conviction or that firm persuasion that he is, which is necessary to warrant us in assuming their belief in his existence as the basis of an argument against them for doctrines repugnant to their passions or their prejudices. There are with most of them things more subjectively certain than that God is, and consequently, if hard pressed, they would sooner deny his existence than surrender them. Hence they need to have the existence of God established anew to their minds, and to be shown that it is absolutely certain, so certain that there is nothing else that we believe or can believe that it would not be more reasonable to deny than to deny it.

We propose, consequently, to offer a few suggestions in refutation of atheism, but our readers must not suppose that we are about to inflict on them a long chapter of metaphysics. There are popular errors which admit of no popular refutation. The mass of the people can understand, and profit by, the results of the profoundest thought and reasoning, but only a limited number can understand the processes by which those results are obtained. There is no truth above the reach of the common mind, but the arguments which demonstrate the truth, or the reasoning necessary to vindicate it from the errors often mixed up with it in the popular mind, can in general be appreciated only by those who have received a preparatory discipline. Hence the Divine wisdom in all matters of primary importance and essential or useful to our salvation teaches us not through philosophy and metaphysics, but by revelation communicated to us by a living and ever-present authority. But the refutation of atheism is possible without any very long or intricate process of metaphysical reasoning. The question involved is by no means so difficult as it has sometimes been made to appear, and the question needs but to be clearly and distinctly stated to be within the reach of the ordinary understanding.



There are, doubtless, real atheists in the world, both speculative and practical, but no man can be consistently an atheist. Not indeed, as some tell us, because every man in every act of intelligence asserts principles from which that God is can be logically inferred, but because, as a matter of fact, every man in every act of intelligence, in every exercise of understanding, in every thought, apprehends and asserts that which is God, although he may not be distinctly conscious that such is the fact. The refutation of atheism does not lie in demonstrating from principles distinct from God that God is; it lies in showing that the human intellect has in its operations immediate intuition of that which is God, and could not operate or know any thing at all if it had not. The question has been obscured and rendered difficult to ordinary minds by our modern philosophers, who have proceeded on the supposition that, in order to know that God is, we must be able by our natural light to originate the belief in his existence, and to demonstrate it from certain principles or premises more immediately known to the mind than is God himself. They have supposed it necessary to begin, with Descartes, in doubt, to assume, at least for the purposes of the argument, that man began in total ignorance of God, with no conception of his being or his attributes, and then proceed to show how by the operations of his own mind he might attain to the conception of God, and demonstrate his real existence. But this is an error, and one attended with many fatal consequences.

The belief that God is, inasmuch as it is a matter of supernatural revelation, pertains to faith, but as the preamble to faith, as St. Thomas calls it, it must be a matter of science. It is necessary, in order that it may be a matter of science, that we should not merely believe, but also know, that God is; and we must know that he is, because faith, though transcending reason, must be reasonable, have some relation to science, which could not be the case if we had no knowledge properly so called of the existence of God. Motives of credibility must have a scientific basis, but unless we know independently of the revelation that God is, and is the Creator of all things, they can have no such basis. But to the reality of science or knowledge as distinguished from faith it is not necessary that its matter or the object known should be originally

discoverable by the mind's own operations; all that is necessary is that, when clearly and distinctly presented to the mind, it be intuitively evident. The distinction between faith and knowledge does not necessarily consist in the fact that the objects of the one are supernaturally revealed to the mind, and the objects of the other are discovered by it, but in the fact that in the former the assent is given on the authority of the Revelator, and in the latter by the intuitive apprehension of the truth. In point of fact there is very little of what we know that has been originally discovered by us, or presented to the mind otherwise than by the teacher who originally knew or had already learned it. It is not, therefore, at all necessary to the scientific validity of the belief in God, that it should have been originated by the mind's own operations, or that it should be a belief which the mind without assistance from abroad could have generated.

The belief, moreover, is one that the mind not furnished with it could not originate. If we could suppose a people at any time entirely destitute of the belief, in total ignorance of God, with no conception of his being, we should be obliged to suppose them remaining for ever without it, unless supernaturally taught it by God himself, or by teachers from some other people who had already been taught it. The reason of this is, that there is no conceivable process by which the mind can originate it, which does not presuppose that the mind is already in possession of it. "Fear made their gods," sang old Lucretius, and whole hosts of philosopherlings have labored to prove that the passions have generated the belief in God, and that therefore it has no validity. The passions have, no doubt, obscured the intellect, and influenced the notions which men left to themselves have formed of the attributes of God, and of the worship which he exacts of them, but they could not have originated the belief itself, for the belief is an act of the intellect, which precedes all motion of the passions, and without which neither passion nor its object is conceivable. I must intellectually apprehend an object before I can desire it, fear it, or love it; and I must conceive it to be God before I can tremble or love, be filled with fear or awe, thrill with terror or delight in its presence as in the presence of the Divine. All the passions in themselves are blind, and no one of them is capa-

ble of presenting any object to the mind, and they have and can have no object save as presented by the intellect. Men must have had the belief that there is the Divine, that God is, before they could have supposed that what moves their passions is God or Divine, or be led to infer from the fact that their passions are moved that there is a Divinity that moves them; they must also have held his existence before they could have dreamed of saying this or that is God, or of identifying him with wood or stone, heroes or animals, the elements, the mysterious, the terrible, or the beneficent forces of nature, the wind or the rain, the storm or the tempest, the sun, the moon, or the stars of heaven; and consequently the belief that God is must have preceded the rude forms of African fetichism, as well as the poetical and polished mythology of Greece and Rome. The belief must necessarily precede its applications or its corruptions, and consequently all those have grossly erred who have labored in the interests of atheism to prove that man has generated in his own mind the belief in God.

They, again, have erred no less grossly, but from more commendable motives, who have alleged in the interests of the belief that the human mind is able to generate it. This to some extent is the case with the author of the work before us. We say to *some extent*, for he does not precisely allege that the individual has originated the belief for himself, since he assumes that the well-instructed child has before forming the belief *heard say* from his father that there is a God. Nevertheless, his whole argument proceeds on the supposition that the individual is able to originate the belief, and he undertakes to show the process by which it may be done. Like all philosophers of his class, he begins with the child, — forgetting that the adult is before the child, and that the human race must have begun in the adult man, not in the infant, — and attempts to show the gradual formation of the belief through the development of what he calls the sense of awe, the sense of wonder, the sense of admiration, the sense of order, the sense of design, the sense of goodness, the sense of wisdom, and reverence. In what sense the author here uses the word *sense* is not very clear, and we suspect it would be difficult even for him to inform us. He writes with great looseness of expression and indeterminateness of thought. The

word *sense* in our language has more than one meaning. It means the faculty of perceiving through external organs, as the eye, the ear, &c.; sometimes it means the organ itself; sometimes, again, the exercise of the perceptive faculty, sometimes its object, and, finally, sometimes simple feeling, or affection of the sensitive soul, in modern language, of the sensibility. When we say *sense* of a thing, we use the term to denote a feeble or obscure perception. Thus a sense of awe would mean a feeble and obscure perception of awe, which, if not nonsense, means that we are conscious of a slight degree of awe. This of course is not the meaning of the author, and by sense of awe he would have us understand most likely either the feeling of awe or the faculty or capacity of feeling awe, or of being affected by the emotion termed awe. So of the sense of wonder, and of admiration. Thus far we presume the author understands by *sense* the power or capacity of the soul to feel awed, to wonder, and to admire. But when he speaks of *sense* of order, of design, of wisdom, and of goodness, he cannot use the word in the same sense, because order, design, wisdom, goodness, are not feelings or emotions of our soul, but objects intellectually apprehensible by it, and he must here use the word to denote either the intellect itself or an exercise of intellect, either the power to apprehend order, design, wisdom, and goodness, or the actual apprehension of them. Reverence, again, is an affection of the rational soul, and demands as its condition the intellectual apprehension of its object, and follows instead of preceding such apprehension.

But passing over the unphilosophical use of language, a common fault of our author, let us inquire if it be possible either to obtain the conception of God or to establish the belief in his existence in the way Mr. Newman indicates. Awe, wonder, admiration, order, design, wisdom, goodness, are all considered by him as properties or affections of the soul, and as affections of the soul they lead us gradually, as they are developed, to the belief in God. We demand how this is done. By way of deduction or induction? Not by way of induction, for there is no induction in the case. Induction is concluding from a number of particulars a general law or principle common to them all, and the law or principle is not applicable beyond the particulars enumerated. In the present case, regarding

the particulars enumerated as subjective affections, the principle or law obtainable by induction from them would be subjective also, and pertain solely to the human soul, or be the human soul itself. Not by deduction, for deduction is simply analysis, and analysis can give you only what is in the subject analyzed. But these affections are subjective, human, and therefore do not contain God, and therefore God cannot by analysis be obtained from them. This is sufficient for the refutation of Mr. Newman's theorizing.

But omitting the awe, wonder, and admiration, and confining ourselves to the sense of order, design, wisdom, and goodness, as a feeble and obscure perception of them, we are still unable from it alone, as assumed to be developed in the child, to obtain either immediately or by way of inference the belief in God. Men must hold the principle of causality, must believe in a first cause and a final cause, and in the necessary relation of cause and effect, before they can either intellectually apprehend order, design, wisdom, or goodness, in nature, or dream of inferring the existence of God from them, and therefore must really believe in necessary and eternal being, cause and end of all things, that is to say, in God himself. This fact alone condemns the whole physico-theology of your Bridgewater Treatises, and the ordinary argument *a posteriori*, so much insisted upon by the pretended natural theologians of modern times.

The argument *a priori*, or from cause to effect, as it is usually defined, is no more conclusive. It proceeds on the supposition that there are certain principles, at least in the order of our knowledge, more ultimate than God, from which his existence may be logically concluded. But either God is contained in those principles, or he is not. If he is not, he cannot be concluded from them, for nothing can be in the conclusion not contained in the premises. If he is, he can be said to be contained in them only in the sense that he is identical with them, or identically those principles themselves, and then he is not concluded from them, but is immediately apprehended in the immediate apprehension of them. In the order of reality there can be no principles more ultimate than God, for he is himself prior to all not himself. If at all, he is himself ultimate, the first principle conceivable or possible, and therefore there can be no principle from which his existence is con-

cludable. There can be none in the order of our knowledge. In what we know, God is either apprehended or he is not. If not, he cannot be concluded; if he is, then he is apprehended prior to the logical process, and not obtained by it, and all it can do is to clear up and establish the fact that what we do really apprehend is God.

Let us understand this. Reasoning consists in deducing conclusions from given premises. It can neither operate without premises, nor furnish its own premises, and therefore it does and must always proceed from premises furnished it, and, in the last analysis, from premises furnished or given to the mind prior to all reasoning or logical process. The mind cannot by reasoning obtain its first principles, because without first principles it cannot reason at all. Hence the first principles of all reasoning are *given*, not obtained; therefore are called *data*. As there can be nothing in the conclusion not contained in the *data* or premises, so nothing can be assented to in the conclusion which had not really been assented to in them. Reasoning is not an operation by which knowledge is extended to new matter, a process by which we go from the known to the unknown and make new conquests to the domain of our knowledge. All it does is to distinguish, clear up, and establish what we already know in its premises, or is given us in the *data* from which we reason. It changes the state or the form of our knowledge, but does not give us knowledge of any new matter. In the order of knowledge, distinguished on the one hand from faith and on the other from opinion, the principles, premises, or *data* are intuitively evident, and consequently nothing not intuitively evident can be concluded. It is therefore impossible to conclude God by any logical process, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*,—for the principle of both arguments is the same,—unless he is intuitively evident in the premises, and therefore apprehended prior to the commencement of the reasoning. Hence the belief in God has not been and cannot be generated by any simply logical process whatever.

Reasoning is an exercise of the reflective, as distinguished from the intuitive understanding, and its premises must be distinctly apprehended as the condition of its operation. But in the intelligible order, as distinguished from the sensible order, reflection cannot take its premises immediately

from intuition, as modern Transcendentalists and exaggerated spiritualists maintain, because we are not pure intelligences, but intelligences united to body, and, unless by a miracle, can act in this life only in conjunction with the body. Hence we are capable, in the reflective order, the order in which we properly act, of no pure intellection, or intellectual operation. We are incapable of performing any intellectual process in which the senses do not take part. We must act as we are, soul and body, intellect and sense united, and consequently cannot reflect or reason on any object which is not either sensibly presented or sensibly represented. This is the great fact on which Aristotle insists against Plato, and St. Thomas against the Platonists, and is the fact intended in the famous maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*. Neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas ever intended to teach that nothing is apprehensible by us which is not an object of sense, or to deny that we may have, and have, intuition of the intelligible; for Aristotle makes philosophy properly so called consist in the knowledge of principles and causes, which he holds to be supersensible, and St. Thomas concedes that we have in our desire for good at least an obscure apprehension or intuition of God, who is our sovereign Good. What they mean is, that nothing can be in or present to the mind as an object of the reflective understanding which is not either a sensible object or an intelligible object sensibly represented. Neither held the modern doctrine of Sensism, any more than the modern doctrine of Transcendentalism. All they meant is the well-known fact, that the intuition of the intelligible, though real and the basis of all science, as of all demonstration, is not, and cannot be, immediately an object of reflection. To be such, the object of the intuition must be sensibly represented to the mind.

But the intelligible has no sensible representative in the order of nature, for by its own nature it is always supersensible. The pretence of some, that the sensible world is the image and representative of the intelligible world, is unworthy of any serious consideration. The material is, and can be, no image of the spiritual; and all theologians agree, that the image and likeness of God to which man was created pertain to man's soul, not to his body. Analogies may be detected between the forces operating

in the sensible world and those of the spiritual, and on the exhibition of these much of the charm and vivacity of poetry depends; but these forces are not themselves sensible; they are invisible and immaterial, save in their effects. The correspondences of the Swedenborgians are too fanciful to be entertained. Intuition of the intelligible must, in order to be an object of reflection, be sensibly represented; and as it has no natural representative, it must be represented to us through the medium of artificial signs, or words, which are the sensible signs of ideas, or intelligible objects. Sensible objects may be objects of reflection without the aid of words or language. I can reflect, for instance, on a tree, a blade of grass, or a flower, although ignorant of its name, because I am able to seize the object itself and hold it up before my mind's eye, and speculate on its form, its properties, or its uses. But in the intelligible order this is not possible. Mathematics is a mixed science, and pertains only in part to the pure ideal or intelligible, and yet no mathematician can carry on his processes without the aid of sensible signs or symbols. If we could, as our Boston Transcendentalists contend, take our premises immediately from intuition, we should be pure intelligences, and independent, intellectually considered, of the body while in it, which certainly is not the fact. We must take them from the sensible signs which signify them, and therefore from language. The real office of intelligible intuition is not to originate belief or to propound its object to reflection, but to evidence or confirm it when sensibly represented.

Now God, if he be at all, must be in the intelligible order, or rather that order itself, as distinguished from the sensible. He certainly is no object of our senses, as is conceded on all hands; the distinct or reflective belief that he is, is not and cannot be taken immediately from intuition, even assuming that he is intuitively apprehended by us, because in intuition nothing is reflective or distinct. It would by intuition alone be impossible to assert either to ourselves or to others that God exists. Before we can distinctly conceive that he is, we must have the truth that he is, sensibly represented to us, that is, expressed to us by sensible signs, in words, or language. Hence we could not attain to the belief that God is, could have no distinct belief that he is, unless taught it through the medium of words by some one other than ourselves.



But if the human mind is unable to generate the belief, the very fact of the existence of the belief becomes a proof, and a conclusive proof, of its validity. We do not, of course, contend, that the simple fact that a belief is entertained is in all cases a proof that it is well founded, for we are far from believing in the infallibility of the human race; we only say, that the fact that a belief which man could not of himself originate, and which he can have present to his mind only as taught it by another, is in the world, and generally held, is full proof that it is true. For if we can have it only as we are taught it, we must either assume that God himself has first taught us, or else suppose an infinite series of teachers. My father may have taught me, but who taught him? His father? But who taught his father? These questions may be continued to infinity, and we must either assert an infinite series of teachers, which is an infinite absurdity, or we must stop with the first man, the commencement of the series of generations, and then arises the question, Who taught the first man? God himself, is the only answer conceivable, and then God really is; for if he were not, he could not teach his existence, since what is not cannot act. This is historically the way in which the belief has actually originated. God taught the first man his own existence, and the belief has been perpetuated to us by the unbroken chain of tradition. This of itself sufficiently refutes the atheist.

The tradition of the human race in this respect is uniform and unbroken. History traces the belief from the first man down to us, and the testimony of the human race to the existence of the tradition in every age and in every nation is itself sufficient to warrant belief in its reality, if human testimony is sufficient to establish any fact whatever. There may have been atheists in every age who have denied the existence of God, but even these are so many unexceptionable witnesses to the fact of the tradition, for these all assailed it, and they could not have assailed it if it had not existed; they all arraigned the belief in God, but in so doing they only proved that the belief survived, since men do not arraign what is not, or deny what is not affirmed. The mythologies and idolatries of the heathen all vouch in like manner for the fact of the primitive tradition, for they are all manifest corruptions or perversions of it, — of the belief and worship of God

which preceded them, subsisted with the patriarchs and the Jews contemporaneously with them, and in the Catholic Church have survived them. Even if man could have originated the belief itself, still the universal tradition would be full evidence that he first learned the existence of God from God himself.

But we will not stop here, lest we be supposed to hold one of the errors of Lamennais. This would establish the validity of the belief in God, it is true, but it would not make his existence a matter of science. Here was the error of Lamennais. He made the belief traditional, assumed the original revelation by God himself, but made the belief rest for its evidence, not on intuition, but on the testimony of the race, and therefore left it a matter of faith, of mere human faith too, and not a matter of science. The belief is proved to be true by the tradition, but to be a matter of science it must be evident not merely from testimony, but from intuition, or, in other words, it must be intuitively evident, and that it is intuitively evident we proceed now to show.

We allow the atheist to doubt all things if he wishes, till he comes to the point where doubt denies itself. Doubt is an act of intelligence; only an intelligent agent can doubt. It as much demands intellect to doubt as it does to believe, — to deny as it does to affirm. Universal doubt is, therefore, simply an impossibility, for doubt cannot, if it would, doubt the intelligence that doubts, since to doubt that would be to doubt itself. You cannot doubt that you doubt, and then, if you doubt, you know that you doubt, and there is one thing, at least, you do not doubt, namely, that you doubt. To doubt the intelligence that doubts would be to doubt that you doubt, for without intelligence there can no more be doubt than belief. Intelligence, then, you must assert, for without intelligence you cannot even deny intelligence, and the denial of intelligence by intelligence contradicts itself, and affirms intelligence in the very act of denying it. Doubt, then, as much as you will, you must still affirm intelligence as the condition of doubting, or of asserting the possibility of doubt, for what is not cannot act.

This much, then, is certain, that however far the atheist may be disposed to carry his denials, he cannot carry them so far as to deny intelligence, because that would be denial

of denial itself. Then he must concede intelligence, and then whatever is essential to the reality of intelligence. In conceding any thing, you concede necessarily all that by which it is what it is, and without which it could not be what it is. Intelligence is inconceivable without the intelligible, or some object capable of being known. There is no intelligence where there is no knowledge; there is no knowledge where nothing is known; and there can be nothing known where there is nothing to be known. So, in conceding intelligence, the atheist necessarily concedes the intelligible. He who asserts intelligence asserts the intelligible, for without the intelligible intelligence is impossible. But as what is not cannot act, so what is not cannot be intelligible. The intelligible therefore is something which is, is being, real being too, not merely abstract or possible being, for without the real there is and can be no possible, or abstract. The abstract in that it is abstract is nothing, and therefore unintelligible, that is to say, no object of knowledge or of the intellect. The possible, as possible, is nothing but the power or ability of the real, and is apprehensible only in the apprehension of that power or ability. In itself, abstracted from the real, it is a pure nullity, has no being, no existence, is not, and therefore is unintelligible, no object of intelligence or of intellect, on the principle that what is not is not intelligible. Consequently, to the reality of intelligence a real intelligible is necessary, and since the reality of intelligence is undeniable, the intelligible must be asserted, and asserted as real, not as abstract or merely possible being. The atheist is obliged to assert intelligence, but he cannot assert intelligence without asserting the intelligible, and he cannot assert the intelligible without asserting something really is, that is, without asserting real being. The real being thus asserted is either necessary and eternal being, being in itself, subsisting by and from itself, or it is contingent and therefore created being. One or the other we must say, for being which is neither necessary nor contingent, or which is both at once, is inconceivable, and cannot be asserted or supposed. Whatever is, in any sense, is either necessary and eternal or contingent and created, — is either being in itself, Absolute Being, as the Germans say, or existence dependent on another for its being, and therefore is not without the necessary and eternal, on which it depends. If you

say it is necessary and eternal being, you say it is God; if you say it is contingent being, you still assert the necessary and eternal, therefore God, because the contingent is neither possible nor intelligible without the necessary and eternal. The contingent, since it is or has its being only in the necessary and eternal, and since what is not is not intelligible, is intelligible, as the contingent, only in necessary and eternal being, and therefore can be known only in knowing necessary and eternal being, the intelligible in itself, in which it has its being, and therefore its intelligibility. So in either case you cannot assert the intelligible without asserting necessary and eternal being, and therefore, since necessary and eternal being is God, without asserting God, or that God is; and since you must assert the intelligible in order to assert intelligence, and since you must assert intelligence even to deny it, it follows that in every act of intelligence God is asserted, and that it is impossible without self-contradiction to deny his existence.

The conclusion here is evident, but if we analyze it we shall find that it is not that God is, but that what is really apprehended in every act of intelligence as the intelligible, without which the act were impossible, is God. The whole argument proceeds on the assumption that the mind has immediate and direct intuition of being. We find that in every act of intelligence there is apprehension of real being, and it is only in virtue of such apprehension that there is any actual intelligence at all. But this apprehension is immediate, intuitive, not discursive, by virtue of a prior act of intelligence, or a previous apprehension, because without it there is no apprehension, and no intellectual act at all. As certain, then, as it is that there is intelligence at all, so certain is it that in the first, as in the last, act of intelligence there is intuition of being, and of real being. It is equally certain that this real being is necessary and eternal being, and therefore God; for only that which is necessary and eternal, which is being in itself, subsisting by and from itself, absolute, perfect, independent being, is intelligible in and by itself alone. Nothing but being is intelligible, and consequently that which has being only in another is not intelligible in and by itself alone, and can be known only in the being in which it has its being. Hence Malebranche rightly maintained, after St. Augustine, that we see all things in God, in whom we live,

and move, and are. If nothing but being is intelligible *per se*, it follows that the being which is the intelligible, and without which there could be no intelligible, is independent being, being that has its being in and from itself; for otherwise it would not be intelligible *per se*, and could be known only in knowing another being on which it depends or in which it has its being. But being which is independent, that has its being in itself and not in another, is necessarily necessary and eternal being, therefore God. Consequently that of which we have immediate intuition in every act of intelligence as the intelligible is God, which is what was to be proved.

It may help us to understand this if we bear in mind that there are no abstractions in nature, and that whatever is is real. We may say this or that which does not exist is *possible*, but we cannot say the possible is, for in that it is possible its characteristic is that it is not, but may be. Abstracted from the real, from the power or ability of the real, as we have said, it is a mere nullity, and is unintelligible, the subject of no predicate whatever. Between that which really is in itself or in another, that is, between real being or real existence, and nothing, there is no medium. A thing is or it is not, exists or does not exist. Existence as distinguished from being is that which is not in itself, but in another, and has being only by virtue of the creative act of him in whom it is. The word itself, from *ex-stare*, says as much. It is never necessary and eternal, but contingent, with a beginning in time, and therefore is inconceivable without the independent, necessary, and eternal being that has created it, and on which it depends. All conceivable, all possible reality is that which is and exists, that is to say, creator and creature. Hence, between God or Creator and existence or creature, and nothing, there is no *tertium quid*, no medium, and consequently whatever is intelligible to us, or essential to intelligence, which is not existence or creature, is God.

Now it is certain that in reasoning, for instance, we have immediate intuition of cause and effect, and of the necessary relation of the one to the other, and we could not perform a single act of reasoning if we had not. In the syllogism we hold there is necessary *nexus* between the premises and the conclusion, and in all languages the conclusion is said to follow *necessarily* from the premises.

Here is evidently apprehension of the necessary. This apprehension is necessarily intuitive, and not the result of reasoning, because it precedes all reasoning, and is the basis of every discursive process. But the necessary, as the eternal, wherever we encounter it, must have a real entity,—is, in the language of the schools, *ens necessarium*, necessary entity, and therefore God. Consequently, that of which we have immediate intuition in every process of reasoning, and without which no such process would be possible or conceivable, is God the Creator.

In all the operations of the mind concerning numbers, for instance, there is always intuition of unity; for all numbers, as says Thomassin,\*

“are only unity more or fewer times repeated, and since it is seen as unchangeable and eternal, God himself is seen. The truth of unity and of numbers, and of their innumerable and ineffably wonderful properties, and the necessity of this truth which could not not be, its immutability whence it cannot be otherwise than it is, and its eternity whence it cannot not always be, are most evidently perceived and most clearly seen, and since it has so many of the Divine attributes, it can be no other than God himself. . . . As to figures also, there are in the universe no circles, no spheres, no figures which exactly agree with the laws and definitions, which the understanding alone perceives to be prescribed to them. . . . In God, therefore, as in the supreme principle of numbers, as in the very citadel of unity and equality, as in the art of arts and law of arts, all these things are seen, and are clearly seen, with the fullest light and evidence. Finally, the truth of these figures and of their properties, and the necessity, immutability, and eternity of this truth, surpass all created nature, and yet are plainly and most certainly seen with the eye of the mind; and therefore God himself is seen [or intuitively apprehended].”

We may add to the same purport the following passages from St. Augustine, with Thomassin's commentary on them, as cited by Gerdil.

“*Aug.* By these and many similar arguments are those reasoners, to whom God has granted understanding, and who are not led by pertinacity into error, compelled to acknowledge that the truth and reason of numbers do not belong to the external senses, and that this truth and reason are sincere and unchangeable, and com-

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\* Lib. VI. cap. 10, art. 2, *et seq.*, apud Gerdil, Tom. IV. p. 24. Romæ, 1806.

mon to all who reason.\* *Thom.* Therefore this truth, since it is intelligible, unchangeable, and eternal, is God."

"*Aug.* There is † a thing worthy of being known, which is, how from corporeal and spiritual, but mutable numbers, we can come to the immutable numbers which are in that immutable truth : and thus the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. *Thom.* You see the numbers, which are so plainly evident, appear incommutable, and are seen in God, who is the incommutable truth. *Aug.* The incommutable truth of numbers is as the chamber, the *penetrable*, the region, habitation, or seat of numbers." ‡ And again : "A sort of light in a wonderful manner, both secret and public, is present and illumines all those who perceive immutable truths." And further on : "Pass, then, beyond the mind of the artificer, that you may behold the eternal number, then will wisdom shine upon you from its inner recess and from the dwelling-place of truth. *Thom.* He therefore most constantly asserts that God, the eternal and immutable truth of numbers, is seen [intellectually apprehended]."

As to figures, St. Augustine says : § —

"Since agreement, by which alone all things are beautiful, pleases in all arts, and this agreement requires equality and unity, either in the similitude of equal, or in the gradation of unequal parts, who is there that can find supreme equality or similitude in bodies, and would dare to say that any body is truly and simply one, if carefully considering that all bodies are changed either by passing from species to species, or from place to place, and that they are composed of parts occupying their places, by which they are divided into different spaces ? Moreover, the true equality and likeness, the true and first unity, are apprehended not by the eyes of the flesh, nor any external sense, but by the intellect. For how should any equality be desired in bodies, or how should the most of them be known to be imperfect, if that which is perfect were not apprehended by the mind, — if indeed that may be called *perfect* which is not made and which is neither extended in place nor changeable in time ? *Thom.* He argues, then, that the transcendental equality is seen neither by the senses nor the imagination, but by the intellect alone, and that works are judged by it as by the law of all arts. But since this equality is immutable and immense, having no relation to place or time ; since it is perfect, though not made ; since it is the law which may not be judged, but according to which, as being supreme and above them, all created

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\* Lib. II. *de Lib. Arbit.*, cap. 8.

† *Retract. agens* *de Lib. VI.*, *De Music.*

‡ Lib. II. *de Lib. Arbit.*, cap. 11.

§ *De Ver. Relig.*, cap. 30.

minds judge, — it must necessarily be God himself, the law of all arts and the art of the Almighty Artificer, as the same St. Augustine immediately adds : But since this law of all arts is in all respects immutable, and the human mind to which it is granted to apprehend this law is liable to the mutability of error ; it is evident that there is a law above the mind of man, which is called truth.”

And again : —

“ *Aug.* This is that immutable truth which is rightly called the law of all arts, and the art of the Almighty Artificer. *Thom.* Hence it is evident that God is seen [or intuitively apprehended], since this law or truth of equality and unity is apprehended by the intellect alone. *Aug.* Is it easy for the soul to love these things, in which it seeks only equality and likeness, and of which, after the most careful consideration, it hardly detects the least trace or shadow ? Is it difficult for the soul to love God, in whom, as far as is possible for it, still thinking of earth, it sees nothing unequal, nothing unlike, nothing extended in place, nothing varied in time ? If it pleases us to build edifices, and to be busied in such works, what is it that pleases, if it be not numbers ? For I find nothing else which may be said to be similar or equal in them which discipline may not deride. If this be so, why do we descend to these things from that citadel of most true equality, and build on its ruins ? *Thom.* You perceive that the equality itself is God, and is seen by our understanding, and seen so clearly and surely as to be more evident than bodies.

“ *Aug.* It belongs to the higher intellect to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons, which, if they were not above human understanding, would not be immutable ; and if nothing of ours were added to them [that is, if we were not in relation with them, or could not apprehend them], we could not by them judge of sensible things, &c. But that of ours which is employed in treating of sensible and temporal things, and is not common to us with brutes, is indeed rational, but proceeds from that rational substance of our minds by which we adhere to the intelligible and immutable truth [that is, intuitively seize or apprehend it], and is given us for treating and governing inferiors.”\* And Chapter VII.: “As we have said of the nature of the mind, if it contemplates the whole truth, it is the image of God, and from it is in a certain manner distributed and directed to the action of temporals ; nevertheless, though inasmuch as it consults the truth perceived it is the image of God, yet inasmuch as it operates in inferior actions it is not his image.”

We come to the same conclusion from the notion of justice. St. Augustine must speak for us : —

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\* *De Trinit.*, Lib. XII. cap. 2.



"What the mind is, we know from ourselves, for the mind is within us. But how shall we know the just, since we are not yet just? If we know it without us [in space], we know it in some body. But this is not a thing belonging to bodies. In ourselves, then, we know the just; for I do not find it anywhere when I seek it, if I may say so, but with myself. And if I interrogate another what is the just, he asks himself what he shall answer. Is that which he sees the interior truth present to the mind which is able to see it? Nor are all able to see this: and those who are able are not all of them that which they see within themselves, that is, they are not just minds because they can see and tell what is a just mind. Whence could they be just minds, unless by adhering to that form which they behold within them, and, being informed by it, made just minds? . . . . The man, then, who is believed to be just, is loved by that form and truth which he who loves him sees and understands with himself; but which form and truth he is not, as otherwise he would himself be loved."\*

The soul, as Gerdil remarks, knows itself, in the manner in which it knows itself in this life, by its interior sentiment of itself, but it knows justice only in beholding the very form of justice. Now this form and this truth is God himself; for, as St. Augustine says, it is loved for itself, and, besides, justice can be represented to us by no idea of it distinguished from itself, as St. Augustine says again in express terms:—

"For we find nothing such except itself that, when it is unknown, by believing we love it because we already know something similar. For whatever you see like it is it, since it alone is such as it is."

And again: †—

"Hence, even the wicked think of eternity, and rightly blame and praise many things in human actions. By what rules, then, do they judge, unless by those in which they see how each one should live, although they themselves do not live according to them? Where do they see them? Not in their own nature, since they are certainly seen by the mind, and it is evident that their minds are changeable, and whoever sees these rules sees they are unchangeable. Nor do they see them in the habit of their mind, since they are the rules of justice, but their minds are evidently unjust. Where are these rules written? where do the wicked see what is just and what is unjust? whence do they know they should have that which they have not? Where are these

\* *De Trinit.*, Lib. VIII. cap. 6.

† *Ibid.*, Lib. XIV. cap. 15.

rules written, if not in the book of that light which is called truth? Hence, every just law is written in and transferred to the heart of the man that works justice, not by migration, but as it were by impression, as an image passes from a ring to the wax, *yet does not leave the ring*. But he that does not do that which he sees should be done, is turned from that light by which, notwithstanding, he is enlightened."

"Behold, you blame God," he says (Enarr. in Ps. lxi.), "as if for injustice. You could not blame him for injustice if you did see justice, for how could you know that this is unjust, unless you know what is just? You see this to be unjust from some rule of justice, and comparing with it the evil that you see, and finding that it does not agree with the rectitude of your rule, you blame it as an artificer distinguishing the just from the unjust. I ask you, then, whence do you see that this is just? Whence that I know not what with which your soul is sprinkled, — for it remains in many respects in darkness, — that which flashes upon your mind? Whence is this *just*? Has it no origin? Is it from you, and can you give justice to yourself? No man gives himself what he has not. Therefore, since you are unjust, you can be just only in turning to some permanent justice, which you cannot depart from without being unjust, nor come to without being just: when you go from it, it is not wanting, when you approach it, it does not increase. Where then is this? Go where God has once spoken, and you will find the fountain of justice where you find the fountain of life."

These extracts, which are only a specimen of what we might make from St. Augustine, and which we introduce both for their merit as arguments, and as authority for our Catholic readers, fully sustain our position. They prove that in all our intellectual operations, as their necessary condition, we have intuition of real being, of the unchangeable, the necessary, and the eternal, and real, necessary, unchangeable, and eternal Being is God, and therefore they prove that we have intuition of God. This intuition is like all intuition, indistinct, indefinite, and we do not from it alone ever know or become able to affirm that its object is God. To know this, it is necessary to reflect on the object of the intuition as re-presented to us in language, or sensible signs. Here is the place for the various arguments ordinarily adopted by theologians. They do not prove to the mind that has no intuition of God that God is, for God is the first principle of all proof, of all demonstration, of all science; but they do prove to the

mind that the object of its intuitions, by virtue of which it knows or reasons, is God. These arguments, whether from effect to cause or from cause to effect, whether from the order and design of nature, the necessity of a prime Mover or of a universal Governor, do not prove from principles distinct from God that God is, but that principles which we did not know to be God are God, and nothing else, which is still better.

Another branch of the subject, namely, the evidence that God not only is, but is the creator of all things, or has created the world, and which contains the refutation of pantheism, remains to be considered; but as it would make this article quite too long to take it up now, we reserve it for a future occasion. Pantheism is the form which atheism now assumes, and the great point to be proved to complete the refutation of atheism is not to establish the fact that we have intuition of God as being, but of him as creative being, for it is the creative Deity that is now generally denied. We live in an age marked by the revival and prevalence of heathenism, and the grand error of heathenism originated in the loss of the conception of God as creator. Heathen philosophy forgot the first verse of Genesis: "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." It lost sight of the creative act of the Divinity, and hence it was never able to attain to sound theology even in the natural order. The philosophers of our age lose sight of the same fact, and hence their errors. We will endeavor hereafter to recall the fact to their minds, and establish it. But we have said enough for the present. We have shown that God is, and that he is the very principle of all our intelligence, the fountain of all truth, and the source of all light. As such, we are in immediate relation with him, are in our own minds intimately united to him. Let it be our study to be as intimately united to him in our hearts by a never-failing charity, which loves him above all things for his own sake.

- ART. II. — 1. *Encyclical Letter of His Holiness, Pope Pius the Ninth, to the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops throughout the World.* Rome, at St. John of Lateran. 1850.
2. *Letter of the Count de Montalembert to the Catholics of France, on the Presidential Election.* Paris. 1851.
3. *Acts of the Synod of Thurles.* 1851.
4. *Speech of His Grace, the Most Rev. Paul Cullen, Archbishop of Armagh, Primate of all Ireland, at the Opening of the Catholic Defence Association.* Dublin. 1851.
5. *Speech of the Most Rev. John Hughes, Archbishop of New York, at the Astor House Banquet.* 1851.
6. *Letter of the Rt. Rev. Michael O'Connor, Bishop of Pittsburg, on the Claims of Kossuth.* Pittsburg. 1852.
7. *The Catholic Press.* 1852.
8. *Letter from Europe.* By REV. DR. BAIRD. New York.
9. *Speeches of Kossuth.* 1851-52.
10. *The Protestant Press, passim.* 1852.

It has been said by some who look over our Review, that we are not remarkable for saying new things. Some of our friends have hinted that a little more variety might not be unsuited to our pages, and that it would be likely to secure a class of readers who seldom do us the honor to read our essays. They look at our table of contents, and they find that the Church, in some one of her aspects, is the centre around which every word and sentence is made to revolve. Our doubting friends ask whether this be politic or necessary. Would it not be well, at times, to suppose, were it but for the sake of argument, that Catholics and Protestants can meet on common, or, at worst, debatable ground? What principle would be sacrificed, if an article now and then should appear, in which the Protestant might find some recreation, and some instruction even, without being compelled to stumble over sentences which remind him that his soul is in danger, that he is an inhabitant of a lost world, and that the incomprehensible distance which separates starry bodies most remote from one another is as nothing compared to the abyss which divides the Church, the Catholic world, the Star of Bethlehem, from the world without, the Protestant world, the star that

fell, once upon a time, and dragged after it a third of the lights of heaven? Grant that the Protestant be a fly, cannot you try, at least, to catch him with honey?

Meanwhile, the flies who are to be caught with honey buzz the same complaint in our ears. They cannot open our Review without finding something therein which shocks their sensibilities. Eternal damnation, with all its attendant and unnamable horrors, is forced upon their unwilling attention, as a thing which may be predicated of them, *in sensu composito*, with the same certainty which enables the by-stander to say of a man who has swallowed deadly poison, and who will not eject it, that he will surely die. Such a course cannot be maintained without innumerable sins against common charity. And why cannot you imitate the policy of our Protestant Reviewers, even of the graver sort, who, if they judge it necessary or expedient to adopt, as their ordinary tone, a heavy, solemn, and religious style of writing, nevertheless interweave flowers and pretty ornaments with their solid matter, and not unfrequently emulate, with no small degree of success, and certainly to the satisfaction of their readers, the light tone and playful manner of the magazine? Why always harp on the same string?

We do not mean to institute a comparison, *servatis servandis*, between ourselves and a Paganini, yet we venture to observe that good music *can* be drawn from one string. We have frequently answered the objection, that our language involves a breach of common charity, and we will not here repeat our answer. We grant that the objection, as it is here stated, has some color of truth. We do not think much of *common* charity, inasmuch as it is a counterfeit presentment of an abused name. A little observation is enough to satisfy one that it is the charity of the world, and that in ethics it is called philanthropy; in theology, indifferentism. True charity, or simply charity, should not be uncommon; but it is, inasmuch as faith is also uncommon. We do not prize the common charity which is rejected by the Church, anathematized by the Apostles, and declared by Christ to be a mere human sentiment, incapable, in any case, of unlocking the gates of heaven. We submit that every word proceeding from the mouth of Christ is honey, and none the less when his words, which were full of sweetness to the penitent, sound-

ed very like a sentence of final reprobation to the proud and obstinate sinner. If our flies mistake the nature of honey, we cannot see that the fault is ours.

But we present nothing new! The Church, and nothing but the Church, inspires our matins, lauds, and even-song. To these people who ask for a new story we might reply, "Story! God bless you, we have none to tell." The things urged by us have been said before. The Catholic, as often as he has occasion to speak of the world without, finds himself chanting an antiphon that has been familiar, in some form, to every Christian, who must testify against the world, if not in his blood, at least in his tears. The wisdom of Paganism ended with the conclusion that man can know nothing. The wisdom of the Gospel taught Solomon and St. Thomas that man can know only one thing,—that God is alpha and omega, the beginning and the end. There is nothing new under the sun, and that which is hath been; that which hath been will be. The saints of every age know that the soul is better than the body; heaven, above the earth; God, the omnipotent master of Satan; and knowing this thing, they not only know all things worth knowing, but the only thing which can be known at all.

Yet no objection brought against the Christian is more likely to provoke a smile of pity than this which we are now considering, inasmuch as it implies the utter abandonment of right reason on the part of those who make it. We might retort that the world sings but one song, that it knows and can know no other; it is the song sung to it by the Devil in Paradise, which it caught up and has repeated ever since, with a persistence not to be shaken by the discovery, continually made, that it is a lying song. No degree of suffering, no amount of experience, could or can teach ancient or modern heathens that the world is not a thing to be sought or loved for its own sake. The apple of Sodom never ceases to look inviting to the eye, but the bitter ashes which fill it, and choke the eaters who pass along, furnish no warning or example to the crowds that press from behind, eager to taste and see how bitter Satan is. Were it not a thing of common experience, it would be incredible that the masses of mankind rush blindly to the gulf whence they, as well as Christians, can hear the never-ceasing cry of departed rebels against God, and

dupes of the world. "Therefore we have erred! The harvest is over, the summer is ended, and we are not saved." Then, if we are reproached with the sameness of our speech, the answer is prompt. The unity of speech which confesses God includes all truth, and it is the key of heaven. The unity of speech which confesses Satan includes all error, and it is the key of hell.

But, aside from all this, our objector maltreats his own understanding when he complains that Catholic language is one. He acknowledges the intrinsic worthlessness of his own cause. Unity of language implies unity of principle. The gentile, by which term we mean the ancient and modern heathen, the infidel, and the Protestant, finds in the world one language and one speech, proceeding from one principle, which is, — In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth? No, say the gentiles, in the beginning the earth created the heavens, and God. Let us build a tower whose top shall pierce the skies. So they set aside the old, God-given unity of language, and found Babylon, the city of the world, the Babel of tongues; and the object of their ambition, the motive of their rebellion, the tower whose top was to reach to heaven, turns out to be a sightless, ruined monument of the folly of its builders, and to reach, not heaven, but hell. The variety of tongues, the diversity of language, for which our gentile asks, may and should be clearly recognized by him as a confusion of speech, utterly wanting unity of principle, referrible to the same causes, and pregnant with the same effects, as the variety of tongues brought upon the dwellers of Babel by their foolish imitation of their master, — of the master of all gentiles, — of Satan, — who before them said, "I will plant my throne above the stars; I will be like unto the Most High"; and who, like them, — like his eldest earthly son, their father according to the flesh, — like Cain, — bore upon his brow the sign of damnation, wandered from the face of the Lord, and staggered under a weight of punishment greater than he could bear.

Catholic unity of language implies one principle, one motive, one first and final cause of speech, and as the various parts of any instrument whatever reflect the purpose of the maker, and are intelligible or valuable only as they serve that purpose, so in every sentence of the Catholic speech there appears the principle which informs or vivifies

the whole. This principle may be called the glory of God, or his justice, or his kingdom, but it is always God, the Lord of science, who directs thoughts, and puts words into the mouth of his servants. In this sense, the Word of God becomes flesh in the word of man, because the *words* of men, naturally presenting the senseless, soulless, unprincipled confusion of Babel, become a *word* taught by God, repeated by regenerated man after the pattern shown him in the *mountain*, conserved by, for, and in the Church of Christ through all ages, and declaring, in every word that proceeds from the Christian tongue, that the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth, absolute, universal Master in heaven, on earth, and in hell. It is not denied that this *word* may be enunciated by the Church, and by her sons, in varied measure, but the burden is still the same, and under all its accidental forms the Christian can readily hear the great word, so often spoken, so little understood, that the soul is more precious than the body; heaven, than the earth; and that in every thought, word, and action we must seek first the kingdom of God, in which search is found the true, though viewless kingdom of this world, and it is seen to be, not an abiding-place for man, not the beginning or the end of his being, but a land of exile whose natural productions are apples of Sodom, and whose only use is to furnish a causeway to the gates of heaven.

We have the authority of poets and of discontented men for saying that variety is charming. It is true, inasmuch as the human heart is objectively *immense*, nothing can fill it that is not God. The good things of this life may arrest its attention for a moment, but they are not God, and it turns to seek something new, feeling the while a sense of disappointment that grows more keen as the heart grows old, and old without having found God. Aged gentiles are hence miserable, inasmuch as they have never sought God, the true good of their heart, in himself, but they have sought him in his creatures, in which he is never found. They are found in him. Variety ceases to bring pleasure to the old age of a heathen. But it never need bring any thing but contentment to the Christian, who seeks every thing in God, and finds him in every creature. The world, which is such an unfathomable mystery to the unconverted, from the ancient dualists to the modern humanitarians, is to him a book illuminated by



the rays of God's countenance; the heavens declare to him the Divine glory, the firmament displays the infinite creative act; he can understand and repeat the hymns of benediction and praise wherein the royal prophet calls upon even inanimate creatures, from the sun, moon, and stars to lightning, rain, and hail, to bless the Lord, and magnify his name for ever. That summons of the Psalmist king was the best possible answer to the dualist, who pretended that of inanimate beings some were intrinsically evil, eternally turned from good, and incapable of bearing any other than a blaspheming testimony to the Fountain of benediction. It was the best possible answer to the pantheist, inasmuch as it placed the inanimate being in the relation of the creature to its Creator, by imposing upon it the duty of sacrifice. It was the best possible answer to the gentile. He placed the end of his being in creatures. They pointed to God as the sole end of his being, and of theirs, and invited him to seek them in God.

If what is called variety pleases the Christian, his pleasure has nothing in common with that of the heathen. If variety be charming to the gentile, it is so for its own sake; it is so because the possession of a new object brings present weariness, whereupon he seeks in rapidly successive novelty some remedy for the sting which his idols leave behind, as an intimation that, in seeking them as his chief good, he totally mistakes the end of his creation and of theirs, and that every step in their direction removes him eternal ages from God. Multiplicity without unity is chaos, and chaos is the world of the gentile. Not so rolls the Christian world. In it the problem of multiplicity in unity is fully solved. The Christian does not possess the things of this world, he uses them. He finds them in God, and God, the only object which can fill his heart, is found in them. Hence their use brings contentment, their loss imports no sorrow, for God remains when they disappear. And new objects are not sought to stifle disappointment, or to banish satiety, but to find in every creature the means of drawing nearer and yet more near to God. Talk of the lack of variety in Christian life! Why, only in it is variety to be found. Confusion is not variety, yet the world of the gentile is confusion itself, because it is a world of means without an end, effects without a cause, the many without the one. *Felix qui potuit*

*rerum cognoscere causas*, exclaimed a genuine heathen, from the depths of his gentile misery. The heathen may well complain of the sameness of objects in his world, but his weariness cannot be shared by the Christian, whose world is properly a *universe*, replete with multiplicity, variety, in a supreme and infinite unity. And the Christian language, — who but a foolish gentile would discover in it sameness? It is the only living speech, for it is vivified by the Infinite Word by whom all things were made, and in whom all things live; it is the happy tongue *quæ rerum potuit cognoscere causas*. Monotony, indeed! Read the writings of the saints, listen to their words, note their ecstasies in the Divine presence, and confess that in the language of the world without you lack words to express things, and lack ideas even to your beggarly words. Let the gentile whose world is barren, who has not even energy to “whistle for want of thought,” study men like a holy solitary who began to meditate upon the petitions of the Lord’s prayer, but found the words “Our Father” so suggestive, that he never got beyond them. What does that torrent of ideas mean? Let him study the interior life of the saints, who find in the contemplation of God a fulness of delight which causes them to exclaim, “O Beauty, ever ancient and ever new! Too late have we known thee; too late have we loved thee!” Why have saints found material for the study of a lifetime in the name of Jesus? Hear St. Bernard:—

“Nec lingua valet dicere,  
Nec litera exprimere,  
Expertus potest dicere  
Quid sit Jesum diligere!”

What is seen in these saints may be seen in every Catholic, regard being always had to the degree of goodness by which his Catholic life is measured. Every Catholic has some knowledge of the things about which we have been speaking; good Catholics know more, the saints know most. Through the mercy of God, and without any merits of our own, we find ourselves in the Church, and as the Catholic *universe*, whose Lord and Master is God, is eternally distinct from the gentile *world*, whose Lord is also God, but whose master is Satan, we are constrained to admit that the worst Catholic enjoys advantages which are unknown, although not unsuspected, by the most

praiseworthy heathen. It is not very strange that the gentile, whose ideas are centreless, and whose language is confounded, should see little variety in Catholic speech. Degrees of holiness are degrees of union with God, wherefore the language of the Catholic will bear the more testimony to God, in proportion as he draws nearer to the Divine presence. The oftener he approaches the sacraments, the more frequently will the words, God, Christ, and the Church, fall from his lips. It is natural that the subject of his thoughts should habitually employ his tongue. God has filled his heart with an abundance, and out of that abundance his mouth speaketh. Moreover, the knowledge of divine things enables him to understand the multiplicity of the universe, to apprehend its cause, and to discourse intelligently thereon. But that cause is God in Christ, through the Church. *Scientia*, said the Roman orator, *est cognitio per causas*; and as he was a pagan, he had no science. The Catholic, who is taught to refer things to their causes, and to do it constantly, cannot, if he be a Catholic, lose sight of God in Christ, through the Church. But to the darkened understanding of the gentile, the Church is a mere human fact, or at least he treats it as if it were, and hence he does not know the endless variety in simplicity, — multiplicity in unity, — of which only the Church possesses the key. Standing upon the earth at noonday, one can see the sun in the heavens, but nothing else. Let the observer stand near the sun, and he will see all the objects illuminated by that orb. So the gentile, from his opaque world, can see the sun of Catholicity shining in the heavens, but he has no conception of the light in which his earth and other objects appear from the centre of illumination. Hence the Church, a word which is pregnant, for Christians, with a world of ideas, does not give him literally the ghost of a notion. A lifetime of meditation on the words "Our Father," or on the Holy Name of Jesus, is to him an unfathomable mystery. To his mind, our infinitely suggestive Catholic names and words convey little or no meaning. They do not inspire an idea. Poor fool! Like most gentiles, he loves to talk about the fine arts. Did he ever ask himself what it means that the highest efforts of oratory, historical composition, painting, sculpture, architecture, and other arts which he prizes, as the complement of the only civilization he understands,

were inspired by the Church, by a prayer, by some influence from a world of which he knows nothing? Does he ever ask himself why artists who warm themselves in the blaze of the nineteenth century are content to copy the excellences of men who lived in the Catholic world, and who prayed, without the faintest hope of ever reaching the excellence of those models? Or why it is that no deception, in this age of deceptions, is more successful, more highly prized, than a successful imitation of the works of the men who prayed? It would seem as if one fact, which is constantly recurring in Protestant experience, would lead him to understand the necessity of getting into the Catholic world with all speed. He finds that he can comprehend all forms of heresy, of gentile delusion; he can comfortably associate with all or any of the votaries of error, and few if any vagaries of theirs seem to him wonderful or strange. Men may deny the Trinity, or affirm it; believe in the innate depravity of man, or in his essential goodness; maintain the existence of hell, or reject it; admit the existence of God, or doubt whether there be such a Being. He sees no word in the language of any of these, which is not written in his vocabulary, and whose meaning is not satisfactorily ascertained. But when he is thrown into the society of Catholics, he sees something in them passing strange and incomprehensible. He instantly knows that they do not belong to the world which is familiar to him. It is not that he disbelieves their doctrine, because he disbelieves the doctrines of many persons familiar to him in his own world. It is not that he despises them, because he despises many of his own associates. It is not because he thinks them to be ignorant and superstitious, for the place whence he came abounds with ignorant and superstitious people. Then why can he not comprehend the men and things of the Catholic world? Why is its language to him strange and unintelligible? Is it because Catholicity is nonsensical, beneath his understanding? No, for he would then see through it, as he does through any thing absurd and foolish which he meets in some men and things of his own world. Moreover, he knows that the genius and learning of ages was inspired and fostered by this incomprehensible religion. He every day sees men of exalted natural attainments leaving his world in disgust, and embracing Catholicity. Works of

art, which he knows cannot be equalled in his world, were thrown off in the Catholic universe with an ease and rapidity which make him almost think that Catholic artists made a pastime of what costs him a lifetime of toil.

And he is conscious of another mystery. The men of his gentile world, with whom he lives, are not to him special objects of love or of hatred, apart from any good or evil they may have done to his person. Friendship to few, good-will, or at least indifference, towards all others, is a rule which he seldom finds it difficult to observe in his world, unless where his real or supposed enemies are concerned. But the presence of a Catholic, certainly of a Catholic priest, causes in him a feeling of distrust, of antipathy, of incipient, and not unfrequently of burning hatred. He knows that these feelings are shared by all true gentiles of every age; he has a secret notion that they must be, and he feels himself urged, and sometimes quite prepared, to do Catholics an injury. If he can persecute, he will. If he cannot by law, he contents himself with urging its necessity, and in the mean time with annoying them in all ways within the law. Now why do these feelings towards men who have never offended him, and who would serve him, arise in the heart of a true gentile. That they do arise is certain; and the halls of legislation, the courts, the schools, the workshops, the kitchens, even here in Boston, bear witness that they do. He cannot tell. His distrust, uneasiness, or hatred is to him as incomprehensible, when he tries to account for it, as is his utter failure to comprehend Catholic language and ways. He sometimes endeavors to justify himself by saying that, in other countries, Catholics, long since dead, worked some evil to Protestantism, and he also imputes to Catholics doctrines and practices which they anathematize and abhor. Yet he knows in his secret soul that these accusations are false, or at least of doubtful truth, and he is also aware that, even if they were true, his contented toleration of worse evils in his own world takes from him his excuse for persecuting Catholics.

Then what is the secret of his utter inability to comprehend any thing appertaining to Catholicity, and his hatred to its name? He cannot tell. If he would plead ignorance, and put himself in the category of those who take *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, there would be a hope for him, because his pride, the chief if not the only

obstacle to conversion, to a translation to the Catholic universe, would receive a smart blow from that confession. But such a course would be inadmissible, for the men of his world are enlightened in their generation; they have harnessed the lightning, they have annihilated space; there is no power in nature which they have not chained, or do not hope to chain; there is no secret in nature which they do not understand, or think that they understand, or at least expect to master. Then this Catholicity at which they so hopelessly stare is not within the range of natural things. Then it is above nature, it belongs to a higher world, and the things peculiar to it are of course, and naturally, above the comprehensions of men who live in a lower world, in the gentile chaos. And this is the reason why Catholicity is and must be eternally incomprehensible to the natural man. It is scarcely worth while to notice the objection made by bigoted Protestants, who fancy that they are religious persons. They share the feelings just described; the Church is to them unintelligible and hateful in a supreme degree. Their anger and wonder are especially aroused by the fact, that no conspiracy against the Church, organized these eighteen centuries, has produced any other result than the ruin of her enemies, an unexpected and effective display of her own resources, and the occupation by her of a position higher, firmer, than that which she apparently held when they began the attack. No vessel ever encountered surer destruction in running upon rocks, than have the kings and kingdoms that sought to crush her. The spiritual children of Pius the Ninth have heard, as Christians of every age have heard, the voice of an angel coming to them in their Egyptian banishment, and saying, "Arise, and return, for they are dead that sought the life of the child." How many times have they rolled stones to the door of her sepulchre, sealed it, placed soldiers to watch it, and then went their way to make merry over the fallen Church, at the very moment when she was putting aside the stones, paralyzing the soldiers, and showing herself to the people as the Bride of Christ, beautiful as the moon, royal as the sun, terrible as an army in battle array! Let her visit, as she has visited, the valley of dry bones, the remnants of fallen empires, the ghosts of a ruined civilization, and presently the ghosts vanish, the dry bones live, new kingdoms appear.

Now the bigoted gentile, who fancies that he is religious, not seldom admits that the things of the Catholic world are incomprehensible to him and his fellows, and that they are not the results of natural causes. Therefore he argues that the Catholic Church is a device of Satan, and sometimes he tries to believe that it is. Catholics need not be disturbed at the accusation; it was also preferred by the bigoted gentiles against our Lord Jesus Christ:—"He casteth out devils through Beelzebub, the prince of devils." "He is a Samaritan, and he hath a devil." The answer of our Lord will serve as an answer to the modern Pharisee: "A house divided against itself cannot stand." The Church of Christ stands yet. She continually wars against devils,—casts them out; then she has no league with them. Her works are those which the Devil cannot endure, neither can his servants of the gentile world. What he hates, she loves, and what he seeks, she spurns. Moreover, our bigoted Protestant, who fancies that the Church is a device of Satan, has two or three awkward difficulties awaiting solution. In all ages, the great mass of the men who actively sought the destruction of the Church were confessedly servants of the Devil, inasmuch as they were atheists, enemies of all religion, and therefore, in the eyes even of Protestants, limbs of Satan. The horde of European revolutionists is an instance in point. Then the gentile admits that the Church is incomprehensible, and, somehow, invincible. Now the Devil is a shallow creature, easily seen through, readily detected in even the most astute of his wiles, as the Holy Scriptures abundantly testify. And he is a coward; he flies from the man who resists him. Moreover, when our gentile, admitting that Catholicity is supernatural, surmises that the Devil fashioned it, he commits a serious blunder. The Devil is not a being in the supernatural world; he is ordinarily invisible, it is true, but only gentile philosophers confound the invisible with the supernatural. The Devil is a fallen being, and he is in the order of ungraced nature. Hence our gentile, in admitting that the Church does not belong to the natural world, grants also that the Devil has no part in founding it. And only a little of the intelligence which is said to illuminate this age would suffice to show the gentile that his very world is the theatre especially taken by the Devil, under Divine permission, for the scene of his

infernal labors, and, that his very world is characterized by the mass of Protestant preachers as the Devil's especial ground. Therein they are right.

The discovery, or perhaps we should say the revival, of the application of algebra to mathematical and other kindred calculations, was received by the learned as a great addition to the instruments of science, and with reason, since the terms of an equation are universal, — embrace any possible number of particular quantities. The formula represents all and each, and solves any quantitative problem connected with any of them, while it is indifferent to their non-quantitative specialities, and stands to them severally as the universal does to the particular. The Catholic dogma stands in a similar relation to all and each of the things of the universe. It is generative, moreover, which is an attribute only of the Living Universal. Herein is a peg whereon to hang a remark apposite to our subject. The algebraic formula, the generic statement, is useful as a proposition to which any number of particulars may be reduced. It may stand for any of them, and solve any question about them connected with any predicate which is common to all of them. It can do no more. Propositions, particular statements, may be reduced to it, not one can be educed from it. It is not fecund. The Catholic dogma is living, living in the Church, living in Christ; and it is generative, because it has life. Its life is the grace of Christ. So there is no question, no problem of the universe, which may not be reduced to it. It solves all and each. And there is no conclusion or proposition affecting the life of man which may not be educed from it. The Church tells you what is and what is not, what must or must not be done. Through her, strength is given to believe and to do; to make the conclusion educed from her *live* in the moral world, live in human acts. God is the Living Universal, and only he can be; but the grace of Christ is the life of the Church, and that grace, inasmuch as it is Light and Love, is the Holy Ghost; wherefore it is said, *Ecclesia est Spiritus Sanctus*; and this grace, this life of the Church, makes her creatrix of the moral, the Catholic world, wherefore she is a living universal. And so every human act, to be meritorious of eternal life, to have a place in the moral, supernatural, Catholic world, must be informed through her, and live her life. A man must



have her for his Mother, or he cannot have God for his Father. And as there is no object which may not be affected by human acts, or which may not affect them, and as none of these have a place in the Catholic, supernatural world unless they are informed, directed, vivified, by the Church, it is clear that there is nothing in the universe which is not subject to Catholic dogma. Every thing that exists may be made an occasion of sin or of well-doing, of damnation or of salvation. The Church, in which alone damnation is avoided and salvation obtained, and which directs with infallible certainty, and strengthens with certain, though unmerited grace, every human act in the supernatural world, gives us the means of avoiding the one and of obtaining the other. Wherefore the dominion of the Church is imperial and universal. Every thing that exists in the world stands in a relation either conducive or adverse to salvation. The Church knows and tells us with infallible certainty what that relation is, and our thoughts and acts with reference to the things of the universe are shaped accordingly. Inasmuch as God is better than the world, heaven than hell, the soul than the body, the supernatural than the gentile world, so, when an object is adverse to God, to heaven, and to the soul, while favorable to the other alternatives, that object is bad, and it is to be eschewed; otherwise it is good, and to be sought and referred to God.

From all this follows a conclusion easily drawn. Every thing that exists in the world stands in one aspect to the Catholic, and in a contrary aspect to the Protestant or gentile. The Catholic—we mean, of course, the true Catholic—refers every thing to God, nothing to himself or to the world. Concerning every thing, he asks, Is it good for God, for heaven, and for the soul? If so, it is to be prized; if not, it is worse than worthless. It is possible, nay, it is quite probable, that some Protestants may assent, in theory, to this view, and that it may even be inculcated from pulpits; but the Protestant world denies it in theory and in practice, which is a sufficient reason why Protestant sermons are disregarded, in addition to the fact that Protestant ministers were not sent to preach. The sermons, when they happen to be partially orthodox, are disregarded because they are unintelligible. They are unintelligible because they are in opposition to

the principles of the Protestant world, and are therefore propositions drawn from no principle and asserted on no authority. Drawn from no principle, because they can and do flow only from the Catholic dogma, of which the Protestant world knows nothing. Asserted on no authority, for the minister has none of his own; he knows not the Church, and he is not sent to preach. That some scattered propositions deduced from Catholic dogma are admitted in theory by some Protestants, and inculcated from pulpits, is not wonderful. Human nature is not essentially corrupt. The understanding was darkened by the Fall, but it was not destroyed. The will was weakened, but it was not spent. Some of the truths of what is sometimes called natural theology and ethics, but which we prefer to call a portion of the primitive revelation given with language to the first man, can be discerned by us, even in a fallen state. Some of the more facile duties of the moral law can be done by fallen man. *Pure* error or evil in a proposition, or in a human act, is intrinsically impossible. The gentile world, although it is destitute of faith, hope, and charity, is not wholly destitute of grace. It knows nothing of habitual, sanctifying grace, which some theologians call the grace of Christ in a more especial sense, inasmuch as it crowns in the living man the work of redemption; but the gentile need not be a stranger to that grace which is sometimes called the grace of God, by way of intimation, we suppose, that the grace bestowed upon him may be said to be, to a certain extent, the grace of God the Creator rather than that of God the Redeemer. He can discover some truths, do some naturally good works, coöperate with Divine grace from step to step, until he pass into the Church, into the supernatural world, and become the subject of the grace of Christ, in its full acceptance. God is willing, God denies no necessary graces, and Christ, in dying, offered him the means. As there are degrees of sanctity among Christians, so there are degrees of unbelief and of wickedness among gentiles. It is true that they are all equally removed, *in sensu composito*, from heaven, because all are shut out. But in any other sense it is not true that they are in the same predicament. They who perish farthest from the shore sink in the deepest water. It is not surprising, then, that some gentiles assent to more conclusions drawn from the Cath-

olic dogma, and live more regular lives, than others do. Nature, although it cannot do every thing, — cannot gain heaven, — yet is not absolutely good for nothing. Finally, the assent of some Protestants to certain detached Catholic conclusions indicates that they have preserved a remnant, or at least a reminiscence, of Catholicity from the wreck of the sixteenth century. Besides, the Church *is*; every man may see her; she sits upon a mountain, and her light is not hid. And Protestantism is not a negative, but a privative. Every privative presupposes a positive, and cannot be without it.

Now these things show that Catholics and gentiles live in two eternally distinct worlds, and they indicate how and why. The Catholic refers every thing to God, and regards nothing as good which does not come from God, and end in him. The gentile refers every thing to this world or to himself, and regards nothing as good which does not end in himself. The gentile never thinks it necessary to subordinate and refer his own being to God as his final end. Even when he admits that there is an hereafter and a heaven, he thinks that he will go to heaven, as a thing of course, inasmuch as a destiny which will bring permanent misery upon himself is a case quite out of the course of events in his world. And when he says that he will go to heaven, he does not mean that he will go to render glory to God, but to bring happiness to himself. God and heaven are only for his sake. So even heaven, the centre of God's presence, he subordinates to himself.

It is difficult to conceive two worlds more opposed, more irreconcilable, than these. One is the causeway to heaven, the other the antechamber of hell, and heaven and hell each casts its light or its shadow upon its own world, and colors it accordingly. If the opposition between the Catholic and the gentile were visible only on Sundays, outside the walls of the church, or on stated occasions, it would not be so singular. But there is not a moment in which it may not become evident. There is not an action in which it may not appear. There is not a thing, however indifferent in itself, which may not be an occasion for its manifestation. Say that a man eats. If he be a gentile, he will eat simply to satisfy his appetite. If he be a Christian, with a sign of the cross he refers his eating to the glory of God. The two men have placed the action

in two distinct worlds. How? The gentile eats simply for the sake of eating; more accurately, to gratify himself. The action is not done for God, and God has no part in it. It is then an act done in the world in which God is not master. The final end of the action is the satisfaction of the eater. God is defrauded of the glory due to him. Glory, from the mere act of eating? Yes, glory. He has willed that every thing we do must be done for him. And before him there are no such things as great and little. The universe is as a grain of sand. Alexander eating is as Alexander conquering the world. We make the distinction between great and little because we are little. They are alike before God, because he is great. Are not the actions of what we call little men alike to the men whom we call great? Therefore glory is not given to God; a sin has been committed, and it will be remembered and punished at the last day. The Christian, on the contrary, places the action in the world in which God is master. Two worlds, one its own end, the other a simple means; one with Satan for its master, the other with God for its master; one in which God has no part, the other in which Satan has no portion; one in which every thing glorifies God, the other in which every thing glorifies man,—are two sufficiently distinct worlds. The soul was made for God, the body for the soul, eating for the body; therefore eating is an act to be necessarily subordinated to God, and when it is not, it loses its signification, its end, its place in the universe. Logicians say that the sorites is the most difficult to manage of all forms of reasoning. Yet the Catholic makes a sorites like the above every day, every hour, and with infallible accuracy, for his argument begins and ends with God. This habit of close reasoning, based upon the science of final causes, the most recondite of all sciences to the gentile, the most easy to the Catholic, indicates that the Christian must be an excellent logician, and so he is. It proves more. All science is based upon the science of final causes; more accurately, of the Final Cause. The gentile knows nothing of this science. Then he knows no science. Science *est cognitio rerum per causas*. *Causam*, Cicero should have said, as in effect he did in his last moments, when he exclaimed, *Causa causarum, miserere mei!* So the gentile is a very unscientific person, while the knowledge he lacks is obtained from the

Catechism, and is known even to Catholic children. This is the demonstration of a proposition of ours which has seemed strange to some, in which we said that the Catholic child who knows his Catechism knows more than the most learned Protestant.

The man who knows the final cause of things knows the first cause, and he is, in despite of himself, an ontologist. Every Catholic is an ontologist,— he cannot help it; and if he chance to affect psychology, it is owing to accidental circumstances, such as a wrong direction given to his early studies, the choice of a text-book, the influence of a favorite professor, or an analytical turn of mind. But he forgets his psychology in grave matters. All Catholics untainted by secular education are ontologists. It cannot be otherwise; for ontology is the science of beings, therefore of forces, therefore of causes. The Catholic learns this from his Catechism, and applies it to his life. Ontology deals with the creation of secondary causes, in the first cycle, and their return to God the Creator, in the second cycle; the Catechism deals with the same thing, and so does the Catholic, continually. The sign of the cross, made by him over his meat, is a sign of his ontology, and a summing up, *eminenter*, of the science itself. A Protestant cannot be an ontologist, therefore. And hence it is matter of history that no Protestant ever was an ontologist. Certain chapters of history *can* be written *a priori*. Protestant metaphysics, being destitute of principles, because barren of all knowledge concerning final causes, sink into materialism. Hence the Protestant predilection for what are mis-called natural sciences. That predilection is instinctive. Those so-called sciences utterly ignore the science of causes, the first and the final; so they are a congeries of effects without causes; therefore they are the science of effects which are not effects. Any manual of natural science, so called, exhibits this result. The science turns out to be an imperfect, and often arbitrary, classification of objects, which is changed to suit the whims of each succeeding professor, so that one need not live a long life to find himself constrained to study half a dozen sciences of the same class of objects, each contradicting the others. And so the Protestant science of logic degrades the syllogism,— a cunning manœuvre, destroying, at a blow, the instruments of reasoning; and it makes of universal ideas

mere names. It was appropriately done, for *ideas* imply causes; *names* indicate things, without any reference to causes. Protestant metaphysics are an excellent hand-maid to Protestant theology; in the former, we have the science of effects without causes; in the latter, the science of a world without a God.

The opposition between the two worlds, gentile and Christian, is necessarily visible or imminent in every thing. We selected eating as an example, but the same thing is universally evident. What can God have to do with my vote? Just as much as with every thing else. God is the author of society. He placed man in it, in order that he might the more readily obtain means whereby to glorify his Creator by saving his soul; government is necessary to society; government should be administered in truth and in justice, and your vote decides whether good men shall so administer it, or whether bad men shall pervert it; your vote decides whether society shall be an instrument for the salvation or the damnation of men, whether it shall glorify God's mercy or his justice. God will be glorified in any case, and the only question is, whether you are to be his mere instrument, to be used and thrown aside in hell, or a co-worker, to be summoned, after a lifetime of faithful coöperation, into the joy of your Lord.

To the gentile, riches are his, poverty is a crime, sickness a curse, misfortune undeserved, enemies hateful, disgrace inexplicable, the world good, the flesh to be indulged, man illimitably progressive, and death a sovereign calamity. To the Christian all these propositions are reversed. Riches belong to God, poverty is a virtue, sickness may be a mercy, misfortune a blessing, enemies are to be loved, disgrace is an occasion of repentance and of merit, the world evil, the flesh to be repressed, man fallen, death a release. In every thing the same antagonism is visible, although its appearance, universal as it is, never fails to make the gentile wonder; another proof that the gentile is essentially unintellectual, and that he is an *inductive* philosopher. An examination of each case of antagonism will furnish the same result, and indicate the root of the evil, the cause of this irreconcilable difference between the two worlds. The Christian seeks God in every thing, the gentile seeks himself. This error of the gentile, by the way, could not fail to produce idolatry; indeed, it is idolatry; and accordingly

the worship of the creature, its substitution for the Creator, is a very old fact, as predicable, however, of the gentile to-day as ever it was. Whoever reflects upon the great apostasy of the world from God to itself, will understand why idolatry made its appearance so early, why it is that our age is eminently idolatrous, and that creature-worship will never pass away.

Not unfrequently this never-ending antagonism between the Catholic and the Protestant view of men and of things excites the most marked attention in every quarter, and it is when the thing in question occupies a large space in the public eye. Kossuth and Louis Napoleon are prominent examples in point. It is pretty generally agreed that Catholics oppose Kossuth and uphold Louis Napoleon, while Protestants uphold Kossuth and oppose the French President. And this fact astonishes many persons as if it were a new thing. It is not new or surprising to Catholics, inasmuch as their judgment concerning these two individuals is a mere application to new cases of principles with which they are familiar, and which they are called upon daily to apply to men and to things. The magnitude of the interests at stake do not, for their own sake, move the Catholic, hasten his judgment, or retard it. It is as easy to judge a great as a small matter, for the Catholic dogma is as applicable to one as it is to the other, and moreover, in its presence, great and small affairs of this world are alike.

With reference to Louis Napoleon, the question before the Catholic is, what bearing the recent events in France have upon the kingdom of God upon earth. Whatever ambitious projects the President may cherish, whatever his motives may have been, whatever may be his personal standing in the sight of God, are questions foreign to the cause which is to be adjudicated before the two worlds. Granting his motives to be good, his enemies will not take them into account, or admit them as an excuse for what he has done. We have nothing to do with them; we have simply to weigh the acts which have been done in the presence of the world, leaving all adjudication of motives to Him who alone can judge them. If the heart of the President be right in the sight of God, it will be well for himself; if not, God will accept what he has done, press it into the accomplishment of his designs, and cause

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the President to go the way of mere human instruments of his will. Yet, when the act is good, it is but fair to infer that the motive is also good, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, and we have yet to see proof that Louis Napoleon was not sincere. Meanwhile, the work done by him has been good. He preserved the independence of the Holy See, the centre of Catholic unity. What is called the temporal power of the Pope may not be essential to his office, but the history of the last thousand years gives evidence enough that it is the will of God that the Pope should retain that temporal power. He has lost it several times, and it has always been restored to him in a wonderful way. The last restoration, in 1849, is an event which has to this day exercised the wits of gentiles, who cannot comprehend it because the providence of God is in their world an empty sound. And God has manifested his providence, not only by always restoring the Pope in some strange, out-of-the-way manner, which no one, no gentile certainly, would have anticipated, but also by punishing the enemies of the Holy See. History has yet to say that a Roman republican came to a good end. The enemies of the Papal crown were always the enemies of the Papal mitre. Louis Napoleon, in driving them from Rome, gave the anti-Catholic world a blow which shook it to its centre. He has also served the interests of religion in France by securing to the Church in that country a freedom which it has not known for centuries; by promoting the interests of religious education, and in other ways which it is not necessary to recount. Government is essential to the well-being of society; the President found his country torn by factions, on the eve of a reign of terror, — terror, not to the wicked, but to the good, — and he inaugurated government, a thing almost unknown, hopeless, forgotten, in France. He has silenced the Socialists, the enemies of the Church, and, in an especial manner, of the Christian family. He has preserved, for the present, the peace of Europe, inasmuch as his unexpected and providential act has damped, if not destroyed, the hopes of the revolutionists. Now the question before the Catholic is this. What relation has the work done by Louis Napoleon to the soul, to heaven, to the supernatural world? From the enumeration of his acts, it results that they tend to the defence of the Church, of the family, of government,



and of society. The men protected by him are generally Catholics, persons who regard the world as subordinate to God. The men repressed by him are generally gentiles, persons who subordinate the world to human passions. The things encouraged by him are prized by Christians; the things destroyed by him are not lawful for Christians to love. It is easy to anticipate and to understand the unanimity of the Catholic judgment regarding Louis Napoleon. The work done by him is good for the kingdom of God.

Now the gentile encounters here his usual difficulty in comprehending the Catholic judgment. It is based upon the principle that what is sinful is not good for the state. This is the Gospel which sounds like foolishness to him; for God, heaven, the Church, and the soul have no voice in politics in the world which possesses him. His model statesmen laugh at the notion that they should do or undo any thing for the sake of the soul. A member of Parliament, or of Congress, who might defend or oppose any measure on this ground, would be hissed out of countenance. The gentile denounces Louis Napoleon, because the work done by him is not good for the body, for the world. The President, he says, has trampled upon the freedom and rights of Frenchmen. Men are entitled to the largest liberty of thought, speech, and action. Human nature is perfect or perfectible; its tendencies are innocent, they perfect it, therefore men have the right to follow its tendencies. Any action is just which tends to make man free in every thing. The people are sovereign, therefore they may elect to have any or no government. If they do not like the Church; if they kill or banish priests, and turn the churches into playhouses or stables; if they assassinate in cold blood every man who is likely to embarrass them by his fidelity to God or to the state; if they promote godless education; if they plot against the integrity of the family; if they organize midnight conspiracies against the state, thereby filling peaceable men with alarm; if they circulate licentious writings in all imaginable shapes,—they only exercise the freedom essential to the development of human nature. The people never make mistakes. That government is the best which governs the least, and Louis Napoleon has retarded the time when all government will become unnecessary to a self-

regulating people; he has fastened chains upon human nature; his work is therefore bad.

The two conflicting judgments were to be expected, for the principles of the parties are utterly irreconcilable. This is forbidden by the law of God, says the Catholic, therefore it is not good for the country. This tends to free the people from all law, says the Protestant, therefore it is good for the country. No wonder that the Catholic and the Protestant stare at one another, when they talk of recent political events.

The case of Kossuth presents no special difficulty. The Catholic judgment is unpopular, but that is nothing new. When Kossuth landed in England, he ceased to be the hero of a tale of Eastern crime, and in declaring England to be his book of life, he avowed his ambition to be the hero of the Western world of villany. True to his world, he appeals to our mob against the government; seeks to entangle us in an unjust, as well as foolish, war against nations that have done us no harm; reviles all that is respectable in the counsels and traditions left by the founders of our republic, and adds his influence to the forces which are expedited for the downfall of our national greatness. Considering the immense number of persons who have been led astray by him, who have committed and will commit the most atrocious crimes against Heaven, the Church, and society, in consequence of his evil example,—considering the thousands who have lost and will lose their lives because of him,—it is lawful to conclude that no man of our day has caused more misery, more sin, or has precipitated more souls into hell. We have heretofore shown that his Magyar cause was unworthy the support of an honest man. The atrocious murder of the venerable men, Lambert and Latour; the theft of the property of Hungary; the saddling his country, already ruined by domestic and foreign wars of his creation, with an immense debt, for which he left only notes and promises; the false pretences under which he is now filching more money from silly people, and burdening his country, whose credit he has as little right to pledge as he has to pledge that of America, with a new debt,—are only a tithe of the misdeeds for which he will yet stand adjudged guilty before outraged Europe. He is pledged to destroy the supremacy of the Pope, and to uproot, if possible, the Catholic Church

in Europe. He is the friend and ally of the enemies of religion, government, the family, and society, whom Louis Napoleon has succeeded, for the present, in whipping back to their kennels. Not satisfied with the piles of dead bodies heaped together by his insane lust for power and for revenge, he is even now devising the murder of untold thousands. He is pledged to ruin Austria, and one of his avowed reasons is, that the Catholic governments may fall with her; that the demons of rape, murder, and robbery may be let loose upon Europe; that the Church, and all those holy and useful institutions which depend upon the Church, may be totally swept away. He is the preacher of revolution for its own sake. The modern revolutionary doctrine, of which he is a champion, is condemned by right reason, and anathematized by the Church, which repeats the words of St. Paul, and enforces the law of God, denouncing eternal damnation to those miserable men who, without just and weighty causes, known as such to the world, and declared to be such by competent authority, refuse obedience to their legitimate rulers. No *Catholic* is or can be a Red Republican or Socialist. The revolutionists themselves are a small minority of the people. They are cowards, moreover; they plot and fight only in the dark, and Louis Napoleon has shown that one *man*, with sufficient resolution and willingness to expose his life to the constant peril of assassination, is strong enough to drive them all back to their burrows. When they succeed, the people begin to know what despotism means. And after loading the people with untold miseries; after laying waste the country with fire and sword; after destroying, in a year, the fruits of the piety and the industry of ages; after the commission of crimes which recall the memory of barbarous times; after filling their purses with gold stolen from the altar and the poor, — they run to a hiding-place, to some nest for swarming vipers, like England, and plot in the dark for fresh horrors to Europe, already thrown by them, and by such as they, into the barbarism of pagan ages. These are the works of Kossuth, and Catholics, trying his conduct by the law of God, cannot see in him any other than the enemy of souls.

But how the gentile laughs at that accusation! He admits that Kossuth and his friends have done these things, but in his world these things go under other

names. War against the Church is war against unmanly superstition ; godless education is freedom to the mind ; the damnable license of writers is the freedom of the press ; midnight conspiracies are patriotic councils ; assassination is the immolation of a tyrant or of a slave upon the altar of liberty ; theft is a loan for the public welfare ; wholesale murder is the just retribution awaiting the tools of despotism ; Kossuth is the apostle at whose voice tyrants quake, and chains fall from the limbs of oppressed nations. He is the hero of the divine fury which arouses humanity ; he is the champion of universal liberty ; he is the high-priest of the PEOPLE-GOD.

The Catholic dogma, the formula of endless variety in supreme unity, contains the solution of every question, the particular formula for every action, the meaning of every thing which exists, and the right name for every object in the universe. It is the generative formula of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful in the moral world. It is therefore easy to conceive that there never was a time when it was not invoked by Christians for their guidance, and that its appearance in history is a constantly recurring fact. Theologians say that there are four marks by which the Church may be known. There are four marks by which the gentile may be known. These are ignorance, unbelief, hatred, and scorn. The gentile cannot understand Catholic doctrine ; he will not believe it ; he hates it, he scorns it. Our Lord Jesus Christ, who taught us every lesson worth knowing, taught us this lesson also : " He came unto his own, and his own received him not." The people could not or would not understand his language, or the principles of his Gospel. Seek first only the world, said they. Seek first only God, he answered. This was as incomprehensible to them as it is to the gentile now. No amount of experience can teach the gentile ; his heart is hardened, and, like Pharaoh, he suffers great calamities without any profit to his soul, inasmuch as he attributes these calamities to the Fates, to chance, to the air, to magicians, to any hand but that of God. Whom he chastiseth he loveth. But the Pharaohs of every age lose the benefit of chastisement ; their hearts are hardened, they return with hatred the love of God. Our Lord spoke of this matter frequently with his disciples, and it happened more than once that when he preached to the peo-

ple his disciples did not understand him, for they, like some worldly Catholics of our own day, were not enlightened by the Holy Ghost. Our Lord told his disciples he knew that the people did not understand his words. "To you," he said, "it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God; to the rest I speak in parables, that seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not hear." He told the people that he was a king. They raised the cry of treason. What people now say of the Pope was then said of Christ; — his spiritual authority would lead him to grasp temporal honors, and to teach the people disloyalty to the kings and presidents of that day. His Apostles encountered the same treatment; they were looked upon as men belonging to another world, and speaking another language; they were adjudged public enemies, and as such they were doomed to die. For three hundred years, and more, the Christians' road to heaven was red with their own blood. Their pure lives, their submission to the authorities, their loyalty, brought them no mitigation of their sufferings; for they obeyed man only for the love of God, and no breach of the commandments of the world is less readily forgiven by it than the violation of that which calls upon men to love the world first, last, and alone. The early Christians, like Christ and the Apostles, were accused of plotting to upset the state. It seemed to the people impossible that men united in a compact body, having one law, one doctrine, one God, one visible chief, one method of talking and of acting, and who had been treated so cruelly by government and people, could possibly be loyal citizens. The words of the prophet, quoted by Christ as applicable to the people who stood near him, wondering what he meant, are just as applicable to the gentile world of every age: "For the heart of this people has grown gross, and with their ears they have been dull of hearing, and their eyes they have shut, lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and be converted, and I should heal them." St. Paul, when he preached to the Jews, at Rome and elsewhere, and when he saw how blind, deaf, and dumb they were, could not refrain from marvelling at them. Learning made no difference in the hearers, or rather, as happens in our own day, a thorough secular education seemed to make the hearers more stupid

and more incapable of understanding the Gospel. Such men employ their learning to invent obstacles and reasons why they should not believe in the Church. In the time of St. Paul, the philosophers of Athens were the most accomplished gentlemen in the world. Yet he found them an uncommonly stupid set of men, more incapable than the unlettered crowd of comprehending the Christian doctrine. He, like his Master, like all Catholics, had to meet the never-failing accusation of disloyalty to the state, a circumstance which proves, if proof were wanting, that good Christians were always good Papists, inasmuch as the Roman centre of unity was and is the main cause of that accusation. When St. Paul was at Philippi, he was imprisoned and whipped for a cause which is always recited in the acts of indictment against the Christian, — for teaching fashions which it was not lawful for the Romans to observe. So, when the struggle between the Church and the emperors of Germany, concerning investitures, was going on, the misunderstanding was as great as ever. The Holy Ghost sends bishops to rule the Church of God, the bishops send priests to preach, and to administer the Sacraments. But this doctrine, which centres all in God, was incomprehensible to men who made every thing centre in the world, that is, in themselves. The emperors could see in a bishop only an efficient police marshal, and in a priest an active constable. So the emperors insisted that it was their right to give the ring and crosier, the emblems of authority, to the bishops. This was a subordination of the soul to the body, heaven to earth, God to man, and the Church could not, of course, permit such a practice to be enforced. So in France, when the Church insisted upon her own independence, or upon the abandonment, on the part of a married king, of some woman whom he had taken to the place of his wife, the gentile kings and people accused the Pope of interference in temporal affairs. So in England, when the Church resisted the absurd pretensions of Henry the Second, the tyranny of John, and the licentiousness of Henry the Eighth, all of whom strove to make the Church in England an Anglican sect, the gentile kings and people were enraged, and, not heeding that the Lord who sitteth in the heavens laughed them to scorn, imagined a vain thing; and no subsequent lesson has induced them to abandon their contest with God, and

with his Christ. Pretending that Catholics were disloyal to the state, they have ever since persecuted them, and the very last year saw Queen, Lords, and Commons persisting to imagine a vain thing. The silly law concerning titles is precisely the same in principle with hundreds of laws passed in different countries, during the last eighteen hundred years, by gentiles who have eyes and see not, and they serve to prove that no amount of human knowledge will enable a man to comprehend the first principles of the Catechism, or to understand a sentence uttered by a Catholic concerning religious things. This omnipresent fact is within the experience of every Catholic. It is seen as often as a Catholic becomes a candidate for the humblest office, enters a common school, opens a store, labors in a kitchen, or in any way comes into contact with Protestants. Misunderstanding of the most radical stamp, of the most hopeless character, awaits the Catholic in every quarter, and the burden of the Protestant or gentile complaint, however diverse in form, is always found to be the same in substance; — the *Catholic* is disloyal to the world; he seeks first the kingdom of God, and his everlasting justice. The gentile accusation is true. Catholics glory in their disloyalty to *his* world, inasmuch as loyalty to it is disloyalty to God.

See what profane history has to say of your saints. What nice instinct selected that word, *profane*, and *secular*! It is always blasphemous, for its material includes only those things which are outside the temple, — the Church; which are unconsecrated, and which belong, accordingly, to the secular world, which is a world of mere facts, effects without causes, — causes, that is, known to itself. See what this history has to say of wicked men. Their actions fill every page. Whereas saints like Francis, Dominic, Ignatius, Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, Pius the Fifth, Thomas à Becket, Catherine, Theresa, and others, are dismissed with an indignant or sneering paragraph, in which the world is informed that these saints, in whose honor the Church erects temples to Almighty God, were fanatical, arrogant, haughty, superstitious men and women. The history which writes down Christ as a malefactor, spares no abuse of his saints.

Before we close this article, we wish to call attention to two facts connected with our subject. We may return

to each hereafter ; we dismiss them here with a paragraph. The instrument used against its nature is spoiled, and the work on which it is used is ruined. The world is compelled, as the Devil was before Christ, to testify against itself, and accordingly in every age the ruin of gentile handiwork teaches every one, excepting the blind and deaf worker, that the world is an instrument whose only use is to furnish a causeway to heaven. The personal enemies of Christ were doomed, even during their lives, and the holy city became a ruin,—not one stone remained upon another. The cities which rejected the Apostles have followed Jerusalem, at no great distance, to the valley of death. The Roman empire, drunk with the blood of the saints, became the sport of naked barbarians. The German Cæsars, who sought to make a tool of the Church, saw their house become extinct, and their sceptre pass into other hands. Roman republicans have seldom failed to pay a bitter penalty for their temerity in laying hands on an ark watched over in an especial manner by God. The house of Bourbon, which has been guilty of innumerable attempts against the independence of the Church, is now a beggar for its lost hereditary crown. The house of Hapsburg sinned in like manner, and it required Austerlitz and 1848 to teach it the things good for its peace. England, with her Crystal Palace, and her Titles Bill, looked like a very great nation, in 1851 ; let the Times newspaper say what she is in 1852. She invited all the nations of the earth to come and see her before the angel would begin to cry, *Cecidit magna Babylon!* The world must be used as an instrument, or woe to the world and its worshippers.

The other fact, to which we can only briefly allude, is this. When worldlings discover their mistakes in judgment, when they find that the Catholic was right, after all, they quietly amend their opinions, and partially adopt the Catholic view, without, however, conceding the Catholic principle, which no mistake of theirs can lead them to comprehend, and without giving due credit to their Catholic teachers. Let the recent case of Kossuth be cited for a thousand others which might be adduced in point. At present, by far the greater portion of the respectable papers denounce him as an impostor, and his cause as a bad cause, and the people quietly listen and many believe. It is likely that, long before the time named by the Most Rev.



Archbishop Hughes, the country will recognize Kossuth as a humbug. Yet, six months ago, the Catholics were almost alone in this just appreciation of the man and of his cause. One year previously, there were several unthinking Catholics who were disposed to defend the mischievous agitator. Two years ago, the editor of this Review, who was the first to call the attention of the American people to the cloud which menaced the country from Hungary, and which has now burst upon us, was heard with ill-concealed impatience on the part of some, when he called the whole Magyar agitation by its right name. The truth slowly, but surely, overtakes the lie. It has required the experience of three hundred years to make the world begin to surmise that the Protestant rebellion of the sixteenth century was an outrage upon civilized Europe. Three hundred years passed before the Roman imperial court reversed the sentence pronounced by its representative, Pontius Pilate, upon our Lord.

Plain talking, then, and plain dealing with Protestants. They cannot understand your principles, unless they be illuminated by the Holy Ghost. Controversies with them are not of much avail, and any concealment of the Catholic dogma, or any thing like an apology for it, is worse than useless. If you wish to be instrumental in the conversion of any of them, pray for them, exhibit the beauty and holiness of the Catholic dogma in the sanctity of your lives, and in that way it is possible that they may begin to suspect that it is for their peace to embrace it. "Let your light so shine before men that they, seeing your good works, may glorify your Father in heaven."

ART. III. — *Les Saints Lieux. Pèlerinage à Jérusalem, en passant par l'Autriche, la Hongrie, la Slavonie, les Provinces Danubiennes, Constantinople, l'Archipel, le Liban, la Syrie, Alexandrie, Malte, la Sicile, et Marseille.* Par MGR. MISLIN, Abbé Mitré de Sainte-Marie de Deg en Hongrie, Camérier Secret de S. S. Pie IX., Chevalier du Saint-Sépulchre, Commandeur de l'Ordre Constantinien de Saint-Georges de Parme, Membre de plusieurs Académies de la Suisse, de Rome, et de la Toscane. A Paris : Guyot Frères. 1851. 8vo. 2 tomes.

THESE are two interesting and in various respects highly instructive volumes. The author is a native of Switzerland, and was formerly tutor to the young Archdukes of Austria, and, we believe, to the present Emperor Francis Joseph. He is a man of learning and talents, of firm faith and sincere and tender piety. He travels as a Catholic and as an ecclesiastic, but as one who well knows the world, as a shrewd observer, and as an able and impartial commentator on what he sees and hears. A more pleasant, instructive, and trustworthy traveller it has rarely been our good fortune to meet, or one whose accounts of the countries through which he has passed are more interesting or more important. We see and learn more of them in his pages than we could by visiting them ourselves, for he always seizes the right point of view, and shows you the precise things a Catholic traveller ought to see and become acquainted with. His account of the Holy Places in the East we must reluctantly leave to a future article, as well as his observations on Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire, in order to confine ourselves to some remarks he offers in passing on the late revolutions in Austria and Hungary.

The Abbé Mislin set out from Vienna on his pilgrimage to the Holy Places on the 24th of June, 1848, after the first Red Republican revolution in that city, and just before the open revolt of Kossuth and the Magyars. His position at the court of Austria gave him a good opportunity of understanding the character and purposes of each, and his candor, independence, and obvious good faith render his statements worthy of all confidence. He loves Austria, indeed, and is strongly attached to the imperial family, but he is no blind idolater of Austrian policy, and though

far from sympathizing with the false liberalism of the age, he comments with great freedom on the acts of the imperial government. We cannot better prove what we say, than by letting him speak at some length for himself.

“It was from Vienna in Austria that I set out on my pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Having returned in the early part of 1848 to that capital, where I had resided many years, it was not long before I became a witness to the events which followed the revolution of February and the unexpected fall of Louis Philippe. The proclamation of the republic in France was hailed in Austria with shouts of joy, not merely by the anarchists, but also by men in power. These feared constitutional ideas much more than republicanism, and believed that the overthrow of constitutional thrones would consolidate the absolute monarchies. The anarchists foresaw all the advantages which might be derived from this thunder-clap which was reverberating on the banks of the Seine, and which must shake all the old monarchies of Europe.

“Some attempts at insurrection had been made in several provinces of the Empire, but they had been easily suppressed, in part by the people, and in part by the army, which for the most part at all times remained faithful to its sovereign. Then the Polish, Italian, and Hungarian revolutionists, directed by the clubs of France and Germany, comprehended very well that it was neither at Milan, nor at Presburg, nor at Cracow, that they could overturn the Austrian monarchy, but that it was necessary to strike it in its heart,—and they appointed their rendezvous at Vienna. The 13th of March, while the members of the Estates, professors, and lawyers bore their *respectful* petitions to the foot of the throne, believing that only some reforms were demanded, the real reformers, aided by the students of the University and the populace, made a revolution in the streets. Assuredly, if in such a case the goodness and loyalty of the sovereign could save a state, Austria would have escaped the scourge of a revolution; but for those who wished the ruin of the Empire, the announcement of the concessions made by the Emperor became merely a signal of revolt.

“The revolutionists at first turned the popular hatred against a man whom they had for a long time designated as the keystone of the arch of the *ancient system*. This man was removed, and the same day the monarchy crumbled to pieces. But the edifice was everywhere undermined, and all the genius of Metternich could no longer have sufficed to uphold it. Besides, however great had been the influence of this statesman, it was not, at least had not been for some years, so preponderating as to render him responsible for the acts of the Austrian government. He had against him the constant opposition of one of his colleagues, sustained by a bureaucracy the most jealous, the most Voltarian, the most nu-

merous, the most indomitable, and the most powerful to be found in the world. For a long time there had been no unity in the government, and it could be neither strong nor durable.

"Having entered upon the affairs of state in the sequel of the old French Revolution, and during the disastrous wars in the early years of the present century, Prince Metternich was able, in the Congress of Vienna, to reconstruct a powerful state from the vast provinces of the ancient monarchy so powerfully shaken by the conquests of Napoleon. It was not in his power to fuse all the heterogeneous elements which composed the Austrian empire, and to form from nationalities so different and so opposed one to another as the German, the Hungarian, the Italian, the Bohemian, &c., perfect national unity. He cemented together the materials which Providence furnished him; the weather or revolution dissolved the cement, and the edifice fell to pieces. But the different races that composed this grand empire too soon forgot that the acts of Prince Metternich had been infinitely more useful to Austria than the conquests of Napoleon to France.

"In Austria harmony was preserved by a skilful balancing of province against province, and of their reciprocal pretensions. Austria has often been blamed for this system, which, however, was for her a necessity, and at the same time an act of good government. France will always be *one*, whether as a monarchy or as a republic. Paris has become France; all is centralized there; centralization in Austria is an impossible evil. In general, the provinces were well administered; nevertheless, if more development, more life, had been given to provincial and municipal institutions, they would, perhaps, in the hour of danger, have been found powerful auxiliaries, instead of emitting from their bosom, as was the case, the first sparks of that fire which is now consuming the monarchy.

"But would it answer any good purpose in these times to attempt by means of concessions to allay the storm which is everywhere raging? It is not when the river overflows its banks, but when it flows peaceably in its channel, that durable dikes can be constructed against its foreseen inundations. Prince Metternich did not lack foresight. He perhaps was not well informed of the nature of the movement that broke out at Vienna, on the 13th of March, but he had for a long time followed the progress of revolution in Europe with all the clear-sightedness of his genius, and he has often been heard to say, 'We are hastening with giant strides towards an abyss.'

"People and kings have rushed onward to the precipice with equal blindness. Revolutions, those eternal scourges of God, succeed each other, as formerly those hordes of barbarians whom God sent against those he would chastise. This chastisement is the most

terrible that can be inflicted on the human race. 'God,' says Bossuet, 'sends them to punish scandals, to awaken the faithful and their pastors, the people and sovereigns; suffers the seducing spirit to deceive haughty souls, and to diffuse everywhere a haughty chagrin, an indocile curiosity, and a spirit of rebellion.'\* To strike a death-blow at Austria, the revolutionists hypocritically revived in the provinces a vain spirit of nationality. This the secret societies labored assiduously to effect. Then, on a convenient day, the 13th of March, the delegates of the twenty nations, or rather, twenty clubs, proclaimed the revolution under the windows of Prince Metternich, and in the evening he went into exile. These were the real actors, all the rest were simpletons or dupes. The Austrian people were as much surprised by their revolution as were the rest of Europe. The Viennese themselves had no suspicion of what they had done, if we except a fanatical sect which is sure to appear in evil times, like birds of prey on the field of battle, or wherever there is a carcass to devour. The Jews contributed powerfully to the revolution, and *these knew what they were about.*†

"Foreign emissaries had indeed some accomplices in the interior; but at first these were limited to a small number of nobles greedy of popularity, to booksellers who wished to sell publicly unlicensed publications which they had long been selling privately, advocates who aspired to be ministers, medical doctors without patients, desirous of trying on a suffering public the experiments suggested by their rash empiricism, and professors without talent, without conviction, and without faith, who had taught their pupils to rebel against God, waiting for an opportunity to teach them to stir up an insurrection in the streets. These all made use of young persons, rash and inexperienced, whom they might disavow at need; but, placed in advance by men who were less courageous, these young persons remained there. Hence it is that we saw for the first time in the annals of the world one of the most powerful monarchies governed by the students of a university.

"Whilst they conducted the car of state through the rugged roads of insurrection and terrorism, the population of Vienna, proud of the precocious reputation of their young Phaetons, imprudently yoked themselves to it, and ran with them to cast themselves into

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\* Bossuet, *Oraison funèbre de la Reine d'Angleterre*.

† As much as I am led by character, by principle, and, above all, as a Christian and a priest, to preach forbearance, and to rise against the unjust persecutions of which the Jews are sometimes the victims, I must still brand with infamy the conduct of those among them who use all the means in their power to disturb and ruin the states which afford them hospitality, and who pay with their gold for the publication of the most infamous libels against religion and government.

the abyss. From the very beginning, men of the old nobility, generally esteemed for their character, their talents, and their experience, and who had adopted in good faith the innovations of the month of March, endeavored by devotion to their sovereign and their country to give a regular direction to the progress of affairs, to ally liberty with order and justice, and thus prevent the ruin of the state. Then it was that we saw the Count de Fiquelmont charged with Foreign Affairs, the Count de Latour Minister of War, and the Count de Hoyos at the head of the National Guard. But their very titles were crimes; the people screamed, It is aristocracy, *camarilla*, reaction!

"The populace of Vienna invented then a new constitutional means to rid themselves of the ministers. This was the *charivari*. During the night, some hundreds of workmen, students, and National Guards assembled before the houses of the functionaries marked out for insult, and forced them to resign their offices. One of the ministers, M. von Pillersdorf, was able for a time to sustain himself in office by means of concessions. He had been the representative of the revolution in the Council of State, under the former order of things. He became unexpectedly Minister of the Interior, and charged to form a ministry. Without character, without energy, without any fixed purpose or definite end, his policy was always to give way; a deputation, a few cries in the street, an article in a newspaper, infallibly resulted in obtaining from him a dangerous measure, of which he could not calculate the reach: he appeared to hold, that to flatter the people is to govern.

"All the powers, however, were more and more concentrated in the hands of the students; and the inhabitants of Vienna, now so proud to belong to a constitutional state, submitted with a *bonhomie* which seemed to flow from imbecility to the most arbitrary and despotic government ever known. 'When the multitude are once taken by the bait of liberty, they follow as blind men provided that they only hear its name.'\* We can with difficulty conceive the abject state to which the Viennese were sunk before these petty tyrants of twenty-one.

"The students, while they yet suspected the intentions of the National Guard, made an appeal to those upon whom they had fired on the 14th and 15th of March, and joined the populace. The greater part of the National Guard were at first well-intentioned. They desired order, and would have been contented with the liberties obtained on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of March; liberties which they compromised, by believing that it remained for them to defend them, and that by marching at the tail of the University

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\* Bossuet, *ubi supra*.

and populace they would abdicate their dignity, and sacrifice to fear their liberty, their fortune, their existence, and that of the monarchy.

"The alliance of the National Guard, of the students, and of the populace once completed, there were seen frequently at Vienna what are called *demonstrations*. These scenes were at first hypocritical, then they became threatening, and at length so revolting, that in the night of the 17th of May the Emperor was obliged to leave his capital with all his family. He who had given his people liberty was the only one that was not free, and the Viennese must for ever blush, that on the evening of the 15th of May they turned against the sovereign whom they had surnamed the *Good* those very arms which he himself had given them.

"However, all these demonstrations were the work of a directing club, who from the bowels of the earth, where they were concealed, the same day and hour, by secret means, moved the blinded populations of Paris, Frankfort, Berlin, Vienna, Naples, and Rome. All these people believed themselves free, and yet they obeyed servilely unknown, irresponsible masters, who commanded all their proceedings, all their actions, all their thoughts, and all their assassinations.

"The terrorism which hung over Vienna soon drove from this city all who could live elsewhere. Their departure was said to be a plot of the aristocracy and the rich to ruin the poor people. The resources diminished daily, commerce languished, public credit was gone, the workmen threatened the proprietors, anarchy was complete within, new crises were inevitable. Yet in such a state of things it was necessary to carry on the war in Italy.

"If the revolutionists wished not to preserve to the monarchy its most beautiful province [the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom] they would at least, one would think, interest themselves in the fate of that army under Radetzky, composed of their brothers and sons, who, believing themselves bound by their oath, daily exposed themselves to death with a bravery that commands the admiration of Europe, not excepting even Italy herself. And yet I very much doubt if there was anywhere a city where the victories of the Austrian army were received with more displeasure than at Vienna, where the very flag of that army was proscribed. It mattered little to these false patriots that province after province should be lost to the Empire; for the only empire which existed for them, that which commanded all their sympathies, was not Austria, but the revolutionary empire which embraced all Europe. They disavowed the army of Italy, and Count de Latour was obliged to apologize for sending it reinforcements. The army sustained itself by its valor and its fidelity, and it was the sole support of the state, which its own citizens sought with a blind fury to de-

stroy. Experience has demonstrated, that, if there is a good *constitution* in Austria, it is that of the army.

"The evil was extreme, since the monarchy was attacked at the same time within and without. Foreigners have been much astonished at the revolution in Vienna, for they had supposed no people were less inaccessible to revolutionary ideas than the Austrians. Their ancient fidelity to their sovereigns was proverbial, and it was constantly repeated that the Viennese remained outside of the intellectual and political movement of the age, and had but one want, *that of good living*. But the citizens of Vienna had read this reproach so many times in books and journals, that it contributed not a little during their *glorious days* to inflame the ambition of all those heroes of the shop and the college who wished to ape the *gamins de Paris*, and the pupils of *l'École Polytechnique*. They wished to imitate at Vienna what was done in Paris, and they attempted it with a servility that bordered on buffoonery. There came from France, among others, professors of barricades. One day they invented an imaginary enemy, and in less than no time all the pavements of Vienna were piled up even to the first story of the houses; men, even women, watched all night in the useless intrenchments, and the next day the greater part of the journals exclaimed, with an ecstasy truly German, *Now we can look the great city of Paris proudly in the face; we have nothing any longer to envy her*. It is the servility with which all that is done in France is copied in Germany, that led M. de Humboldt to say to a French gentleman who was taking his leave of him to return to Paris, 'See to it that your country keeps herself well, for when France gets a cold in her head all Europe is obliged to sneeze.' I do not know whether this is a great honor for France or not, but surely it is very little for the rest of Europe.

"If Prince Metternich foresaw the use which the good Viennese would make of *liberty*, he did very wisely in granting them only *good living*; for assuredly nothing has so completely vindicated the old order of things as the new order which they have instituted in its place.

"It has been the same with the liberty of the press. Certainly I am not the man to make an apology for the censorship of the press as it was formerly practised in Vienna. It was in the last degree irreligious, silly, and absurd. But that censorship was perfect liberty in comparison with the frightful tyranny which under the revolutionists weighs upon the manifestation of thought. The most unbridled license propagates each day the most disgusting pamphlets against religion, and against individuals supposed to be hostile to the new order; and I have seen many persons make fruitless efforts to find a journal or a printing-office which would publish some timid rectifications. Not only could they get nothing printed



at Vienna, but *the Committee of Public Safety* (there was a committee of public safety!) had the folly to attempt to strike by its measures even the journals of foreign countries. One fact will serve to show what was the liberty of the press there enjoyed. As there were no Jesuits at Vienna, and as the revolutionists must have a phantom, they took the Liguorians. The Swiss radicals, or rather Swiss societies, affiliated with the secret societies of all countries, had decreed that the Liguorians, the Benedictines, the Sisters of Charity, and many others, must be considered as *affiliated* with the Jesuits. The students and Jews of Vienna ratified this judgment, and shamefully expelled these religious from their houses, stripped of every thing, and reduced to the necessity of begging public charity in the environs of the capital. Four citizens of Vienna, touched by their situation, wrote a *confidential* letter to the Archbishop, praying him to intercede with the minister that some slight succors might be given to these unhappy proscribed, out of the sums of which they had been despoiled, to save them from dying of hunger. This letter was sent to M. Pillersdorf. The students, becoming aware of it, obliged the minister to give up to them this *culpable* letter. They caused it to be printed and placarded on the walls, in order to denounce its signers to the public hatred; they treated these worthy citizens to a *charivari*, and then forced them by threats and injuries to retract the sentiments of humanity which they had expressed in their letter.

"The liberty of writing went even to that. O Galileo, it has been said that the intolerance of the Inquisition condemned you to retract your admirable system of astronomy,\* but you were happy that it did not force you to deny your humanity!

"Thus it is, the revolutionists of all times and countries are alike. In Germany, Italy, France, Switzerland, they promise liberty, and give only the most hideous slavery.

"We have just seen how the people of Vienna, maugre their habits of fidelity, order, and peace, suffered themselves to be drawn into revolution by foreign emissaries. But it must be confessed that there were many internal causes which greatly facilitated the efforts of those who sought the ruin of the monarchy. There was no unity, there was no life, in the upper regions of the government. This great empire moved on the old machinery, upheld solely by the affection of the people for their sovereign. Their attachment to the imperial family was not belied for a single moment. In the very worst days of the revolution, the Emperor appeared in the streets, and was always hailed with enthusiasm. If subsequently

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\* I am far from conceding this stereotyped calumny, due to the bad faith of the anti-religious. Galileo was only obliged to respect the Holy Scriptures.

the people rushed with threats towards his palace to wrest from him some new concession, they never dared avow that their demonstrations were directed against the person of the sovereign. Obligated, in order to obtain freedom of action, to quit Vienna, the Emperor Ferdinand did not quit his states, and there was not a province that would not have been happy to possess him. An indissoluble bond, a bond of reciprocal affection and esteem, binds together this family and the people.

"The Austrian people are kind-hearted, religious, honest, and distinguished for their good sense, and consequently are little accessible to revolutionary ideas. It was not these people that made the revolution. They were the most peaceable, wealthy, and happy people in Europe. But among them was a minority called *intelligent*; that is, reading newspapers, discontented, and irreligious. This minority had been for a great number of years in open conspiracy, and it comprised the entire body of the officials of the government. The bureaucracy was a leprosy which extended from one extremity of the empire to the other, and eat into its very heart. An innumerable army of officials seemed to have no other duty than to impede the progress of affairs, to render the government odious within and without, and to ruin the state. It is commonly believed that the Emperor of Austria was an absolute monarch; but there were by his side, below and above him, councils, cabinets, bureaus, presidents, referendaries, &c., that sanctioned, modified, or annulled his decisions. The signature of the Emperor was often a recommendation very little respected by the officials. This bureaucracy, very unpopular, and necessarily so, sought to obtain pardon of the *intelligent* public for its attachment to the budget by its manifest contempt for the government. The government itself was sustained by nobody. To attack it passed for good taste and breeding in the court, the public offices, the saloons, and even in the antechambers of the Emperor. The Austrian *Moniteur*, that is, *The Vienna Gazette*, published on its first page the ordinances of the government, and opposed them in the other three.

"The bureaucracy inspired an infinity of hatreds against the government. In making a revolution, all thought they were attacking the bureaucracy; what was their astonishment, when, mounting to the assault against the government, they found the bureaucracy by their side, mounting with them!

"The bureaucracy had obtained possession of the Church and of education, the customs, the censorship, and the police. It had enslaved the Church. This was the gangrene of the Austrian monarchy. A jealous, inept, and tyrannical legislation had petrified all the institutions of the Church. The bishops were generally little more than Aulic Councillors, and could seldom attain to the

episcopate, except after having been imbued in the public offices, during many years, with Jansenistic principles, the germ of which they must transplant into the ecclesiastical institutions. Some few prelates, worthy of the ancient times of the Church, were persecuted by the provincial governors, who were always sure to be sustained by the government. Parish priests were the heads of bureaux, sometimes agents of the police. One would believe that this order of things was established expressly for the irrevocable destruction of both Church and State. With very few exceptions, there were no preachers in Austria; the word of God was not free.

"In the choice of professors of theology, what was most feared were men of Catholic convictions. During a long series of years the only authorized text-book on canon law was a work placed on the Index by the Holy See, and it is a curious *pendant* to this condemnation that the Index of books prohibited by the Church was itself proscribed at Vienna, and even the *Roman Breviary* was placed on the index of the Austrian censors. The priest who should use the said Breviary, not corrected by the Austrian censors, was liable to a fine of fifty florins. The law, indeed, was not executed, but it existed. Pious associations, congregations, confraternities approved by the Church, were prohibited by the civil, and often also by episcopal authority.

"Notwithstanding the will of Francis the First, expressed on his death-bed, that regular relations with the Holy See should be re-established, and that the laws contrary to the discipline of the Church should be modified, after a great many years and a thousand fruitless efforts on the part of Rome, not a single step toward this important result had been effected, — a result which would have been even more useful to the State than to the Church. The bishops of Prussia, of England, of Turkey, could correspond freely with the Holy See; the bishops of Catholic Austria could not. Let it not, however, be forgotten that this was the work, the creation, the *fetich* of the *enlightened, intelligent, and liberal* party, whose most constant, and perhaps only, opponent in the government was that same Prince Metternich who has been held responsible for acts which he uniformly fought against. Hence, immediately after the revolution these tendencies became a thousand times more manifest and oppressive than they were before. The first acts which signalized the *era of liberty* were acts of intolerance and proscription so revolting, that it is necessary to go very far back in the history of tyranny to find any thing to equal them. But the actual trammels will break of themselves when the ephemeral terrorism born of the clubs and the University shall have had its day.\*

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\* The present pious Emperor, Francis Joseph, has verified this prediction in abolishing at the commencement of his reign the infamous Josephine laws. — Ed. B. Q. R.

"As in all revolutions, they attacked violently the clergy at Vienna. The insults, calumnies, and menaces were directed principally against the bishops and the rich abbey which had escaped the vandalism of Joseph the Second. The poor convents and inferior clergy, however, though treated with less envy and severity, did not escape their share in the persecution. But this was not all. Books, pamphlets, journals, caricatures, and those impure works which ignorance and corruption have produced, were circulated, tending to bring religion itself into derision. It would not, therefore, have been just to spare its ministers.

"However, it was especially against the nobility that the wrath of the people was directed. It is true that the nobility enjoyed great privileges, that many of those privileges ought not to exist in the present times; that the charges and rents of the tenantry were sometimes rendered extremely burdensome by the severity and intolerable vanity of the possessors of titles and seigniorial rights; that many of the nobility gave grave scandals; and that many Austrian, Bohemian, and Hungarian counts and barons, in regard to instruction and the opinions they entertained of themselves, seemed to be ghosts of the thirteenth century,—all this was true, and to be expiated. But it is equally true that a large number of great names were nobly borne, and were found at the head of great and useful undertakings; that many of these old families had the purse always open for the unfortunate; that their gardens, museums, picture-galleries, were constantly at the service of the public; that the peasants on their lands were infinitely better treated than the peasants on the lands of rich commoners; that often they founded schools, erected and endowed churches; and that they furnished in all departments distinguished men, whom Austria will always honor.

"Austria, a Catholic power, has always been the most tolerant power in Europe of the other forms of worship embraced by a small minority of its subjects. The government seems to have reserved all its jealousy for the so-called dominant religion. In the sequel it will do better than tolerate it, better even than protect it; it will leave it free. The bishops have a great duty to perform, and a great future opening before them. Their duty is to take the place which God gives them, without fear of the edicts which impiety may launch against them. Every one will be free to speak, to write, to associate for worldly or political purposes, and no one can deny the same right to the Church. The time has passed for expecting the aid, often suspicious, always impotent, of the government. The Church has a life and a strength of her own. Let the bishops reject, if they still retain them, their absurd prejudices against the Holy See, the remains of the Reformation which the enemies of the Church revive, which ignorance propagates, and which the light of truth will dissipate. Let them attach themselves

more closely to the Chair of Peter, — to that impregnable tower against which all the efforts of the wicked break, and fail, — to that Mother-Church, severed from which all other churches are but withered and dead branches.

“Heresy, as a destructive scourge, had torn up the soil of old Germany, and covered it with blood and ruins. The heresies of the last three centuries have sunk into a nihilism the most absolute offered us in the whole history of the aberrations of the human mind. Nothing remains of them but the name, and that hatred of the one only religion which survives all heresies. Catholic sovereigns have shown only too many unjust prejudices against the Church. May the sad experiments of Antichristian legislation which they have made serve as a warning to their successors! Unhappily, a part of the bishops sustained the laws which oppressed the Church, under the pretext of freeing themselves from the yoke of Rome; but the tendencies now manifest, especially among the younger clergy, are very different, and we may be sure the Church will be free from the moment that the clergy are worthy that she should be. O, if Austria had known how to take the position in her interior and in the affairs of religion which belongs to her as a great Catholic power, — if she had left to its free development in her states that Catholic element which is the element of order, peace, and justice, — if she had not suffered the consummation of that greatest political crime against a Catholic nation committed since the division of Poland, — a crime so much the greater as it was wholly unincited, — her government would not have been overthrown on the 13th of March, by a few operatives and students from the University, at the bidding of foreign revolutionists. Catholic France and Austria suffered the radicals under their own eyes to cut the throats of the most Catholic people in Europe, for wishing to defend their liberty and their faith, conquered, centuries ago, at the price of blood; and not half a year after the destruction of the *Sönderbunde* passed away, before they both fell prostrate under the force of the radical doctrines which annihilated the Swiss Cantons. In the political as in the moral and as in the physical order, we are always punished where we have sinned. Never are we the accomplices of a wrong, without finding that wrong, sooner or later, our chastisement.\* The people of Vienna, like those of Milan, of Leghorn, of Rome, applauded the disasters of the Swiss Catholics, and the justice of God was not tardy in weighing upon them as they had weighed upon others. In the Swiss question the Austrian government was guilty only of weakness, while the people of Vienna approved the violences and sacrileges of radicalism. They were therefore ripe for revolution. They had for a long time been

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\* Montalembert, la Chambre des Pairs, *Affaires de la Suisse*. 1847.

pervverted, and yielded in nothing to the population of Leipsic, Berlin, or Frankfort. I speak always of the *lettered* or radical population.

"I have often heard it said that the Viennese conducted themselves so grossly in their revolution only because they had no idea of political life, and that the fault is chargeable upon the previous government, which prohibited foreign journals. But I do not concede that the education of a people is made by journals; and, moreover, the journals were passably numerous in Austria. It is true that those published in the monarchy were strictly gagged by the censorship; and this shows the absurdity of that censorship, since at the same time it permitted foreign journals, however bad they might be, to enter, or at least was unable to prevent them from entering. It was the same, too, with books. The few authors Austria produced were obliged to send their manuscripts to a foreign country for publication, while all the worst books published in Germany and France were sold publicly in Vienna, except those which attacked the government. These last were sold only in secret; yet every one could obtain them. Thus the Austrians, as well as the Prussians, the Saxons, and the people of Baden, could at their ease form their mind and heart in the study of the most revolting productions of France and Germany. Nevertheless, the censorship of the press was one of the principal prettexts of the revolution. It deserved not so much hatred; it deserved only pity and contempt.

"We can easily understand that, with such an order of things, education must have been in a deplorable state. The bureaucracy hated the Church and feared revolution. Between this fear and this hatred, it crushed all the young minds, of which it had taken possession for half a century. It had the shame of being overturned by those it had formed after its own image and likeness. Science, generally little esteemed, and poorly recompensed, was cultivated only by a few individuals who had a passion for it, which infallibly conducted them to the hospital. Many of the professors devoted themselves to teaching only after having failed in other pursuits, and they lived isolated, discontented, and unknown. Never could a poet or a serious author leap the threshold of the saloons of the great, so as to receive some words of recompense and encouragement. In order to gain a momentary admission, he must declaim some frivolous scene, or sing some smutty couplets. In the time when France produced Racine, Bossuet, Corneille, there were Colbert, Turenne, the great Condé, and a whole people, to comprehend and admire them; while the upper and lower society of Vienna understood and admired only farces and ballets, and produced only dancers and buffoons. The government which had so great a fear of the independence of the Church had no fear of the immorality

and irreligion which overflowed in all directions, but even caressed them. It was for works of beneficence that pieces the most immoral were represented in the theatres, so as to attract a greater crowd.

“ While the Catholic cause was abandoned in France by the several ministries which issued from the revolution of July, 1830, whilst Spain and Portugal struggled under the pressure of a revolution always breaking out anew, whilst Italy inflamed herself for a future revolution, anti-Catholic and anti-social, while Protestant Switzerland profaned Catholic churches, pillaged convents, and destroyed the institutions of learning, while the Machiavellian governments of Germany demanded laws under the name of liberty for the oppression of Catholics, Austria, if she had had the courage to unfurl anew that ancient banner of Catholicity, which is also that of liberty and civilization, showing by her interior administration and her foreign policy that she respected, and would cause to be respected to the full extent of her power, the rights of Catholics in Prussia, in Russia, in Switzerland, in Syria, she would have found in herself the strength which the protection of Heaven gives, and would have commanded the sympathies of the whole Catholic world.” — pp. 1 – 16.

Our readers, we are sure, will thank us for this long extract, which not only reveals the character and the impartiality of the author, but gives us a very full and satisfactory account of the origin and character of the Austrian revolution of March 13, 1848. He is no enemy to Austria, but he is no flatterer of the Austrian government, which, though not censurable under the relations alleged by the revolutionists, had many and great faults, which no lover of freedom and Catholicity can palliate or disguise. The imperial family were pious and well disposed, but the administration was almost wholly in the hands of the enemies of the Church. Happily, however, the government was forced by the rude shocks it received to recognize its errors, and the present Emperor has already done much, and we trust he will do still more, to correct them. Even as a matter of sound policy, he should leave the Church free, for it is only through her freedom and independence of the state that government, or even society, is practicable in any part of Christendom. The attempt to maintain society on atheistical principles, by chaining up the Church, disparaging the clergy, ridiculing religion, and directing attention solely to worldly interests, roast beef and plum-pudding, has signally failed, and we hope it will be long before a new crop of fools will be produced to renew it.

From Vienna the author passed through Hungary. He embarked on the Danube in the steamboat *Ceres*, on the 24th of June, 1848.

"Our boat," he says, "shoots rapidly along among the islands of the Danube, so green, so beautifully shaded by trees of every hue. I have already lost sight of Vienna, all except its admirable Tower of St. Stephen, on the summit of which floats a flag, but not that which has united so many different nations in one empire, and been consecrated by a glorious history of a thousand years. The Austrian flag is now proscribed in Austria, torn and insulted more than if it were the flag of a foreign or a hostile nation. O the unspeakable folly of men! They imagine themselves free because they have a flag of three colors, which is imposed upon them by the clubs of Paris! These nations in revolution have denied all their historical recollections, in order to have, like the French, a tricolored flag, which is not national even in France. If this mania of imitation continues, I shall see on my return the Seine and the Gironde flowing at Vienna and Berlin, and the Column of the Place Vendôme ornamenting the capital of German unity.

"The revolutionary ideas, which are now triumphing in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere, have so little foundation in the actual wants of the people and the demands of the age, that they were very different only a few months ago. But for the French revolution of February, we should have seen constitutional monarchy established some seven or eight times in Italy, and forty times in Germany. The republic of San Marino alone would not have adopted it, for the want of space for a Palais-Bourbon and a Palais du Luxembourg. All Europe would have had seven or eight ministers more or less responsible, presided over by an immutable thought, a House of Peers for life, and a House of Commons chosen for five years. But all at once the mould breaks in the hands of the masters, and more than one constitution which began monarchical has ended in being the most democratic in the world, — *desinit in piscem*. The wants of the people change not with the winds which flap the flag on the old metropolis of St. Stephen, or with the storms that periodically break forth on the banks of the Seine." — pp. 18, 19.

As he visits Presburg, the ancient capital of Hungary, the author makes some reflections and offers some details not without interest. The Hungarian revolution has not yet broken out, but it is on the eve of its explosion. The author sees clearly what is coming, and gives a brief and trustworthy account of the causes and nature of the struggle which was then prepared. He fully confirms the view



which has been uniformly taken in this journal of the Hungarians and of their late rebellion against Austria.

“A few years ago I assisted at one of those turbulent Hungarian Diets which preluded the present tempest. After a stormy session of the Chamber of Deputies, in which I had seen the Austrian government furiously attacked without hearing a single voice raised in its defence, save that of the official and almost indifferent voice of the President, I observed to the President, that it was impossible for an edifice to remain a long time standing which every body conspired to demolish. ‘The [Hungarians,] [Magyars,] he replied, ‘are ardent, vivacious, high-spirited, clamorous, and fond of opposition in — phrases. It is necessary to let them throw off their excess of fire and eloquence. My predecessor, who took every thing literally, died in endeavoring to restrain them, but I, who know them, leave them to act and speak in their own way. Whatever they may do or say, they are sincerely attached to their king, and let there come a real danger for the state, they will be its most courageous defenders.’ The President left me very little convinced by his observation.

“I love the Hungarians for their open and chivalric character. They are religious, brave, hospitable, prepossessing to strangers. When I first presented myself in the Chamber of Magnates, I knew nobody; a simple priest, I was at once received as a brother by many prelates and bishops, who came to meet me, and with whom I have remained ever since tenderly united. More lately I have obtained rank among the Hungarian clergy, who had for a long time opened to me both their arms and their hearts. But this year, 1848, the Hungarians have forgotten the recollections of 1741; they have forgotten that chivalric cry of loyalty and enthusiasm, *Morianur pro rege nostro Maria Theresia*, [Let us die for our king, Mary Theresa,] which had remained as the symbol of their national character. It is true, Joseph the Second but ill repaid the devotedness of this people; but, strange as it may seem, he is the idol of the revolutionary party. If he struck the people, he struck the Church still harder, and the *Brother Sacristan* of Frederic the Great has obtained the pardon of the sovereign who imposed on Hungary the German language, and carried away from Presburg the crown of St. Stephen.

“A violent reaction has manifested itself in the late Diets, not only against the German language, but also against the Latin, which was the language of public affairs; and they have substituted the Hungarian or Magyar language in its stead. In Europe generally this victory is regarded as the triumph of the *liberal* party; but it was in fact only the self-styled victory of a turbulent minority over the Catholic clergy and the Austrian government. This, however, is enough to render it popular with foreigners.

“ In Hungary, in a population of twelve millions and a half, there are not less than fifteen or sixteen distinct nationalities, each for the most part with a different language of its own. The Hungarians, or rather the Magyars, form only about one third of the whole population. How embarrassing for a government to make itself understood in this tower of Babel ! Usage had introduced the Latin. The Latin of Hungary had long been the subject of the railleries of those who did not know it ; but, without being as pure as that of Cicero, it had the advantage of not being the idiom of the Illyrians, the Magyars, the Croats, the Wallachians, or the Saxons, and of being understood by all the nations of the earth. In the United States as in France, in England as in Germany, they can use a passport, or any other document, written in Latin ; but if written in Hungarian, it would be as unintelligible as if written in Chinese or Sanscrit.

“ In a political point of view, the triumph of the Magyar language has been, therefore, an act of oppression, and the *Liberals* who committed it were so intolerant, as to wish to oblige the Croatian deputies present at the Diet forthwith to speak a language which they did not know. Through the intervention of the Austrian government, the Hungarian Diet granted to Croatia the interval of two Diets to provide herself with a language. Yet this decision did not prevent the Magyar Liberals from hissing her deputies, as often as they attempted to avail themselves of this respite to defend the interests of their country in Latin.

“ I insist on this fact, because it has been, not in itself, but in the tendencies it betrayed, the first cause of the misunderstanding between the Croats and the Magyars, and of the war which is on the point of breaking out between them. The triumph of the Magyar language in the parliament was a new irruption of the Magyars into Pannonia, the subjection of fifteen nationalities to one alone, or of eight millions of people of other races to four and a half millions of Magyars.

“ The revolution in Vienna, last March, was hardly known at Presburg, before on the one hand the Hungarians attempted their separation from the empire, and on the other sought to incorporate with Hungary proper Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania, so as to have a compact kingdom of fifteen millions of inhabitants. The Diet, the ministry, the Palatine, that is to say, the three constitutional powers, took the road to Pesth, under the direction of Kossuth, who soon absorbed them all, and summoned the Slaves to unite with them. The Croats, with their Ban Jellachich at their head, who had heard it said that the revolution of Vienna was made in favor of all the nationalities of the empire, and therefore in favor of their own, declared that they would be to the Hungarians what the Hungarians wished to be to the Austrians, that is to say, independent, holding immediately from the crown alone.

"The Magyars take up arms to subject the Croats, and the Croats take up arms to defend themselves against the Magyars. Here are the two nations in face of each other, or, I prefer to say, two men, Kossuth and Jellachich, so completely is each identified with the cause he defends. The one, Kossuth, is an eloquent rhetorician, able to stir up the masses as the tempest stirs up the waves of the ocean; the other, Jellachich, a soldier, loyal and intrepid, electrifies an entire people, rude indeed, but brave and devout. The one fascinates by his discourses, the other by his example; the one is nourished by the discourses of the old French Convention, which he admires, the other by the history of his country, which he loves; the one glorifies revolutions, the other glorifies liberty." — pp. 21 – 24.

We commend this parallel between Kossuth and Jellachich to the admirers of the former. No one questions that Kossuth is a distinguished revolutionary orator, and in that sort of eloquence — the lowest in the scale and the easiest to be attained to — which is adapted to rouse up the evil passions, and stimulate the natural insubordination of an unreasoning and unscrupulous multitude, he stands preëminent. But of the lofty character of a true patriot, of a real lover of liberty, or of a wise and prudent statesman, he has as yet given us no indication. His speeches in this country tire by their repetitions, and disgust by their egotism. His credit is every day diminishing, and if he ever leaves this country it will be as a small man in comparison with what he was esteemed when he first set his foot on our shores. He is far inferior, in all the qualities that fit him to be a leader of a revolutionary movement, to Joseph Mazzini, and can fill only a subordinate place under him. Our people have shown their usual bad taste in attempting to make him the object of their hero-worship. They love liberty and delight to honor it in its representative, and for this we honor them. But in Kossuth they have selected a second-rate revolutionist, — a sort of Camille Desmoulin, or rather a Robespierre without Robespierre's incorruptibility in money matters, — not the representative either of liberty or of a noble struggle in behalf of national independence. The Magyars were the oppressors, not the oppressed, and while they were seeking to render themselves independent of the empire, they were fighting to keep eight millions of Hungarians of other races in subjection to themselves. It was

the Croats who were fighting for liberty, and who were the real champions of freedom. He who deserves our sympathies and honors is not Kossuth, but their noble chief, the Ban Jellachich (*Yellashish*, as we have been told to pronounce it). He loved his country and liberty, and knew how to defend both, and he deserves to have his name placed high on the list headed by our own Washington. But we return to our author.

“ But behind this question of language there is a war of nationality to be settled, of which language is the expression. The Magyars have two objects to accomplish, that of consummating their separation from Austria, and that of confirming their independence by rendering themselves powerful enough to defend it. Certainly, if Croatia, Sclavonia, and Transylvania could identify their interests with those of Magyardom, place themselves under the direction of Kossuth, and declare war on Austria while she is engaged in suppressing the revolt in Lombardy, it would be the severest blow that could be struck to the monarchy ; but this blow will not be struck, for they will never submit to the Magyars.

“ Moreover, the opposition of Hungary to Austria is not at all the work of the people, as was that of Galicia in 1846. It is a conspiracy of a part of the nobility, availing itself of all the anarchical elements of the country to obtain its ends. Hungary, enjoying a constitution and privileges of its own, must have fewer grievances from Austria to complain of than other provinces. If that constitution and its privileges are absurd in our times, as in many respects they undoubtedly are, the fault is not in the crown, which has frequently attempted to introduce some modifications, but to this same Magyar nobility, who always resisted them, and now rise in rebellion. The lands of the nobles, for instance, were subject to no tax or impost whatever. How, then, could the Austrian government open its frontier to the productions of Hungary, and thus ruin the proprietaries of the other provinces, which bear all the burdens of the state ? How could it construct roads, protect agriculture, commerce, and manufactures ? The resources of Austria, compared to those of other states much less important, are very inferior, although the taxes in the German, Bohemian, and Italian provinces are very high. If the finances of Austria are in a deplorable state, the fault is chiefly that of Hungary. Thus, many provisions of the Hungarian constitution maintained by the Diet, in spite of the crown, have the disadvantage of keeping this kingdom in a semi-barbarous state, and of also seriously injuring the prosperity of the whole empire. . . .

“ It is curious to see the democratic clubs of Europe make common cause with the aristocratic movements of Hungary, as they

did two years ago with the popular movements of Galicia. Provided revolutions are only made, it is all the same to them whether they are made with or without, for or against, the people. 'In our times,' Chateaubriand says, 'liberty is reason. It is without enthusiasm, and is sought because it is necessary to all, — to kings, whose crowns it secures by restricting power, and to the people that they may no longer rush into revolutions to find what they already possess. Certainly, then, all the revolutions which we have witnessed of late lead very far from their avowed object, independence and liberty.'

"Formerly the revolutionists appealed to the *fraternity of nations*, now they appeal to the distinction of nationalities, that is, to the *isolation* of nations. But here, again, the same contradiction. The same radicalism that seeks to separate the Italian and Germanic races in the broad plains of Lombardy, compresses under the same yoke the people of French, Italian, and German descent in the narrow valleys of Helvetia; the same spirit that tends to detach the Magyars from the Austrians, would compel the Bulgarians, Germans, Slaves, Croats, &c. of Hungary to submit to the domination of the Magyars." — pp. 24–26.

We regret that our limits compel us to take leave of our author, at least for the present, at Presburg; we hope, however, to rejoin him in our next Review, and accompany him on his journey to the Holy Land. We have merely cited here his testimony as to the causes, character, and tendencies of the Austrian and Hungarian revolutions. What we have cited was written in the month of June, 1848, after the revolution in Vienna, and before the outbreak of hostilities between Hungary and Austria, but by one who saw clearly what was to be expected, and fully comprehended the causes which were at work to ruin the Austrian empire. Since then, Austria, who appeared to us at that time utterly prostrate, whose empire we thought must be dissolved, and the German provinces be united to a new German empire embracing all Germany, the Italian be absorbed in an independent federative Italy, and the Slavonic be in part merged in a new and independent kingdom of Poland, and in part incorporated with the Magyars, forming an independent and powerful kingdom of Hungary, — since then, we say, Austria has suppressed the revolt in Italy, put down the revolution in her hereditary states, and reduced the Magyars to submission. This has disappointed and enraged the revolutionists, for Austria was the key-stone of the old European edifice, and it was only by her destruction that it could be demolished.

Threatened with Red Republicanism within, with continued revolt in her provinces, and having to oppose, not only her own rebellious subjects, but the combined power of the whole revolutionary party of the Continent, Great Britain, and the United States, Austria called upon Russia to assist her in putting down the rebellion in Hungary. Russia complied with her request, and the Magyars were finally defeated and reduced by the combined forces of Austria and Russia.

This assistance granted by Russia to Austria has been represented by the defeated revolutionists, Great Britain, and the United States, as an unauthorized and criminal intervention in the domestic affairs of independent nations, and the revolutionary ex-Governor Kossuth, liberated from a Turkish prison through the intervention of Lord Palmerston and Mr. Secretary Webster, calls upon us to give him material aid in reviving the suppressed revolution, and to unite with Great Britain and intervene so far as to prevent Russia from again intervening. He made the same demand of England, and found many of the English people ready to respond to it—in their toasts. This demand is the burden of all his speeches here, and their name is legion. Our government, if we may judge from the President's late message, was at first inclined to favor his revolutionary projects, and even to comply with his demand. Many of our citizens have been quite enthusiastic on the subject, and, having declared Kossuth the champion of liberty, the apostle of humanity, a second Messiah, come to break the power of tyrants, and to redeem the human race from bondage, have been ready to respond to his appeal, and to force their government into a war with both Austria and Russia in his behalf.

Kossuth, in all his speeches that we have read, in all his reasonings, quietly assumes as the basis of his arguments what he knows perfectly well is false, and the mass of his American sympathizers take his statements as true, without having any clear or just conception of the real merits of the question. Four years ago Hungary, to the great body of our people, even our educated people, was as much a *terra incognita* as the interior of Africa. Very few of them had any knowledge of its inhabitants, its domestic institutions, or its relations to the Austrian empire. Italian refugees and French liberals had prejudiced them against

Austria, and prepared them to believe that any party opposed to her must be in the right. When, therefore, they heard Hungary had revolted and taken up arms against her, they took it for granted that the Hungarian cause was a good cause, and deserving the sympathy of every American citizen, and every friend of liberty throughout the world.

But Kossuth knows perfectly well that Hungary had no ground of complaint against the Austrian government. That Hungary had not developed her resources, that she had not kept pace with the industrial progress of the age, that she had to suffer very serious evils, very many things that needed reforming, is most true and undeniable; but all this was due, not to the Austrian government, but to the obstinacy and folly of her own Diet, or local parliament. The imperial government labored constantly to persuade the local parliament to introduce the reforms which in the process of time and change of circumstances had become necessary, but always without success, and there was not a grievance complained of, not a reform needed, that the Hungarian parliament was not competent to redress or to introduce, if it had been so disposed. This fact should never be overlooked or forgotten, for it renders the opposition to Austria wholly unjustifiable.

Moreover, the immediate causes of the war with the imperial government were not the grievances that required redress, but desire for national independence on the one hand, and on the other the determination of the Magyars to subject to Magyar rule the non-Magyar races of Hungary, or rather of Croatia, Slavonia, Transylvania, &c., in a general way reckoned as parts of Hungary, but not within the limits of Hungary proper, civil or geographical. The pretext for hostilities was, that the imperial government would not aid the Magyars in reducing these non-Magyar races, that is, would not aid in stripping the empire of a number of her provinces, and give them to the Magyars, to render the kingdom they proposed to declare independent powerful enough to defend itself. If the imperial government consented to let Hungary separate herself from the empire, and become independent, it could not be expected to add to her proper dominions other provinces, or to refrain from efforts to confine the independent kingdom within the limits of Hungary proper. The demand of the Magyars was itself

unreasonable, and they had no right to feel aggrieved that it was not complied with, or that the imperial government aided Croatia, Sclavonia, and Transylvania to maintain their independence of Hungary, and their loyalty to the empire. Even assuming Hungary, which, however, was not the case, to have been recognized as independent of the empire, this would have been no cause of war on the part of Hungary. A state has a right to defend its loyal provinces, and in fact the war of the Magyars on the Croats, who adhered to the empire, was itself a war on the empire, and of itself justified the imperial government, and would have done so even assuming Hungary to have been independent, in making war on Hungary. The revolt of the Magyars had no justification, and their war upon the empire was aggressive, and in all respects unjustifiable. Under any point of view, then, from which we choose to consider the Magyar cause, it was essentially a bad cause, with which no friend of freedom or of justice could, understanding it, sympathize.\*

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\* We are not sure that this is sufficiently clear to all our readers. Hungary is sometimes spoken of as including Croatia, Sclavonia, and Transylvania, and sometimes as excluding them. Geographically it includes them, politically it in some respects did, and in some respects did not, include them. These states, inhabited chiefly by Sclavonians and Roumans, were distinct from the Hungarian state, but were for certain purposes of administration joined to the kingdom of Hungary, and dependent on the Hungarian crown. Yet they had a civil organization of their own, and diets of their own, at least Croatia had a diet, distinct from the Magyar Diet, which is meant whenever mention is made of the Hungarian Diet.

While Magyar Hungary, or Hungary in its restricted political sense, remained united to the empire, those provinces in some sense held from the empire, if we understand it, through the Hungarian crown. In consequence of this fact, when the Magyar kingdom obtained, in March, 1848, from the concessions of the good, but weak and terrified, Emperor Ferdinand, an independent ministry, the Magyar government claimed these provinces as a part of the Hungarian state, and demanded their submission to the new independent ministry. As the concession of that independent ministry was a virtual separation of Hungary from the empire, and threatened to be soon even a formal one, and to render Magyar Hungary in all respects an independent kingdom, the effect of this demand would have been, if complied with, to sever Croatia, Sclavonia, and Transylvania from the Austrian empire, and to make them provinces of the independent Magyar kingdom, and to subject the Sclavonians and Roumans to the Magyars, their bitter enemies and hereditary oppressors. The Croats, who were impatient of their *quasi*-dependence on Hungary even while Hungary was united to the empire, could not entertain the thought of being dependent on her as an independent kingdom. They preferred being united to Aus-



But Kossuth and his friends misrepresent the relation which subsisted between Hungary and the empire. Certainly Hungary was distinct from and independent of the Duchy of Austria, but to assert it to have been independent of the Austrian empire or state, and connected with it only by the accidental union of the crown of each in the same person, is to assert a palpable falsehood. Hungary was an integral part of the Austrian state, as much so as the Duchy of Austria itself. Austria aside from Hungary, Bohemia, Galicia, Croatia, Slavonia, Transylvania, Dalmatia, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, &c., is not an empire, but a dukedom, and these kingdoms and provinces, in forming in union with the Duchy of Austria the Austrian empire, are not regarded in law as subjected to that duchy, and dependent on it. They are, in reference to it, independent states, as the several States of our Union are, in relation to each other, independent states. The empire of Austria is a federative, or, as some term it, a composite state. The members or components, taken separately, are

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tria, and holding immediately from the Emperor, to being subjected to the Magyars no longer united to Austria. They consequently, under the lead of their noble chief, the Ban Jellachich, refused to submit to the Magyar ministry. The ministry took up arms to compel them to submit, but were defeated by Jellachich. They then applied to the imperial government to use its authority to compel them to submit, and to put down what Kossuth calls "the Servian insurrection." The imperial government, if its action has not been misrepresented, counting on the loyalty of the Magyars, and trusting that they would still remain united to the Austrian state, appears to have been at first disposed to listen to their request; but as soon as it was clearly manifest that the Magyars were to be satisfied with nothing but absolute independence of the empire, it refused, and approved the Ban Jellachich.

Here we get at once at the immediate causes of the war of the Hungarian ministry under Kossuth against the empire. The Magyar Diet had so alienated the affections of the non-Magyar provinces of the geographical kingdom of Hungary, that they would not consent to belong to the political kingdom of Hungary, if independent of Austria, and governed by the Magyar nobility. The Magyar ministry undertook to force them into submission, and, failing, called upon the empire, from which it was separating and wished to separate them, to assist it. The imperial government, after a brief hesitation, refused its assistance, and even extended its protection to the non-Magyar provinces. Then the Kossuth ministry turned against the Austrian state, fomented the new Red Republican revolution in Vienna of October, 1848, and marched its troops to the aid of the insurgents, with the hope of securing Magyar independence and the subjection of the Croats and non-Magyar races, under the walls of Vienna, by the ruin of the Austrian monarchy. They were defeated, as every body knows, by

mutually independent, and have each their local institutions and administrations; but in their composition, federation, or union, they form one state, just as the States composing our Union are one state in their federative character. The relation of Hungary to the empire was substantially the relation of Massachusetts to the federal government of the American Union; and she had no more right to secede from the empire, and declare herself independent, than Massachusetts has to secede from the Union, and declare herself a complete and independent state. How Hungary came to be thus united to the empire, we have heretofore shown at length, when treating expressly of the Hungarian rebellion. Suffice it to say here, that the union had received the assent of the Hungarian Diet, and therefore of Hungary herself, and she could not dissolve it without a breach of faith, or treason to the empire. However independent of Austria Hungary might have been in her local civil administration, she was not separately from the empire an independent state. She was not in herself what the au-

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the noble Prince Windischgrätz, and obliged to retreat across the Danube, followed by the Austrian army. Now the sole pretext of this hostility against Austria was, that the imperial government would not aid the Magyars to reduce the non-Magyar races to subjection to the Magyar ministry, and thus aid in strengthening the Magyar kingdom resolved to become independent, by divesting the empire of Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania, and giving them to that kingdom. The baseness of the Magyar ministry has been disguised by the common mistake of confounding these non-Magyar states with the Magyar state of Hungary proper, or Hungary in its restricted political sense, and by not regarding the fact that the non-Magyar states were not struggling for independence of the empire, but for independence of an independent Magyar Hungary. They were loyal to the empire, but would not consent to make part of a Magyar kingdom independent of the empire. They were bound to the Magyar kingdom only as that kingdom was indissolubly united to the Austrian state, and consequently owed it no obedience when it ceased to be so united. The attempt on the part of the Magyar ministry to subject them was a wanton invasion of their rights, gross usurpation, and an outrage upon common justice, which would have amply justified Austria in making war on that ministry, even if it had been the ministry of an absolutely independent state. The defence of Austria and of the Croats is triumphant, and one must be wholly blinded by the revolutionary mania of the times, not to see that Kossuth and his party were wanton aggressors, and under every conceivable point of view in both law and justice deserving of condemnation and the utter reprobation of mankind. Not only the men were bad, but their cause was bad, and we have just as little sympathy with those who condemn Kossuth, and yet approve his cause, as we have with those who make Kossuth their *fétiche*.

thorities call a complete state; which is evident from the fact, that she had no ambassadors at foreign courts, and could maintain diplomatic relations with no foreign power. In all external or foreign relations she was merged in the Austrian state. She could declare herself, therefore, independent of the Austrian empire only by an act of rebellion, and justify herself in doing so only on those grounds, if such grounds there are, which justify revolution. She had, as we have seen, no such grounds to allege, for she really had no grievance to complain of against the imperial government.

Hungary at war with the empire was then simply the rebel at war with his sovereign, and every sovereign has the indefeasible right to reduce the rebel to his allegiance. It makes no difference here whether the sovereignty is lodged in an emperor or in a president, in a king or in a congress; the sovereignty and its rights and prerogatives are always the same. In the case before us the Emperor represented the sovereignty of the state, the sovereign state, and had therefore the right to reduce Hungary to her obedience, and consequently the right to invoke the aid, if he saw proper, of Russia, or any other friendly power, in doing it, and the power invoked had the right, if it saw proper, to grant the aid solicited. No man who knows any thing of the meaning of the word *state*, or of international law, or has the least glimmering of common sense, can deny this.

But, if this be so, no nation, unless in a clear case of self-defence, can have the least right to intervene to prevent the power called upon from granting the aid invoked. Here is a point to which we wish to call the attention of our readers. Those of our statesmen who have opposed Kossuth's demand for intervention against intervention, have done so on the ground that such intervention would be impolitic, and contrary to our interests as a nation. This is no doubt true, but we would oppose it on higher grounds,—on the ground that we have no *right* to intervene in the case, and could not intervene without manifest injustice,—not, indeed, without striking a direct blow at the right of independent nations to manage their own domestic affairs in their own way. We retort Kossuth's doctrine of non-intervention upon himself. He says, nations have the right to modify their institutions, and to adopt

such ameliorations and such forms of internal government as seem to them good, without the interference of foreign powers. As against one another, with the single exception of the right of neighboring nations to intervene simply in necessary self-defence, and understanding by nations independent nations, we accept and even maintain this doctrine. But in the present case this doctrine applies to Austria and Russia, not to Hungary, for Hungary was not an independent nation, was not in herself a complete state. She could introduce no reforms or alterations incompatible with her indissoluble union with and subjection to the Austrian state. She had no competency to declare herself independent of the empire; and to intervene at the request of the empire to prevent her from doing so, or to aid in reducing her to her allegiance, was not in any sense of the word to intervene in the domestic affairs of an independent state,—was and could be no violation of the law of non-intervention. But to have intervened to prevent Austria from invoking the aid of Russia, or to prevent Russia from granting it, would have been a direct intervention in the domestic affairs of independent states, and an undeniable violation of the law of non-intervention.

What Kossuth is soliciting of us is manifestly in violation of the very law of non-intervention he contends for. He wishes us to unite with England in saying to Austria and Russia, that if Hungary again rebels,—for Hungary is not now in a state of rebellion or revolt,—and declares her independence, Russia will not be permitted to take any part in the contest, and if she presumes to do so, it will be counted a *casus belli*. But this would be, not an intervention in behalf of a revolutionary government already existing *de facto*, but an intervention to encourage a province of an independent state to rebel and organize such government. If this would not be intervention in the internal affairs of independent states, we are at a loss to understand what would be. In any point of view, then, from which you choose to consider the matter, Kossuth's doctrine of non-intervention condemns him, and his insisting upon it proves that, however brilliant a rhetorician he may be, he is but an indifferent lawyer, and a sorry logician. If non-intervention is the law, we have nothing to do with the case, and have no right to protest against the conduct of either Austria or Russia. If intervention is the law, or the

right, as it must be to justify us in intervening at all, then the alleged intervention of Russia is justifiable, for she has as good a right to intervene to put down revolution as we have to intervene to sustain revolution.

But we deny that there was any intervention, in the legal or political sense of the term, in the case. To assist a friendly power, at its request, to put down a rebellion in its states is not intervention, is not to violate the law of non-intervention. The intervention prohibited by the law of nations is the intervention of a foreign power, *motu proprio*, in the internal affairs of an independent state, or without the request or permission of its sovereign. We have for this the authority of one of the greatest revolutionists of the age, the Abbate Gioberti, who belongs heart and soul to Kossuth's party, and is as innocent of all Catholic faith and tendency as the well-known pantheist, Stallo, who recently defended Kossuth at Cincinnati. Whatever Gioberti may have once been, his recent work, *Del Rinnovamento Civile d' Italia*, proves that he can no longer be regarded as a Catholic, and that for years he has been a thorough-going revolutionist, prepared to carry his points with or without the Pope, with or without the Church. He is a decided liberal, and can no more than the fallen Lamennais be regarded as a Catholic priest, or as a Christian believer. He must therefore be good authority for Kossuth and his friends. Well, Gioberti, when accused in the Sardinian Chamber of having proposed, as Sardinian minister, to intervene in the affairs of Tuscany, replied, "I ask, Is to enter any foreign state whatever with an armed force always intervention, in the political sense of the word? I answer, if this entrance is by the request of the prince and people, it is not intervention; if against the will of the prince and people, it is intervention."\* By *people* in this connection we must understand the people, not of a particular province, but of the state, and the people also in a political sense, speaking through its legal organs, not the mob or club. Now Russia did not take part in the contest against the will, but at the request, of the prince and political people of the Austrian state, and therefore neither intervened nor asserted the right to intervene in the internal affairs of independent nations. We

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\* *Del Rinnovamento Civile d' Italia*, Tom. II. p. 593.

are, as our writings have sufficiently shown, no special friends of Russia, and we do not seek to conceal the fears with which we see the advances of the Russian empire; but we are bound to be just at all times, to all persons, and to all states, and we must say, that, since the peace of 1815, we have seen no disposition on the part of Russia to intervene in the internal affairs of any of the western states of Europe, in the sense in which intervention is contrary to the law of nations. It is rarely that we find on the throne an abler or a more equitable prince, aside from his schismatic character, than the Emperor Nicholas. If he were, as he should be, in communion with the Church, we should have no fears of his power or his growing influence. All things considered, it will be difficult to name the European state which for the last twenty-five years has been more wisely or advantageously governed than Russia, or a secular prince who has more scrupulously observed his engagements, and respected the rights of his neighbors, than its present sovereign.

There having been no political intervention in the case, and no assertion of the right of intervention, the request of Kossuth for our government to intervene against intervention is absurd. The fact is, all the intervention there has been, has been on the other side. In the first place, in the revolution in Vienna and in that of Hungary, the organized revolutionists of Europe openly and avowedly intervened, and many of the chief officers in the Magyar army were foreigners, such as Bem, Dembinski, and Guyon. Austria had to resist, not only her own Hungarian rebels, but armed Poles, Italians, Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, and perhaps Americans, aided by the popular demonstrations of the people of the United States, England, Germany, France, and Italy. In the second place, the English government and our own openly sympathized with the Magyars, and were on the eve of opening diplomatic relations with them. There was no lack of at least indirect intervention against Austria, amply sufficient to justify Russia, had she chosen, in volunteering her assistance to Austria, and in entering unsolicited into Hungary, in the interests of order and humanity, with an armed force adequate to suppress the rebellion.

Little does it become either the British government or our own to complain of Russian intervention. The Brit-

ish government has not ceased, for the last twenty or thirty years, to intervene in the internal affairs of Continental states. *Blackwood's Magazine* for February last, speaking of Lord Palmerston, says very truly: "He supported openly, so far as he could,—favored covertly when this was impossible,—the cause of revolution all over the world. He aided by the fleets of England the establishment of one revolution in Belgium, by the marines and volunteers another in Spain. He concluded the Quadruple Alliance to force revolutionary queens upon a reluctant people in both kingdoms of the Peninsula. He covertly aided in the spread of *liberal* ideas in Italy,—openly in supporting the insurgents in Sicily. He took Russia by the beard in the Dardanelles on account of the Hungarian insurgents; and afterwards, for a wretched private dispute at Athens, ranged France by her side,—all but brought on a war with France by the bombardment of Beyrout, and hostilities against Greece; and irritated Austria past forgiveness by the open sympathy expressed for the Hungarian insurgents."\* And in the discussion in the British Parliament growing out of inquiries as to the dismissal of Lord Palmerston, it was avowed by Lord John Russell that the policy of the government had been the introduction and support of constitutional government in Continental Europe. As for our own government, no man can deny its interference in Mexico in favor of federalism, its open declaration that it would intervene to prevent the reestablishment of monarchy in that now distracted republic, or its unwarrantable interference in the affairs of European states by its expressed sympathy with the revolutionists, by resolutions of Congress, the diplomatic correspondence of the Secretary of State, and the official messages of the President. England has been constantly intriguing, and sometimes openly warring, for the establishment of British constitutionalism on the Continent, and we have become a nation of democratic propagandists, openly, and even through our government proclaiming all non-popular governments illegal, and virtually all crowned heads tyrants and usurpers, against whom it is lawful for their subjects to conspire when they will; and there is little room to doubt that Mr. Webster and Lord

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\* *Blackwood*, Feb. 1852, pp. 255, 256.

Palmerston contemplated an Anglo-Saxon alliance for the protection and support of the revolutionary movement of Europe, which is headed by Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin, Kossuth, and men of like character. Mr. Webster, we can believe, intended on our part no *armed* intervention, for he seems to have believed that the presence of English and American ships in the Mediterranean, and the united declaration of the two governments, would so overawe the sovereigns, and so encourage the revolutionists, that nothing more would be necessary. That something like this was in contemplation may be easily inferred from the acts and avowals of the government, and the lacrymose tone of the honorable Secretary's letter to Mr. Rives, instructing him to maintain his diplomatic relations with Louis Napoleon.

Now, if we have a right to intervene for the spread of democracy, and England for the spread of constitutionalism, and to encourage revolutions for one or the other, neither we nor England can deny the right of Russia to intervene in opposition, and by our intervention we give her at least a very plausible pretext for doing so. The silly pretence that the Allied Sovereigns propose to intervene against our democracy here at home, is unworthy the least consideration, and no man knows it better than our present Secretary of State. Mr. Webster pretends that the Allied Sovereigns, in their famous Laybach Circular, assert principles which deny the legality of our institutions; but we have, in replying to his letter to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, proved that this is not the fact. Mr. Webster is a great man. We have never denied it; we have heard him advance truly conservative doctrines, and develop views which proved him capable of being a statesman of the very first rank; but his mind is comprehensive rather than acute, stronger in grasping certain general conclusions than in the analysis of principles. He has strong sympathies and strong prejudices, and is not incapable of blunders which would be unpardonable in a smaller man. He read the Laybach Circular as a democrat, not as a statesman or as a lawyer, and entirely misapprehended its character. We have never been the advocate or the apologist of what has been called the *Holy Alliance*, but we prefer it to the unholy alliance of the revolutionists. That alliance was rendered necessary against the doctrine of the *Fraternity*, the "*Solidarity*," of peoples, proclaimed and



acted upon by the French Jacobins: but in no document we have seen has it ever proclaimed the right of one nation, of its own motion, to intervene, against the will of the sovereign authority, in the internal affairs of another. That the alliance was intended to maintain the historical rights of nations and sovereigns against modern revolutionism is conceded: but this in the mind of such a man as Mr. Webster should be an argument in its favor, not against it. So eminent a man as Mr. Webster cannot be ignorant that revolutions, even when necessary, are a terrible calamity, and that in Europe, and indeed in all countries, if we except our own, they have uniformly ended in destroying constitutional freedom, and in rendering military despotism more or less indispensable for the maintenance of society. Such were the effects of the movements of the Gracchi, and of the revolutions produced by Marius and Sylla in Rome; such were the effects of the old French revolution, and such throughout Europe are likely to be the effects of the Red Republican revolutions of 1848. Louis Napoleon is no tyrant, is no enemy of popular freedom, but he has been forced either to leave France a prey to anarchy or to rule her through the army. His constitution is not liberal, is not democratic, but we are much mistaken if it does not give to the people more power than in the present state of opinion is compatible in France with the peace and security of the state. The democratic revolutions and revolutionary ideas have rendered popular freedom impracticable in every European state, and we cannot but regard every man as really an enemy to liberty who sympathizes with them.

For ourselves, to return to Kossuth, we care not how much he is feasted, nor how much money he may induce silly dupes to give him. In himself he is nothing to us but a simple human being, whom we should be glad to see leaving off his trade of revolution, and settling himself down quietly to the work of making his peace with Heaven. All we regret is, that his progress amongst us keeps alive the sympathy of many of our people with revolutionism, and tends to foster feelings and wishes incompatible with the safety of our own institutions. No people is secure that runs mad after revolutionism, and we shall not feel that our institutions are safe till our people cease to sympathize with revolutionists. We have no solid support for

our institutions till our people know that treason is a crime against the state and a sin against God, and that every one who rebels against legal authority, and conspires by force of arms to overthrow it, is a traitor. The revolutionists have destroyed liberty on the continent of Europe, they have involved their respective countries in all but complete ruin, and here, the last stronghold of political freedom, they will do the same, if not frowned instantly down by our people. We may give them an asylum, for hospitality is a virtue that we would have our nation always practise, but we should do it only on condition of their remaining in private life, and scrupulously abstaining in word and deed from all interference in politics, foreign or domestic. It will not answer to make heroes of them, or to put them forward as our teachers and leaders. Let them live and repent, but live in retirement, without honor or notice, as they deserve. The facts detailed by our author in his account, which we have translated, of the revolution in Vienna, fully warrant this severe judgment, and admonish us to look upon all revolutionists, in the modern sense of the term, as the enemies of God and of mankind. We have been wrong and foolish in the sympathy we have extended to them; let us correct our error, and hereafter show that we are capable of honoring the cause of freedom and order.

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ART. IV.—*Le Ver Rongeur des Sociétés Modernes, ou le Paganisme dans l'Education.* Par L'ABBÉ J. GAUME. Bruxelles: Goemaere. 1851. 12mo. pp. 230.

THE Abbé Gaume, Vicar-General of Nevers, is one of the more estimable of the present Catholic authors in France. He is not, indeed, remarkably brilliant, or very profound; but he is earnest, and in all his writings aims at practical results of the highest importance. We cannot but applaud the motive of the publication before us, the end sought to be gained, however far we may or may not agree with the author as to the cause of the evil he so clearly points out, or as to the specific means of removing it.

There can be no question that the worm which is devouring the very heart of modern society is paganism. The tendency to heathenism is in our fallen nature itself, and there is no age of the world in which it does not more or less manifest its strength. As long as man exists on the earth he will in greater or less degree manifest this tendency, and the Christian will have in himself and in society to continue the old war against paganism. That in modern Europe the tendency has during the last four centuries been unusually strong, and that there has been in many countries a decided reaction in favor of the pagan world against which the early Christian martyrs so heroically struggled, and did such brave battle, we have on more occasions than one attempted to prove, and it is evident to every intelligent student of history. Heathenism is everywhere rife, and modern generations grow up with heathen notions of life, accustomed to judge men and events by a heathen standard. Professed Christian countries have lapsed into carnal Judaism, another name for heathenism, and look only for a temporal prince in the Messiah, and worldly advantage or prosperity from religion. The Church is tried, not by its spiritual effects, but by its assumed bearing on the temporal civilization of nations. Even the people of Catholic countries are more or less influenced in their judgments by pagan maxims. They place, for instance, a much higher value on the active than the contemplative religious orders, and extol those who devote themselves to active beneficence and the relief of bodily wants far above those who devote themselves to prayer. The heroic devotion of the old monks and anchorites of the desert is termed by many a sublime folly. *Ascetic* is a word in bad odor, and if used will hardly be understood in a good sense. Faith in the reality of the unseen world is weak, and all thought and labor devoted to that world, or not attended by practical, visible results for this temporal life, are looked upon with suspicion, and very extensively as thrown away. So far gone is the age, especially among Protestants, where we see its real character, that its very spiritualism is material. We listened some time since to an oration before a literary society by Mr. Horace Greeley. He began by denouncing the materialism and utilitarianism of the age in good set terms, and with some truth and power, and ended by proposing a

greater attention to physical education, or the education of the body, as the only practicable remedy!

That the uneasiness, the insubordination, the revolutions, and the terrible social as well as spiritual evils which afflict modern society, grow out of the prevalence of paganism, or carnal Judaism, no well-informed Christian can doubt, and that it is the one and only enemy to our virtue and to our peace, whether individual or social, is just as certain. That it is necessary to see this, to understand well the fact of the prevalence of paganism in modern society, and the means of banishing it, or of emancipating the young generation from its thralldom, the Abbé Gaume feels deeply and sees most clearly, and so far we sympathize entirely with what he writes. The cause of this paganism in modern society he ascribes to the use of heathen works as class-books in our higher schools, and the remedy, he contends, is to abolish those works, and to substitute text-books written by Christian authors in their place.

“ We have been,” he says, “ much occupied of late years with freedom of education. This freedom has been energetically and perseveringly demanded, both as a necessity and as a right. All honor to those who have so nobly consecrated their talent and their courage to this important question ! But there is something still more important than freedom of education, namely, that education be Christian. Freedom is the means, not the end, and if we make not education Christian, freedom of education will serve only to multiply the poisoned sources whence our youth may drink in death. To render education Christian is the work now to be done, at whatever cost. In other words, we must substitute Christian for pagan education. We must reconnect the chain of Catholic instruction, manifestly, fatally, and sacrilegiously broken throughout all Europe in the fifteenth century. We must place once more by the cradle of the infant generations the pure fountain of truth instead of the poisonous pool of error, of spirituality instead of sensuality, of order instead of disorder, of life instead of death. We must inform once more science, literature, art, and manners with the Catholic principle, if we would cure the foul diseases which now consume them, or free them from the severe bondage under which they groan. We must save society, if it can yet be saved, or at least prevent all flesh from perishing in the frightful deluge which threatens us. We must in this way second the manifest designs of Providence, whether in tempering as steel the hearts of those who are to sustain the shock of the conflict to which we are rapidly hastening, or in preserving to religion a small number of faithful, to become the seed of the kingdom of justice and peace.

"Here is the great revolution to be effected,—a gigantic revolution, before which the individual is as nothing. It will be resisted in more quarters than one; it will stir up the fiercest opposition; but it is possible to be effected, far more so at present than at any former period." — pp. 4, 5.

All this is very well, and shows that the author's views of the main question are sound and important. We will let him state his problem in his own way.

"In order to render the truth of my proposition palpable, I will waive all abstract reasonings, all metaphysical theories, and content myself with a few striking facts.

"1. With the exception of some acts of disobedience, inevitable even in children well born and bred, throughout all the Middle Ages, Europe was full of respect and submission for the Church. Christian in her faith, in her laws, her institutions, her sciences, her arts, her language, society tranquilly developed those beautiful and strong proportions which made her every day more like Christ, the divine type of all perfection.

"2. At the close of the fifteenth century, the sovereign power of Catholicity was enfeebled. The former union of religion and society was broken. The paternal voice of the Roman Pontiff, hitherto so venerated, became suspected; the majesty of their power faded into a shadow; the filial submission of kings and people was diminished; a fatal desire of independence sprung up in the heart of society; — every thing announced a rupture.

"3. Hardly had the sixteenth century commenced, when from the cell of a German monk a voice was raised, the powerful organ of the evil thoughts which ferment in the soul, which exclaimed, 'O ye nations, separate from the Catholic Church, fly from Babylon; break the bands of your long childhood; ye are strong and enlightened enough henceforth to guide yourselves.' This voice was heard with a favor which astonishes even at this day. In a large part of Europe society accused its mother of superstition and barbarism, abjured her doctrines, despised her greatest men, burned every thing that bore the marks of her sacred hand, and overthrew or mutilated, as monuments of ignorance, slavery, and idolatry, the temples and edifices where preceding ages had sheltered their faith and immortalized their learning and genius.

"4. This incredible rupture with the Catholic world was not a passing vertigo; it still continues. Neither sufferings, nor humiliations, nor disappointments, nor catastrophies and calamities, have been able to bring back the prodigal to the maternal bosom. So far from it, his aversion to the Church is only continually augmenting; it has changed into hatred, hatred always living and acting; so that after three centuries Europe seems able to do only

three things, — but to do them with the perfection of despair, — to despoil, enchain, and persecute the Church. To-day, having reached the paroxysm of passion, the old daughter of Catholicity has no other rallying-cry than those horrible words repeated by every tongue from the Adriatic to the ocean, and from the Mediterranean to the Baltic: *Christianity oppresses us; we will not that it reign over us; take it away; its very sight is intolerable.*

“5. During all the time of this aberration the Church has remained unchanged. Before as after it she is one and the same; equally good, wise, and devoted. Before the sufferings of society she has remained neither idle nor silent. Never, perhaps, has her maternal tenderness displayed more universal solicitude, more indefatigable zeal. From her ever-fruitful womb there issued in the fifteenth century thirty-five religious orders or congregations; in the sixteenth, fifty-two; in the seventeenth, ninety. All these great bodies, acting as one man, rendered her action unceasing on the family and society, from the north to the south of Europe. From St. Vincent of Ferrer to St. Vincent of Paul, innumerable saints astonished the world by their heroic virtues, and showed to the most blind that the Church of Rome had not ceased to be the incorruptible Spouse of the Saint of saints, the Mother of all men truly great; — *Alma parens, alma virum.*

“On their part, her admirable doctors, from Bellarmin to Bossuet, have proved that she is ever the source of light and of wisdom. Continued in all the majesty of its force by the Popes and Councils, Catholic instruction has long since reduced to powder both the Protestant principle and the vain reasons which served as a pretext for the rupture with the Church, as well as those they invented for continuing it. Neither demonstrations, nor admonitions, nor benefits, nor supplications, nor tears, nor efforts of any kind, have been able to touch European society, or to renew the ancient alliance of the daughter with the mother.

“From these facts, which no one will dare deny, it evidently results that, for the last four centuries, there has been a new element in Europe, an element more or an element less than in the Middle Ages, and this element forms a wall of separation between Christianity and society.

“What is this element? Where is it?” — pp. 7 - 9.

This is the problem. The author contends that the new element in society is paganism in education, the element less is Christianity abstracted from education. He assumes that the difference which obviously exists between modern society and society in the Middle Ages is due, and due alone, to the difference between the system of education adopted and pursued then, and that adopted and pur-

sued during the last four hundred years. Education, he contends, makes the man, determines not only his intellectual, but his moral character, and that education, too, which is accomplished in the individual during the period between infancy and youth or adolescence. "The life of man," he says, "is divided into two periods, *perfectly distinct*, that of *receiving* and that of *transmitting*. The first period includes the time of education, that is to say, of development, or of instruction; the second, the rest of life till death. Not having being in and of himself, man receives all, in the intellectual and moral order no less than in the physical order. After having received, he transmits, and he can transmit only what he has received. In transmitting what he has received, he creates family and society after his own image. The truth or falsehood, the good or evil, the order or disorder, realized in the external facts of family or society, are only the reflex and product of the truth or falsehood, the good or evil, the order or disorder, which reigns in the interior of his soul." (pp. 10, 11.) That is, the child is purely passive, and ductile as wax in the hands of the instructor, and receives the form, whatever it may be, that the instructor gives him. The original nature and disposition of the child, it seems, count for nothing, and never interpose any obstacles which defeat the intention of the instructor!

The opinions and manners of parents, the author maintains, form those of their children, and the opinions and manners of the uneducated classes are formed by the opinions and manners of the educated classes. The opinions and manners of the educated classes are formed by their literary education. This education is principally determined by the books which are placed in the hands of the young during the seven or eight years which unite childhood to adolescence or youth. It is so because these years decide the character for life, because these books are the daily food of the young, who must study them with care, learn them by heart, and thoroughly master them both as to their form and substance, and because this assiduous study is accompanied with explanations and commentaries designed to make the students comprehend the sense of these books, admire their style, their thoughts, and beauties of every sort, — to exalt the deeds, the words, and the institutions of the men and nations whose history they

relate, — in a word, to present the authors of these works as the unrivalled kings of talent and genius. Hence all comes from education. (p. 11.) Having assumed this, the author proceeds to give us at length his solution of the problem. We let him speak again for himself:—

“For a long time a founder in Florence exercised his art with wonderful success. The secret of his glory was in preparing the mould into which he melted in turn gold, silver, and bronze. One day the municipality of Florence sent him an order for the statue of one of the great men of the republic, and the Archbishop for a bass-relief for one of the chapels of the celebrated Duomo. The glory of his country and the love of his religion gave the artist new ardor; under this double inspiration his genius conceived a masterpiece. Unfortunately he had only the mould for a horse. ‘It makes little difference,’ thought he to himself, ‘I will combine the metals so well as to repair this inconvenience.’ In fact, the gold and silver, scientifically mixed, are poured together into the mould. They are expecting a hero with ancient forms: the artist breaks the mould and takes from it — a horse!

“‘*Quanto sbaglio!*’ said he; ‘but I perceive my mistake. I have not used my metals in proper proportions.’ He immediately sets to work again, forms a new combination, and makes another mould similar to the former. This time the artist works for the Archbishop, who was awaiting his bass-relief. The mould being opened, he found — a horse like the first. ‘This is unpardonable,’ cried the artist, striking his forehead. ‘How did I forget that gold and silver are not the proper metals for a founder? His right metal is bronze. With that, error is no longer possible. I am used to it, and it is used to me. We are old friends.’ And he prepared his bronze with jealous care, repaired his mould, which he took heed not to change, and studied deeply all the conditions of the problem. When he had resolved them, he kindled his furnace, poured the metal into the mould, which gave — a superb bronze horse. Then the unfortunate artist fell into despair; he blamed every thing except himself for his misfortune, and died without being able to understand that, to change the form, we must change the mould.

“Nations of Europe, you are the Florentine founder. Since the fifteenth century you have cast your children in a pagan mould, and you are astonished that they do not come out Christians! Listen to your history.

“During the whole of the Middle Ages education was exclusively Christian. Pagan works were never placed as *classics* in the hands of the young. They were read only at an age when the mind, the heart, the imagination, — in a word, the soul, — cast in the



mould of Christianity, had received an absolute form ; when, in consequence, paganism could no longer do any thing more than impress on the child a secondary form, without at all influencing the foundation of his moral being. Christianity was then, with regard to education, what the substantial meats which appease the hunger of the guests are in our feasts, and paganism was only as the knickknacks of our desserts.

“ What was the consequence ? That which always results from education ; that is to say, the young generations, nourished from the cradle with Christianity, penetrated with Christianity, brought up in the knowledge, in the love, in the admiration of Christianity, and rendered enthusiastic of its glories and of its works, transmitted to society what they had received. And society was Christian, Christian to the core. And this Christian society made Europe wonderful for its greatness, strength, and heroic virtue, and covered it over with monuments, whose inimitable beauties form but the least part of their glory.

“ Towards the end of the fifteenth century you broke the Christian mould and substituted the pagan, and cast in it the young generation. The consequence has been what it must necessarily be. Nourished with paganism, educated in admiration of paganism, they began to show themselves pagans and to transmit to society what they had received. If, at the first casting, they were not entirely pagan, attribute it to the action of Christianity, which, still dominant in the family and society, prevented a sudden and complete transformation.

“ Yet such was the influence of this first trial, that all the chiefs of the great revolt of the sixteenth century were among the most ardent disciples of classic paganism ; they gloried in having been cast in the pagan mould. Every day they plunged into it anew, inviting all the world to imitate them, and making of their new form a weapon against the Church, whose language, science, and arts they began to accuse of barbarism. The danger became more and more serious ; religion and society evidently lost ground. Educators again set themselves to work, and tried to form a new generation, which, being thoroughly Christian, should counterbalance the disastrous action of that which was just ceasing to be, or already had ceased to be Christianity. The great Catholic reaction of the sixteenth century commenced. Called to assist in it, doctors the most experienced, the religious orders the most learned, redoubled their activity. The ablest of these great bodies, the immortal Society of Jesus, seemed to be created expressly to come to the aid of the Church and society in the work of education. It devoted itself to it without reserve, although it adopted, like its companions in arms, the pagan mould. Public opinion rendered this necessary, as no other form of beauty was then recognized.

"In fact, as all the world knows, the sixteenth century was the golden age of the *renaissance*; it was *par excellence* the age of the worship of classic antiquity in literature and poetry,—the age when pagan artists, Hellenists, and humanists abounded throughout Europe,—whose echoes ceased not to repeat their dithyrambics in honor of the Greeks and Romans. The colleges of the Society covered all Europe. Youths without number, above all, those belonging to the higher classes, pressed around the chairs of the illustrious religious. The science, virtue, devotedness, and paternity of the masters, the orthodoxy of their doctrine, the variety and display of the religious ceremonies performed in their houses, seemed to combine to revive and perpetuate in society at large, and in the higher classes especially, the vigorous faith of the Middle Ages. The Benedictines, Oratorians, and others in great number, rivalled the Jesuits in science and zeal, whilst the universities, rich in professors distinguished no less for their virtue than learning, coöperated in the universal restoration, crowning by their learned lessons the apparently so well commenced edifice of Catholic instruction.

"But what has been the final result of this action so general and so well combined? The same with that of the Florentine founder. They cast the generations in the pagan mould, and they obtained pagan generations. According to the great law which presides over human life, these generations did not delay to transmit what they had received, and paganism inundated Europe. Alas! history, sad history says it, instead of being reanimated, the Christian spirit was more and more enfeebled, especially in the literary classes, among whom, through the zeal of so many excellent masters, it ought to have revived with new vigor. All the world knows that, at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, the men who had most largely participated in public instruction were the least Christian both in manners and in belief.

"That these bitter fruits, with the exception, perhaps, of a small number of the less poisonous, have been produced by the pagan tree replanted in the bosom of Europe, and cultivated with so much care for the nourishment of youth, an observation of another sort fully confirms. On the one hand, the women, in whose education the pagan element either does not enter at all, or only to a feeble extent, have constantly shown themselves more Christian than the men; on the other, the lower classes, preserved from the same scourge, remained loyal to the old faith, and have ended by becoming hostile to religion only under the influence of the classes brought up in the school of the Greeks and Romans.

"Founder of Florence! neither your art nor your intention can change the nature of things. As long as you cast your metals in the mould of a horse, you will have a horse. Nations of Europe! as long as you cast youth in the mould of paganism, you will have

pagan generations. Neither your laws or education, however liberal they may be, nor the talent of your professors, nor your intentions, will ever change any thing. To think the contrary is an error. This error you have committed, and every day for more than three centuries. This is the worm that gnaws your heart. This is the solution of the problem. By the fearful consequences with which it now threatens the European world, the error which we have just described has become so evident, that men the least suspected of partiality have not been able to avoid noticing it. Under pain of an inevitable, and perhaps even fatal catastrophe, they conjure society to change its system.

"Let it suffice to cite the words, so full of good sense, of a member of the National Assembly, on the occasion of the late law on instruction.

" 'Since the commencement of this debate,' says he, 'the University and Clergy have thrown back accusations on each other. You pervert them with your philosophic rationalism, say the Clergy. You brutalize them with your religious dogmatism, replies the University. Conciliators come up and say, Religion and philosophy are sisters. We have fused together free inquiry and authority. University and Clergy, you have had the monopoly each in your turn ; divide it, and let this end.

" 'We have heard the venerable Bishop of Langres thus address the University : "It was you that produced the Socialist generation of 1848 !" And M. Cremieux hastened to retort, "It was you that brought up the revolutionary generation of 1793 !" If there is any truth in these allegations, what must we conclude from them ? That the two methods of education have both been fatal, not in that which constitutes the difference between them, but in that which is common to them both. Yes, it is my conviction that there is in the two methods a common point, which is *the abuse of classical studies*, and it is thence that they have perverted the judgment and morality of the country. They differ in this, that one makes the religious element, the other the philosophical, to predominate ; but these elements, far from having caused this evil, with which they have been reproached, have, on the contrary, attenuated it. We owe it to them that we are not so barbarous as the barbarians, constantly proposed by *Latinism* for our imitation.

" 'Permit me a supposition which, though somewhat forced, will explain my thought. I will suppose, then, that there exists somewhere, among the antipodes, a nation, which, hating and despising labor, has placed all its means of existence in slavery and the successive pillage of all their neighbors. This nation has created for itself a political system, a morality, a religion, a public opinion conformable to the brutal principle it adopts, and which preserve and develop it. France having given the Clergy the monopoly of edu-

cation, they see nothing better to do than to send all the French youth to this people, to live its life, to be inspired with its sentiments, to be transported with its enthusiasms, and to breathe its ideas as air, only they take care that each scholar shall depart fortified with a little volume called the *Gospel*. These generations thus brought up return to their country, a revolution breaks out, and I leave you to imagine what part they will play.

“ ‘Seeing this, the state takes the monopoly of education from the Clergy and gives it to the University. The University, faithful to tradition, sends also the youth to the antipodes, among that pillaging and slave-holding nation, after providing them with a little book called *Philosophy*. Five or six generations thus brought up have scarcely returned to their native soil, when another revolution breaks out. Formed in the same school as their predecessors, they show themselves their worthy rivals. Then comes a war between the monopolizers. It is your book that has done all the evil, say the Clergy. It is yours, retorts the University.

“ ‘No, gentlemen, your books count for nothing in all this. That which does the evil is the strange idea, conceived and executed by you both, of sending the French youth, destined to labor, to peace, and to liberty, to impregnate and saturate themselves with the sentiments and opinions of a nation of brigands and slaves. I affirm it, — the subversive doctrines to which have been given the name of *Socialism* or *Communism* are the fruit of our classical education, whether distributed by the Clergy or the University. I add, that the *baccalaureate* will impose by force classical education, even on those schools which pretend to be free, and which, they say, ought to hold from the law.’ ” — pp. 15–20.

The question opened by the author is a grave question, and is at the present moment exciting no little controversy among Catholics in France. Respectable names are found on both sides. The Abbé Gaume appears to be sustained by Cardinal Gousset, whose name has deservedly great weight, and also by Count Montalembert, dear to every Catholic, for his chivalric defence of Catholic principles, and his steady devotion to Catholic interests, but who perhaps is a little too enthusiastic in his admiration of the Middle Ages. We are ourselves incompetent to mingle in the debate. Prior to our conversion, and during the first two or three years after, we entertained to their full extent the views defended by the Abbé Gaume. Maturer reflection, and something of that intimate acquaintance with the tendencies of our fallen nature which is obtained only by the effort to live the Catholic life, have led us to regard those views as somewhat exaggerated, and to the convic-

tion that the disuse in our schools of the Greek and Roman classics as text-books would of itself have comparatively little effect in banishing paganism from society.

We do not question the faith or the piety of our author, but we cannot bring ourselves as a Catholic to believe that a system of education has been adopted and pursued for four hundred years by the most illustrious religious orders and congregations, the most able and learned doctors, and the greatest and most heroic saints, under the supervision of the Church, and at least with her tacit approval, which is directly fitted to paganize society. It seems to us that we could hardly say so without impeaching either the vigilance or the infallibility of the Church herself. Education is a part, and an important part, of the mission of the Church, and to suppose that she has fallen into a grave mistake on the subject, or has utterly failed in her judgment of what is essentially a Christian education, or what is essentially repugnant to it, is in our judgment more than we can do compatibly with our Catholic faith. To do so would be only to follow in the track of Savonarola, who has not yet been cleared of error and proved to have been a good Catholic. Of course we do not mean that it is a matter of faith that heathen text-books should be used in our schools, or that educators are not free to disuse them, or that it is not lawful to maintain that it would be well, or indeed that it is even necessary, to discontinue their use; but we do doubt our right to contend that their use has been incompatible with Christian education, and has been the cause of the paganism in modern society. The Abbé Gaume is free to maintain that it would be well, and that under existing circumstances it is necessary, to banish the ancient Greek and Latin classics from our schools; but not, in our judgment, that the paganism of modern society has resulted from their use, and that in suffering them to be used the Church has acted as unwisely as the artist who, wishing to cast a hero, poured his molten metal into the mould of a horse.

We do not believe, moreover, with the Abbé Gaume, that education is all-powerful, and that the child is as ductile as wax in the hands of the educator. Never is the child purely passive, ready to receive any form you may choose to give it. This is the error of Robert Owen, and

of the Socialists and Communists generally. It is the doctrine of all those who are at war with society as it is, and who ascribe the depravities of individual character to the depravities of the social state in which character is formed. No child is purely passive in the formation of its character. The soul is essentially active, and it acts in receiving as well as in transmitting. Do your best, you cannot cast all children in the same mould, and turn them out good Christians. Some children, in spite of the most adverse influences, nay, it would sometimes seem, in consequence of adverse influences, grow up firm, loyal, devout Christians, whose life is most edifying to study. Others, brought up in the most careful manner, piously educated, and kept for years in ignorance of evil, wilt down before the first temptation, and end in being thorough reprobates. Education is the ordinary means under Divine Providence of forming Christian character, but it is not infallible, and often fails utterly of its end, even when no objection can be brought against the quality of the education furnished, or against those who furnish it. The same regimen will not produce the same effects in all. Even the blessed Apostles were an odor of life to some, and an odor of death to others. In the same family, in the same school, you find some turn out all you could wish, and others turning out the reverse. Always must you make allowance for innate differences of disposition, and for the free will of children.

There is in the author's doctrine on education a latent Pelagianism, and an assumption of the innate goodness or perfectibility of human nature. Education, as he treats it, is merely a human means of forming character, and he, unconsciously no doubt, reasons on the supposition that human nature has the capability by development and cultivation of being elevated to the Christian order. There is in this a forgetfulness of the corruption of our nature by the Fall, and of the necessity of grace to enable us to overcome them. Christianity in all its parts lies in the supernatural order, and neither Christian belief nor Christian character is possible by any conceivable culture which is merely human. We are not born Christians, but infidels and heathen. Nor are we born with the seeds or germs of Christianity in our soul, either as to faith or as to character, and they are implanted in us only by re-

generation. The seeds or germs with which we are born are the seeds or germs of paganism, and the more full and thorough the cultivation of our nature, the more complete and thorough pagans do we become. Hence it is that no education, no training, however wise or judicious, orthodox or pious, can infallibly insure Christian faith and character; for as long as we remain in the flesh we have within us the seeds or germs of heathenism, ready at all times to spring up, and which can be prevented from development only by the grace of Christ.

The author, it seems to us, mistakes the effect for the cause. The Middle Ages, he tells us, were thoroughly Christian, and were so because education was Christian. Would it not be truer to say, that education was then Christian because society itself was Christian? If education was then Christian, whence came, if the character of a generation is determined by it, the generation which in the fifteenth century broke the Christian mould and introduced the pagan? The generation which broke with the Middle Ages, and sought to revive Greece and Rome, must have been formed under a Christian system of education, and therefore, according to the author, could transmit only the Christian family and society. How, then, did it become so paganized as to substitute the pagan mould for the Christian? Certainly the generation that changed the mould had already become paganized, and paganized, if the author is to be believed, under a system of thoroughly Christian education. How, if by education you can always determine the character of the rising generation, and through it of society, did that generation become so paganized? That generation had not been cast in the pagan mould, yet it had become pagan. How, with this fact staring him in the face, can the author assert the infallibility of education? or that, if the mould was changed, the change was not the effect, but the cause, of the paganism of modern society? It strikes us, therefore, that it would be far more true to say that there is paganism in education because society itself is pagan, than that society is pagan because there is paganism in education.

Finally, so long as paganism prevails in society, the mere exclusion of pagan class-books can hardly be expected to banish paganism even from education. The education which forms character is given far less in schools

and colleges than in the family and in society, and far less by the text-books studied than by the personal character of school-mates, and of teachers and professors. The pagan books usually read in Catholic colleges have very little influence on the young, and the evil influence they are likely to produce is after the student has left college rather than before, and therefore at an age when, according to the author, the character is already decisively formed. We can see no great harm a good-conditioned boy, at the age when they are usually studied in Catholic colleges, is likely to receive from Cæsar's Commentaries, Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, abating a few dirty passages, Virgil's *Æneid*, Cicero's *Orationes*, and Sallust's *Histories*, or from Xenophon's *Cyropædia* and *Anabasis*, Homer's *Iliad*, and, with a few exceptions, the Greek tragedies, read, as they are, not for their principles or doctrines, but for their language and the beauty of their form. If the tone of society, of the college, and of the professors be thoroughly Catholic, the pupils will imbibe very few false notions from these books. The injury that is done by classical literature, we think, is done chiefly at a later age, when read for its principles, or for the instruction and amusement of learned leisure, or at least where the tone and tendency of the family and society are pagan. It is very possible that the classics have amid prevailing heathenism some slight influence in exaggerating the evil, but in general our age is so much more heathen than ancient Greece and Rome, that the study of them not unfrequently has even a corrective tendency. Moreover, we know that some of the most pious doctors and greatest saints of the Church have been educated in Latin and Greek through the medium of these books. The author tells us that the sixteenth century was the golden age of the classics, and we would ask him what age has been more distinguished for the number and greatness of its canonized saints? The seventeenth century, again, was a century of powerful reaction against Protestantism, and it too, in France and Spain especially, was eminently distinguished by piety, zeal, and sanctity. Yet it was precisely in these two centuries that the system of education the author condemns was in its greatest vigor, and the most generally adopted. If we come down to the eighteenth century, we find society fall off in its classical studies almost as much as in its faith and piety. Experience is far from warranting the sweeping censures of the excellent Abbé Gaume.



It is true that the nations of Europe in the last century found themselves pretty generally acting on heathen maxims and applauding the heathen spirit. You say the generation which prepared and effected the old French revolution was educated in schools exclusively under the control of the clergy. Be it so. So was the generation that prepared and effected the rupture of society with the Church in the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth century; and the fact that the modern system did not prevent men from becoming infidels and incendiaries is no more an argument against it, than the fact that the former system did not prevent them from becoming heretics and revolutionists is an argument against that system which you approve and would revive. You are obliged to confess that the system of education adopted in the Middle Ages did not save society from the Protestant rebellion, every whit as violent and as wicked as the Jacobinical revolution at the close of the last century; but you do not regard that fact as a condemnation of it. You seek the causes of its failure in something else than its supposed defects as a system. Why not be equally liberal and just to the modern system? Why make the Jesuits more responsible for the paganism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, than the mediæval educators for the paganism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries? The argument, *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, is not always valid, and we see no reason for counting it more valid in the eighteenth century than in the fifteenth.

Scandals must come, heresies must come, the love of many at times will wax cold, and large masses will detach themselves from the Church. It has been so from the beginning, and will be so to the end. It is bad logic to attribute such things, when they come, to the wrong system or mistaken policy pursued by the Church, and by no means wise forthwith to demand an entire change of system. No foresight, no prudence, no policy, however wise or judicious, could have prevented them. The fault is not in those who labor to prevent them, and remain faithful to the Church, but in those who break away and rush headlong into the mad career of heresy, infidelity, and immorality. The Jesuits and other religious orders in the first half of the eighteenth century labored assiduously in the education of youth, and yet many came out of their schools infidels, real gentiles. There is no denying it, but

the fault cannot be charged to the system they pursued, for they had previously pursued the same system for a hundred and fifty or two hundred years without any such results.

We are not as well pleased with the remarks of M. Bastiat, cited by the Abbé Gaume, as we should like to be. They strike us as being neither logical nor true. He represents the state as taking the control of education from the clergy and giving it to the university, because education in the hands of the clergy had prepared actors for the revolution of 1793. This is historically incorrect. It was done solely because the influence of the clergy was adverse to that revolution, and because the state wished to have its children educated for this world, and not for heaven. The parity he seeks to establish between the clergy and the university does not exist, and to maintain it is unjust to the clergy. Neither they nor their system prepared Europe for revolution, and it was evidently so prepared in spite of both. We are not edified by the Catholic priest who cites with approbation an author who places the infidel University of France on a par with the French Clergy, and represents both as equally contributing to paganize society. The world to a great extent has relapsed into paganism in spite of the clergy, who have always strenuously resisted it, and it is not in these times, when we have to struggle as for life and death to prevent paganism from entirely swallowing up Christian civilization, that we can afford to bring accusations against them, and hold them responsible for the evils which threaten to overwhelm us. It was they who, aided by the prayers of the faithful, under God first rescued the world from paganism, and it is only they, aided by the prayers of the faithful, who can a second time rescue us. Let us not be so mad, then, as to cut off the right hand on which we must lean for guidance and support.

All these theorizings as to the causes of past calamities, and all these specifics for the cure of prevailing evils, are always to be received with suspicion. They all proceed on the assumption that these calamities might have been prevented, and that these evils may be removed, by human foresight, wisdom, and strength; and hence it is that their authors soon forget the supernatural agency of Heaven, become proud in their own conceit, impatient of instruction, and, like Savonarola, like the ill-fated Lamennais, like

the brilliant Abbate Gioberti, end in losing their faith and their virtue, and in calling down the anathemas of the Church and of all good men. Providence has given us our work, he has placed instruments in our hands, and bid us use them, but to give or to withhold success he has reserved to himself. To succeed or not to succeed does not depend on his ministers. When they succeed the glory belongs to him, and when they fail it is not for us to blame them. If they are faithful in the work he gives them to do, they will receive their reward in heaven; and the ill success of their labors, if ill success attend them, must be explained by his plans, inscrutable to us, and into which we are not to pry.

What were the proximate causes of the pagan reaction of the fifteenth century, or of the new outbreak of heathenism in the eighteenth, we do not know. We have no theory to explain the presence of either at the precise time it appeared, or to tell why either might not have just as well appeared a century earlier, or a century later. All we know is, that there was in the fifteenth century a powerful pagan reaction, which gave birth to the Protestant movement and revolt, and that there is now in society a widely prevalent heathenism, affecting Catholic countries in some degree as well as Protestant countries, and to which is to be ascribed our modern Jacobinical revolutions and socialistic movements. At either epoch the real origin and cause of the heathenism are to be sought, not in this or that erroneous policy, in this or that system of social organization, or in this or that system of instruction and education, but in our fallen and corrupt nature. Every man in his fallen state is naturally a heathen, and the paganism which at any time or in any country obtains is nothing more nor less than the natural expression of what every one of us without grace is in himself. By whatever causes faith is weakened, and men are led to neglect the means of grace, heathenism is promoted. What these particular causes are, and why they operate at one time more than at another, in one country more than in another, is just as difficult for us to explain, as why, of two friends having equal opportunity, one shall be converted and the other shall remain an infidel; why, of two women grinding at the mill, one shall be taken and the other left. We know that it is so, but why it is so we do not know.

The Middle Ages were not as completely Christian as many modern romanticists dream, but their errors and defects were not in general errors and defects of faith. They transgressed the law of God through pride or passion, but they did not erect transgression into a principle, and, like modern times, invent theories to justify it. Consequently, you had in general only to touch the conscience to bring the sinner to the confessional. Education could then be Christian, for society was Christian, — as to faith in all, as to practice in many, and especially in those intrusted with the instruction of the young. This Christian education no doubt tended to preserve Christianity in the family and in society, and to check the manifestation of the heathen tendencies of our nature. But the education was Christian because society was Christian, and only in a weaker sense was society Christian because education was Christian. After the rupture, society, which in fact never was and never will be thoroughly Christian, but only relatively so, became heathen in its principles and theories, and education, though it remained Christian in school, became to some extent pagan out of school, and unable to resist the pagan tendencies of human nature itself, and the pagan influences of society. It is far less what is studied in school that makes our youth grow up pagans, than the influences of pagan society out of school. Yet these influences acting on the schools may have made them less Christian than they were in the Middle Ages, and they again may have reacted on society and augmented its heathenism. But except where the state has restricted or denied the liberty of education, and banished, as in France for the last sixty years, religion from the schools, we do not believe this has been to any great extent the case in Catholic countries, though it undoubtedly has been in Protestant countries. However, heathenism is now prevalent in society, and it is not by education alone nor chiefly that we can expel it, for the simple reason, that so long as society remains heathen, whatever your schools, you cannot withdraw your children from heathen influences.

We are undoubtedly to make constant and deadly war on the heathenism of the age. In prosecuting this war it may be found necessary to place the same interdict on the literary remains of pagan antiquity that the Church always places upon the literary productions of contemporary

heretics, because the prevalence of paganism may have made them in some sense the works of contemporaries. Whether this will be so or not, we do not know, and happily it is not for us to decide, since we are not in holy orders, and the care of all the churches does not devolve on reviewers. This is a matter for the decision of those whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us. Some whose opinions we are bound to respect, and do respect, appear to think it is necessary to exclude the classics from the studies of the young. Others, equally deserving our respect, think it is not, and till the proper authority decides, we have no opinion on the subject. All we venture to say is, that in our judgment the banishing of the Greek and Roman text-books usually studied by our youth will of itself do little towards checking the evil complained of. It will cut off only a feeble rill, while it leaves the main torrent to pour in the poisonous floods of heathenism.

We have, as we never cease to repeat, no faith in specifics, no confidence in the man who proposes to cure all ills with a "Morrison's pill." All the evils of society, however wide they may spread out their branches, spring from one and the same root, and are really destroyed only as you cut off that root itself, and deprive them of the sap by which they live. This root is our own corrupt nature, and nothing is really remedial, or any thing more than a mere palliative which instead of curing is pretty sure to aggravate the disease, that does not heal this nature itself, or enable us to keep its evil affections in subjection to the law of God. Instruction alone will not do this, for few of us do as well as we know, and a man may know perfectly well his duty, and entirely neglect it. Nothing will do it but God's grace, and our sole instruments are the means of grace. In other words, we must not rely on ourselves, or hope by human means, by any humanly devised schemes, however promising they may appear to our wisdom, to roll back the tide of heathenism, and restore society to Christian life. It is not for us to attempt to raise the dead, to rekindle the vital spark that is extinct. We must rely on God, and feel that the work is his, and his alone. By pious submission, and devout and continued prayer to him to have mercy on mankind, we may coöperate with him in its performance, and rest assured that in his own way and time it will be done.

Some of the objections we have suggested the Abbé Gaume has himself noticed and attempted to answer, though, we must say, not to our satisfaction. We beg our readers, however, not to misunderstand us. Into the real question as to the propriety, or the necessity, under existing circumstances, of banishing the pagan classics from our schools, we have not entered, because we consider that as a question for the ecclesiastical authorities to settle, not for us. We have only wished to enter our feeble protest against the assumption that their use in our schools has been the cause of modern paganism, and that the Church has erred or been culpably neglectful of her duty in suffering them to be used. Nor have we wished to depreciate education, which no man prizes higher than we do; our wish has been to guard our readers against ascribing to it a virtue it does not possess, against ascribing all the good in society to good, and all the evil to bad education. Education can do much, and should be encouraged; good education should never be neglected; but it is never able of itself to overcome nature, or to preserve society from all aberrations. The mere cultivation of nature is always an evil rather than a good, for good is not a natural product, is not developed from nature, but is the fruit of supernatural grace and discipline. Our reliance for the reformation of society is not, therefore, on education alone, but on it and all the other means of forming character which God has provided, and especially on his own gracious pleasure. In a word, we have full faith only in prayer and the sacraments as the instruments of salvation, whether for the individual or society; for there is nothing of which we are better assured than that the salvation of either is of God, not of man, and, as we often say, that God will prosper no means the glory of which does not redound to himself. We must never forget that the Church is God's Church, not man's, and that it is only through the Church, his Immaculate Spouse, whom he loves, and for whom he shed his blood, that he does or will regenerate and bless either the individual or society. Human means, the might of the powerful, and the wisdom of the wise, he brings to naught, save as inspired by his grace and subordinated to his praise.

ART. V. — *La Raison Philosophique et la Raison Catholique. Conférences prêchées à Paris dans l'Année 1851, augmentées et accompagnées de Remarques et de Notes,* par le T. R. P. VENTURA DE RAULICA, etc., etc. Paris. 1851.

THE coming generation will enter on the stage of active life under better auspices than those under which we entered. Infidelity is going out of vogue. There may be nearly as much of it in the world as ever; but if there is, at least it no longer carries so bold a front as formerly. It even assumes the mask of belief; it pretends to be Christian, in order that it may appear respectable. Now there is an immense advantage in this. A great number of persons, particularly young persons, are governed by fashion in the formation of their opinions; and there are many who, without any pains to form opinions, allow their language and their outward actions to take their form and color from those with whom they associate. Many a young man has been fool enough to say, not in his heart, but with his lips, "There is no truth in revelation," because he hoped to gain *éclat* by the bold impiety of his language. Many a one, without knowledge, without examination, without reflection, has scoffed at all belief in miracles and mysteries, in order that he might have the name of thinking for himself, and bowing to no authority but that of his own individual reason. Irreligion was fashionable, and therefore contagious. Incredulity was tempting, as the shortest road to distinction. This evil, the bad legacy of three centuries of religious disputation, doubt, and denial, is beginning to pass away. This openly Antichristian spirit, though not banished, has been rebuked. A long period must yet elapse before the world will see what has been briefly, but happily, described as an "age of faith"; — an age when all the civilized nations of the world shall form a *Christendom* once more; when all will be united in the same religious belief, and in the bonds of Christian brotherhood and charity. We may salute that blessed epoch at a distance; we may long for its return, and each one in his own way and measure strive to hasten its advent; but none of us may rationally hope to witness its arrival, — then sing his *Nunc Dimittis*, and go to rest in

peace. Still we are advancing towards it. The spirit of doubt and denial has nearly run its course. It is time for the human mind, worn and desolate with its weary flight over the ocean of uncertainty, to return to that *ark* which is its only resting-place. The idolatry of reason, of man's individual reason, must at last succumb, like the old pagan idolatries, to the divine authority of faith.

Attempting to show you the utter inadequacy of *reason*, whether as a *substitute for faith*, or as the *arbiter of faith*, we have no fear of laying ourselves open to the charge of being an *enemy to reason*. To the right use of reason we are not opposed; to reason herself we can have no hostility. We shall appeal to reason throughout our observations. It is the abuse of a good thing, the idolatry of reason, that we oppose; and it is a most criminal abuse of reason to attempt to substitute her teaching for the revelation of God, or to make her the judge of him and his infallible declarations.

There is a philosophy which, fixing itself on the firm basis of revelation, so far as religion and morals are concerned, is content with hunting arguments and illustrations from history, analogy, or experience, in favor of the truths which it reveres. It knows that the supernatural world is far above the sphere of its contracted powers, and that its true province is the wide field of nature, in which it has room enough to expatiate and employ in fruitful researches its principles of natural science, which would be only misapplied if brought to bear upon the supernatural. It is no "scrutinizer of majesty"; it does not strive, with rash and impious hand, to lift the veil of mystery. This is the right use of reason; this is true philosophy. But there is also a philosophy which, professing not only ignorance, but also disbelief, of all revealed truths, undertakes to give us the speculations of pure, unaided reason, as all-sufficient to guide us through this life and prepare us for the future;—and this is the substitute which has been kindly offered us for that religion which has civilized and reformed, enlightened and blessed, mankind. It cannot be wrong to examine what titles to our respect and confidence are possessed by this bold pretender; what certain truths requiring our belief, what lessons of wisdom to be reduced to practice, have been taught or can be taught by this philosophy of reason.



The most important and deeply interesting questions to the human mind are those respecting the nature, attributes, and providence of God ; our relations and duties towards him ; our origin, the purpose of our present existence, our future destinies, and the causes of the evils which surround us. These are the great problems which reason has tried to solve, from the very dawn of history to the present day. Now, what progress has she made towards a right decision of any one of these questions ? Can it be shown that of herself she has ever discovered a single truth regarding even one of them ? and is it not demonstrably certain, that she has fallen into the most serious errors on each and every one of them ? Every scholar will admit that the wisest and best of the philosophers of pagan antiquity have done little credit to reason by their researches into these matters. Their ignorance and blindness surprise us ; their degrading errors seem to us scarcely conceivable. Yet it must be observed, that, while the mistakes and absurdities which abound in their speculations are their own, whatever fragments of truth may be found amid their masses of error most certainly are not theirs, — are not discoveries of reason, but vestiges of revelation. It is one thing for reason to discover a truth, and quite another thing for her to recognize the form and lineaments of truth in that which is proposed to her as such. We should laugh at the silly arrogance of the man who should pretend to have discovered the propositions of Euclid or the theory of Newton because he believed in them and could repeat their demonstrations.

Reason herself, though unenlightened by revelation, cannot deny — on the contrary, must admit as a probability at least — that our Creator, at the very origin of our race, may have manifested something of his wisdom, power, and goodness to his rational and responsible creatures, — may have prescribed their duties towards him and towards each other, — and may have held out to them the hope of rewards and the fear of punishments hereafter. Now this is precisely what we know to have been done, on the testimony of the inspired writings, which give us an authentic account of the facts, and are corroborated by all the monuments and traditions of our race. The dogmas of the existence of the Creator and Ruler of the universe, of the necessity of religious worship, of the immortality of the

soul and future rewards and punishments, of man's fall and promised restoration, were not the fruits of philosophic inquiry. Revealed by the Almighty to our first parents, to be transmitted to all their descendants, found among the most rude and barbarous, as well as the most civilized and refined, nations of the ancient world, they were the inheritance of the human race, the traditionary religion of all mankind. But in the course of time that same neglect and indifference in such matters which are still exhibited by so many and to which every man is liable, the power of passion and of vice to darken the mind, and the pride of reason exercised about things entirely above the sphere of its comprehension, gradually so weakened the remembrance of these great truths of primitive revelation, blended with them so many errors and absurdities, ingrafted so many superstitions on them, that the fair image of truth was no longer to be recognized in the monstrous systems of polytheism and idolatry which prevailed in every nation but one of the ancient world, and which still prevail wherever the Christian revelation is not yet received.

The philosophers of the Grecian states and of the Roman empire were men of the greatest genius and ability. While the world lasts, the monuments they have left us will bear witness to their Herculean powers of mind. They were acute, subtile, earnest, persevering in their search for truth, and they devoted themselves with heart and soul to moral, metaphysical, and theological investigations. In their ardent inquiries they could discern absurdity and folly in the religion which they practised; and by visiting in person, or collecting the reports of travellers who had visited, the East, they occasionally caught some echoes of the faith of a chosen and separate people, who worshipped one only God in spirit and in truth. And yet they were only groping in the dark, and their own conclusions were so far from satisfying their minds, from appeasing "the mighty hunger of their souls," that we find them all confessing their doubts, uncertainty, and ignorance, and some of them expressly declaring that reason had utterly failed, that philosophy could not enlighten them, that there was no hope for man but in a revelation from above. They never dreamed of reforming the popular religion of their respective countries; they might as well have attempted to command the tempest, to chain the winds, or check the tides;

for supposing them to have had, what they unquestionably had not, the will to sacrifice themselves in such a cause, and the power to force unpalatable truths on unwilling multitudes, who were ready to stone or burn them for their pains, they had *no certain truths* to teach, *no doctrines which they firmly believed*, not even on the first and fundamental points. They had done what man left to himself in this dark world could do to arrive at truth. We know the state of their minds, the extent of their knowledge and ignorance, for their opinions are recorded in their writings; and we confidently summon them as witnesses to prove the utter insufficiency of reason to guide us through this life or prepare us for the next. Let us select one or two of those questions which are obviously most important, and would necessarily first claim attention; — for example, *the doctrine of a God, Creator of all things*. This tenet was originally revealed, and was always believed by those who retained that pristine revelation. But the attribute of *creative power* was too great for the comprehension of unaided reason; and that pure, simple, and sublime idea of omnipotence, which the Israelite and Christian acquire in childhood, never entered the mind of the wisest sages of antiquity. Reason could not conceive how any thing could be *created*, in the proper sense of that term. Matter exists; therefore it must have existed from eternity. It might be shaped or fashioned into different forms, differently combined, variously modified, as it is on a small scale by the hand of man or the machinery of man's invention; but drawn from nothing! called into being by the fiat of almighty will! — reason never reached by its own efforts this sublime, though now familiar belief. This may appear to some a purely speculative question; but there are practical consequences of the highest moment resulting from this utter failure of reason to realize the truth of a Creator-God. For according to any system of philosophy, or to any religion but that revealed to us, man was not the creature of God. He owed not to him his existence, but at most his form and mode of being. He could not therefore call God his Father. He knew not whether the Deity cared for him or not. He might fear his superior power, but he could not love him; he never had the idea of loving him. There is not one phrase in all the writings of the pagans to show that the love of God, "the first and greatest command," was

even thought of by them. And looking at the evils to which he was subject, the miseries of that condition in which the Deity had placed him, and all the moral disorder of the world, man could scarcely feel that he owed either gratitude or love to a Supreme Being whom he did not know as his Creator and Father. Another consequence of the failure of reason was an almost total ignorance of the second great command, which is like to the first. For not recognizing a common Father in heaven, man did not know as brothers his fellow-men on earth. Hence that heartless indifference to human suffering, that cruel barbarity, that bloodthirstiness, which disgraced every pagan nation, — exhibited by them in peace as well as in war; in the heroism of Horatius, in the patriotism of Brutus; in the cruel treatment of prisoners and slaves; in their inhumanity to women and children; in their human sacrifices, their bloody gladiatorial shows; in the practice which universally prevailed, as it still does in China and every nation not enlightened by Divine revelation, — a practice which both law and philosophy sanctioned among Greeks and Romans in the days of their greatest refinement, — the practice of exposing infants to death as soon as they were born, which was never declared illegal until a Christian Emperor, Constantine, ascended the throne. We have all sympathized with the Roman auditory, who rose to applaud the sentiment, "*Homo sum : humani nihil a me alienum puto*," — "I am a man, and feel an interest in all that concerns my fellow-men." Why is it never noted, that the whole plot of this play of Terence turns on the discovery, by the father who utters this noble sentiment, of his child, supposed to be dead, because exposed to death in infancy according to custom, which was, moreover, a custom so well established and sanctioned and regulated, that, when the new-born infant was presented to its father, if he did not take it in his arms, if he turned his back on it, it was to die as a matter of course?

The idea of creative power being totally lost, all religion might have perished with it, but that the imperfect remains of traditionary truth, the feeling sense that religion is the first great want of humanity, the hunger and thirst of the soul for some object of supreme veneration and worship, the idea of Divinity originally and permanently present to the mind of the whole human race, drew men back from

the dark gulf of atheism, at least practical atheism, towards which reason was hurrying them by its restless efforts to measure with its feeble powers the infinite and incomprehensible.

Let us interrogate philosophy as to the limits of her researches on another point of immense importance and vital interest to all mankind. *Divine Providence*, a superintending care of the moral and physical universe, was merely a question, on both sides of which reason had much to say. Fate, blind, inexorable destiny, a power superior to gods as well as men, was commonly supposed to be the ruler of the universe. Then the question of a providence was complicated by the want of a clear and firm belief in the unity of God. The philosophers, who listened to the voice of tradition, and thus received an intimation of this important truth, still fell short of any just conception of the relative or moral attributes of the Supreme Being, whose existence and absolute attributes they indistinctly knew. Some regarded him as the *Soul* of the *universe*, animating the whole frame of nature; others, as an inert being, indifferent to the affairs of men or committing their government to inferior gods. Whether he could be propitiated by man, — whether prayer, sacrifice, or any other religious acts were necessary or could aught avail us, — they professed themselves utterly unable to determine. The Epicureans released all their gods from every sort of care. The Stoics thought that man was all-sufficient for himself, and accordingly they pronounced it weakness to pray for corporeal blessings, and waste of time, and folly too, to ask Heaven for the goods of the mind. The Peripatetics were doubtful and contradictory, and the Academicians ready, on this as on every other point, to maintain either side of the question. In fact, there was more of truth in the popular superstitions than in the speculations of philosophy. The people prayed to their false deities; they called on gods that could neither hear nor help them; they preferred their petitions to beings more vicious than themselves, and oftentimes for objects most unholy. But still they recognized the sacred duty of prayer. The philosopher, guided by pure reason, scoffed at this Divine instinct of our nature, this innate tendency of our being, this universal sentiment of our race. He proposed to rob poor human nature of its last defence, of prayer, — the lan-

guage of faith, the cry of weakness and of want, the voice of hope, the only refuge from despair, — prayer, the bond of union between man and his Creator, the homage which we offer him in concert with the heavenly host that minister around his throne, the one of all our acts or occupations which immediately and of itself prepares and practises and fits us for heaven! And if he who at the present day acknowledges no higher philosophy than that of reason does sometimes bend the knee to his Creator in humble supplication, it is not from any certain knowledge that his philosophy gives him of the necessity and efficacy of prayer; for how can reason assure him that the Deity wishes to be invoked, and that he who has foreseen and predetermined all things will hearken to the petitions of weak and erring mortals? When, therefore, he prays, he is obeying a higher voice than that of reason, — the voice of conscience, enlightened by some rays of revelation; he is listening to the voice of God within him.

On the question of *the immortality of the soul*, reason may be expected to speak a more confident language. It is emphatically the faith of the human race. It was clearly revealed in the beginning. The soul whose immortality is in question is our own; and we have through consciousness some natural knowledge of it, as the substance which thinks, remembers, wills, and differs in all its ascertained properties from body or matter. It might, then, without the help of revelation, be inferred that the soul is not liable to the decay or dissolution to which the body is subject, and could only be destroyed by the same Omnipotence which called it into being. Yet human philosophy has been able, by its ceaseless questionings, to overshadow even this subject with its gloomy doubts. The wisest and best men of antiquity affirmed that the mind was immaterial, and therefore indestructible; they shrunk with horror from the prospect of annihilation; they fondly hoped to live beyond the grave; they thought the universal traditionary belief must be right. At all events, they would rather err on this side; they would cherish this delusion, if it were a delusion; they would cling to the belief of an hereafter, as the only adequate motive and recompense of virtue, the solace of adversity, the support of wronged and suffering innocence, the last hope of trembling humanity. Those who are versed in Greek and Roman lore will rec-

ognize the argument, while they will sympathize with the feelings, of these ancient advocates of the immortality of the soul. But what is the character of this argument? Why, it is an appeal mainly, not to reason, but to the sentiments and instincts of our race. How different, too, is this opinion or persuasion of theirs from the firm, unwavering, and immovable confidence which revelation gives! How unlike the Christian's "*Credo in resurrectionem mortuorum et vitam æternam*," — "I believe in the resurrection of the body and life everlasting." But philosophy never did and never will produce a *Credo*. On this subject it held, not the language of certainty, but of hope and earnest desire, blended with fears and haunted with doubts, which philosophy had no power to exorcise. For there were those who, vindicating the rights of reason, claimed some firmer foundation for their faith, and would not believe what did not present to their minds the characters of evident and indisputable truth. "We want," these philosophers answered, "we want proof, conclusive arguments addressed to reason, and you offer us hopes and fears, instinctive feelings, a natural dread of annihilation, vulgar superstition, and your crude notions of the substance of the soul, which we do not feel bound to admit, which you cannot prove true, and which science may hereafter refute." Pressed by such difficulties, the nobler spirits among the old philosophers felt that reason alone was a treacherous guide, and turning reproachful looks upon her, and uttering a cry of distress, a prayer for help, took refuge (so to express it) in the temple of Hope, resolved to wait there until some messenger from above should enlighten their ignorance. In truth, the strongest testimonies of the absolute insufficiency of reason to determine this and similar questions abound in the writings of Plato and Cicero, and may be found in the declarations of other philosophers. On this very subject, after a full discussion of it, Cicero, though persuaded of the immortality of the soul, expressly says, "It would require a god to decide which of the opinions is true: as for ourselves, we cannot even determine which is the more probable." \* Plato had previously put into the mouth of Socrates the following language, speaking also of the immortality of the soul: "The clear knowledge of

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\* *Tusculanae*.

these things is in this life impossible, or at least very difficult. . . . . The philosopher should, therefore, hold to that which appears more probable, unless he has some surer light, or the *word of God himself*, to be his guide." \* Now we ask, whether reason, which could not rise to any thing more than a probability, a cherished, though possibly a delusive persuasion, on a matter so clearly proposed to it by the belief of mankind, could have ever discovered this truth, had it not been primitively revealed to our race. It is very easy for a man at the present day to say, My reason teaches me to know and adore God, to believe in a providence, to expect an immortal life hereafter. He stands on the vantage-ground to which Christianity, not philosophy, has raised him. He lives in the light of divine revelation, though, like some African tribes that we read of, he may curse the luminary which vivifies and irradiates his mind. Had he not been reared in a Christian land, under the influence of Christian faith, he would be, with that same boastful Reason for his guide, a grovelling, superstitious idolater, or at best a doubting and bewildered inquirer after unknown truth.

Reason is not, then, that pillar of light which is to guide us safely through the desert of this life to the promised land that lies beyond it. We needed a revelation, and a revelation has been given to us. Knowing how the wisest and best portion of the human race had longed for the dawning of this celestial light, one would suppose that its appearance was hailed with universal joy. But history tells us quite a different story. And the erring reason, the proud, rebellious reason of man, was not the least potent or conspicuous among the formidable antagonists of Christianity. The cross was indeed a "stumbling-block" to the Jews, but to the Greeks, the refined, educated, philosophic Greeks and Romans, it was absolute "folly." It happened then, as it often happens now, that Reason was ready with her line and plummet, her compass and square, to sound the depths and take all the dimensions of truths which reached from the highest heaven to the lowest abyss of hell; and when her line was out, she was sure that she had fathomed the fathomless, and when her compass was stretched to the utmost, it certainly had measured infinity.

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\* *Phædo*.



tude itself. It is a great question, no doubt, whether the doctrines of divine revelation are to be implicitly believed, or to be subjected to the examination of reason. But to state the question is to solve it. It is the most presumptuous folly that can be conceived, for any man to undertake, by the power of reason, to determine what the Almighty must say when he speaks to his rational creatures. It is the most blasphemous inversion of order for man to attempt to give law to his Creator, to

"Seize the balance and the rod;  
Rejudge his justice; be the God of God."

It is the finite measuring the infinite; — weak, puny human reason declaring itself the judge and arbiter of the Divine reason. When, therefore, any thing is proposed to me with the seal of revelation on it, if my reason cannot fathom it, if it transcend my powers of comprehension, am I to pronounce it false, to reject it as unreasonable? Would not such a rule be destructive of revelation itself? Would it not throw us back into the condition of the pagan philosophers, lost like them, but without their excuse, in the mazes of human opinion? What doctrine of revealed religion is there which could stand such a test? It has been applied to them all successively, and in consequence of its application they have all been successively rejected. If it enable you to-day to deny some article of my belief, will it not enable some one else to-morrow to overturn your peculiar creed? Descending step by step through all the grades of religious opinion, does it not inevitably lead to naked deism? And since nothing is more incomprehensible than God, nothing more incredible than creation, nothing more difficult to understand than an infinite being, self-existent, eternal, omnipresent in all space and in every minutest point of space, must it not end by denying Him? What other limit has it than downright atheism? Reason, then, is not in this sense the judge of revelation. No one is authorized to reject a doctrine because he cannot comprehend it. No Christian can consistently hold a principle, which is not only false, but subversive of all divine revelation. Reason herself, then, if truly enlightened, will direct us to believe what we cannot comprehend, when its truth is duly attested. They who do not comprehend the truths of geometry would exhibit little wisdom in pronouncing them false. The immense major-

ity of men, who understand nothing of the calculation of an eclipse or of the return of a comet, ought not therefore to refuse all evidence to the predictions of astronomical science. The tribes that live within the tropics are not admired for their extensive knowledge and profound philosophy, when they will not believe that water can become solid, so that men may walk on it or the huge elephant move securely over its stony surface, though they do not and cannot comprehend how this may be. The true position evidently is, that our inability to comprehend a fact or a doctrine does not authorize us either to affirm or deny it; but when we have satisfactory evidence of its truth, then we are bound to believe it, whether we comprehend it or not. Now the dogmas of revealed religion must surpass our comprehension, because they relate to God and to the future life, which to us are subjects essentially mysterious and incomprehensible. The believer is the first to proclaim that such is their nature. He knows that, if you strip them of their character of mystery, you take away one of the most evident marks of their divine origin. He knows, too, that mysteries are not confined to revelation. The most familiar facts in nature are often the most incomprehensible. The union of body and soul, and their action and reaction on each other; the secret of animal life; the principle of intelligence and affection in brutes; gravitation, electricity, magnetism, galvanism, — all the known laws of the physical universe, — are so many mysteries, in regard to which we believe the facts that have been ascertained, though we do not and cannot explain or account for them. There is not even a blade of grass, or flower of the field, or dew-drop sparkling on its leaves, or smallest insect nestling in its chalice, that may not suggest to the reflecting beholder a multitude of questions which reason cannot answer. And shall the mind, which, at every turn, at every glance, is so forcibly reminded of its ignorance and impotence, presume to inquire of the Almighty a full and perfect explanation of every truth which he declares, before it will vouchsafe to believe his divine attestation?

There is another point of view, in which enlightened reason must admit its perfect incompetency to deal with revelation any otherwise than by submissive assent and lowly adoration. We refer to that most extravagant of all the extravagances of the human mind, its pretended right

to improve or amend, in any manner whatsoever, the doctrines and institutions, the system of faith and practice, once declared to us on the part of the Most High. To believe in Christianity, because its author was the Son of God, and its promulgators his inspired Apostles, and then to maintain that what was divine at the origin of our faith must change and undergo revision and correction, that it may keep pace with the march of intellect, the progress of human knowledge, the improvement of our race, — to imagine, in a word, that at the present day we can make a more perfect Christianity than God has made for us, — is indeed to verify the expressions of our great poets, that

“Fools rush in where angels fear to tread” ; —

that

“Man, proud man, . . . .  
Plays such fantastic tricks before high Heaven  
As make the angels weep.”

It would be just as rational to pronounce the sun an obsolete luminary, quite good enough to give light and warmth and gladness to the world some two or three thousand years ago, but now behind the age, and totally unsuited to the enlarged philosophy, the increased knowledge, and higher wants of the nineteenth century. Why, if one of the Apostles rising from the grave, or if an angel from heaven (we are but repeating the energetic language of him who was rapt to the third heavens), — if an angel from heaven were to offer us a new Gospel, a pretended revelation, differing but in one iota from that which the Son of God has given us, our only salutation to the innovator must be anathema.

Resting on this firm foundation, the believer is delighted with every effort to enlarge the boundaries of science, and hails with joy every new discovery of truth. He never dreams that Christianity can be endangered by the progress of science. He knows that every tenet of Christian faith is an infallible truth, based on the sure authority of Him who has revealed it. How can that which is true ever be proved false? Or how can any one truth ever be at war with any other truth? Who imagines that the demonstrations of mathematical science will ever be refuted? Who is afraid that any of the conclusions of geometry will be disturbed by the progress of discovery?

Yet no Christian philosopher will pretend that mathematical certainty is greater than the certainty of Divine revelation. If this comparison appear bold and hazardous to any one, it can only be because he does not understand the very meaning of the true revelation. He who holds a system of doctrines which he thinks may have been revealed, while he is not perfectly, that is infallibly, certain that they have been, cannot indeed venture on such a comparison. The reason is obvious. He does not believe truths divinely revealed. But he entertains opinions respecting what has been revealed, which opinions may be in part or entirely false. Such a one is or should be an inquirer, a seeker after the sure and perfect and infallible truths which God has revealed. A believer, a man of Christian faith, he is not and cannot be, so long as a shadow of doubt or uncertainty rests on his mind.

But Reason still claims to be the judge of Revelation, so far at least as to feel authorized to choose among revealed dogmas, — to give a decided preference to some, and a cold, if not contemptuous, look to others. According to this notion, some doctrines are essential and must be believed; others are unimportant, and you may believe them if you choose, or deny them, dispute about them, proclaim them false, or treat them as altogether unworthy of notice. The first class of revealed doctrines are *fundamental*; this is the favorite phrase; they must be retained because they are the foundations of the whole edifice of Christianity. Admitting the distinction, only for argument's sake, still we would ask, What are the foundations without the superstructure? Surely the foundations of any edifice will be of very little service, when the walls, roof, and all the other parts have been taken away. But we are also compelled to ask, How is reason to determine what doctrines are fundamental? That which appears so to the reason of one man may seem very unimportant to another. And experience proves this to be an insuperable difficulty; for they who have assumed the principle in question have never yet been able to designate precisely the fundamental dogmas of Christianity, or to give such a definition or description of them as may enable us to recognize and identify them. But the principle is a bad one, not only false and impious, but clearly irrational. It presumes a revelation, only to destroy what it presumes. A revelation supposes

that God has spoken,— that he has declared certain truths, given us certain laws, established certain institutions. And is it not blasphemy to say, that any truths which he has declared to us are of so little consequence that they may be disputed, denied, spurned with contempt? Is it not a bold defiance to the Omnipotent for man to disregard, to set aside as trivial and useless, to nullify, no matter on what pretext, any law that God has given him? Is it not ingratitude and insult combined in the highest degree, to make light of and reject any institution, which he, through infinite mercy, has established for our eternal welfare? There is wisdom in the homely saying, that “*beggars should not be choosers*”; only mount *the beggar man upon the steed of reason, and it is not hard to tell in what direction he will gallop*. For if it be reason’s privilege to play the master with the word of God, to canvass the merits and demerits of divine truths, to discuss their comparative value and worthlessness, to sift the wheat from the chaff, to treat them as a pile of rubbish containing some hidden gems, or as a decayed and ruinous and rotten fabric, which must be cleared away to the very foundations,— then welcome deism, atheism, or any thing else which will only be consistent with itself,— which will not give the lie to its own silly pretensions!

If, then, we are asked what is the province of reason in relation to revealed religion, we answer, to seek the light of revelation, if it has not yet been found, and to follow its guidance when it is found. If the further question is put, how shall reason distinguish and recognize revealed truth, without attempting to give a complete answer to the inquiry, we will simply say, that reason has the undoubted right to question and reject whatever comes to her in the guise of human opinion. She cannot fairly be required to admit as revealed what does not purport to be such. All the truths of revelation are *unchangeable, infallible, divine*. Doctrines which have these characters stamped upon them claim the assent and submission of human reason. But the *unchangeable, infallible, divine* truths of revelation are given us from heaven, not to be discussed, but to be believed,— not to be the themes of philosophic speculation or theological criticism and controversy, but to be the objects of implicit faith and humble adoration.

We find that we have exceeded our limits, and yet we

have said nothing of the learned, and in many respects remarkable work, the title of which we have placed at the head of our article. We may return to it hereafter; but we have fully accomplished our object for the present, if we have made clearer to any of our readers this great truth, that Reason must ever be ancillary to Faith, — that she can neither dispense with revelation nor pretend to be its judge.

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ART. VI. — *A Course of Five Lectures, delivered in St. Louis, on Protestantism and Government.* By Hon. HUGH A. GARLAND, Author of "John Randolph of Roanoke." Phonographically reported by E. F. Underhill. St. Louis. 1852. 8vo. pp. 28.

DURING the last winter, the editor of this journal, at the invitation of the Catholic Institute of St. Louis, gave in that city a course of five lectures on Catholicity and Civilization, in which he endeavored to maintain that all true civilization is of Catholic origin, and that all nations in the ancient world became barbarous in proportion as they departed from the patriarchal religion, and that all modern nations tend to barbarism in proportion as they recede from the Catholic Church. He did not maintain this thesis precisely as an argument for the Church, for he contended that the Church is spiritual, instituted not for the civilization of nations, but for the glory of God in the salvation of souls; he maintained it because it is historically true, and because it is a conclusive argument against the carnal Judaism into which the world has lapsed, and which proposes simply material civilization and temporal well-being as its sole end. His lectures were nothing but a running commentary on the sacred text, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."

The conclusions of the lecturer were neither flattering nor acceptable to the carnal Jews and gentiles who listened to them. If his conclusions were sound, and nobody pretended that they did not follow irresistibly from his premises, and if what he alleged to be facts were really facts, the

boasted progress and intelligence of the modern uncatholic world could be regarded only as false intelligence, worse than no intelligence at all, and a progress towards barbarism, if not arrested, destined to end in savagism. The secular and sectarian press, with one or two honorable exceptions, kept up during the delivery of the lectures a continual fire against the lecturer and his assertions, and even sought to crush him beneath the weight of his own shameful writings prior to his conversion, and which he had long since retracted. But this was not enough. The lectures were listened to by large numbers of the most respectable and influential classes of the city, with deep interest, almost with enthusiasm. Nowhere had the lecturer ever found a more intelligent audience, or been listened to with more manifest respect and sympathy. Something was necessary to be done to counteract the influence of his decidedly anti-Jewish and anti-gentile lectures. So, at their close, a number of anti-Catholic citizens of St. Louis invited the Hon. Hugh A. Garland, a Virginian, and formerly clerk of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to deliver a course of lectures in reply to them, and to tell the people what they were to believe as to the compatibility of Protestantism with civilization and good government. Mr. Garland accepted the invitation so far as to consent to give a course of lectures on the same subject, or at least some branches of it, and the pamphlet before us consists of a phonographical report of his course.

The author does not profess to *reply* to the course by the editor of this journal, but professes to go over the same ground, and, save in the correspondence between him and the gentlemen who invited him to lecture, he makes but a single allusion to him, and that, save as to its too complimentary character, one to which we can take no exception. We might, therefore, very well regard ourselves as under no special obligation to notice the pamphlet; but as the correspondence which occasioned it is published at its head, and as it was no doubt intended to be a vindication of Protestantism against the Catholic lecturer, without the responsibility of a direct answer to his arguments, and as our silence might be misconstrued by the enemies of our faith, we have concluded not to let it pass without making it the subject of a few brief comments.

With the author personally our relations have long been friendly and affectionate, and we remember with great pleasure the intercourse we enjoyed with him, in the bosom of his own family and elsewhere, during our late visit to St. Louis, the great city of the West. We confess we were not prepared for such a course of lectures as he appears to have given, from a gentleman of his character and intelligence. Surrounded as he is by Catholics, in daily and hourly intercourse with them, and to some extent familiar with Catholic doctrines and treatises, we did not expect from him arguments against us which would hardly have been creditable to a Dowling or a Sparry. We speak of the arguments as to their substance, not of the language in which they are clothed, which for the most part is that of a gentleman, and unexceptionable.

The precise purpose of the author in his lectures he nowhere distinctly states, and we are at a loss to determine what general thesis he means to maintain or to refute. His lectures as a course appear to lack unity of design and distinctness of aim. The author has read a good deal on various subjects, has thought intensely, and has made many just observations; but he does not seem to have digested his materials, or to have worked out his thoughts, and reduced them to a system. He does not appear to have determined his principles and doctrines, and become able to state them clearly and distinctly, so as to bring his reading and observation to bear directly on their illustration and defence. His lectures are to us, though eloquent and high-wrought in passages, confused, indeed chaotic, and successfully defy our powers of analysis. We cannot reduce them to unity, and test their soundness or unsoundness by testing them in their principle. In a word, the author is far more of a Protestant than we had taken him to be, and, like all Protestants, argues and draws conclusions in general without any major premise, or, when he has a major premise, without any middle term. The only way of thoroughly reviewing such an author is to take him up sentence by sentence, and examine each sentence by itself. This is not precisely the author's fault; no Protestant can write otherwise, without writing himself out of his Protestantism. Protestantism is essentially illogical and unintellectual, repugnant to the fundamental laws of reason, and the Protestant who should undertake in his writings



against Catholics to conform to those laws, would at every step refute himself. We have neither the space nor the time to take up these lectures at length, and point out all that we judge unsound in them, and the author must expect from us only a few brief remarks on such statements of his as appear to us the most deserving of animadversion.

The author very properly, in his first lecture, denies and refutes the doctrine, popular in our times at least, that man began in the savage state; and consequently he denies and refutes, whether he intends to do so or not, the whole modern doctrine of the progress of the species, or the perfectibility of human nature. He also asserts a spiritual order, and maintains that it is above the temporal, or in other words, he maintains the supremacy of the spiritual order. Thus far he has done well, and done much. His admission that man began in perfection, that is, in perfection as a man, not in imperfection, and his assertion of the supremacy of the spiritual order, contain in themselves the refutation of all his Protestantism, and substantially all that he alleges against the Church. But though he recognizes a spiritual order, he does not recognize, properly speaking, the supernatural order, or at least, that God has not only given us a religion supernaturally, but also a supernatural religion. "Besides the faculties of understanding, and the passions, and the appetites which belong to nature or this outward material order, man is endowed with reason, conscience, and high moral faculties, which teach him truth, what is right and what is wrong, — the great guides given him by his Creator to accomplish the ends of his creation here. These faculties are the highest qualities that man possesses, and [those] that distinguish him from the material world around him. These moral faculties, properly educated and properly instructed with the truths which God, his creator, has revealed to him *by means of these faculties*, can keep in subjection the animal appetites, and guide man to reason and justice. The spiritual quality, being supreme, should govern and control the whole man." (p. 3.) We will not press the language here employed as far as it would bear, because even the best reporters are seldom to be relied on for strict verbal accuracy; but it is clear from it, that the spiritual recognized by the lecturer is the higher faculties of the soul, which are evi-

dently in the order of nature, since they pertain to the nature of the human soul, and that these higher faculties, without supernatural revelation and without the grace which enlightens, elevates, and sanctifies, are adequate to teach us the truth, and to enable us to attain our destiny; for the only revelation assumed to be necessary, or to have been made, is the revelation which God makes to us by the means, that is, through the medium, of these faculties, which, as they are natural, must be natural as to its medium, and therefore as to its substance, for no natural faculty can attain to truth that lies in the supernatural order.

The author, whatever he may believe himself, is therefore in his principles really a Rationalist or a Transcendentalist. Here is his fundamental error, and the source of all his other errors. Revelation with him means only the man arriving through his higher faculties at a higher order of truth than is perceptible by his senses; that is, God has made man capable of attaining to supersensible truth, and as man does attain to it by means of a higher order of faculties than those of the senses, God is said to reveal it, simply because it is not revealed or presented to our apprehension by the external world, to which the author improperly restricts the word *nature*. But this is no proper revelation at all, and gives apprehension of nothing that transcends the natural order. Hence religion according to the author is natural, and is only the educator or the education of our higher faculties. It develops the moral faculties, draws out what is in them, and directs them to their proper objects; but it neither gives to them, or presupposes in them, as supernaturally communicated to or infused into them, any thing above nature, fitting them to perform what surpasses the natural light and strength of man. "Religion," he says, "*taken in its broad and comprehensive sense, as teaching man to live, and bringing forward and making predominant in all his acts that moral and spiritual faculty which belongs to him*, is the most essential and important principle in the training and education of society." (p. 4.) Religion in its broad and comprehensive sense must comprehend all that is essential to religion. But as the author here defines the term, it is only the cultivation of human nature, and implies no grace, — nothing that lifts nature above itself. This is evident from what he immediately adds in the same paragraph: — "How is this to be

done? has been the great problem of history from the beginning down to the present day, — has been the difficult question *that has never yet been solved*, and of which it has fallen upon us, in our country, to attempt a solution. I trust that during the present course I shall be able to show that there has been a revelation to man of all those great truths, and that they must be taught to the individual and the community, — must be enforced and impressed on them, *so as to bring out and make predominant in all man's acts those moral faculties the nature of which has been revealed to man by his Creator*"; that is, a revelation by means of these faculties themselves. The end of religion is, therefore, not to raise man above his nature and enable him to attain to a supernatural destiny, but to develop and render predominant in himself and society the higher faculties or quality of his nature. This clearly brings religion within the natural order, and entirely neglects at least the supernatural.

But there is another point involved in this extract, not without difficulty. The author contends and proves that man began in the perfection of his nature, a fully developed and perfect man. Of course in the beginning the higher nature predominated, the spiritual ruled the carnal. He tells us also that the moral faculties, educated and instructed by the truths which God reveals to us through them, are adequate to teach us truth, what is right and what is wrong, to enable us to keep our animal appetites in subjection, and to guide us to reason and justice. But in this extract, how the moral and spiritual faculty which belongs to man is to be made predominant in all his acts, individually and socially, he alleges, has remained unsolved from the *beginning* down to the present time, and the task of solving it has fallen upon us at this late day in this country. So up to the present, all the revelations of God and all our moral faculties have only enabled us to know that the spiritual faculty *ought* to predominate in all our acts, whether as individuals or society, without teaching us in any respect how or by what means it can be made thus to predominate! Man began with that predominance, has always been able through his faculties to know what it is, and to effect it, and nevertheless, how it is to be done has never yet been ascertained, and remains for us in this country to find out!

We mean no disrespect to the author, who is really a man of fine abilities, and, where not cramped or blinded by his Protestantism, a good reasoner and a pleasing rhetorician. We call his attention to this inconsistency into which he has been betrayed, for we believe he honestly means to be a Christian, and is one of the few Protestants who would sooner give up private judgment than the Gospel. No doubt man has the moral and spiritual faculties the author contends for, but we respectfully suggest to him that the cultivation of these does not place a man in the Christian order, nor advance him a single step towards the kingdom of heaven. Christianity is a new creation, above the primitive creation, and holds from God as supernatural creator, as the latter does from God as the creator of nature. It differs as to order from nature. It is the kingdom of grace, and demands of its subjects that they act from God to and for God in a sense unintelligible or superintelligible to any of our natural faculties. Man considered in his natural powers and capacities can no more grow or develop, no matter what the instruction or cultivation he receives, into a Christian, into a citizen or subject of the kingdom of grace, than an alder-shrub into an oak, or a dunghill fowl into the eagle that gazes with undazzled eye on the noonday sun. The most upright and perfectly developed man in the natural order can no more enter into the Christian order without being born again, regenerated, made a new creature, than the foulest sinner, the most revolting criminal. As to live a natural life it is necessary that the child should be born, so to live the Christian life is it necessary that he be born again, supernaturally regenerated. No acts are in the Christian order, or meritorious in relation to heaven, except those that proceed from grace as their principle, and are done for God as the end of grace in the supernatural order, either as the Supreme Good itself, or as our supreme good. This is what Christianity teaches us, and it discloses the grand mistake of all who make Christianity nothing but a means, natural or supernatural, of cultivating our spiritual faculties.

There was one great fact to which the lecturer to whom the author was requested to reply called the attention of his audience, and on which he insisted at great length; namely, that our nature has been so corrupted by the Fall, the understanding so obscured, and the will so attenuated,

that left to itself the inferior nature, the appetites and passions, uniformly predominates, and thus man falls in his natural life even below, so to speak, the plane of his nature. Hence, left to the light and strength of his nature alone, he not only cannot gain heaven, but cannot institute and maintain true civilization. Civilization he defined to be the supremacy of reason, or the freedom of man's higher faculties; and barbarism, to be the predominance of appetite and passion, or of man's lower nature. The former he contended could not be secured except by Catholicity, or true religion, not only as a revelation, not only as a teacher, but as a repairer, as infusing into man a supernatural power to subject the lower, and maintain the freedom and supremacy of the higher, faculties of his nature. Here was the whole doctrine of his five lectures, and all else that he said was brought forward solely to elucidate and defend it. The author, considering that he was, if not expressly, yet in some sense, replying to the Catholic lecturer, and endeavoring to set aside his conclusions, should not have passed over this in silence, or quietly, almost surreptitiously, assumed the contrary, and reasoned from it as an admitted truth. The great fact is, that men under the law of nature alone, without the aid of supernatural religion, of Catholicity, cannot in their present fallen state fulfil the law of nature, and have a perpetual tendency to run into barbarism; for barbarism is in society only the dominion of the flesh in the individual. No training, no cultivation in the order of nature alone, can save a people from barbarism, for it is only by grace that men can in their present state keep the law of nature even, and maintain the freedom and predominance of what the author calls the moral faculties. This is not speculation or theory; it is fact, proved to be such by all experience.

This being undeniable, the conclusion that all true civilization, and therefore all true liberty, are the products of Catholicity, and that all nations lapse into barbarism as they recede from it, follows inevitably, unless there be included under the name of Catholicity other than the true religion. If the alleged Catholicity be the true religion, the conclusion is certain, and the Catholic lecturer proved it *a posteriori* to be true of what he called Catholicity; that is, the one religion which has been transmitted to us from the beginning, through the patriarchs, the synagogue,

and the Catholic Church, or Church in communion with the See of Rome. He proved, or at least attempted to prove, this historically, and the author had no right to assume the contrary, without at least some attempt to answer the arguments of the Catholic lecturer, or some attempt at independent proofs. He was not, in a *quasi* answer to the Catholic lecturer, at liberty to assume as a conceded truth, that religion in any other sense than that of mere education of man's natural faculties is not needed, and that man is abundantly able without supernatural grace to keep the law of nature, and institute and maintain true civilization. Till he had refuted his Catholic opponent, and established the fact that civilization is practicable without Catholicity, as the lecturer defined it, he was not free to attack the Catholic Church; for that was virtually to deny civilization itself. The Catholic proofs that civilization is impossible without Catholicity were conclusive so long as unanswered, and to attempt, without answering them, to disprove Catholicity, was not to prove that there can be civilization without Catholicity, but, if any thing, that there never has been and never can be any true civilization at all, assuredly not the thesis the author wished to defend. The author has thus signally failed. The corruption of our nature is a fact that cannot be denied, and equally undeniable is it that nature left to itself tends inevitably to barbarism, for we receive the seeds or germs of true civilization only as supernaturally deposited in our hearts. We bear the seeds or germs of barbarism in our very natures, and we have only to act out our corrupt nature to be genuine barbarians.

The author makes no account of this fact, and proceeds on the assumption of the natural origin of civilization, and of the capacity of nature, without supernatural light and strength, to sustain the most perfect civilization. Overlooking the necessity of grace to enable us to keep even the natural law, he attempts to prove historically that the Catholic Church is false, and that Protestantism and society well governed are compatible with each other. But he has failed in both respects, for his proofs rest on the misreading or the misinterpreting of history on the one hand, and the surreptitious change of the terms of his proposition on the other, as often as necessary to meet historical facts which he can neither misread nor misinter-

pret. He does not keep steadily to one view of civilization, and his conception of good government is very much that of no government at all, or of a government that leaves men a prey to all the barbarous elements of our nature. Man started, he concedes, with all he needed, a good government, and proper teachers and guides, but soon fell from the right way, lost his good government, lost his light and freedom, and became a degraded, ignorant, superstitious slave. Through the corruptions of human nature? O, no! But through the cupidity and grasping ambition of the priesthood. Indeed, the author seems disposed to charge all the evils of society, and nearly all the faults of individuals, upon the priesthood, the heathen priesthoods in the world before Christ, and the Catholic priesthood since. Religion has always been perverted and man corrupted by his spiritual guides. Of antiquity, only the Jewish people were preserved in a state of true civilization, and they only by the frequent and miraculous interposition of Almighty God; that is, they were protected and prevented from falling into all the barbarism of the gentiles only by the supernatural grace of God,—precisely the doctrine maintained by the Catholic lecturer. In the world before Christ the author finds himself obliged to concede, and apparently without being conscious that he does concede, the practical inadequacy of nature to sustain good government and true civilization. What becomes now of his doctrine of the sufficiency of nature, of the sufficiency of our moral faculties to tell us what is right and what is wrong, and to keep our animal appetites in subjection? If this were so, how came your ancient priesthoods so corrupt, and how could they so corrupt the people and degrade them to the lowest barbarism?

If the author may be credited, prior to the coming of Christ true civilization was maintained only by the continued supernatural intervention of Almighty God, and all nations tended to barbarism in proportion as they receded from the patriarchal religion and polity. This is precisely the doctrine the Catholic lecturer himself asserted and defended in his lectures at St. Louis, and thus far the author, consciously or unconsciously, agrees with him.

But since the coming of Christ it has not been the same. By the Christian revelation "man found that which had been lost and forgotten, and was once more restored to

himself." (p. 8.) Nevertheless, only a short time elapsed before he, in part at least, lost himself again, and fell anew into ignorance, superstition, and slavery. His spiritual guides proved unfaithful, his faith was corrupted, and his manners and morals were debased. Whence and by what means? Whence and in the same way in which the gentiles lost the patriarchal religion and polity. Menes, king of Egypt, "brought all the priesthood into subjection to him, and associated them with him for the purpose of enslaving and degrading the people." (p. 5.) In the same way Christianity was corrupted. Under paganism the Emperor was not only supreme civil lord, but also *pontifex maximus*, or supreme head of the pagan church. When the Emperor became converted, he "placed himself at the head of the Church, in the same position which he had previously occupied with respect to the pagan church, and was now as before *pontifex maximus*." (Ibid.) This is inferred from the conduct of Constantine and Theodosius, who are alleged to have imitated Menes of Egypt, especially Theodosius, who as *pontifex maximus* took upon himself to decree what is orthodoxy. (p. 9.) In this way the clergy were subjected to the prince, made civil functionaries, and employed to pervert religion, and to corrupt and enslave the people.

An ingenious theory, only it does not happen to be supported by a single fact. But suppose it to be true, what does it make in favor of the author's thesis, if thesis he has? Suppose it, it only proves that the subjection of the Church to the state, and the usurpation of ecclesiastical functions by the civil power, are fatal to religion and civilization,—precisely what the Catholic lecturer at St. Louis alleged. What does this say in favor of Protestantism, or against the position assumed, that modern nations in proportion as they recede from the Catholic Church tend towards barbarism? Surely there can be no greater departure from the Church than to subject her to the civil authority, and to convert her clergy into civil functionaries. Then, again, this very absorption of the Church into the state, of which the author complains, is the characteristic of Protestantism. Protestantism was sought as the emancipation of sovereigns from subjection in spirituals even to the spiritual authority, and of giving them supreme authority in both spirituals and temporals. Every



Protestant sovereign claimed to be *pontifex maximus* in his own dominions. Henry the Eighth of England assumed for himself all the powers that had previously been attributed to the Pope, and caused himself to be declared supreme head of the Church in his realm. The present Queen of England is the sovereign pontiff or papeess of the Church of England, and all the bishops hold from the crown. The same is true of the Protestant sovereigns of the Continent, and here, where democracy prevails, the great boast of Protestantism is that it emancipates the people from all subjection to spiritual authority, and gives them the control of their pastors, and the power to determine their religion for themselves. On the author's own principles, then, Protestantism is a departure from primitive Christianity, and tends necessarily to destroy true civilization, and barbarize the nations that submit to it, by absorbing the spiritual power in the temporal. Why, when really reasoning from the principles of the Catholic lecturer, did the author put on the air of reasoning against them?

But the author has misread history. It is not true that Constantine or any other Christian Emperor ever claimed to be in relation to the Christian Church *pontifex maximus*, or supreme head of the Church. Constantine expressly disclaimed the character, and recognized in its fullest extent the independence and exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical authorities in all things spiritual. When he entered the Holy Council of Nice, he remained standing till invited to be seated by the Bishops, and even then took his seat on a low stool at their feet, acknowledging that there they were sovereign, not he. Theodosius never pretended to any ecclesiastical powers, and in the decree referred to he only promulgated as the law of the land the decisions and canons of the Church, made by the proper ecclesiastical authorities. That some usurping Emperors, both in the East and the West, sought to encroach on the liberties of the Church, and in doing so caused incalculable evil, is no doubt true; but they were resisted by the Church, and never succeeded in subjecting the spiritual authority to themselves, save in heretical or schismatic countries. The Catholic Church always asserted her independence in face of the temporal power, and she is the only church that has uniformly maintained the freedom of the spiritual order. Schismatics and heretics have always been ready

to surrender spiritual liberty to the prince, on condition that he would protect them in their heresy, or their schism, against the Church. One of the reasons alleged by the Catholic lecturer why she and she alone could preserve civilization was because she and she alone asserted and was able to maintain freedom of religion, the liberty of conscience, in face of the temporal power.

But the author tells us that subsequently the Popes themselves destroyed the purity and efficacy of the Christian religion, by absorbing the state, and making themselves supreme in both orders. "The second or third successor of Hildebrand completely triumphed over the Emperor, and established himself as supreme head of both temporal and spiritual affairs, and was now *pontifex maximus*." The Pope "now placed himself on the throne of the Cæsars, and was supreme in all things, both spiritual and temporal, — was emperor and *pontifex maximus*, as Constantine and Theodosius before him had been, and was like them the supreme object of adoration to his subjects." (p. 11.) Unhappily for the author, this is all pure theory, or pure imagination. It is false as a whole, and in all its parts. The second successor of Hildebrand, or St. Gregory the Seventh, was Urban the Second. He proclaimed the Crusades indeed, and excommunicated Philip the First of France, for a scandalous adultery, but did not completely triumph over the Emperor, or exercise supreme authority as emperor any more than his predecessors. The third successor was Pascal the Second, whom Henry the Fifth of Germany caused to be imprisoned, with many cardinals, bishops, and nobles who adhered to the Holy See, and forced to concede to the Emperor the faculty of investiture. This was no triumph over the Emperor, but for the moment a triumph of the Emperor over the Pope. The fact is, none of the Popes, in their struggles with the Emperor, ever completely triumphed; they saved the principle at stake, but were often obliged to concede to the temporal authority in practice the faculties it claimed. There is no instance on record of a Pope who was in himself both emperor and pope, as there is on record no instance of a Christian Emperor who was both pope and emperor. The two powers have always been, under the Church, distinct, and, saving in the ecclesiastical states, not only distinct, but separate; and the struggle of the Popes with the civil power has

never been to place themselves on the throne of the Cæsars, to absorb the imperial authority and dignity in the pontifical, but simply to maintain the freedom and independence of the spiritual order, and prevent that very union of the two powers which the author regards as the source of all spiritual and temporal evils. All the power the sovereign pontiffs have ever exercised, or pretended to exercise, over temporal sovereigns, is that of declaring the law according to which they are bound in the sight of God to govern; of subjecting them, as Catholics, to the discipline of the Church for their sins, crimes, and moral offences, in like manner as if they were private individuals; and, as the highest recognized court of Christendom, to judge the causes between sovereign and sovereign, and a sovereign and his subjects, submitted to them for adjudication. The Pope's right to decide judicially causes thus submitted is unquestionable, though whether he holds it *jure humano*, or *jure divino*, may not be defined; and whether he has or has not the right to execute by physical force the sentence he pronounces, is a question of no practical importance, because as Pope he has never the physical force for the purpose at his command, and cannot have it without the consent of secular sovereigns. He has in the secular order for enforcing his commands, or for executing his sentences, whether upon private individuals or upon public persons or authorities, practically at least, only moral means, and can have no other.

That the Pope ever was "*the supreme object of adoration* to his subjects" is a charge which the author should never have suffered himself to bring. The supreme object of adoration to all Catholics was always, and is, and always will be, God, and God alone, and the author disparages his own understanding rather than ours, when he supposes that any of us are incapable of distinguishing between God and the Pope. The author is wholly unwarranted in his assertion that Constantine and Theodosius were the supreme object of adoration to their subjects, especially if he means their Christian subjects. The pagan Emperors were adored by their pagan subjects, but no Christian Emperor has ever received divine honors from his Christian subjects. Charges so foul, made without the shadow of authority, by men so respectable in their station and general character as our author, are in the last degree unpar-

donable, for such men cannot be ignorant that they are unfounded, and utterly false. In Mr. Garland's particular case, the charge, we doubt not, was made without deliberation, and from a habit acquired when he was a Transcendentalist of substituting theory for fact, and his own gloss for the text.

The author has much to say of the doctrine which he ascribes to St. Gregory the Seventh. We have no space to follow him through his commentaries; but the whole amount of what he alleges, taking it in its fullest sense, is, in principle, that the spiritual authority is supreme, and that kings are no more exempt from the power of the keys given to St. Peter than are their subjects, — in their public than in their private conduct. Supposing the power of the keys, this is nothing to which the author can object, for he himself says the spiritual is supreme and ought to rule in the individual and the community; and it would be ridiculous to pretend that sovereigns are not as much bound to obey the law of God in their official as in their private conduct. If you concede to the Church the power of binding and loosing at all, that is, any power of spiritual discipline, you cannot without gross inconsistency and absurdity subtract all public persons in their public capacity from its operation. Hildebrand, even according to the most the author makes out, asserted only the principle that the spiritual is supreme and ought to rule in the individual and the community; that is, that princes and states as well as individuals are bound to conform to the law of God, and are subject to spiritual discipline when they violate it, — a principle no Christian, and no well-conditioned pagan even, can have the folly to deny.

The author has conjured up a phantom, and is frightened at it. He seems to suppose that in the Catholic world the two powers, spiritual and temporal, have been identified, first by the Emperor making himself Pope, and secondly by the Pope making himself Emperor. All this is fancy. The Church, and therefore the Pope, or the Pope, and therefore the Church, teaches that the two powers are distinct, and she neither claims the imperial purple for herself, nor accords the tiara to the Emperor. But in admitting the two as distinctly subsisting powers, she does not therefore admit them as equal in rank or authority, as two coördinate and in all respects mutually independent

powers, for she asserts the supremacy of the spiritual order, and the obligation of the temporal power to rule in secular affairs in obedience to the law of God as defined by the spiritual authority instituted by Almighty God, and supernaturally assisted and protected for that purpose. Here is no identification of the two orders, no absorbing of the one by the other, but here are two distinctly subsisting powers, each with its own constitution, only the one is inferior and subordinate to the other, as the body is inferior and subordinate to the soul. This is only the doctrine the author himself asserts in principle, and therefore is a doctrine to which he has no right to object, and to which none but a political atheist can object. The only thing here to be objected is, that the Catholic Church is not the divinely constituted representative of the spiritual order on earth. If she is, the author must concede St. Gregory's doctrine; if not, he is where he was when he began, and obliged to end, not with the conclusion that Protestantism and good government are compatible, but with the conclusion that how true civilization and good government are to be secured is, as he says in the outset, an unsolved problem, and reserved for the future to solve. This in fact is the author's conclusion. His church is in the future, and so is his civilized order. He takes refuge in hope, and sings,

"There is a good time coming, boys,"

but when or how he confesses himself ignorant, as must every Protestant.

#### ART. VII. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Histoire des Souverains Pontifes Romains.* Par le CHEVALIER ARTAUD DE MONTOR. Paris: Didot Frères. 1847. 8 tomes. 8vo.

THIS is a popular history of the Popes, from St. Peter to Pius the Sixth inclusive, written in a truly Catholic spirit, with learning, good sense, and good taste, and admirably adapted to general reading. A translation of it into English, accompanied by a few judicious notes, correcting a few slight mistakes and modifying the views of the author on one or two questions, would be a valua-

ble accession to our literature, and tend not a little to correct many of the errors with regard to papal history still very widely entertained by the people, sometimes Catholic as well as Protestant.

We notice this work at this time both for its own merits and because it bears us out in one or two statements in the article on *Christianity and Heathenism* in our last Review, to which some exceptions have been taken. And since we have referred to that article, we wish to correct the blunder we committed, of calling the Emperor Charles the Fifth the *son* of Maximilian the First. He was the *grandson*, not son, of Maximilian. Several correspondents, some of them highly esteemed friends and most worthy clergymen, and some of them Protestants or *Liberal* Catholics, have taken exceptions to our statement, that "we have yet to see full evidence that any Pope, after he became Pope, was a very bad man," and have referred us to the concessions to the contrary of certain Catholic historians. The concessions we are referred to we were well aware of, and we protested against them as unwarranted by the facts in the case. We expressly asserted that they were uncalled for, and that they constitute the only real embarrassment of the Catholic in his controversies with the enemies of the Church. We therefore refused to accept them as authority, and consequently there was no use in citing them against us. Their justice was the point our correspondents should have proved.

Our readers are requested to bear in mind that we did not say that we had seen *no* evidence, but that we had yet to see *full*, that is, conclusive evidence, &c. Nor did we pretend that every Pope had been a *good* man; we simply said, that we had yet "to see full evidence that any Pope, after he became Pope, was a *very bad* man." Here is a point which our correspondents appear to have overlooked, and yet it is a point of some importance. A man may not be very good, may not be a saint, and yet not be very bad, that is, very wicked. The Chevalier Artaud de Montor has given us in the work before us the history of every Pope down to Pius the Sixth, and proves, not indeed that every one was a saint, but very clearly that not one of them is proved to have been a very bad man. Instances of weakness he enumerates, but never of great crimes. He shows us many Popes, according to human modes of judging, who committed mistakes, and through weakness or love of peace yielded too much to the tyranny and rapacity of temporal sovereigns, but none who were governed by an unjust ambition, or who were grasping and oppressive. He refutes the calumnies circulated against some of them, and especially those alleged against those particular Popes mentioned by our correspondents. He is a respectable authority, and far more reliable than Reeves. We have read him for the first time since we

wrote the article to which exceptions have been taken, and are well pleased to find him sustaining us.

We have found in our historical reading that Catholics have not always been just to the Sovereign Pontiffs, and that popular Catholic historians have been too ready to concede charges preferred by the enemies of the Church. They seem always to have written on the principle, that, where there is a doubt, the benefit of that doubt belongs to the enemies of the Popes. But as the Popes are the party accused, this is to reverse the well-settled rule of both law and justice. The accused is always entitled to the benefit of every doubt, on the principle that every one is to be presumed innocent till proved guilty. These authors throw upon us a burden that we are not bound to bear, and, instead of compelling the accuser to prove his charges, they require us to disprove them. This is being generous to a fault, and carrying candor to an excess. No doubt the concessions we refer to may be made without impeaching the sanctity or the infallibility of the Church; yet they embarrass the Catholic controversialist, for the enemies of the Church will recognize no distinction between the concession of an unimportant fact and the concession of an essential dogma. Moreover, these concessions, being made by Catholic historians, pass into history, form the popular judgments of history even among Catholics, and thus lead the faithful themselves to regard the facts of history as less creditable to them than they really are, which operates in many to weaken their faith, to diminish their charity, and to damp their zeal. Our rule is to dismiss every charge against either the official or private conduct of a Pope, that is not fully proved, and we ask other proof than the fact that some writer, who professes to be, or really is, a Catholic, concedes it. We find concessions even in Baronius that we are far from accepting.

In the same article we said in substance that the popular histories circulating among Catholics, especially in England and this country, have been written by unbelievers, heretics, Gallicans, or lukewarm Catholics. This charge our correspondents deny, though in most respectful and courteous tones. They refer us to Rohrbacher's popular history of the Church, recently published in French, as a refutation of our statement. Our statement, if taken literally, may be too sweeping. But we had reference, as was obvious enough, not to the works which have been written, and which are known only to scholars, but to the works which circulate among the people, and form the popular judgment of historical persons and events. In this sense we have no reason, when asserted specially of England and the United States, to doubt its accuracy. We have not indeed read Rohrbacher's history, but we were aware of its existence and of its general character. It vindicates the Sovereign Pontiffs, we are told, and is Ultramontane in doctrine,

spirit, and tendency. As much, too, may be said of the Ecclesiastical History by Baron Henrion. But excellent as these works are, they are far from leaving nothing to be desired, and, moreover, they are not in general circulation in England and this country, and have as yet done comparatively little in forming the popular judgments of ecclesiastical and papal history in any country.

It was far enough from our intention to ignore or to underrate these and many other recent publications of a similar character. These works we regard as among the first fruits of the reaction which has commenced in our times against the heathenism which has prevailed more or less for the last four centuries, and which we conceded had commenced. We did not suppose it had commenced with us ; we did not suppose that we had made a new discovery, that we were telling the Catholic public something no one else had told it, and were to be the father of a new movement. We regarded ourselves merely as engaged in a work with others, and as laboring to help on a Catholic reaction which had been commenced, under the providence of God, by choice spirits in all Catholic countries, and commenced, too, long before we had left the ranks of heresy. We lay no claim to originality, even where a Catholic may be original, and our highest ambition is to be a feeble echo of what we hear from others, at whose feet it is our pleasure and our glory to sit and learn. We are but an humble laborer in a great work in which all good Catholics are engaged, and whoever, from the earnest and positive tones in which we sometimes speak, imagines that we claim to be any thing more, or that we look upon ourselves as destined to start or to effect something new, does us no ordinary injustice. Our article was written to help on the Catholic reaction against paganism in modern society, and, if we failed to give full credit to the labors already accomplished by others, it was because our mind dwelt on the tendencies still predominant among the mass of the people, and because we are accustomed to count nothing done as long as any thing remains to do.

We have departed from our usual policy in making these remarks, because we have felt that something was due to the correspondents who had in a kind and courteous manner called our attention to certain statements which they regarded as unsound. The sneers and denunciations, the cavillings and misrepresentations of the newspaper press, we sometimes glance at, but we make it a rule to let them pass for what they are worth. But hints and suggestions from friends, or even from those who are not Catholics, made in a courteous manner and with serious aims, are always welcome, and will never be suffered to pass from us unheeded, whether we formally acknowledge them or not.

For ourselves, in looking around us and striving to form a just



estimate of society in its relations to the Church, we see much to afflict us, much that needs amendment, even in the tone and manners of Catholics ; but we are far from believing that we of this generation have fallen upon peculiarly evil times. We know no epoch in the world's history in which, had the choice been left to us, we should sooner have chosen to have our lot cast, than the present. The Church in this world is always the Church Militant, and the Christian's life here below is always a warfare. Not till we die can we put off our harness or lay down our arms. But we verily believe that the reaction of heathenism, which broke out in the fifteenth century, has been arrested, and that a decided Catholic reaction against it has commenced, and is proceeding with no little rapidity and force. There is no country where this reaction is more needed, where it has a freer field, or may be encouraged with fairer prospects of success, than our own. It is needed here, as elsewhere, for the salvation of souls ; it is also needed to mould our people into a uniform national character, to preserve good government, to secure freedom, and even to save society itself.

A noble field opens here to our young Catholics. Here is a spiritual work to be done worthy of their noblest ambition. Hundreds and thousands of them are now wasting their genius and talent, their enthusiasm and strength, in idleness and sensuality, or in the ignoble pursuit of mere worldly wealth or honors. Let them aim higher, and open their eyes and their hearts to the great, the noble, and the enduring. Let them, each according to his own gifts and callings, give themselves up heart and soul to the work of banishing heathenism from our society, and of rendering this country, if the youngest, the most beautiful and the best beloved of the children of the Church. Never was there a nobler work, never did a more honorable or glorious career open to ingenuous youth. This country must be won to the Church. To win it, we must labor constantly to cultivate a high and uncompromising, but sweet and gentle, Catholic tone among ourselves, and by our prayers and our examples, our words and our deeds, to bring all with whom we have any relation under the pure and hallowing influences of our holy religion. Would that we could speak a word that would reach the heart of every Catholic young man in the country, and make him feel that to this noble work is he called, and that in it he may find an object equal to the largest ambition, and a good that will fill his soul with sweet joy and peace. We are growing old now, and our hair is turning white, and, young men, we look to you to enlist in the grand army of the living God, and to march forth with brave hearts to the battle against ignorance, superstition, heresy, infidelity, irreligion, the implacable enemies of the Church, and always in arms against the Lord and his Christ.

2. *College Conversations.* By MARY MONICA. Vol. II. London : Burns. 1849.

THESE Conversations are written by a lady, a convert from Anglicanism to the Church, and the volume before us has been placed in our hands by a reverend and very dear friend, late engaged in giving missions in England, with a request that we would examine it and give our opinion as to its suitableness for republication in this country. The book is pleasantly written, in a gentle spirit, and our young folks have found it very interesting. It is a good book of its class, and the class cannot be too much multiplied. We never praise a book written by a lady, if we can help it, for we think the writing of books is not woman's vocation, and a female literature is pretty sure to be a sentimental literature, wanting always in robust health and masculine energy; and we generally look upon every work by a recent convert as *suspect*; but in the present case we very cheerfully commend the little work before us, and trust that some of our enterprising publishers will not hesitate to give us an American edition of it.

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3. *The Glories of Mary. From the Italian of* ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI. First American Edition. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1852. 12mo. pp. 802.

THIS is a very beautiful edition of one of the sweetest and most admired of the devotional works of that great saint, Alphonsus Liguori. We have not compared the translation with the original, but it has been made by one that is abundantly able to do it faithfully, tastefully, and affectionately. We say no more of this work now, for we mean to seize the earliest opportunity to make it the text for an article on devotion to Our Lady.

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4. *The Ursuline Manual. Catholic Piety. The Child's Catholic Piety.* New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1851.

THESE are well-known and approved manuals, and need no commendation from a reviewer. We notice them now as an act of justice to Messrs. Dunigan of New York, who are among our most deserving Catholic publishers, and distinguished for their enterprise and liberality as business men. They spare no pains to send out their publications in the best style of art, and the editions of these manuals now before us, especially of *The Ursuline Manual*, deserve high commendation for the beauty of the letter-press and the richness of the binding. The illustrations are numerous, and

several of them are of great merit. They are mostly from Overbeck or from disciples of his school, — a school which is highly admired by those who are better judges of art than we are, but which after all does not entirely satisfy us. It has too much mannerism, and appears to be confined to a single type. Upon the whole, however, these excellent manuals will compare favorably for letterpress, illustrations, and binding, with the best specimens of publications issued in this country, and we trust the publishers will find themselves liberally patronized.

5. *Rivers's Manual; or Pastoral Instructions upon the Creed, Commandments, Sacraments, Lord's Prayer, &c. Collected from the Holy Scriptures, Fathers, and Approved Writers in God's Church, with Prayers conformable therunto, for the Use of those who wish to be instructed in the Christian Religion.* Boston: Thomas Sweeney. 1852. 12mo. pp. 432.

THIS would appear to be a well-known and standard work, although we ourselves never heard of it before seeing the present edition. We have partially examined it, and with two exceptions, where the author gives as the doctrine of the Church what is only opinion in the Church, namely, that man was created in a state of grace, &c., — the Council of Trent uses the word *constitutus*, instead of *conditus*, — and that a man may be saved with simple faith *in roto*, without faith *in re*, we like it very much, and regard it as a most excellent work. We would, however, suggest to the publisher to employ an editor and a proof-reader when a second edition of it is called for, and also to do the same in the case of several other publications which he has sent out. His publications are distinguished for the errors of the press, and the lack of editorial supervision.

6. *Reflections on Spiritual Subjects, and on the Passion of Jesus Christ. From the Italian of St. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI.* Boston: Donahoe. 1851. 12mo. pp. 331.

IT is enough to say that this is one of the spiritual works of St. Alphonsus Liguori. It cannot be too often read and meditated, with a prayer to the great saint to pray for us.



any form of Protestantism, cannot be reasonably objected to; but works written for Protestants, for the purpose of vindicating to them particular dogmas or practices of our Church, can hardly be of much use. To Protestants individually, when they manifest a serious, candid, and inquiring mind, when they show themselves really desirous of knowing and embracing the truth, and perfectly willing to be taught it, we should exhibit all patience, and do our best to answer all their objections, however frivolous; but in our public addresses to Protestants collectively, as a body or aggregation of bodies outside of the Church, it is never well to apologize, in the modern sense, for our religion, or to assume the attitude of defence. Our proper method is always to attack, and compel them to act on the defensive. The party which acts on the defensive only, which suffers itself to be attacked in its lines, and seeks only to prevent them from being broken, in some sense confesses its own weakness, and declares that it has no expectation of conquering and seeks merely to save itself from defeat, which seldom fails to dispirit its own forces and to embolden and invigorate those of the enemy. Whatever apparent advantages Protestants have ever gained in their controversies with Catholics, they have gained by acting on the offensive; by simply throwing out objections, and keeping us busy with refuting them. Once put them on their defence, and compel them to state and defend their own thesis, and you have already vanquished them, for they have no defensible thesis.

There is no Catholic dogma, taken apart from the authority of the Church, that is defensible. Deny or waive the commission of the Church from God to teach, therefore her presence as infallible teacher, and there is nothing that she teaches us of faith that a wise man will undertake either to deny or to defend. To waive that authority, and to descend into the arena to combat with Protestants, is to concede them in the outset all they contend for, namely, the possibility of determining what is Christian faith without an infallible church. We can then combat only with arms borrowed from the Scriptures and the Fathers, and if with such arms we combat them successfully, the victory inures to them, not to us. We defeat ourselves by our very success, for our doctrine is, that, without the infallible authority of the Church, Chris-

tian faith is not determinable. We can in our controversies with Protestants appeal to the Scriptures and to the Fathers only to prove what the Church has always believed and taught as Christian faith; but unless the Church is already conceded to be infallible in believing and teaching, this does nothing to settle the question as to what really is Christian faith. There are very few Protestants who will be favorably affected by such an argument, for there are very few, if any, who hold themselves bound to believe a doctrine because the Church has always believed and taught it. The great majority of them, at least as we have known them, would regard that as an excellent reason, not for believing, but for disbelieving a doctrine. How often do we find Protestants alleging as a sufficient reason for rejecting a doctrine, that it is a doctrine believed and taught by the Church, — Popish doctrine!

Protestantism is not merely a protest against this or that Catholic doctrine, but primarily and essentially against all church authority, — against believing any thing because the Catholic or any other body called a church believes and teaches it. The best method of dealing with it is, in our judgment, not to stand up and ward off its blows, but to summon it to the bar and compel it to answer for itself. It is of little use to define and defend our particular doctrines against it; we should rather compel it to define and defend the doctrines it professes to oppose to us. Let our controversialists with one accord, resolutely and perseveringly, attack Protestantism in its principle, or want of principle, and show that it has no positive character, nothing but negation, nothing positive to oppose to the authority it denies, for a dozen years or so, and very few Protestants would be found to pay it the least reverence. They would themselves be forced to see that Protestantism has in reality no principle, no bottom, and nothing but sheer negation, which is sheer falsehood, to oppose to Catholic faith. It is really nothing but negation, and what passes for its principle is really nothing but the denial of all principle. It is a mere system of negations, leading to universal negation, that is, universal falsehood. We ordinarily treat it — not Protestants, but Protestantism — with quite too much tenderness and respect. In itself it is absolutely nothing, and is intelligible only by the truth it denies. It has no being in itself, no substantive exist-

ence of its own, and consequently, the moment that it is thrown back upon itself, and compelled to maintain for itself an affirmative existence, it fails, melts into thin air, and vanishes in vacuity.

Take any so-called Protestant doctrine you please, analyze it, and you will find that it consists of two parts, one affirmative, the other negative. The affirmative part will in all cases be found to be, as far as it goes, the Catholic doctrine, — what the Church believes and teaches, and always has believed and taught. Take, as an instance, the doctrine of justification by faith alone. If there is any doctrine which can be called Protestant, it is this. But this doctrine is affirmative and negative. Its affirmative part is justification by faith; but this is Catholic doctrine, not Protestant. It is, and always has been, the doctrine of the Church, and is hers as much as is any other doctrine. The distinctively Protestant element is expressed, not in the words *justification by faith*, but in the little word “alone,” which Luther added in his version of the Scriptures. This little word is strictly negative, and serves only to deny the necessity of good works to justification, that is, the necessity of intrinsic justice to justification, as the Church teaches. As God is a God of strict justice and infinite veracity, and cannot declare, pronounce, or repute one just who is not just, it follows that without intrinsic justice there is and can be no justification, and therefore the Protestant opposes to the doctrine of the necessity of intrinsic justice, not something positive, not a substantive doctrine, but a sheer denial, that is, sheer falsehood. The same conclusion may be obtained by analysis in the case of all the so-called Protestant doctrines. What they have that is positive or affirmative is Catholic doctrine, and therefore not distinctively Protestant; what they have that is distinctively Protestant is purely negative, and therefore false.

We must bear in mind, that of contradictories one is always necessarily false, and the other necessarily true, for truth can never contradict truth, nor falsehood contradict falsehood. Truth is always in being, and all being is true; falsehood is in not-being, and all not-being is false. All false assertion is in asserting that not-being is being, or that being is not-being. If to the Catholic faith there is and can be opposed nothing but simple denial, the

truth of that faith and the falsity of the denial, or simple negation opposed to it, follow necessarily. If, then, Protestantism as the contradictory of Catholicity be proved to be purely negative in its character, it is proved by that alone to be false, and Catholicity is proved to be true. The Protestant by simply denying Catholicity has not therefore done enough to put the Church on her defence. He has as yet done nothing to his purpose, and before she can be required even to plead to his allegations, he must oppose to her some affirmative doctrine, some truth, which he has, but which she denies.

Now what we contend is, that our Catholic controversialists should waive all direct defence of Catholicity, and compel the Protestant to state and define this affirmative doctrine, this truth, which he thinks he has to oppose to her teaching. We insist on this, because it is a fact well known, infallibly known, by every Catholic, that the Protestant has, and can have, no such doctrine, no such truth, — that he has, and can have, only pure negation. He sustains himself now by attacking us on the strength of some fragments of Christian doctrine which he has stolen from the Church. When he is let alone he denies, and denies only; when hard pressed, he defends himself by abandoning his distinctive Protestantism, and resorting to these fragments of Catholicity. We must deprive him of this subterfuge, by showing that these fragments are not his, that the truth of which they are fragments is held by the Church in its unity and integrity, and that he must confine himself to his denials. The moment we force him so to confine himself, his aggressive power is gone, and he has more than he can do to take care of himself. He is then forced to comprehend that the positive elements on which he has been accustomed to rely, and which have served to keep him in countenance with himself, are not his, and that he as a Protestant has never had any right to claim them. He will then understand that, reduced to his distinctive Protestantism, he is reduced to pure negation, which is only another name for pure falsehood, and then that he must either escape to the Church, or sink into universal nihilism.

Every body knows that Protestants never state and defend any thesis of their own against us. Their method is to attack every thing and to defend nothing. They throw



out their objections without any inquiry, not only whether they are really objections to the Church, if sustained, but whether the principles which they must imply, if urged at all, are or are not sound. Nothing is more common with them than to urge contradictory objections, or to object to the Church for reasons which mutually destroy one another. The objections they usually urge, if objections, are so only by virtue of a principle from the logical consequences of which they would themselves recoil with hardly less horror than we. Now, what we ask is, that our controversialists, instead of laboring to prove that the objections urged do not lie against the Church, should attack these objections themselves, and show Protestants what it really is they must maintain, if they persist in urging them. At first, Protestants will pay no heed to what we tell them; they will continue for some time their old course, and reply to us only by a few sneers, a little personal abuse, or silly anecdotes against a pope, a cardinal, or an individual Catholic. No matter. If we keep on, if we persevere unitedly in carrying the war into their country and attacking them in their camp, they will soon be obliged to heed us, if they would not lose all their followers, and be forced to engage in earnest in the work of defending themselves. This is all that we want, for the moment we can compel them to act on the defensive, we have vanquished them.

Mr. Morris understands this, and to some extent acts on it. He aims to refute the Protestant objections to the worship we pay to Our Lady, by showing what they imply, and what would be the consequences of admitting them. This is very well as far as it goes; but in the first place, it is objections to a particular Catholic doctrine or Catholic practice that he analyzes and refutes, not objections to the authority of the Church, without which we could not ourselves defend the doctrine or practice objected to; and in the second place, the consequences which he shows must follow from admitting the objections urged are such as most Protestants can very easily accept, and from which very few except Catholics recoil. To show to a Catholic that the worship he pays to the Blessed Mother of God is in perfect harmony with the doctrine of the Incarnation, as set forth by the Fathers and defined by the early Councils, and that to deny its propriety is to fall into Nestori-

anism and Pelagianism, is enough, all that can be necessary in his case; but it is just nothing at all to the great body of Protestants, or if something, it is only a good reason to them for being Nestorians and Pelagians. Who among Protestants are to-day any thing but Nestorians and Pelagians? Who is there to recoil from Nestorianism because it denies the Incarnation, or from denying the Incarnation because to deny it is to deny grace and to fall into Pelagianism? The author assumes too much when he assumes that Protestants hold that "the Word was made flesh." Some of them profess thus much, but very few of them hold it with sufficient firmness to feel themselves bound by any logical inference you can draw from it, while the immense majority of them do not even hold it in words, and glory in denying it. We are acquainted with no Protestants who rise above Nestorianism, and Pelagianism is the grand heresy of the age. All Protestants who are not Manichæans are Pelagians. It is of no use to appeal to the symbols and formulas of the Protestant sects, for these are no longer believed, and are kept only for the purposes of controversy. There may be a few thousands of individual Protestants in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States who really intend to believe the doctrine of the Trinity and that of the Incarnation as held by the Church in the early ages, and who would consider it a sufficient reason for rejecting a doctrine that it evidently contradicted them; but the great mass, whether they know it or not, are ingrained unbelievers, and can be convinced by no *ratio theologica*, no theological reason, or arguments drawn from the analogies of faith.

Mr. Morris is unquestionably an able and learned man, but he was a Tractarian, and in spite of himself he judges Protestants generally by what he found to be true of the Tractarians. He may, perhaps, be disposed to retort upon us that we were Unitarian, and judge the Protestant world by what we found to be true of Unitarians. But we were Presbyterian and well acquainted with Anglicanism before we became Unitarian. Moreover, when we were a Unitarian our principal study was of the non-Unitarian sects. The Unitarians with whom we associated were not a mere clique with a peculiar language and profession of their own, living and conversing only among themselves, and hardly deigning to notice any thing occurring out of their

own "set." In this they differed essentially from the Tractarians. These were a clique in the bosom of the Establishment, living, to a great extent, solely among themselves, with very little intercourse with any but persons of their own stamp. They all had the same mark, and it was as easy at a glance to say of one of them, He is a Puseyite, as it is to say of this man, He is a Quaker, or of that man, He is a Methodist minister, or a Presbyterian parson. Even when converted and received into the communion of the Church, nay, when carried through a course of theology and raised to the priesthood, the Puseyite is as unmistakable as before. No man of the least discernment could mistake the production of a converted Tractarian for that of one who had been brought up a Catholic from his childhood. At every page the peculiar habit of thought and mode of expression of the "set" are apparent. Besides, you have but to look into the natural heart, abroad upon the Protestant world, and to observe the tendencies of the Protestant mind everywhere, to find conclusive proof that our judgment, by whatever it may have been influenced, is far more conformable to fact than that of the converted Tractarians. It is far more unfavorable, we grant; but whoever considers the nature, tendencies, and effects of heresy will for that very reason conclude that it is the more likely to be the true judgment. In judging the Catholic world our rule is, The more favorable, the truer the judgment; in judging the uncatholic it is, The more unfavorable, the truer the judgment. The presumption is always in favor of the Catholic, and we can believe no evil of him till it is proved; on the other hand, the presumption is always against the heretic, and we can believe no good of him till it is proved. We require proof to believe evil of a Catholic, or to believe good of a heretic. The most favorable construction must be presumed to be the true one in case of the former, the least favorable the true one in case of the latter.

The Tractarians, in the judgment of Protestants, are virtually Papists, and Father Newman has proved, in his own inimitable way, and by a perfectly legitimate application of his doctrine of development, that Tractarianism is repugnant to genuine Anglicanism, and, we may add, then *a fortiori* to all other forms of Protestantism. It will not do, then, to take Tractarians as in any sense the repre-

representatives of the Protestant world. They represent nobody but themselves, and are merely Protestants struggling to get out of Protestantism into Catholicity, without disowning the Anglican Establishment or going to Rome. They have much in them that we like, but, logically considered, they can command no respect. They are neither fish nor flesh, nor yet good red herring. They are nice men, but shockingly bad logicians. In the general movements of our age they are a fact, but a fact of no great significance, and becoming less and less significant every day. *The Westminster Review*, under its new management, is a far better index to the tendencies of the Protestant mind even in England than *The Christian Remembrancer*, and *The Weekly Despatch* than *The Guardian*. Divine grace may be operating in this or that locality in an extraordinary way for the conversion of Protestants, but the Protestant world, as such, pursues its natural course towards the denial of all Christian doctrine, and therefore of all truth. Nothing is more evident than this to every one who has looked out from his own clique, and accustomed himself to take broad and continental, instead of narrow and insular views. England is not all the world, nor are converted and unconverted Tractarians all England. If the author could, to use his own favorite word, — which, as he and his school use it, we detest, — *realize* this, he would write a work much better adapted to the state of men's minds than is the very elaborate treatise before us.

Even under a purely literary and logical point of view, we are far from being able to commend the author's learned volumes as warmly as we could wish. It is unpleasant to have to find fault with every work that comes to us from a converted Puseyite. We exceedingly regret it. We wish some of the school would write and publish a work strictly Catholic in thought and expression, so that we could prove to them that we have no personal dislike to them, and are as willing to commend the true and the good coming from them as from any other source. We do not like the attitude we have been obliged to assume towards them; but it is not our fault. These gentlemen were a clique, a peculiar school, before their conversion, and, unhappily, they remain so since, though no doubt unintentionally, and without suspecting it. The only difference we can detect in mental and moral characteristics be-

tween a converted and an unconverted Puseyite is, that the former believes a little more, and the latter a little less. We have just read a pleasant, though not a very able work, entitled, *A Tour in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, &c.*, by James Laird Patterson. The author commenced his travels as a Puseyite, but had the happiness to be converted in Holy Week at Jerusalem, where he was reconciled to the Church. According to his account, he was conditionally baptized, and afterwards read his abjuration of Protestantism. Here it is the custom, we believe, for the convert to read his abjuration before receiving the Sacrament, — to put off Protestantism before being clothed upon with Catholicity. But it has struck us that the account given by Mr. Patterson is significant, and may explain many things which have puzzled us in the converted Tractarians, especially of the development school. They appear not to have been required to abjure their heresies before being reconciled to the Church; at least, they seem never to have comprehended that such a requirement was made, or at all necessary, in their case.

It would seem from all that we can learn respecting them, that these excellent converts never came to the Church because oppressed with the burden of sin, — because they wished to have quenched the flames of hell already kindled in their bosoms. They were not children of wrath as others, but were already good pious Christians in a degree, and needed not to have the Christian life begotten in them, but helps, which they could not find in the Anglican Establishment, to live that life in its perfection. They came to the Church, not to obtain sanctity, for that they already possessed, but to attain to *heroic sanctity*, the sanctity of canonized saints, which they became convinced that they could not have outside of the Roman Catholic Church. They had nothing to put off, no old life to reject, to anathematize, for the life they had lived was, as far as it went, the true Christian life, and what they wanted was something more than they already had, — not something radically different. Here, we apprehend, is the source of whatever misunderstanding there is between them and us. They retain their belief in the sanctity of the life they lived in the Establishment, and look upon conversion, at least in their case, as a putting on of Catholicity without any putting off of Puseyism, and their Catholic life as

a continuation of their Puseyite life under circumstances and conditions far more favorable to its development and growth. If they had been forced, as we were, to feel that we must come to the Church that we might have life, not merely that we might have it more abundantly, and that conversion and reception into the bosom of the Church were the commencement, not merely the continuation, of the Christian life, we suppose we should have found little in them with which we could not have sympathized. They would then have distrusted their past life, intellectually as well as morally, and would have set themselves to learn as little children. They would have relied on none of their past historical reading or patristic learning, nor paraded it before us till they had reviewed it in the light of Catholic faith and theology. They would then have disturbed us with no novel speculations, and insisted upon no novel theories for the explanation of facts which have no existence out of the darkened understandings of heretics.

We have no wish to disparage in any respect whatever the merits of the illustrious author, to whose ability, learning, zeal, and piety we pay a willing tribute ; but he seems to us to lack artistic taste, scientific method, and sound didactics. He is deficient in grasp and vigor of thought, in clearness and force of expression. His work has, properly speaking, no beginning, middle, or end, and he himself tells us that we may begin to read either with the first or the second part, as we choose. He has brought together a rich mass of materials, collected with great pains and labor, but he has not melted them down, and cast them into a uniform and consistent whole. His style is dry, hard, involved, and obscure. Without being verbose, it is needlessly diffuse, accumulating proofs, which do nothing to strengthen each other, on points where very little proof is required, and leaving the points most in need of proof unsustained by a single authority, — overloading with commentaries points which were originally clear and certain, and passing over with scarcely a remark those which were doubtful and in need of being elucidated. Indeed, we are at a loss to understand the author's state of mind, or to form any conception of the class of persons for whom he writes. He fails from first to last to win our confidence in his own judgment, and he very seldom enables us to deter-

mine the principle on which it rests, or the relation of that principle to the well-known principles of Catholic faith and theology. For the most part, his conclusions, we presume, are orthodox; but we feel very often that the processes by which he obtains them are exceedingly heterodox. His mental tastes and habits, his style and manner of writing, are to a great extent Protestant, or those of a man to whom truth has been presented piecemeal. He does not march straight to the heart of his subject, and lay open its central principle, from which all that appertains to it may be explained in its unity and real order. He proceeds, even when his intention is the reverse, from facts to principles, from particulars to universals, from multiplicity to unity, in the true Protestant style. He does not appear to have learned that principles are before facts, the universal or general, the generic, before the particular, and unity before multiplicity, or that, if the general is never obtainable without the particular, it is never obtainable from the particular; that unity is no induction from multiplicity, ontology from psychology, nor principles from facts. Hence he is seldom, if ever, truly logical. The Catholic has truth as a whole, in its unity and integrity, and therefore his method is to descend from the general to the particular, from unity to multiplicity, from principles to facts, and therefore a strictly logical method. He, when faithful to his privileges, borrows his light from the Creator, not the creature, enlightens facts by principles, not principles by facts, and particulars by the general, without which they are unintelligible, not the general by particulars. But the Protestant, having at best only some faint and broken reflections of truth, can only proceed by way of induction, which never leads to the truth, but the farther from it. And hence it is that Protestants, whatever their learning and ability, are always illogical and sophistical.

Logic, as an art, is the intellectual application of principles, and is determined, not by the human mind itself, but by the real or intelligible order which exists and operates independently of the human mind. Its office is not to discover principles, but to apply them; not to invent truth, but to demonstrate it. It always presupposes the mind that is to use it is already in possession of the principles to be applied, or of the truth to be demonstrated or proved. Truth is being, or that which is or exists independently of the

perceiving or reasoning mind, and principles are simply the ontological truth, either originally or by participation. Logic, therefore, depends on the real order, as much as does intuition itself, and consequently must proceed from, not to, the ontological truth or principle. It is then and must be deductive, and consequently all induction, not resolvable into deduction, is illogical, a mere sophistry. The peculiar Protestant philosophy, it is confessed on all hands, is the inductive, or, as it is sometimes called, the *Baconian* philosophy. This philosophy starts avowedly with the assumption that the general, the universal in the language of the Schoolmen, or, as we may say, the principle, is unknown, and that nothing is immediately apprehended by the mind but particulars, or simple facts. Its pretence is to rise from facts to the principle, from particulars to the general, from multiplicity to unity, from psychology to ontology, from man and the universe to God. But as the essence of logic is the application of principles to facts, not of facts to principles, &c., thus imitating in its own order, faintly, very faintly assuredly, the creative act of God by which he produces existences from nothing, (for facts without principles, particulars without the general, are unintelligible, and to the mind as if they were not,) it follows of necessity that no inductive philosopher is or can be a good logician, and if he ever reasons logically at all, it is only on condition of reasoning illogically. If a Protestant is ever logical, it is only by denying while he affirms his own system, which is supremely illogical.

Now it seems to us that the learned author has not sufficiently distrusted his Oxford logic, which has for its basis the inductive philosophy. There is no doubt, that, to most of us who are converts from Protestantism, the truth has been presented, as he says, "piecemeal," and that we came to it in its unity and integrity only by successive steps, or rather by successive illuminations. This has been owing in part to the disadvantage of our position and training. But when a Protestant has once been really converted, he is inexcusable if he then finds it necessary to continue the Protestant method. His Protestant method never brought him to the Church; he was brought in spite of that method, by the power of Divine grace, his will co-operating therewith, and, so far as reasoning entered for any thing into the process, by his unconsciously in some



cases, consciously in others, adopting and pursuing the Catholic method. Moreover, once converted and instructed in his faith, he has the truth in its unity and integrity. He can now seize it in its central principle, see the universe, natural and supernatural, from the point of view of its Creator, and descend from God to creature. He holds, so to speak, in his hand the principle of all things, from which all facts, all particular questions, are solvable. To proceed now as an inductive philosopher, as a Protestant who has truth only as reflected in faint and broken rays from the creature, is to forego his high privilege as a Catholic, and to derive, as to his manner or mode of thinking and writing, no advantage from his conversion. This is, as it seems to us, the precise case with our author. His conversion appears to have been a putting on of Catholicity without a putting off of Protestantism, or the grafting of certain Catholic truths into his Oxfordism. Hence he attempts to explain and vindicate Catholicity by Oxford logic and philosophy. All this was natural, considering that the converts of his school regarded their Oxford life as sinning only by defect, as faulty only in respect to what it lacked, not in respect to any thing it professed to have. Still, if the author had reviewed his Oxford logic and philosophy, and freed himself from their trammels, we should not have had occasion to accuse him, as we have done, of lacking grasp and vigor of thought, clearness and force of expression. If on becoming a Catholic he had taken the pains to adjust his philosophy to the ontology of the Catechism, he would have given us no occasion to complain of the diffuseness and obscurity of his work; and he would have compressed it within a third of its present dimensions, and made it far more complete, intelligible, and conclusive. As the case now stands, we are often at a loss to determine what he really means, and as we see he has an unsound philosophy, we dare not rely on his judgment, when we can determine his meaning, unless we can justify it from other sources. Whether it be Catholic or not, he gives us no means of knowing, for he does not connect the principle on which it rests with, or show its relation to, the well-known principles of Catholic faith and theology, although this is precisely what he proposes to do, and would have done, if he had followed Catholic instead of Protestant logic.

The author divides his work into three parts. In the first part he labors to prove, from the admission that "the Word was made flesh," that our Lord was perfect God and perfect man, and therefore we can predicate of him in his human nature all that we can predicate of a perfect man, — or of any man, sin excepted. In his human nature, he has the proper faculties, affections, and duties of humanity, and therefore owed to his Virgin Mother submission, the love and obedience due from a son to his mother. All this is true, and the author has admirably developed and proved it. In this respect we can warmly commend his work. In his second part, he undertakes to prove from the admission which Protestants must make, that "Mary was a good woman," that our Lord, from the first moment of his conception in her womb, enriched her with all communicable graces, and especially with full and complete knowledge of his own person and character, and of the whole mystery of redemption. Now, as Mary was at the least a good woman, she would naturally wish to know what manner of child it was that the angel had announced should be born of her, and which was conceived by the Holy Ghost in her womb. This wish would be known to the child as soon as formed, for all knowledge was infused into his human soul, by virtue of the hypostatic union, from the moment of conception. He knew the wish as soon as formed, and could comply with it, for he had all power. Thus as a dutiful and loving son he was bound to do so, and of course did do so. But it may be said that he owed a duty to his Father as well as to his Mother, and it may not have been the will of God, his Father, that he should have communicated this knowledge to his Mother so soon and at once. Very true, it *may* have been so, but it is for you to prove that it was so. Therefore it was not so, and therefore he did communicate it! (Vol. I. pp. 352, 353.) This is a tolerably fair specimen of the author's logic, when he is not assisted by the Catholic author he chances to cite. There are many things very proper in pious meditation, which are, nevertheless, of no value as arguments, and which are very unsuitable to be proposed to those who are without; for some things may be very edifying to the pious believer, that are by no means convincing to the unbeliever. We say nothing of the conclusion at which the author arrives, for we do not know what is the current

teaching of our divines on the subject. We have had, in the little time we have been in the Church, as much as we could do to learn what is of faith, without making ourselves acquainted with all the remote consequences which theologians have drawn from admitted theological principles. We know that Our Lady had the grace of humility, and that if it was the will of God that she should for a time remain in ignorance of some things pertaining to the mystery of redemption, or the person and character of her Son, which we can conceive might have been the case, she would have had no wish to be enriched all at once with the knowledge supposed, for she had no will not in accordance with the Divine will. We must, then, know by positive revelation what was the will of God in the premises, before we can conclude any thing as certain on the subject, one way or the other. Consequently, to us, the whole fabric of doctrine which the author has constructed on the supposed Protestant admission that "Mary was a good woman," even if true, has no solid foundation in any thing he has advanced. We do not, let it be understood, dispute his conclusions; we only question the process by which he professes to obtain them.

The author starts with a false principle, namely, that moral evidence can never give certainty, or any thing more than probability. The certainty of the believer, he supposes, is due not to evidence at all, but solely to the gift of faith, *donum fidei*, received in the Sacrament of Baptism. But the gift of faith adds nothing to the objective certainty, or the certainty of the matter of faith. What it gives is subjective certainty. It gives us a clearer view and a stronger hold of the objective certainty, but does not create or in any manner affect that certainty in itself. It consists in a supernatural illustration of the understanding, and a supernatural inclination of the will; but for this very reason it gives us a supernatural facility, not only to believe the truth proposed, but also to detect error and uncertainty, and consequently, instead of facilitating our belief of what is not objectively certain, or what is merely probable, it renders it all the more difficult for us to believe it; and hence, of all people in the world, Catholics are the least credulous. To deny all objective certainty, or to allow only an objective probability, is simply to declare all faith, except as an infused habit, absolutely impossible. Over-

looking this fact, denying all objective certainty, the author does not even aim in his logic to establish the objective certainty of his conclusions, and appears to suppose that he has done all that can be required of him when he has rendered it probable that they are not improbable, or incredible. He concludes *a posse ad esse*, and seldom asks any thing better than the argument *de congruo*, — and what is worse, he contends that we can have nothing better. This proceeds from his false philosophy. He and his school are genuine psychologists. They do not, perhaps, intend to deny all objective truth; but they all contend that the form under which it is apprehended depends on the human mind itself, and that the truth apprehended by us would appear very different, if our minds were differently constituted, as we may suppose it actually does to superior beings. If this be so, there can be no objective certainty, and then no demonstration, and no absolute proof, moral or metaphysical, as has been shown over and over again by those who have so fully refuted the Kantian philosophy, whether as taught by Kant himself, or as modified by Coleridge, the metaphysician of the Tractarian school. The doctrine refutes itself; for if the *nexus* between the premises and the conclusion be not necessary, there is no objective certainty; and if no objective certainty, how can you affirm fitness or congruity, or even probability? But if there is, why start with the assumption that there is not, and that the form of the object depends, either in whole or in part, on the subject? No doubt some Catholics have been trained up psychologists, which we regard as their misfortune, but no Catholic is ever a psychologist in his theology. Truth is properly defined by St. Augustine to be being, that which really is or exists, and either we are unintelligent beings, or we apprehend it, as far as we apprehend it at all, as it is or exists independent on our minds; for it is of the essence of intellect to apprehend truth, as St. Thomas himself teaches, in teaching that truth is the object of the intellect, as good is the object of the will. Superior beings see farther than we do, and know truths that we do not; but truth, as far as we see and know it, wears to us the same form that it does to them. We regret, therefore, that the author has retained his Oxford logic and metaphysics. It is not well to set out by denying in principle all objective certainty,

then to proceed to prove a thing, for aught we know, may be, and thence to conclude that it is fit to be, and if fit to be therefore it is, and may be taken as the principle from which Catholic doctrine may be concluded or vindicated. The fabrics we thus erect are simply castles in the air.

The author, we are sorry to see, is not careful to mark the distinction between opinions in the Church and the opinions of the Church. He places the opinions in the Church, which he is not forbidden to hold, on the same line with doctrines of the Church, which he is not permitted to deny, and concludes indifferently from either, what is to be received as "the mind of the Church." This is inexcusable. He has the right, when contrary opinions are held by respectable theologians, to adopt which opinion he chooses; but he can hold it only as an opinion, not as faith. Where there are contrary opinions, both of which it is lawful to hold, either may be held as an opinion, but neither can be held as Catholic doctrine, or as a principle from which positive arguments in defence of Catholic doctrine may be drawn; for the opinion that could be so taken it would not be lawful to dispute. It would in fact cease to be opinion, and become faith. The author must remember that he is avowedly writing for Protestants, and in his arguments with Protestants for Catholicity he cannot conclude from what are mere opinions amongst our own theologians. He may refer to these opinions for the purpose of warding off Protestant objections, but he cannot make them the basis of an argument to prove that a given doctrine is Catholic doctrine, and ought to be believed as such. Among the *loca theologica*, or theological topics, we do not recollect ever to have seen opinions in the Church enumerated. We do not say that the opinion of the author is not generally the sounder opinion, but we do say that he often treats opinion as if it were faith, and erects on it a fabric which he will find very apt to excite the derision or the blasphemy of those for whom he professes to write. We hold the worship which we pay to Our Blessed Lady too sacred and too tender to be exposed, as the author exposes it, to the rude scoffs of an unbelieving world, and we think that, if he chose to defend it at all, he should have done so with more reserve, or at least with arguments, and from principles, which are able to stand the test of the most rigid logical criticism, not with

principles which are perhaps questionable, and arguments which are at best ridiculous.

We are told (Vol. I. p. 8) that the first two sections of the work "may be said to be little more than an expansion of meditations, which mainly contributed to the author's own conversion." This is obvious enough on their very face, and no doubt accounts for much in them of which we are obliged to complain. As the meditations of an Anglican, working his way to the light, of which he catches partial glimpses from afar, whose rays now and then reach and cheer him with their warmth and brightness, and render visible without dissipating the darkness which surrounds him, they are most admirable, and not unworthy of being studied. But why publish them, with all their necessary crudeness and inaccuracies? Why not correct them by subsequent Catholic study and experience? In them we see too plainly the Oxford student, who has as yet no clear and distinct perception of the truth, stumbling over difficulties which a more thorough knowledge of Catholic theology would prove to be no difficulties at all. The author appears here with all his Oxford prejudices, with full confidence in his Oxford historical and patristic reading, and that lofty contempt which Oxford students always affect for the learning and judgment of Catholics. He disparages the edition of the Fathers by the learned Benedictines of St. Maur, and seems never to have thought it possible for a Catholic divine, not a graduate of a Protestant university, to instruct him, or in any manner to aid him in his researches after truth. Even the Angel of the Schools is too common an authority among Catholic students to command his respect. If he consults a Catholic author it must be an ancient Father whose sense is uncertain, or a modern doctor whose language is not always clear and definite, or whose speculations do not enter into the current theology of the Church. All this is perfectly natural in an Anglican in the process of his conversion to Catholicity, but we must be pardoned for saying, that it is not precisely what we look for in a professor in a Catholic college.

The author makes a great display of learning. He amends the Hebrew of the Old Testament, and the Greek of the New, with wonderful facility, if not felicity, — corrects the text of a Father wherever the received reading

does not happen to be to his purpose, and settles the genuineness or spuriousness of works attributed to ancient authors, without the least hesitation, deciding against all Christian antiquity without the slightest misgiving. He gives up arguments and historical readings, on which the ablest of our divines have uniformly insisted, and does it not to win the confidence of Protestants, but to save Catholics from the reproach of ignorance and credulity, or their criticism from the derision of their learned adversaries. Now in all this, for aught we know, he may be right. We are not learned enough to pass judgment on the solidity and accuracy of his learning. But the lofty airs he assumes, and his low appreciation of all Catholic intelligence and scholarship are not precisely fitted to win our confidence. It would be well for us who are converts to learn what Catholics really know, before we take it upon us to treat them as mere sciolists and pious fools, or for granted that we have brought into the Church an invaluable treasure in our Protestant cultivation and learning. The Church, perhaps, could have contrived, with the blessing of God, to get along without us, much better than we without her. After all, we brought her nothing to boast of, nothing but our sins, our ignorance, and our infirmities. Our conversion is not likely to create a new epoch in her history. And for us to suppose that we can throw new light on the sacred mysteries, and clear up in a new and more satisfactory way the abstruse points of theology which Catholic theologians have not yet settled, would, were it not presumptuous, be simply ridiculous. We ought to consider ourselves as knowing nothing except what we have learned since our reconciliation to the Church, at the feet of her teachers and pastors.

For ourselves, we confide in no judgments we formed prior to our conversion, and trust no historical or patristic reading we had then made, save so far as we have since reviewed it in the light of Catholic faith and theology. We have felt it necessary to learn all anew under the direction of Catholic teachers, who happen never to have been schismatics or heretics, and whom we have found abundantly able to instruct us in every branch of science and erudition. We know no reason why this should have been more necessary in the case of a converted Unitarian, than in that of a converted Puseyite. Indeed, it strikes us

as less necessary, because the line of demarcation between Unitarianism and Catholicity is so broad and distinct, that no one of ordinary discernment can mistake it; while Puseyism runs so near to Catholicity on so many points, so successfully counterfeits Catholic doctrines and practices, that, if we are not on our guard, we may easily mistake the one for the other. Human nature in the absence of Satanic temptation can go far, and with Satanic aid may go much farther, in counterfeiting Catholic faith and sanctity, and it is not always easy to distinguish the asceticism of the Stoic, which springs from pride, from the asceticism of the Christian, which springs from humility, or the sanctity of Littlemore, for instance, so praised by Father Dominic, from the supernatural sanctity of the Catholic. It requires an extraordinary grace to be a discernor of spirits. The same counterfeit is often effected in doctrine, and the resemblance of the counterfeit to the genuine is often so close, as to be most difficult even for well-informed persons to detect. The Oxford converts themselves were deceived, for the sanctity which they believed they possessed, of which they were accustomed to boast, and to which for a long time they referred as a full justification of their remaining in the Anglican Establishment, they held to be true Christian sanctity, when in reality it was no more Christian sanctity than is that exhibited by some Moravians, Methodists, and Quakers, or even some of the ancient or modern Pagans. The closer the resemblance of one's life to Catholicity before, the more liable is he to err after, his conversion; and the farther removed one's heresy from orthodoxy before his conversion, the less liable is he to retain it afterwards. The Tractarian converts, from the peculiarity of their doctrine and practice prior to their reconciliation to the Church, are, of all classes of English and American converts, precisely those who are the most likely to originate a new heresy among us, or to fail to apprehend and maintain Catholic doctrine in its integrity. Their writings must always be read with the presumption against them. Therefore, of all should they be the most careful to rely in nothing on their past life, save as they review it in the light of what they have learned since their conversion, not under instructors who, like themselves, are but recent converts, of their own class, but under such as have been Catholics from their youth. These hints and



suggestions may not be called for, and our impression with regard to the Tractarian converts may be wholly unauthorized; but we fear that what we have said, ungracious as it may seem, is not misplaced or mistimed. We sincerely wish, therefore, that, instead of giving us the meditations which mainly contributed to his own conversion, the author had given us meditations and arguments that originated in his Catholic faith and study, and therefore such as ought to convince those without of the truth of Catholicity. He would then have written, not as a convert from Puseyism, but as a Catholic.

Our limits do not permit us to give a full analysis of the author's work. The great body of his work is undoubtedly Catholic, sound, and really meritorious. But aside from the faults we have already found with its style, logic, and philosophy, and aside from the fault we shall soon have to find with the theory on which it is confessedly written, there are one or two points on which the author, in his direct teaching, is undeniably heterodox. In his table of contents we find this startling proposition: "Even fatalism would not exempt from moral responsibility." Here is his illustration and proof of it:—

"It has been shown by Butler, in his admirable *Analogy*, that, if the opinion of a necessity or fate could be proved, it would do little to influence practice with any reasonable man. Whatever excuse can be made for the man who murders, or the child who steals upon the score of necessity, will also serve as an excuse for the magistrate who executes the one, or the parent who punishes the latter. And this among other considerations shows, that however intoxicated with fatalism men might be at the first draught of it, still after a while men would be treated as if they were free, and forced against themselves to believe it. The very words for 'fate' imply a speaker or distributor who made the fatum to exist. Now if it be true that that fatalism which puts this reflection out of sight would leave moral obligations where they are, then predestinarianism itself would not destroy them, the Catholic doctrine of predestination far less." — Vol. I. p. 119.

This is wretched sophistry, as well as bad theology. Butler is no great authority with us, but as cited by the author he does not attempt to prove that fatalism is compatible with moral responsibility; he simply contends that men, if they held it, would be *practically* obliged to act as if they held it not, and to distribute rewards and punish-

ments as they do now,—a mere truism. He does not assert, and far less does he prove, that, if fatalism were true, they would be *morally* responsible agents, and therefore subjects of moral praise and blame. Because men would do as they do now in their practical conduct, through an irresistible fate, even assuming fate to be the decree of God, it would not follow that predestinarianism itself would not take away moral responsibility. Fate, whether taken in the old heathen sense, or as the author explains it, stands opposed to free will; and does the author mean to say that without free will we should or could be morally responsible? Predestination, in the Calvinistic sense, is repugnant, and always held by Catholic divines to be repugnant, to moral responsibility, because it destroys free will. It is simple fate, and renders its author, or he who spoke the *fatum*, the real actor in all the acts of man. And hence Calvin makes God the author of sin. Predestination, in the Catholic sense, does not take away moral responsibility, most assuredly, simply because it does not take away free will; because it is not *fate*, or a predestination that executes itself without the free concurrence of the will of the predestinated, that is, the free concurrence of a will intrinsically free not to have concurred. How predestination, which is certain and infallible, can coexist with the freedom of the will, is a mystery which human reason cannot explain. But if the word *fate* has any meaning in our language, it denies free will, and if there is any thing certain in theology or philosophy, it is that the denial of free will is the denial of all moral obligation, of all merit and all demerit. It is therefore false, and, reference had to the definitions of the Church condemning Calvinism and Jansenism, even heretical, to say that “even fatalism would not exempt from moral responsibility.” The author, in his whole chapter on predestination, from which we have taken the passage cited above, seems to us either to use language very loosely, or else to be writing on a subject which he has by no means mastered. We can gather very little that is definite from what he says. This, however, may be owing to our own ignorance and dulness of apprehension.

But here is another passage which, with all respect, we would recommend to the notice of his Eminence, Cardinal Wiseman, to whom these volumes are dedicated by the author:—

"Now suppose a state of things in which it was an acknowledged principle, not only that Christ did every thing as an example to us, but also that it was a clear case that he on several occasions . . . . . disguised his real meaning, though he knew people in general would draw a conclusion from his words just the opposite of that meaning. If this was the state of things in which the Fathers lived, it is plain that they might treat heretics as our Lord did the impertinent thoughts of his disciples, when he answered them by this wise but evasive *climax*. [St. Mark xiii. 32.] Hence it is clear, that if a number of passages can be quoted from the Fathers, in which the ignorance is ascribed to Christ's human nature without more ado, such passages may be nothing more than a convenient answer to present difficulties, and not in the least a statement of their real doctrine upon the subject. Until the reverse of this can be distinctly proved, it will not avail to quote these passages in defence of the Ignorantists [Agnoetæ]. There is no Catholic divine now-a-days, probably, who would not admit that such evasive answers were not only no lies, but absolutely allowable when impertinent questions were put. There are a very few, if any, Protestants, who would not practically use this principle in real life, however indignantly they may at first sight repudiate it. It is lawful in some cases for inferiors to answer superiors in this way ; as, for instance, if you asked a servant if he had been ever guilty of theft, for no one is obliged to criminate himself ; but there are far more cases, where it is lawful for superiors to evade questions which inferiors have no right to ask. Hence it was lawful for our Lord and Master, the absolute ruler of his creatures, to answer impertinent thoughts in this manner. And, by parallel reasoning, it was lawful for the Fathers to answer heretics in a way which, while it disguised their own sentiments probably, nevertheless did the heretics good. For it is always lawful to lead a man away from a greater sin by leading him to a less : thus nobody in his sane senses would deny that it was a virtuous deed to induce a man to stupefy himself by drink, who would only use his wits to avail himself of a solitary opportunity for murder of a man in mortal sin, or adultery mutually agreed upon. If any body would deny it, it must be simply because he had never given the question a thought, or else because he was so dull of conscience as to prefer the ruin of two souls to the temporary suspension of the powers of one. Now if the Fathers could lead the heretics to blaspheme the human nature of Christ, to do so was to lead them to a less sin than blaspheming his Divine nature, which blasphemy might never be forgiven, neither in this world nor in purgatory." — Vol. I. pp. 263 – 265.

The doctrine which the ordinary reader will draw from this language is, that it is sometimes lawful to lie for the interests of truth, and to do evil for a good end ; in other

words, that "the end justifies the means," — the very doctrine which is so generally, and so falsely, laid to the charge of Catholic theologians, especially the learned Fathers of the Society of Jesus. The author himself seems to warrant this interpretation of his language, for he says expressly, "Jesus would be condemned of jesuitry by those out of the Church, if he lived in our days." (Vol. I. pp. 296, 297.) The author is not writing for Catholics, who may be presumed to know their own doctrine, but avowedly for Protestants, who are supposed to be ignorant of it, and who expect, as he must know, that a Catholic writing on this subject, which has been so much controverted, so foully misrepresented, and made the occasion of so much scandal, will state the Catholic doctrine in a form as little likely to be mistaken for the one commonly charged against us as the truth will possibly permit. It is fair, then, to presume, if he not only does not disclaim expressly the doctrine charged, of which he clearly is not ignorant, but uses language which seems to warrant it, and in some respects certainly does warrant it, that he really holds and intends to teach it; for, under such circumstances, an author's doctrine is to be inferred fully as much from what he refrains from denying as from what he actually asserts, and the rule for interpreting his language is to put upon it, not the most favorable, but the least favorable construction that it will bear, — especially when, as in the case before us, he is *ex professo* explaining and defending *œconomia* in presenting the truth, that is, the presenting it so as to avoid as much as possible the giving of scandal, or leading people into error and sin. If the author holds that what is called Jesuitry, the doctrine that it is lawful to lie for the truth, and to do evil for a good end, is really reprehensible, why does he use language that may, without violence, be understood to imply it? Or why does he not take special pains to frame his language so as to guard against it, by marking clearly the distinction between it and the true Catholic doctrine?

What the author in the secrets of his own heart intends, we know not, and judge not, for we are treating of the author, not the man. We presume he means right, but he evidently thinks loosely, and expresses himself carelessly, almost wantonly. He neglects to distinguish between not telling truth, and telling what is not truth. No doubt it is

sometimes lawful, nay, sometimes our duty, to conceal or not disclose the truth we may happen to know, but it is never lawful to do so by telling that which is not true. When we are questioned by those who have no right, or on matters on which they have no right, to question us, and when the truth, if told, would scandalize or lead men into error and sin, as sometimes happens, we are free to practise what the Fathers called *œconomia*, or prudently to withhold it, and to evade the questions put; but never are we free to withhold it or to evade the questions put by answering what is false, or what, in a sense the hearers may not with due diligence ascertain, is not true. If the hearers are misled by the answers given, it must be by their own fault, not ours, — by the inferences which they unnecessarily draw from our words. If the answers we give, in order to escape telling the truth we are either not bound to tell or bound not to tell, are false, in every sense, according to ordinary usage of language in like cases, or are true only by virtue of some mental restriction or reservation, or some peculiar sense of our own which the hearer has no natural means of ascertaining, they are inadmissible, for then they are literally lies, and it is never lawful, under any circumstances whatever, to lie. Such, briefly stated, is the doctrine of our theologians, as we could easily prove by citations, were they necessary for any other purpose than to show our learning, and within this doctrine can be brought all the examples from our Lord and the Fathers which the author refers to.

“It is lawful in some cases for inferiors to answer superiors in this way: as, for instance, if you asked a servant if he had been ever guilty of theft, for no one is obliged to criminate himself.” In case the superior has no right to the true answer to the question, conceded; but if he has, the case is not so clear; for it is not certain that no one is ever bound to criminate himself, or rather, when juridically interrogated, to confess an act which may criminate him. Under the Common Law, which obtains in England and most of our States, no man is bound to criminate himself; and it is understood on both sides that the state must convict the criminal by other testimony than his own, unless that is voluntarily given, or else not convict him at all. But this is not, as it seems to us, necessarily a principle of universal law. The good of the republic requires that

crimes should be detected and punished, and the criminal, in his quality of citizen or subject, may be obliged, for aught we can see, if the republic chooses, to testify as a witness against himself, as well as against another; and if so, he must be bound to give true and faithful answers as much as any other witness. But be this as it may, and even conceding the right of the servant, in the case supposed, to give an evasive or equivocal answer, he certainly has no right to answer what is not true, or what, without any regard to his own mental restriction or mental reservation, of which his master can know nothing, is necessarily false. "There are far more cases, where it is lawful for superiors to evade questions which inferiors have no right to ask." Undoubtedly, within the limits of the rule we have laid down; but there are none in which they have a right to evade even such questions by direct, plain, and necessary falsehood, or by an answer which must necessarily imply, in the ordinary usage of words in such case, what is not true.

"For it is always lawful to lead a man away from a greater sin by leading him to a less." The author here shows that he holds that the alleged evasions of our Lord and the Fathers, of which he has just spoken, did lead men into sin, though a less sin than that which they led them from. We deny both the fact here supposed, and the principle on which the author attempts to justify it. The so-called evasive answers of our Lord and the Fathers, or *œconomia*, as it is termed, which they on some occasions practised, did not of themselves lead men to any sin at all, and it is nothing short of blasphemy, at least in the case of our Lord, to allege that they did. The principle alleged in justification is false. Sin is never lawful, for by its very definition it is the transgression of the law, and therefore it can never be lawful to lead a man to commit sin, since to lead a man to commit a sin is to participate of its guilt. Otherwise there would be gross injustice in punishing the accessory to a crime, whether before or after the fact. It is lawful to lead a man from a greater sin, though in doing so you do not, cannot, and know you cannot, prevent him, if you do so, from committing a less sin; but never is it lawful to lead him from it by leading him to commit the less; for in the former case the direct and only positive influence of your action is to prevent sin, which is always not

only lawful, but landable, and all that can be said is, that you were not able to prevent all the sin the man was determined to commit: but in the latter case the direct tendency of your action is to lead a man to commit sin, which is never lawful. "Nobody in his sane senses would deny that it was a virtuous deed to induce a man to stupefy himself by drink, who would only use his wits to avail himself of a solitary opportunity for murder of a man in mortal sin, or adultery mutually agreed upon." If stupefying himself with drink in the case supposed is sin on the part of the man himself, we deny it; for we may never do evil that good may come. If you say the stupefaction is not a sin on the part of the man himself, we concede your conclusion, but then it is nothing to your purpose; for then it only implies that it is a virtuous act by lawful means, or means not unlawful, to lead men from sin, which, indeed, nobody in his sane senses will deny, whether the sin be great or little. The case is to your purpose only on condition that stupefying one's self with drink is always in itself sin, and if it be so, it is undeniable that you cannot, without sin, for any purpose whatever, induce a person so to stupefy himself. Whether it would in the case supposed be or be not a sin, we are not called upon to decide.

"If the Fathers could lead the heretics to blaspheme the human nature of Christ, to do so was to lead them to a less sin than blaspheming his Divine nature, which blasphemy might never be forgiven, neither in this world nor in purgatory." Certainly, if blaspheming our Lord in his human is indeed a less sin than blaspheming him in his Divine nature; but to blaspheme the human nature of Christ is unquestionably a sin, and therefore the Fathers could not lawfully lead the heretics to commit it even for the purpose of preventing them from committing the greater sin of blaspheming his Divine nature. What the author might have said, all he needed to say, and perhaps all that he thought he was saying, is, that it was lawful for the Fathers to prevent, if they could, the heretics from blaspheming the Divine nature of Christ, though they suffered them, since they could not prevent them from doing the one or the other, to blaspheme the human nature, and that in doing so they would have been performing a virtuous action, because they would have prevented, if not all sin, at least

the greater sin. If he had said this, nobody could have objected, or pretended that he favored, what is popularly called Jesuitry, — a doctrine which he ought to know, if he does not know, is no Catholic doctrine, and is falsely and calumniously laid to the charge of the illustrious Society of Jesus.

What the author really intends may or may not be orthodox, but his doctrine as he develops and sets it forth is certainly false and scandalous, for his language is well fitted to confirm the calumnious accusations of Protestants against us. This is not the first time we have encountered this detestable doctrine among the Tractarian converts. We found it in Dr. Newman's Essay on Development; we have found it in some of their contributions to *The Dublin Review*, and it seems to have been adopted by the whole school, both before and since their conversion. The Tractarians in the Anglican Establishment were, as they felt, in a false position. They held doctrines and observed practices which that Establishment repudiated, while they asserted its full authority to teach, and their duty of unreserved submission to its teaching. Their study was to advocate what their Church condemned without compromising themselves, or saying any thing which could be made the ground of convicting them of positively departing from her standards. The most disingenuous publication we recollect ever to have read was the famous Tract No. 90, written by Dr. Newman before his conversion. The position of the whole school was a practical lie, and its more distinguished members were laboring with all their might to teach their Church, while they confessed her right to teach them, and made as if they learned only from her. They thus contracted a habit of disingenuous writing, which, while it suggested their meaning so plainly that nobody could really mistake it, yet did not often positively commit them to any thing for which their Church could call them to an account. They were aware of this, even boasted of it, and they justified it on the ground that the end they had in view was a good end, and that they were laboring in the interests of Catholic truth and piety, — the precise ground assumed by our author in defence of the Fathers, and even of our Lord himself. When the excellent Father Glover sent Dr. Newman, then at Rome, by the hands of the lamented Father Shaw, our



first article against his Essay on Development, with the request that he would read it, he replied, as Mr. Shaw informed us, "that he had heard of the article, but he had no time nor wish to read it. He had no hard feelings against the writer personally for having written it, but he was sorry that he had done so, for he had reason to believe that the Essay was doing great good in England." So he looked only at the effects his theory was producing, or supposed to be producing, in a particular locality, without at all troubling himself with the question whether it was true or false; that is, he was willing that the theory, even if false and mischievous, should go uncontradicted, if for the moment it *per accidens* facilitated the conversion of a few Anglicans. This is the only principle we can deduce from the reason he assigns for regretting the publication of our article against his Essay, and this is identically the principle Mr. Morris generalizes and sets forth in the work before us, or what is properly termed Jesuitry.

We find it, in consequence of this Tractarian habit of expressing more on some occasions than is professed, exceedingly difficult to hold the writers who have come to us from the Tractarian school to any fixed or definite statements. They are vague and uncertain, loose and vacillating. They do not distinctly state a thesis and abide by it. They are developmentists. Their thesis grows or changes as they proceed, expands or contracts, becomes now this, or now that, according to the exigencies of the argument. Father Newman, in his Lectures on the Difficulties of Anglicans, has occasion to touch his theory of development. He approaches it with great modesty, and with statements perfectly unexceptionable. You begin to feel that he has renounced it, or that after all he has never really meant any thing more by it than is warranted by the received theology of the Church. His first statement is perfectly satisfactory, and if we stop with it, we have no objection to offer. But we read on, and what in an ordinary writer would be only a logical development, or an illustration of his thesis, becomes unexpectedly an increase or growth of the thesis itself. The development, instead of a logical or an illustrative development, which merely enables us to see the original statement in its true light, and in its logical contents and relations, turns out to be a development by accretion, and takes in other and additional statements,

which entirely change the character of the original thesis, although a careless reader might not observe it. This is, we suppose, an illustration of what he means by growth of doctrine. Just so is it with the author before us. His first simple statement of Catholic morality is unexceptionable; but as he proceeds to develop it he takes up new principles, — accumulates a series of illustrations which develop his doctrine into another, almost totally the reverse of the one with which he set out. You see this, you feel it, you know it; yet, if you accuse him of holding the doctrine with which he ends, you will have no little difficulty in convicting him of doing so; for he has so expressed himself, that, if hard pressed, he can contract his doctrine to his first simple statement, and, when the pressure is removed, expand it to any dimensions he pleases. The great body of Catholic readers will, in consequence of their own logical training, be disposed to interpret him always in accordance with his primitive statements; Protestants for whom he writes, and who better understand his method of writing, since it is very much their own method, will much more truly interpret him by his last statements, and take his developed as his real doctrine. It is singular, that complaints of the sort we here bring are precisely the complaints which the Fathers and all our modern controversialists uniformly bring against the heretics they are opposing. Our author and his school, if free from heresy, have at least the usual arts of heresy, and a most heretical manner of writing.

The author is a developmentist, and along with his main design has evidently wished to show, on the one hand, that Protestants can make nothing of the Fathers without the infallible Church as living interpreter of them, and on the other, that Catholics can make just as little of them without the theory of development. The former is done to show Protestants why he is a Catholic, the latter to show us why he was an Anglican, or not sooner converted, — how he can be a Catholic now without blaming himself for having been so long an Anglican, notwithstanding his profound knowledge of the Fathers. He could not remain an Anglican, because he could not without the Church determine fully what is Christian doctrine; he could not become a Catholic before the invention of the theory of development, because such are the omissions and contra-

dictions of the Fathers, and such the discrepancies between their teachings and those of the present Church of Rome, that it was impossible, without a theory which Roman divines had never recognized, or at least never made use of, to reconcile the Church with the Fathers, and the Fathers with one another, or a given Father with himself. He does not say all this in just so many words, but he seems to us to imply it throughout his book. Catholics may, he says, reconcile the difficulties presented by St. John Chrysostom without the theory of development if they can; he cannot, and does not attempt to do it. He does not, we own, bring the theory prominently forward, but he presupposes it, and confessedly attempts to explain only those difficulties which would be difficulties in case the theory were received as true. There can be no reasonable doubt that he holds it, nor is there known to us any reason for supposing that it is not still held by Father Newman and all the converts of his school, or that they do not still consider its invention or its statement and regular development as an important contribution to Catholic theology.

We have no intention of entering anew, at any great length, into the discussion of Dr. Newman's theory of development. We have heretofore discussed it sufficiently. We have taken great pains to reëxamine the question within the last three or four years, and have been only the more confirmed in the judgment of it, which we have already expressed over and over again. We think the theory uncalled for, unauthorized by a single Catholic writer of the least note, and also false and pernicious. *The Dublin Review* had the temerity, indeed, to cite Suarez in support of it; it might as well have cited our own pages, for the statement of Catholic doctrine which we opposed to it was given in almost the very words of Suarez literally translated, although we had not read him at the time on the subject. We have since read him, and we must tell *The Dublin Review* that its charge, that we, in commenting on its citation from him, took his statement of a theory he was combating for his own, is not well founded. From that citation alone, we had collected the doctrine of Suarez correctly, notwithstanding the Reviewer had cited him very unfairly.

We do not ourselves lay claim to any extensive or profound knowledge of the Fathers; we have neither read

them all, nor all the works of any one of the more voluminous of them. But we have at least looked into some of them, and ascertained enough to be able to assert, without rashness, that they present no difficulties which require for their explication the development theory; and we can easily prove as much from the pages of Mr. Newman's Essay and the book before us. Both Mr. Newman and his disciple, Mr. Morris, afford ample evidence that all the doctrines which they call developments, in so far as they specify them, were believed and held by the Church from the earliest ages. That the faith in the course of time has, in some respects, gained in evidence, light, and distinctness, as says St. Vincent of Lerins, no man who knows any thing of the subject doubts; but that the Church has in process of time taken up or evolved new doctrines, implied in or required by the original *depositum*, unknown to her or to her Fathers in the first ages, we do most unequivocally deny. That we can in all cases sustain this denial without appeal to the decisions of popes and councils, we do not assert; but in arguing with a Catholic, or one who professes to be a Catholic, that is no objection. We are not obliged, in order to sustain it to a Catholic, to prove by an authority independent of popes and councils, that a given doctrine was known and believed at a given time, for if that authority has decided that it has always been the faith of the Church from the first, the question is settled, and no Catholic can open his mouth.

Here is where, we apprehend, the developmentists are principally at fault. They probably do not always consider their theory as absolutely necessary to remove any difficulties the Catholic may encounter in explaining and vindicating the faith to Catholics; they more frequently consider, most likely, their theory as chiefly necessary in the case of those without, or more especially in the case of learned Anglicans. These, not accepting the authority of the Church, cannot, without such theory, get over the difficulties presented to their minds by the Fathers, nor can we without it satisfactorily explain those difficulties to them. But the theory is either true or false. If true, it is as true for us as for them; if it is false, we have no right to propose it to them. Do our developmentists hold that their theory is false, or, as Mr. Newman calls it, only "an expedient," and simply make use of it to remove the un-

founded prejudices of Protestants, justifying themselves in doing so on the ground that it is lawful to use falsehood in the interests of truth? This, we have seen, they are not free to do. Either we need the theory to explain the alleged difficulties to ourselves, in case we are to explain them at all, or we do not. If we do not, the difficulties are themselves unreal, imaginary, and the theory of development itself is false; for there has been no development in the sense it alleges. If we cannot explain to Protestants the difficulties they find, or imagine they find, without it, we must let them go unexplained. We are anxious for their conversion, but we would not knowingly advocate a false theory, even if by so doing we could convert the whole world. God could save all the world, if he would; indeed, he wills all to be saved, and provides all with sufficient means; but he will save no one at the expense of truth, or without the voluntary concurrence of the subject, or in any other way than the one he has established. It will not do, as we have observed is sometimes the case with the converted Tractarians, to understand what St. Paul says about beguiling as if it authorized us to deceive or cheat people into a belief of the truth.

Certain it is, that the theory cannot be accepted or used if it be false, or not true. To use it as an hypothesis or expedient for the explication of certain alleged facts, whether true or false, will not answer, because it is itself only an induction from those facts, and therefore a fact or a no-fact itself. To allege it, in case it is false, is not simply to allege a false explication of a fact, but a false fact. It depends for its truth on the facts it is to explain, and cannot be conceived as true if those facts, in the character alleged, are themselves unreal or do not exist. If, as commonly believed, the faith has come down to us from the first in its purity and integrity, without diminution or addition, the facts alleged do not exist, there has been no development in the sense of the theory, and therefore the theory, which must presuppose those facts, is false and in direct contradiction to the truth; consequently, inadmissible even as an hypothesis or expedient. The developmentists should, then, first of all establish the necessity of the theory, by establishing the existence of an order of facts which demand it. What we ask of them, then, first of all, is to give us a precise statement, with full evidence

of their reality, of the facts which they propose to explain by their theory, or of what they call developments, or proofs of development. Regarded as an hypothesis or expedient for the explication of facts, nobody objects to it, in case the facts themselves exist; for it is then only a general or scientific statement of them, since those facts must themselves be developments. Under this point of view, the objection is not that it does not explain the facts, but that the facts do not themselves exist, and cannot be said to exist without denying the whole Christian religion.

Now, we respectfully request the developmentists, in the first place, to establish the fact, not that there has been development in some sense; or that there have been from time to time, and even may be hereafter, new definitions of faith on the occasion of new errors or heresies; or that certain points of faith, originally formally proposed indeed, but *in globo*, as we may say, have, in the course of time, as they have been controverted and made the subject of special study, been more distinctly drawn out and precisely stated than they were at first, — for this no Catholic denies, or dreams of denying; but that there has been the order of facts they contend for, or actual development in the sense their theory presupposes, — that is, that, as time has rolled on, new doctrines have been evolved from the original *depositum*, or assimilated to it, which were unknown to the primitive believers and not formally, though indistinctly, believed by them, — for their theory means this, or it means nothing; and in the second place, to draw up a complete and authenticated list of the doctrines, dogmas, or propositions of faith, which they hold to have been obtained by development, together with the exact date of the time when they respectively first became known to the Church, and were adopted as part and parcel of her creed. Till they do thus much, all controversy with them on their theory, save as to its metaphysics, must be carried on in the dark, and be incapable of being brought to any definite issue. Surely this request is reasonable, and we hope they will not refuse to comply with it. We make the request far more for their sake than for our own. We think that they have taken up their theory without any thorough examination of the real character of the facts which they propose to explain by it, and that they continue to hold it, because they have never seriously undertaken to define it

even to themselves, and have never settled in their own minds, with exactness and precision, what they do or do not mean by it. We have found all the advocates of the theory with whom we have conversed, however clear and definite on other subjects, no sooner touching upon it, than they become all at once vague and uncertain in their views, vacillating in their expressions, and unable to hit upon any statement which seems exactly to express what they mean. This comes, we apprehend, from the fact that what they mean is neither defined in their minds nor capable of being defined, and that any statement they can frame will either express too much or too little to satisfy them. If the developmentists should undertake to comply with our request, they would most likely discover this, and find that they either mean no more than their opponents concede, or else that they mean what no Catholic can hold, and therefore come to the conclusion, either that they have been making a great ado about nothing, or that they have unwittingly fallen into a most grave error, which it imports them to lose no time in abandoning. Their theory would either vanish in smoke, or be found untenable and pernicious, as hateful to them as it is to us. We do them no injustice when we say, that they are not only inexact writers, but loose thinkers. The attempt to write with a little more exactness and precision would soon compel them to think with more exactness and precision.

No doubt, many will think that remarks like these cannot, without injustice, be applied to Dr. Newman. Dr. Newman is in some respects, we grant, clear and acute as a thinker, and choice and exact as a writer; but he is a man of a sharp rather than a broad and comprehensive intellect. He has little faculty of grasping a subject in its unity and integrity, and he never masters a subject by first seizing it in its central principle, and thence descending to its several details. To use a form of expression borrowed from himself, he takes in an idea, not as a whole, but by viewing it successively under a variety of separate aspects,—by walking all around it, and viewing it successively under all its aspects. He thus attains only to particular views, never to unity of view, or to the comprehension of the idea as a whole. No man has, within the range of these particular views, a clearer or a keener sight than he, and no man can more clearly, vividly, distinctly, accurately, or forcibly ex-

press what he thus apprehends. But nevertheless, whenever he attempts to mould his particular views into a systematic whole, he becomes confused, obscure, vague, and vacillating. His mind is a purely inductive mind, the impersonation of the inductive philosophy, and proceeds not from unity to multiplicity, from principles to facts, but the reverse. He will seize on a particular fact, and generalize it into the basis of a universe. In consequence of the narrowness and unphilosophical character of his mind, his attention is fixed for the time being always on one particular aspect of a subject, which he necessarily treats provisionally, as if it were the entire subject in its unity. His language, chosen for the expression of that particular aspect, lacks breadth, comprehensiveness, and becomes inappropriate, obscure, and false as the representative of the truth not merely as he views it, but as it really is in itself, independent of him. So we cannot, with all his particular merits, which are very great, exempt him from the common complaint which we make of his whole school.

The greater part of the offence we take at what the developmentists inculcate is not to what they openly, distinctly, and formally state; but to what they hint, insinuate, or bring in incidentally, or as it were by way of illustration, or development. The direct thesis, when they have a direct thesis, which they profess to maintain, we can in most cases accept; but they no sooner state it, than they bring in surreptitiously, as if in illustration or support of it, matter which we are obliged to reject with horror. Incidentally Mr. Morris tells us that St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination and grace was in his time a novelty, that is, we suppose, a development, and that it was not generally accepted in the East (Vol. I. pp. 130, 131). This grave charge against the great doctor of grace, if it could be sustained, since it is undeniable that the doctrine taught by St. Augustine in his latest writings on this subject is that of the Church, would go far towards sustaining the theory of development. But there is not a word of truth in it. It is no new charge; it was made by the old Pelagians, and especially the Semi-Pelagians, and their successors in modern times have never ceased to repeat it. Suarez\* takes it up *ex professo*, and refutes it; and the great Bos-

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\* Prolegomenon VI. cap. 6.



suet, in his *Defense de la Tradition et des Saints Pères*\* against M. Simon, who had insisted upon it in his *Histoire Critique des principaux Commentateurs de Nouveau Testament depuis le Commencement du Christianisme jusqu'à Notre Temps*, etc., replies to it at great length, completely refuting it in both its parts, and, what is more to our present purpose, expressly denying and refuting the theory of development at the same time. Mr. Morris is found in bad company when he brings this charge, and we advise him in the next edition of his work to cancel it. It is true, he brings it for a very different purpose from that of M. Simon, Grotius, and other Pelagians or Semi-Pelagians, and without looking upon it as a charge at all; but Suarez terms it "a calumny," *calumnia*, and Bossuet treats it as virtually heretical, and we cannot look upon it as any more true when alleged by a developmentist than when alleged by a Pelagian, when for a good than when for a bad purpose. Bossuet and Suarez, on a question of this nature, are very respectable authorities, and, besides, they sustain themselves by a most formidable list of Fathers, both Eastern and Western, among whom in the East we find St. Gregory Nazianzen, and our author's favorite, St. Ephrem, both of whom teach the same doctrine as St. Augustine. But after all, it is possible that the testimony of Catholic divines who have never had the advantage of being brought up in heresy will not weigh much with our author, when opposed to his favorite theory, and hence we will spare ourselves the trouble of citing some decisive passages bearing on the theory, from so decidedly a Catholic doctor, and therefore so inconsiderable an authority, as St. Thomas of Aquin.

In the third part of his work, the author undertakes to prove the immaculate conception of Our Lady, or her perfect immunity from all stain of original sin. We have only glanced at this part, for it carries on a discussion in which we have no wish to engage. We believe as firmly in the immaculate conception as any one can believe a point which has been questioned, and on which the Church has not as yet formally pronounced, and we always avail ourselves of the privilege allowed us when we say the Litany of Our Blessed Lady, our own dear Mother, to add, "*Re-*

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\* Livre V. chap. 5 et seq.

*gina, sine labe concepta, ora pro nobis."* We know no reason why, if it be of faith, the Church cannot so declare it, and whether it be so or not she is the judge, not we. Whether it is or is not desirable that she should decide the case which has for so many years been pending in her court, it is not for us to say. She does not need our consent, or our counsel, and we have not the impertinence to tell her what we do or do not wish. We look to her to instruct us, and we trust we need but to hear her voice to be ready to obey it, whether it commands what we have or have not wished. But there is little doubt in our mind, that the doctrine of development is favored by many, because they wish the Church to define the immaculate conception to be of faith, and that those who wish to advocate the theory are extremely solicitous to have this decision made. The former think the doctrine would much facilitate, if not the definition itself, at least its reception; the latter, that the definition would give the seal of the Church to their theory. A learned friend of ours, in a conversation the other day, after conceding that Mr. Newman's theory of development was wrong, yet would have some theory of the kind allowed, because of the general desire to have this question defined. We see no need of any theory of development in the case. The simple question to be decided is, not whether the immunity of Our Lady from all stain of original sin is or is not sufficiently developed to be ruled an article of faith, but whether it be or be not an Apostolic and Divine tradition. If it is, the Church can declare it to be so; if not, she cannot define it to be of faith, for to define a point to be of faith is neither more nor less than to declare it to be an Apostolic and Divine tradition. The definition demands no doctrine of development, either to be made or defended, and in defining it the Church will give no more countenance to such a doctrine than she does in deciding any litigated point of faith. We see nothing in our theology to change in case the definition should be made. We should not, unless the Church expressly so decided, regard the definition either as a development or as the result of development; for the fact that it has not hitherto been made would count for nothing, since the case is not now taken up anew, but has really been in court ever since a serious controversy first arose on the subject, and the action has been continued without being de-

cided. Why the Church has not decided it sooner, or why, having delayed it so long, she should decide it now, is no affair of ours. She is the legitimate judge, not only of what is the faith, but of the time when it is proper to define it.

But it is time to draw our remarks to a close. We cannot expect that all we have said will be acceptable to the Oxford converts and their friends. We expect to be censured, and censured severely; but we have said nothing in wantonness, or from any personal motive. The author and his friends have never crossed our path, and are not likely to do so. Their line in life runs remote from ours. They have done us personally no injury, and conferred on us no benefits. Personally there is no reason in the world why we should be opposed to them, or should not in all respects sympathize with them. We have no prejudices against them because they are converts, and can have none, for we are a convert ourselves, and only a year older as a convert than Dr. Newman himself. In learning, cultivation, piety, and fervor, we are not worthy to be compared with the meanest of them. Why, then, should we attack them? Sure enough, why should we? Certain it is, the odds are against us, and most people will presume that, in a controversy between them and us, they must be in the right and we in the wrong. If they are as wrong as we pretend, how happens it that there is nobody in England to show it?

Then, again, it may be said, these converts against whom you are writing are learned and peaceable men, men who have left all to follow Christ, for the most part priests of the Church, devoting themselves without reserve to the glorious work of training souls for heaven, and of winning back England, their native country, to the faith. Why attack them? Why disturb them in their sacred work? Why throw obstacles in their way? All this and much more may be said, all this and much more we have said to ourselves, and it has not been without a full sense of the responsibility we incur, nor without a painful struggle, that we have written what we have. It has been from no private motive, it has been from no indifference to the work in which they are engaged, that we have undertaken the ungracious and most unpleasant task of criticizing their writings. We have done what we have, because we

fear, and not we alone, that they are originating or reviving a destructive heresy, from which both England and this country may receive great harm. Neither learning nor talents, nor zeal nor piety, are perfect safeguards against heresy. Jansenius, for aught we ever understood, was a really learned man, a great man, and an exemplary bishop; and yet he originated a most pestilent heresy. Gioberti is a man of talents, genius, and learning, and he was so scrupulous in the outset that he said his Office on his knees; and yet has he made shipwreck of his faith, and, as we are told, is living now in Paris without a single exterior or interior mark of the sacerdotal character. God may be doing a great work in England, and bestowing freely his grace for the conversion of those who have been so long estranged from his Church, and we certainly have no disposition to interrupt the work, even if it were in our power, or to increase the difficulties of those engaged in it. But England is not all the world to us, and the present moment is not all the time we consider. Erroneous or heretical writings do not all their mischief at the moment of their publication, nor in the country of their authors. The language of England and the United States is the same, and works written and published there find their way here, and exert here hardly, if any, less influence for good or for evil, than if originally written and published here. They may, owing to peculiar circumstances, exert there, for the moment, a good, or not a bad influence, and yet exert here an influence only decidedly bad, and both here and there, hereafter, a most pernicious influence. We have a right to look, under our pastors, to the interests of truth in our own country, and to condemn any books which come under our notice that are likely to do grave injury here, although circumstances may counteract their evil tendency elsewhere. But in reality we believe the writings of the school in question are doing great harm even in England, and we judge so from what we see in the anti-Catholic periodicals of that country, all of which charge, without any qualification, the doctrine of development upon the Church, and tell us that Rome, having failed in her attempts for three hundred years to vindicate her corruptions by denying that she has added to the faith, now concedes that she has made additions, and hopes to defend them by calling them *developments*. It is because

we have honestly believed, whether mistaken or not, that the writings of this school are filled with many grave errors, and cannot but be deeply prejudicial to orthodoxy, both here and in England, both now and hereafter, that we have written against them. What we have done we have done conscientiously, and not without seeking guidance from the Source of all light, and receiving instructions from those from whom it is our duty to learn in all docility. We have written with great plainness and directness, because the case seems to require it; with earnestness and decision, because we could not write otherwise if we would; but we have written nothing in pride or in anger, and if any thing has escaped us that is contrary either to Christian truth or to Christian charity, we wish to retract and condemn it in advance. We have nothing to say as to why the task of exposing them has been left to us, yet it is easy to see, by a reference to existing facts, why the task could be better performed here than in England.

Let not our readers, however, suppose for a moment that we are blind or insensible to the many merits of the men in question. The greater part even of the work before us is truly excellent, and it contains upon the whole a masterly discussion of the subject it professes to treat. What is objectionable, though it pervades in some sense the whole work, really takes up but a very little of its space, and probably would not be noticed by a majority of readers, or, if noticed, would be set down not to an unsound theory adopted by the learned author, but to his want of accurate information on some points, and to the inexactness and carelessness of his language. This is probably the case with most of his English Catholic readers. We cannot so set it down, for the reasons we have given in the course of this article; yet let no one so wrong us as to imagine that we question the good faith of the author, or doubt his determination to be a true Catholic believer. He is, we make no question, an excellent professor, a faithful and zealous priest, who would give his life for the faith, or for a flock intrusted to his charge. In all these converts of whom we speak, there is much to command our warm admiration. They are free from much of the timidity and compromising spirit heretofore not unfrequently encountered in English Catholics. They are no slaves to public opinion; they are open and fearless in the

profession of their faith. They are, and that in our estimation atones for much, no Gallicans, that is, no favorers of the doctrines usually termed Gallican, though by no means peculiar to Frenchmen. They are for the most part, as far as we have been able to discover, in regard to the mutual relations of the spiritual and temporal orders, genuine Papists. They show no desire to reduce the primacy of Peter to a mere primacy of order, nor, with all their Anglican prejudices, any wish to make Catholicity as near like Anglicanism as possible. On all questions of this nature they are honorably distinguished, and nobly maintain the ground which we in our humble way and with our feeble abilities attempt also to maintain. They exhibit much of the robustness and sturdy independence which we admire in the English character. They also appear to have a deep and tender devotion to the Blessed Mother of God, with which we should be sorry not to sympathize with all our heart. In a word, were it not for the Tractarian habits they still retain, their low estimate of Catholic learning and talent, their bad logic and false philosophy, and their abominable theory of development, we would cut our right hand off sooner than write, and pull out our tongue by the roots sooner than speak, one word against them.

The principal errors which we detect in our author and his school appear to us to have originated very innocently, and we are far from intending any moral blame in indicating them. These writers seem to us to have begun their study of Catholic theology where they should have ended. They appear to have begun with the Fathers instead of the modern theologians, or the great scholastic doctors. In the correspondence we have had with some of them, they have sneered at contemporary theologians for studying compendiums. Now we believe, with all deference, that all study of Catholic faith and theology should commence with compendiums, and first of all with that admirable compendium, the Catechism. From the Catechism we would proceed to the next briefest and simplest compendium, and from that we would proceed to St. Thomas and his commentators. When we had well mastered scholastic theology, we would proceed to the Fathers, but not till then, because to us the key to the Fathers is in the scholastic theology. We prize the Fathers above all price, and when once one is prepared to read them, there is no reading,

after the Holy Scriptures, more or equally profitable. But without such preparation, without the key which unlocks their sense, one is almost as liable to misapprehend and wrest them to his own hurt as he is the Sacred Text itself. They were written at a remote period, with special reference to the peculiar controversies, states of mind, and modes of thought at the time, and the reader who alights on them without a previous accurate knowledge of the chief points of Catholic theology will find them filled with obscurities, and bristling with difficulties, which he will hardly be able to solve or clear up.

Our Tractarian friends, brought up to look upon contemporary Catholics as an ignorant, feeble, cunning, credulous, and superstitious set of mortals, far inferior in learning, talents, and morals to themselves, and accustomed to regard the Scholastics as dealing mainly in vain subtleties and distinctions without a difference, very naturally passed from the study of their jejune Anglican theology to the study of the Fathers, whom they were forced to read through the spectacles of their more famous Anglican divines. They thus not only had not the requisite preparation for studying them, but had views and habits which wholly unfitted them for studying them, with even passable success. They have come from the Fathers down to the Scholastics, whom they have studied not profoundly, and have interpreted them by the Fathers, instead of interpreting the Fathers by them. Hence their theory of development, and other errors, adopted to reconcile the Fathers and the later theologians. Nothing was more natural, and we ourselves fell into kindred errors, partially for the same reason; and had we not been put to the study of a brief compendium, and from that upon a rigid course of scholastic theology in one of the commentators on St. Thomas, we might and most likely should have continued in them to this day. Having, to some extent, made ourselves acquainted with Catholic theology, the Fathers became somewhat intelligible to us, and we cannot now find the difficulties in them with which they formerly seemed filled. St. Augustine is now by preference our master in theology and philosophy. Our friends on the other side of the water will understand from these remarks, that it is not themselves personally that we censure, but solely what we regard as their errors.

- ART. II.—1. *The Life of the Rt. Rev. FRANCIS KIRWAN, Bishop of Killala.* Translated from the Latin of GRATIANUS LUCIUS, by the Rev. C. P. MEEHAN. Dublin: Duffy. 1847.
2. *Life of Most Rev. OLIVER PLUNKETT, Archbishop of Armagh.* By the Rev. GEORGE CROLY, of Maynooth College. Dublin: Duffy. 1850.
3. *The Annals of the Four Masters.* Translated from the Original Irish, by JOHN O'DONOVAN, LL. D. Dublin: Hodges & Smith. 1846–50. 3 vols. 4to.

IN the year of grace 1535, Henry the Eighth of England issued a proclamation, in which he ordered that "the name of the Bishop of Rome should be struck from every liturgical book"; in which he placed the clergy under the inspection of the sheriffs of counties, and declared it treason to deny that "the jurisdiction, title, and qualification of Supreme Head of the Church belonged to the King alone." This paper marks the date of the formal schism of England. Six years afterwards, in "a great court," or Parliament, at Dublin, certain Milesian-Irish chiefs and Anglo-Irish barons elected this Henry King of Ireland. The crown was presented to him at Greenwich Palace, and accepted; the harp was quartered in the royal shield; a new seal was struck, and the English ambassadors were instructed to have the additional title recognized and respected abroad.

By the election of such a king, that principle of confusion was introduced into Irish politics which has pervaded all subsequent Irish history. The Parliament of 1541 had not the excuse of ignorance for their choice of an odious schismatic as the head of their new dynasty. The divorce of Queen Catharine, the proclamation of 1535, the martyrdom of Fisher, More, and the Carthusians, must needs be towntalk at Dublin. True, Catholic princes and even the Holy Father entertained some hopes of Henry's repentance; true, his six articles of faith were all forms of Catholic doctrines; true, previous to 1541 his representatives at Dublin were all Catholics; true, the disorganized Celtic constitution needed the insertion of authority and unity, and could only get them from without: yet, with all due allowance for the electors, we must still



condemn them. They sacrificed duty to expediency, the eternal interests of religion to local, and, in some cases, merely personal purposes. To make their responsibility the greater, the election was the work of one order alone, the lay nobility. The clergy and the commons had nothing to do with it. The clergy looked on in silent apprehension of the visitations to come; the people, ill-informed as to events in England, seem to have manifested a good deal of indifference to the Dublin ceremonial. With what horror those who understood the political consequences of the election must have regarded it, may be inferred from the entry in the Annals of Donegal Convent (called usually “The Annals of the Four Masters”) of the first appearance of the English schism.

We insert the passage from the *Book of Obits and Martyrology*, published by the Irish Archæological Society in 1844.

“A. D. 1537. A heresy and a new error broke out in England, the effects of pride, vainglory, avarice, sensual desire, and the prevalence of a variety of scientific and philosophical speculations, so that the people of England went into opposition to the Pope and to Rome. At the same time they followed a variety of opinions, and the old Law of Moses, after the manner of the Jewish people, and they gave the title of Head of the Church of God to the King. There were enacted by the King and Council new laws and statutes after their own will. They ruined the Orders who were permitted to hold worldly possessions, viz. monks, canons, nuns, and brethren of the Cross; and the four mendicant orders, viz. the Minors, the Preachers, Carmelites, and Augustinians. The possessions and living of all these were taken up for the king. They broke the monasteries. They sold their roofs and bells, so that there was not a monastery from Arann of the Saints to the Iccian Sea that was not broken and shattered, except only a few in Ireland, which escaped the notice and attention of the English. They further burned and broke the famous images, shrines, and relics of Ireland and England. After that they burned in like manner the celebrated image of Mary, which was at Ath-Truim, . . . . and the Staff of Jesus, which was in Dublin, performing miracles from the time of Patrick down to that time, and which was in the hand of Christ while he was among men. They also made archbishops and sub-bishops for themselves; and although great was the persecution of the Roman Emperors against the Church, it is not probable that ever so great a *persecution* as this ever came from Rome hither. So that it is impossible to tell or narrate its

description, unless it should be told by him who saw it."—pp. xvii., xviii.

Though in the outset many supposed the divorce question to be a merely diplomatic dispute with Rome, others, more wise, foresaw in it the fruitful seeds of heresy. Shane O'Neil, Prince of Ulster, took alarm at the proclamation of 1535. Marching to Dublin with his forces, he asked and received solemn assurances of the ulterior Catholic intentions of King Henry, and was accompanied on a pilgrimage to Our Lady of Trim by the Lord Deputy Grey, who, "kneeling before her, heard three or four masses very devoutly." The Deputy's devotion and assurances deceived for a time the excited Catholics. But every arrival from Chester or Bristol brought over fresh reports of the progress of the revolts against Rome, and soon a faction favorable to the new doctrines was formed at Dublin under the leadership of Archbishop George Browne, Cranmer's friend and correspondent. This unhappy prelate was full of zeal for the new doctrines, but, previous to Henry's election, was constrained to dissemble. In 1538, he writes to Cranmer that a rumor having spread of his intention to destroy the "ymages and ydoles," he had contradicted it, though his heart well enough inclined him so to purge the land; the same year he was reprovved by Henry for burning a relic of St. Patrick, the famous *Baculus Jesus*. After the act of election, by virtue of a commission which he said was dated two years earlier, he began to rifle the churches of his own diocese, whence he remitted to the royal treasury "gold, silver, and precious stones valued at £ 326 2s. 11d., other 'stuffs of superstition' worth £ 1710 2s. 0d., and one thousand pounds of wax tapers, valued at £ 20." During the short remainder of King Henry's reign, very few conversions were made in Ireland. Agard, a Dublin official, writes to Secretary Cromwell, that, "except the Archbishoppe of Dublin, only Lord Butler, the Master of ye Rolls, Mr. Theasurer, and 2 or 3 mo of small repytaciones, none may abide the herryng of *it* (the king's supremacy) either spirituals as they call them, or temporals." In vain the spoils of five hundred religious houses and twice as many churches were offered as prizes of conversion; in vain the pride and passions of the townsmen were appealed to. The spoils of the Church were left to foreign

adventurers, "the younger sons of good families out of England," the Chichesters, Croftons, and Kings, founders of the most cruel landlord class that ever a nation suffered under. Among the receivers there are not half a dozen native names. Archbishop Browne and the apostate Bishops of Meath, Kildare, and Limerick were English by birth, and nominees of Henry; the Butler family, and Mieler Magrath, apostate Archbishop of Cashel, are the only notable exceptions to the general rule of Irish fidelity.

The expedition of Henry to France after his election, and the bodily sufferings of his last days, as well as the doubt, in which he kept his ministers till the last, of his ultimate views, preserved Ireland during his time from every formidable attack of the Reformation. The first systematic attempt was made in the reign of Edward the Sixth, under the directing genius of Cranmer. Browne was declared Primate, and a new hierarchy was ordered in Council. One Goodacre was by Cranmer ordained Archbishop of Armagh, a Dr. Lancaster was ordained Bishop of Kildare, and a Dr. Bale, Bishop of Ossory. Sir Edward Bellingham, "with 600 horse and 400 foot," was sent to support these nominations, and to assist in stripping the shrines hitherto unplundered. The Catholic populace now began very clearly to comprehend the nature of the new religion. In Cashel they rose and drove the apostate Archbishop out of his see, suffering him to escape to England, where he lived and died a pensioner of the crown; in Kilkenny, Dr. Bale "preached very peaceably," (as they did not understand him,) "until he ordered some of his people to pull down pictures and statues and burn mass-books and vestments," when, as he reports it, the citizens "rose up, slew five of my servants, and barely suffered me to escape with life." Dr. Goodacre, admonished by these tidings, never ventured to Armagh, while the other heretical prelates assumed their functions only in garrison, or rode on occasional pastoral visitations accompanied by troops of horse. Edward's short and Queen Mary's still shorter reign left "the Reformation" as powerless, in Ireland, when Elizabeth ascended the throne, as when Agard wrote to Cromwell, twenty years before, that they could not abide the hearing of it. The Catholics were rather forewarned than intimidated. The acts of Henry, the attempt of Cranmer, and the sudden death of Mary, were to

them so many warnings to recruit their strength and perfect their defences. From the first year of Elizabeth's reign, it was evident that the Protestant policy was to present but one alternative, confiscation or conformity. Her deputy, the Earl of Sussex, summoned a Parliament at Dublin, in 1559, which was very slimly attended. At this Parliament a majority of those present adopted the oaths of abjuration and supremacy, and made it treason to refuse them. None but peers were exempt from being so sworn, and the form of words used made the declaration retrospective as well as prospective; compelled Catholics to swear that their religion was an idolatry, that the Sovereign Pontiff had no power over their consciences, but that their sovereign lady, the Queen, was alone the possessor of "the title, jurisdiction, and style of Supreme Head of the Church." The attempts to proselytize by pains and penalties began with Queen Elizabeth, and ended with Queen Anne. The policy of Protestantism changed at the accession of the present dynasty to the throne, in 1714. Since then, perversion by education has been the favorite scheme of every successive government, from Lord Bute's to Lord John Russell's. Each system has been tried a century and a half, with most diabolical energy and perseverance, and each has signally and totally failed. A summary of the facts of each attempt, of the experiments in each policy, will be the best service we can render to this subject.

The confiscation of Church property in Ireland was soon followed by the confiscation of the property of the Catholic laity, who refused the oaths of abjuration and supremacy. The Earl of Desmond in the South, and the O'Neil family in the North, were prominent chiefs of the Catholic nobility. Having both refused to take the oaths, their immense estates and those of all their kinsmen and allies were confiscated; Desmond's by Elizabeth, in 1575, and O'Neil's by James the First, in 1610. By the first confiscation the entire province of Munster was partitioned among Protestant adventurers from England, and a few native apostates; by the second, the whole province of Ulster was vested in the London Companies and the Scotch Presbyterians. Leinster, being chiefly in the hands of the Butlers, the Fitzgeralds of Kildare, and other apostates, did not undergo the horrors of a wholesale confiscation; but Connaught, under Strafford's vicereignty, in

1638, shared the fate of its neighbors, and a dozen years after was reconfiscated by Cromwell. In one short century the entire soil of the island changed masters. Every title which could insure possession, every evidence of legal proprietorship, the very principle of property itself, was systematically violated, on a scale limited only by the limits of the kingdom. The grandsons of an old, unquestioned proprietary were homeless wanderers, obliged to sell their souls to England, or their swords to the Continental kings. A new aristocracy was lodged in the castles of the banished Catholics; an aristocracy without one common feeling with the people; an aristocracy whose merit was their heresy, and whose tenure was to remain anti-Irish. In the mouldering ruins of convents, and the ashes of villages consumed in war, their genealogies took root, and growing from such a soil, what could they produce but that they have produced, — warfare, disloyalty, famine, and death? Whoever wants to understand the causes of the present misery of Ireland will find them in the four confiscations of the island which Reformed Parliaments and sovereigns decreed, each of which was carried out by a war as cruel and devastating as the principle upon which it was undertaken. The Desmonds were in arms against Elizabeth from 1575 until the last heirs of the name were lost in the shipwrecked Armada; the O'Neils and their allies were in arms against the confiscation of their province from 1585 until 1602; the Catholics throughout the country rose almost unanimously against the Puritan Lords Justices, Borlase and Parsons, in 1641, and remained in arms till the surrender of Galway in 1652. After the restoration of the Stuarts, the acts of settlement and explanation confirmed all the previous confiscations, including even the grants of Cromwell to regicides. Yet in 1685, the Catholics enlisted for King James and their Church, and remained in arms until the surrender of Limerick, six years later, when thirty-nine thousand of them were permitted by treaty to transport themselves to France. Four religious wars within one century attest the virulent energy with which the policy of force was followed up, while estates remained to be plundered, or a Catholic nobility to be exterminated. After Elizabeth's confiscation, Edmund Spenser found Munster "a heap of carcasses and ashes"; after the "crowning mercies" of

the Puritan invasion, not "a soul escaped" of the garrisons of Drogheda and Wexford; after the Williamite war, Parson Story, who traversed the five counties watered by the Shannon, pronounced that district "a fine country, if it had inhabitants." To sum up the cost in human life of these wars, it is only necessary to know that the Irish population at Queen Elizabeth's accession was estimated at 2,300,000, and at Queen Anne's, 1,700,000.

The violation of all law which marked these confiscations, both of personal and ecclesiastical property, further involved the violation of three express conventions, securing liberty of worship to Catholics. Henry the Seventh, on taking possession of his lordship in Ireland, had expressly and solemnly undertaken, among other engagements, "that the Church of Ireland shall be free and enjoy all its accustomed privileges." This stipulation was confirmed by Henry the Eighth, at his election as king, and was flagrantly violated by the same Henry, by Edward, Elizabeth, and the succeeding sovereigns. Charles the Second, in his declaration at Breda, had expressly guaranteed the freedom of the Irish Church, which at and after his restoration he as expressly invaded. Having requested a synod of the Irish clergy, in 1666, he submitted to them the Gallican propositions, adopted by the University of Paris three years before; the Irish prelates, refusing to purchase toleration at such a price, were imprisoned, or found safety in exile. Of the entire number, but three bishops were allowed to remain in the kingdom, two of whom were bedridden from old age. Again, in 1691, by the first six articles of the treaty of Limerick, liberty of worship was guaranteed in the name of the Most Holy Trinity, and sanctioned by the sign manual of the king; yet the treaty was not three years old when an act of explanation was passed, exempting from its provisions all who refused to take an oath more offensive than the oaths of Elizabeth, — that is, all who were included in it at first.

Of the illustrious martyrs of the Irish Church, under the six persecutions, it would be almost impossible to abridge the record. Among them, most illustrious for station and heroism, were O'Hurley, Archbishop of Cashel, burned to death in Dublin; O'Kelly, Archbishop of Tuam, murdered in his carriage at Sligo by Puritan soldiers; O'Brien, Bishop of Emly, executed by Ireton; McEgan,

Bishop of Cloyne, executed by Ireton; Oliver Plunkett, Primate of all Ireland, executed at Tyburn in 1678; Peter Talbot, Archbishop of Dublin, who died in prison; Shane O'Neil, assassinated by Elizabeth's order; the last Earl of Desmond, assassinated by Elizabeth's order; Lord Connor Maguire, executed at Tyburn, under Charles the First; Lord Burke of Brittas, executed under Charles the Second; Sir Phelim O'Neil, executed by order of Cromwell at Dublin; Redmond, Count Hanlon, assassinated by order of Ormond; Father Richard Molony, executed in 1694, for being found in Wales without "a registered certificate." Each Regular Order has its own martyrology in Irish history since the Reformation. The Dominicans count over sixty of their brethren who died gloriously for the faith, during Cromwell's wars, and the Franciscans, who were still more numerous, were equally afflicted and equally heroic. Of the number who died in battle and in exile, only the recording angel has the full account.

The last generation that experienced the horrors of open, undisguised persecution was that which lived under Queen Anne. Her penal laws have been justly described by Burke as "ferocious." By the second Parliament of her reign it was enacted that a son becoming Protestant might make his Catholic father tenant for life, and seize the fee simple and rental of the estate to his own use; a Catholic inheriting property and refusing to conform, by the same statute, was set aside in favor of "the next Protestant heir." By another act of the same year (2 Anne, cap. 3, sec. 7), if an unregistered priest was found at large, a heavy fine was levied upon the country, and paid over to the informer. This last act gave rise to the pursuit called "priest-hunting," in which several fortunes were made. By the 8th of Anne, a tariff of rewards was fixed: for an archbishop, bishop, or other superior, £ 50; for other ecclesiastics, £ 20 per head. A Portuguese Jew, named Garcia, was one of the most infamous detectives during this reign. In 1718 he arrested seven unregistered priests, "for whose detection he had a sum equal to two or three thousand pounds of our money." A contemporary writer says: "He sometimes put on the mien of a priest, for he affected to be one, and, thus worming himself into the good graces of some confiding Catholic, got a clew to the whereabouts of the clergy." The excesses of infamy to which this law

carried the informers was the apparent cause of the reaction against the whole code which set in a few years later.

During these persecutions the resources displayed by the Irish Church were admirable and miraculous. In 1666, notwithstanding the penalties which hung over their heads, there were 1100 of the regular clergy and 780 seculars on the Irish mission. Twenty years afterwards the regulars had increased to about 2,000. After the violation of the treaty of Limerick, between the years 1692 and 1696, 495 seculars and 424 regulars were transported from the kingdom. Even the poor nuns were banished, and at Ypres, Antwerp, and Lisbon the dispersed communities of Dublin, Waterford, and Limerick found refuge. The majority of the Irish sees were for many years administered by vicars, the bishops being easily detected and expelled. A Bishop of Raphoe contrived, in the disguise of a shepherd, to watch over his people from the uplands of Derry and Donegal; DeBurgo, the learned Bishop of Ossory, disguised as a common sailor, found his way into his diocese, and contrived to remain. Missionary priests in mechanical attire would frequent the taverns in cities, gather a few Catholics together, retire as if to carouse, and then administer the sacraments in secret and in haste. One of the churches of Dublin is popularly called "Adam and Eve's Chapel," from a neighboring tavern of that name, in which the parishioners were obliged to meet their pastors in those trying times. The Irish colleges founded on the Continent, at the instigation of the exiles, by the Catholic princes, the Popes, and the illustrious Barberini and Ludovisian families, poured a constant supply of missionaries, catechisms, and books of devotion into Ireland. To the Irish press at Paris, Louvain, and Rome may be partly attributed that general knowledge of the principles of our holy religion which the poor Irish peasantry have never lost.

We placed the era of proselytism by education at the accession of the house of Hanover to the throne. At this point a separate narrative in the history of the Anglican schism opens; for which, we regret to say, the materials are very difficult of access. The clever episcopal memoirs, and the learned annals, quoted at the head of the present article, are confined to events of the seventeenth and previous centuries. The struggles of the Irish Church with



the corrupt and seducing policy of the state, in the last century, are less known, though surely not less important to be known. A proselyting policy had been urged at an early period by the Anglican Archbishops Usher of Armagh, and Daniel of Tuam, and by Bedell, Bishop of Dromore. Upon their theory Usher collected "the Epistles of the Irish Saints," to prove that antiquity was for, and not against them; and Daniel and Bedell had their Bibles in Irish published. So long, however, as there was a Catholic proprietary to be confiscated, or a Catholic hierarchy to be destroyed, arms and force were preferred to antiquarian arguments and Celtic translations. Hugh Boulter, Anglican Archbishop of Armagh, and leader of "the Castle party" in the Irish House of Lords during part of the reign of the first two Georges, was the restorer of Usher's theory. By the 2d and 3d George I., the Established clergy were ordered to provide a free school for young Papists in every parish; but these good, easy men allowed the act to lie as a dead letter. In 1733, Boulter obtained the endowment by Parliament of an "Incorporated Society" to do what the parsons neglected, — "to educate the Popish and other natives." In his correspondence with the English Privy Council, he puts his design in a few clear words. "One of the most likely methods we can think of," he writes, "is, if possible, instructing and converting the young generation; for, instead of converting those that are adult, we are daily losing many of our meaner people, who go off to Popery." The Establishment was, at this time, sorely in need of recruits. "A great part of the churches," says Boulter, "are neglected and going to ruin"; so that "it became necessary to give as many as six or seven parishes to one incumbent to enable him to live." Under this energetic heretic and his successor, Dr. Stone, the "Charter Schools" certainly could not complain of any scarcity of funds. Their Parliamentary grants were equal to £ 80,000 per year; a German baron bequeathed them £ 56,000, and an Irish Earl £ 40,000. The Hibernia Schools, founded by George the Third, for similar purposes, were equally well endowed: up to 1826, they had received of public money £ 240,356, about a million and a quarter of dollars. The "Blue Coat" and other charity schools sprung up about the same time; finally, "the Kildare Street Society's

Schools" were founded, which gave way to the present "national system of education."

Here surely was a vantage-ground and crowning mercy for Protestantism. There were no other schools tolerated but their own, and their own had the public treasury for a revenue. If ever the Irish were to be converted, this was the time, and these were the means. But what was the result? The system not only failed, but in its failure demonstrated anew the utter hollowness and heartlessness of the Anglican schism. It escaped for a time unexposed. A Protestant Parliament voted the supplies, ordered the reports to be printed, and took no further interest in the matter. At length a great philanthropist, the humane Howard, visited Ireland on his "circumnavigation of charity." The committees of Parliament received him with respect, and many improvements in prisons and hospitals were made at his suggestion. He brought the subject of the Charter Schools to the attention of Parliament. In 1787, they ordered an inquiry, and found that, of 2,100 scholars reported, only 1,400 could be produced. Howard and Sir Jeremiah Fitzpatrick, Inspector of Prisons, served on the commission, and were examined. Both stated that the children "were in general filthy and ill-clothed"; that "the diet was insufficient for the support of their delicate frames"; that many of the schools "were going to ruin"; that many of the scholars "were without shifts or shirts, and in such a condition as was indecent to look on." Howard concluded his evidence by asserting that "the children in general were sickly, pale, and such miserable objects that they were a disgrace to all society, and their reading had been neglected for the purpose of making them work for their masters." This was the ripe result of Dr. Boulter's schools, which, however, lived on in their rottenness and pretences for half a century longer. The selfsame design, in a less obnoxious, but more insidious spirit, actuates the present state schools founded in 1834, and the Queen's Colleges recently erected.

With the state schools partial toleration had its rise. The Irish Catholics having withheld, as a body, from the Jacobite attempts of 1715 and 1745, they began to be considered by the new dynasty as not entirely deserving of perpetual persecution. At the date of Charles Edward's invasion, Lord Chesterfield was Viceroy at Dublin, where he flattered

himself he could govern by exquisitely turned compliments. An accident, by which many Catholics who assembled to hear a mass by stealth in an old Dublin building were killed, gave him an opportunity of permitting the erection of an unostentatious chapel. From this date the oppressed began to breathe more freely. In 1757, some Catholic gentlemen, of whom the principals were Mr. Wyse, a Waterford merchant, Charles O'Connor, a country gentleman and antiquary, and Dr. Curry, a Dublin physician, formed the first Catholic Association, for the purpose of petitioning Parliament. After twenty years of desultory effort, they obtained the first Relief Bill, enabling Papists to lease real property, to take apprentices, and to vote at elections. Content with this miserable toleration, they rested from their labors. Somewhat later, John Keogh, a wealthy Dublin merchant, founded the second Catholic Association, which obtained the Relief Bill of 1793. By this concession, Catholics were permitted to sit on juries, to enter the learned professions without taking the oath of supremacy, to hold real property in fee, and to establish schools and colleges. Maynooth and Carlow Colleges sprung up on the enlarged prospect thus opened, and the Catholic merchants and aristocracy began to feel themselves of some account in civil life. It is unnecessary to enlarge this notice of the slow growth of mere toleration by detailing the promises made by Pitt in 1800 and never fulfilled, or to dwell upon the merits of the last Relief Bill, obtained in 1829 by the third Catholic Association, under the leadership of Daniel O'Connell. A century of agitation was just closing, in which the ablest intellects of Ireland and England had used their greatest efforts in the cause of toleration, when we wake as from a dream, and, rubbing our eyes in "the middle of the nineteenth century," find a new penal enactment placed on the British statute-book, and another Catholic Association sitting at Dublin!

Such is a summary view of the attempts by armed force, and by false education, to establish the abominable principles of the Reformation in Ireland. How glorious to the Church is the result! How humiliating to the pride and self-love of heresy! Were ever combatants apparently more unequal? Was ever contest, except that of the early Church against Pagan Rome, so mysteriously

prolonged, and so unexpectedly ended in the victory of the weak? In the one camp is arrayed all the power of England, — her immense revenue, her masterly diplomacy, her conquering armies; the wealth of India is at her hand, and the thunders of annihilation wait but her word. In the other camp we find a simple peasantry, at first following, but soon losing, their disunited nobles; we find them without adequate resources, institutions, or leaders for such a contest, with such an enemy. Yet we see how it stands with both at the end of three centuries. We see Ireland at this very hour as resolutely Catholic as ever before, and England, richer, mightier, more despotic than ever, unable to enforce her last law against the passive hierarchy of the Irish Church. The more we know of the facts of this contest, the more we reflect upon the causes of these things, the more we are forced to exclaim, "The hand of God is here!"

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ART. III. — *The Works of Daniel Webster.* Boston: Little and Brown. 1851. 6 vols. 8vo.

THIS is a much more complete edition of Mr. Webster's works than has heretofore appeared, but it does not embrace the entire series of his writings. "Such a series," the editor tells us, "would have required a larger number of volumes than was deemed advisable with reference to the general circulation of the work. A few juvenile performances have accordingly been omitted, as not of sufficient importance or maturity to be included in the collection. Of the earlier speeches in Congress, some were either not reported at all, or in a manner too imperfect to be preserved without doing injustice to the author. No attempt has been made to collect from the contemporaneous newspapers or Congressional registers the short conversational speeches and remarks made by Mr. Webster, as by other prominent members of Congress, in the progress of debate, and sometimes exercising greater influence on the result than the set speeches. Of the addresses to public meetings it has been found impossible to embrace

more than a selection, without swelling the work to an unreasonable size. It is believed, however, that the contents of these volumes furnish a fair specimen of Mr. Webster's opinions and sentiments on all the subjects treated, and of his manner of discussing them. The responsibility of deciding what should be omitted and what included has been left by Mr. Webster to the friends having the charge of the publication, and his own opinion on details of this kind has rarely been taken." The volumes before us should, therefore, be entitled *A Selection from the Works of Daniel Webster*; although it is but simple justice to the editor to say, that the selection has been made with taste and judgment, and we are aware of no omission that any of Mr. Webster's friends will seriously regret, unless it be some of his earlier speeches in Congress, especially the speech on the Conscription Bill. The speeches, addresses, law arguments, and diplomatic and state papers, on which his fame must rest, and which exhibit his character as a scholar, orator, lawyer, statesman, and diplomatist, are all included.

The editor, himself one of our most distinguished scholars and an eminent publicist, has preceded the collection by an admirable Biographical Memoir of the author, written with great judgment and delicacy. It is no easy task to write the life of an eminent man while he is still living, and yet the editor has done it in a manner to satisfy the partialities of friendship, without offending the modesty of the illustrious subject or the fidelity of history. The tone of the Memoir is of course laudatory, but it is subdued, and probably says no more in praise than posterity will ratify. Some few shades may be necessary to render the portrait a perfect likeness, but the judgments passed upon the talents, opinions, and services of the author are, in general, solid and just, such as time will confirm, not reverse.

Mr. Webster is of Scottish extraction, and was born in Salisbury, New Hampshire, January 18th, 1782. He pursued his preparatory studies at Phillips Academy, Exeter, and graduated, August, 1801, at Dartmouth College, in his native State. He immediately entered the office of Mr. Thompson, the next-door neighbor of his father, as a student of law, and subsequently studied awhile in the office of the Hon. Christopher Gore in this city. He was admitted to the practice of the law for the Court of Common

Pleas of the County of Suffolk, Boston, in 1805, and as an attorney and counsellor of the Superior Court of New Hampshire in 1807, when he removed to Portsmouth, where he appears to have been immediately and eminently successful in his profession. In 1812 he was elected a member of Congress, and again in 1815. In 1816 he removed from Portsmouth to Boston, which has continued to be his home ever since, although, when not called away by his official duties, he for a few years past has usually resided on his farm in Marshfield, in the Old Colony. In 1820 he was chosen a member of the Convention called to revise the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and in the autumn of 1822 was elected a member of the Eighteenth Congress, from Boston. Since then, with scarcely an interval, he has been connected with the general government, as Representative, Senator, or Secretary of State, and has, during the whole period of nearly forty years, been identified with the public history of his country, and exerted a large share of influence on our public policy.

It is not our purpose, in the few remarks we propose to offer on the occasion of a new edition of Mr. Webster's works, to speak at much length of his character as a lawyer or as a statesman. As a statesman, we have often spoken of him, and perhaps enough has been said. He has proved himself one of the very few American statesmen who are able to compare favorably with the higher class of European statesmen, and his views are such as may be honestly commended, with very slight exceptions, for their patriotism, comprehensiveness, and practical wisdom. It is rare that we should now, whatever may have been the case formerly, dissent from his domestic policy; but his foreign policy, although more in accordance with the general sentiment of the great body of his countrymen than the one we should approve, appears to us, in some respects, narrow and illiberal, wrong in principle and dangerous in tendency. In his judgment of the Continental monarchical states he is still a disciple of the eighteenth century, a believer, substantially, in the *contrât social*, and what is called a Liberal. He is not, intentionally, a Jacobin, or a Red Republican, and would, most likely, had he been old enough at the time, have sided with Burke in his denunciation of the old French Revolution; but he would, nevertheless, have denounced it in its excesses, rather than in its

principle. He and the Jacobin have the same point of departure, and differ only in this, — that the Jacobin will carry out the principle common to them both logically to its last consequence, while Mr. Webster, restrained by his good sense and practical wisdom, shrinks from going so far, and attempts to stop short of the proper logical extreme, apparently not perceiving that a principle that will not bear being pushed to its last logical conclusion is false, and ought not to be admitted at all.

Mr. Webster is, perhaps, not vehemently opposed to what may be called a parliamentary or representative monarchy, — we say not, as he would, *constitutional* monarchy, for every monarchy that governs by laws is a constitutional, even a limited monarchy; — but he evidently understands by a constitutional monarchy a representative or parliamentary monarchy, and recognizes the strict legality of no monarchical government unless it is, to use the expression of Lafayette, a monarchy surrounded by republican institutions, or a monarchy compelled to govern in conjunction with a parliament, in one or both of its branches chosen by popular suffrage. No government that does not recognize in some form the democratic element, or rather the sovereignty of the people, in the Jacobinical sense, is, in his view, a strictly legal or legitimate government. Hence, without sympathizing with the socialistic tendencies of the age in their developments, and without wishing in the least to weaken the foundations of law and of order, he is the determined enemy of all the monarchical governments of Europe which are not based on popular sovereignty, and do not rule by means of parliaments or representative assemblies; and he holds it the duty of our government to exert all the influence it can on and through public opinion in encouragement and aid of the party, in all monarchical countries, exerting themselves to revolutionize them, and establish popular institutions in their place.

Mr. Webster evidently adopts the Canning policy, adopted and pursued with such disastrous success during the last twenty years by Mr. Canning's pupil, Lord Palmerston, late Foreign Secretary of the British government, — the policy of intervention, if not by armed force, at least by diplomacy and public opinion, by exertions to create and foster a public opinion everywhere hostile to strictly

monarchical governments, and by encouraging the subjects of such governments to make illegal efforts to subvert them. Mr. Canning and Lord Palmerston adopted and pursued this policy for the sake of introducing into every European Continental state the parliamentary system of Great Britain; Mr. Webster, perhaps, would have little choice whether that system or our own were introduced, but one or the other he insists upon, as we may collect from his speech in Congress on the affairs of Greece in 1823, and his remarkable letter to Chevalier Hülsemann, in December, 1850, in defence of General Taylor's administration for sending Mr. Dudley Mann to treat, if he had a chance, with the rebellious Hungarians, then in arms against their sovereign. We need not say that we regard this policy as repugnant to the laws of nations, and as founded upon a false theory of the origin and principles of government. The sovereignty of the people, in the Jacobinical sense, is not a truth, and can be consistently asserted by no man who does not deny the existence of God. Its assertion is the assertion of atheism in politics, and hence every system of policy which presupposes it must be condemned by every one who believes in God and understands himself.

When Mr. Webster speaks as a lawyer, according to the principles and maxims of the Common Law, what he says is remarkable for its good sense, its profound truth, and its practical wisdom; for then he speaks in accordance with the teachings of our holy religion, which forms the basis of that law; but when he leaves that and undertakes to discuss questions which lie further back, he is the disciple of Hampden, Sydney, Locke, and Rousseau, and proceeds from principles which he did not learn from the law, and which are utterly repugnant to it. This is not a peculiarity of Mr. Webster; it was equally the case with the elder Adams, and, indeed, with the whole of the old Federal party; and it was this that prostrated them, notwithstanding their personal respectability and practical wisdom, before their less scrupulous, but more logical and self-consistent rivals, headed by Thomas Jefferson. They were *via media* men, adopting two contradictory sets of principles, and laboring to reconcile them by stopping half way with each; while their rivals had but one set of principles, which they were prepared to follow whithersoever they



should lead. Hence Federalism, inferior in a logical, but far superior in a practical point of view, or in practical wisdom and common sense, was obliged to succumb to virtual Jacobinism, greatly to the permanent injury, perhaps to the ultimate ruin, of the country, — certainly much to the regret of every intelligent and true-hearted American.

We own that we admire the English constitution as it originally existed, but we do not admire it in its present state. In the original constitution of England the democratic element in the modern sense, or rather the Jacobinical element, had no place, and the sovereign people were simply the King and Parliament. The excellence of the system consisted in its being a government of estates. The House of Commons did not represent the people of England, but the Commons Estate, with a negative on each of the other estates. The positive power was in the crown, which had the initiative of all measures, and the power of the Lords and Commons was, properly, only a negative power, or the veto which each could place on those measures of the positive power, — the Lords by refusing to advise them or to assent to them, and the Commons by refusing to vote the supplies. Thus the unity and efficiency of the government were preserved, while ample security against its power to oppress either the nobility or the commonalty was provided. But Parliament has now virtually usurped the positive power of government, and indeed formally; for, if we mistake not, the initiative of measures is no longer the exclusive prerogative of the crown, and since the Reform Bill of 1832, the House of Commons has very nearly become a representative assembly in the democratic sense, — representing not simply an estate, but the people of England. It may not do this perfectly as yet, but the clamor and agitation for reform will be continued till it does, and then, when the House of Commons represents, not the Commons Estate, but the English people, the king and peers will be found to be mere excrescences on the body politic; they will then be lopped off, and Great Britain will become a pure democracy, and thence a pure anarchy. The tendency to a pure democracy is now fearfully strong, and a democratic revolution in that country is not an improbable, perhaps not a distant event. Mr. Canning's policy, so steadily pursued by Lord Palmerston, of encouraging democratic

revolutions abroad, has reacted and is reacting with terrible force upon England herself, and can hardly fail to produce there the evils it has produced in such abundance on the Continent, especially in the Spanish and Italian peninsulas.

We sympathize fully with Mr. Webster in his love of liberty, and perhaps we should be found, in case of trial, a more unflinching enemy than he of despotism of every kind; but we think he falls into the common mistake of identifying liberty with popular institutions. It is a narrow and unstatesmanlike view to suppose that liberty is possible only where the people are represented in parliament, or have a positive power in enacting the laws under which they are to live. Liberty, we grant, is not possible under a despotism, that is, a government of mere will; but it is possible under any and every government that is a government of laws, where the sovereign governs only by a fixed code, or in accordance with laws previously enacted and promulgated, as is the case with every Christian or nominally Christian government in Europe, even with that of Russia. Laws prejudicial to individual liberty may, no doubt, be enacted and promulgated by governments constituted like the Prussian, the Russian, or the Austrian, and so they may be under governments constituted like the English, or even our own, as we may see in the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill enacted by the British Parliament, and in the "Maine Liquor Law," recently enacted by several of the States of the Union, and among the rest by the free and liberty-loving Massachusetts; for you shall in vain search the archives of the most despotic states of Europe to find enactments more repugnant, at least in principle, to the liberty of the subject, or more really arbitrary in their nature. Parliamentary governments with a king, as in Great Britain, or without a king, as with us, are a clumsy and a very expensive sort of government, and it is perhaps chiefly prejudice on our part that makes us regard them as necessarily superior, in themselves considered, to all other governments. Whether the state of our country and the habits of our people, which unquestionably demand such government and render every other unwise and impracticable for us, be a real advantage, or in fact only a disadvantage, is a question on which something may be said on both sides. Perhaps the fact that none but a republican

government, resting for its basis on universal suffrage, is practicable or to be thought of for our country, is not, after all, any conclusive proof in itself that we are so much in advance of other nations as we commonly suppose. We are not certain that France, if she were prepared for a republic like ours, as she evidently is not, could be said to be farther advanced in civilization than she now is, or than she was under Louis the Fourteenth or Louis the Ninth. A nation's rank in the scale of civilization is determined, not by the mere form of its government, but by the wisdom and justice of its laws, and the alacrity and fidelity with which they are obeyed. In encouraging the subjects of the European Continental states to rebel against their sovereigns, for the purpose of introducing parliamentary or representative governments, whether in the English or American form, it is far from being certain that we are encouraging them to effect a change for the better. God, in his providence, gives to each people the political constitution that is best adapted to its character and wants, and experience as well as philosophy makes it pretty certain that every fundamental change in that constitution invariably becomes a prolific source of evil. Mr. Webster's policy, that our government should take its stand on the side of modern Liberalism, and exert itself officially to create, throughout the world, and in monarchical states, a public opinion hostile to monarchy, and through that public opinion to cherish movements for popular institutions, is not, in our judgment, a policy likely to serve either the cause of good government or that of true liberty.

Mr. Webster is a lawyer, and we are surprised that he should attribute the freedom and prosperity of our citizens to our political institutions, instead of attributing them, as should be done, to the Common Law, or the system of jurisprudence brought here by our fathers, and inherited from the England that was before the Reformation. It is the Common Law, with the independent judiciary under it, which Mr. Webster has on more occasions than one so nobly and so powerfully defended, that constitutes the real ground and support of our liberties. Take away the Common Law, either by substituting a written code for it, or by suffering its principles to be tampered with by the legislatures of the several States, as has been done in those that have adopted the Maine Liquor Law, for instance, and

destroy the independence of the judiciary by rendering the judges elective for a brief term of office, and reëligible, and you will soon find that your political forms are impotent to preserve the freedom and prosperity of the citizen. Yet an independent judiciary is discovered to be anti-democratic, and the tendency is now everywhere to sweep it away; public opinion is setting in with a strong tide against the Common Law, and it is discovered to be democratic to abolish it, and substitute for it an inflexible written code, with new and inept systems of practice, which, while they increase litigation, render justice generally unattainable, except by mere chance.

But be all this as it may, the policy which Mr. Webster has adopted from Mr. Canning is in our judgment unjust, and repugnant to the laws of nations. It assumes for us a sort of dictatorship, or at least supervisorship, over other nations, wholly incompatible with their dignity and independence. We will not say that the government is not free to express officially its opinion, whatever it may be, on a fact accomplished in a foreign independent nation, but it has no right to express an official opinion for the purpose of bringing about a violent change in its form of government, except in those cases in which, if it deemed it expedient, it would have the right to support its opinion by an armed force, or a declaration of war. A government may express its opinion on a revolution in a foreign state when once really effected, and, unless bound by treaty to do otherwise, may treat the revolutionary government, or government *de facto*, as the legitimate government of the state; but it has no right to express any official opinion for the purpose of effecting, or causing to be effected, a revolution. There is no difference in principle between effecting a revolution by expressly creating a public opinion that brings it about, and effecting it by direct intervention with armed force. The means by which you effect a revolution cannot justify your effecting it, unless you have the sovereign right to effect it; and if you have the sovereign right to effect it, you may effect it by armed force, if you choose. It is an admitted principle in international law, that every independent nation has the right to choose its own form of government, and to determine its own domestic institutions, without the dictation or interference of its neighbors; and also, that nations exist to

each other only in their supreme government, or political sovereign. There can be no right, then, on the part of one independent nation, to intervene in any way in the domestic affairs of another, for the purpose of revolutionizing or changing its government. It has no right officially to address the people of a foreign state, or to hold any official communication with them, save through its sovereign, and it gives just cause of complaint whenever it attempts to do so.

This rule is founded in natural justice, and is necessary for the peace and happiness of mankind. It is as much for our interest to observe this rule, as it is for that of any other nation. We cannot assert the right of rebellion, and encourage the subjects of other states to conspire against their sovereign, without weakening the loyalty of our own citizens, and paving the way for a revolution at home, that is, such a revolution as is possible with us. A rebellion against the constituted authorities, except in certain localities and for a brief moment, is not possible in this country, because the power is already in the hands of the people, and the government is subject to their will. A revolution here must necessarily assume the form of removing the restrictions imposed by the law of the land on the exercise of the popular will, or, in other words, of destroying the independence of the judiciary, and abolishing the Common Law. The Common Law, which we have inherited from our English ancestors, is the law of the land, and the law that regulates the relations not only between individual and individual, but to some extent between the citizen and the state. It is our rule of justice, and as no constitution or legislative enactment has, or can have, the force of law, if contrary to justice, it follows that any constitutional provision or legislative enactment repugnant to the principles of the Common Law is *ipso facto* null and void, and may be declared so and set aside by the Common Law courts. This Mr. Webster has himself proved, if we understand him, in a most triumphant manner, in his masterly argument in the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dartmouth College case,—an argument which does him the highest honor, and which ought to be read and meditated at least once a year by every American citizen. The revolution we have to dread is not a revolution avowedly for the purpose of overthrowing the government, or chang-

ing its form, but a revolution which abolishes the Common Law, and leaves us no restraints on lawless power, and no standard of justice but the will or caprice of the majority for the time being. This revolution has commenced and is in process amongst us, and every word we utter in encouragement of revolutions abroad becomes a still greater encouragement to this silent, and as yet bloodless, revolution going on here at home. Liberty here no more than anywhere else is possible without the sacredness of law, and that sacredness is struck here whenever we strike it abroad. A false principle, asserted for the accomplishment of a foreign purpose deemed desirable, is sure, sooner or later, to return and effect a domestic purpose not desirable. There is a moral order in the government of the world, and nations no more than individuals can transgress it with impunity, and nations, as individuals, will find that they are generally punished in that wherein they have sinned, or that their sins prove to be their punishment.

We have dwelt the longer on this point, because it is almost the only thing in Mr. Webster's course as a statesman that we find to disapprove. In almost every other respect we can admire and honor his public life. It is the only instance in which we have found his general policy unjust or dangerous in principle, however we might dissent from it in some of its details. It is the only stain we are aware of on his public character. Yet we ought in justice to say, that in this he has but followed the public sentiment of his country, and of a powerful party in Great Britain. We ourselves once applauded him for it, and we still remember the exultation with which we read, in 1823, his speech in Congress on the affairs of Greece. At that time nobody in the country, to our knowledge, questioned the justice of the policy, however some might doubt its expediency. Under Mr. Monroe's administration the whole country seemed carried away with a spirit of propagandism, and, though the wild democracy against which we have such frequent occasion to warn our readers was then far from being fully developed, as it is now, the youth of that day boiled over with a patriotism and a love of liberty, as they understood or misunderstood the terms, of which we can now hardly form a conception. The movement for constitutional, that is representative government, was going on all over Europe, supported by the mighty influ-

ence of England, which she had so extended by the wars growing out of the French Revolution. A constitutional government was set up in Naples, and another in Spain; the Spanish American colonies declared themselves independent of the mother country, and introduced the republican form of government; and hope was high that it was all over with monarchy except in the English sense, and that republicanism would make the circuit of the globe. Our government and that of England acknowledged the independence of the Spanish American colonies, and President Monroe declared that this continent was closed to European colonization, and virtually that we assumed the championship throughout the world of every party struggling for representative government against monarchy. The writer of this was young then, and has outgrown the wild enthusiasm with which he was then carried away; Mr. Webster was older, and has remained unchanged. All we can say of him is, that in this respect he has not shown his ordinary superiority over the great body of his countrymen, and has followed instead of leading public opinion.

We need not say that Mr. Webster is a great man, for that every body concedes or asserts; but his greatness does not lie in the original apprehension or discovery of first principles. He takes his principles as he finds them in the common sense of his age and country, and where that errs he errs. His mind is English, and practical rather than speculative. His reading has been principally in the ancient Roman and the modern English classics, while his chief study has been history and the Common Law, with the ordinary writers on government. His views have, perhaps, been formed more by the principles of the Common Law than by any other study, and hence are in general sound, and remarkable for their practical wisdom. But in a large class of questions, not immediately solved by these principles, he has taken the principles ordinarily adopted by the old English Republicans, and the modern English Whigs; and consequently, along with the principles that are excellent, true for all times and countries, he has another class of principles, borrowed from modern innovators, which are invariably unsound, and such as he himself would be as ready to condemn as we are, if he were to subject them to the independent action of his own powerful mind, in the light of those principles along with which

he has received them, and which he so firmly holds and so frequently appeals to. The modern English mind, therefore modern English literature, is compounded of the traditional wisdom inherited by Englishmen from their ancestors, and of the innovations of modern reformers. The two elements exist side by side, but they will not coalesce. Consequently, the Englishman lacks unity of moral and intellectual life. When he speaks according to the traditional wisdom of his country, no man speaks with more truth, justice, or practical wisdom; when he leaves this traditional wisdom,—the good sense of his countrymen, for which no people are more remarkable,—and speaks according to the principles of modern innovators, he becomes false, impracticable, and absurd. It is somewhat the same with Mr. Webster. Ordinarily he speaks from the wisdom of our ancestors, for ordinarily the topics he treats are such as lie within the range of that portion of tradition which has been generally retained by Englishmen and Americans; but now and then he neglects it, and takes his principles from the modern innovators, or, what is the same thing, from ancient gentilism, and thus falls into the errors so rife and so dangerous in our times,—errors which in principle warrant the most extravagant conclusions of the Jacobin or the Red Republican. And yet, unless he had a sure means of ascertaining tradition in its purity and integrity, as he has, to some extent, in the case of the Common Law, we see not well how he could do otherwise.

Of Mr. Webster's rank as a lawyer, compared with the more eminent members of the legal profession in Great Britain and the United States, we have no occasion to speak, and, not being a lawyer by profession, we shall not attempt to speak. He is generally considered as having long stood at the head of the legal profession in his own country. But of his professional labors devoted to what is termed Constitutional Law, or the application of the Common Law to the constitutionality of legislative enactments, we must say a word or two. This department of law had, when he entered upon his professional career, been but imperfectly cultivated. "It fell to his lot," says his accomplished biographer, "to perform a prominent part in unfolding a most important class of constitutional doctrines, which, either because occasion had not drawn them



forth, or the jurists of a former period had failed to deduce and apply them, had not yet grown into a system. It was reserved for Mr. Webster to distinguish himself before most, if not all, of his contemporaries, in this branch of his profession." (Vol. I. p. xlviii.)

The first occasion on which Mr. Webster laid down what he took to be the principle of the Common Law, as applicable to the constitutionality of legislative enactments, was in the celebrated case of Dartmouth College, already referred to. "In the months of June and December, 1816, the legislature of New Hampshire passed acts altering the charter of Dartmouth College (of which the name was changed to Dartmouth University), enlarging the number of the trustees, and generally reorganizing the corporation. These acts, although passed without the consent and against the protest of the trustees of the College, went into operation. The newly created body took possession of the corporate property, and assumed the administration of the institution. The old board were all named as members of the new corporation, but declined acting as such, and brought an action against the treasurer of the new board for the books of record, the original charter, the common seal, and other corporate property of the College." This action was decided in the Superior Court of New Hampshire in favor of the validity of the State laws, and was carried up by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, where, on the 10th of March, 1818, it came on for argument before all the judges, who, in the term of the court holden the next February, declared, with only one dissenting voice, the acts of the legislature unconstitutional and invalid, and reversed the opinion of the court below.

The question for the Supreme Court to decide was, no doubt, whether the acts of New Hampshire did or did not contravene the Constitution of the United States; but Mr. Webster, in his argument for the plaintiffs in error, in order to facilitate the decision of that question by determining the real character of those acts, opened up the whole question of Common Law involved, and contended that the acts were invalid because against *common right* and the constitution of New Hampshire. He showed that the College was a private corporation, and that the legislature has no power to divest a private corporation, without its

consent, of any of its corporate rights, maintaining that those rights can be taken away only in case of abuse or forfeiture, of which the court, not the legislature, is the judge. The principle on which his argument rests, if we have rightly seized it, is, that all chartered eleemosynary institutions, under which head are included all educational institutions founded and endowed by private liberality, are private corporations; and that all the rights of private corporations, or rather that all private rights, whether of persons or of things, or rights of private individuals, whether personal or corporate, are determined or defined by the Common Law, and are inviolable, so that any legislative enactment which infringes them is for that reason alone unconstitutional and invalid. This is certainly a most important principle, and if sound, — and that it is, it would be temerity on our part to doubt, — it proves that we do really live under a government of laws, and not a government of mere will, and that ours is really a free government, or rather a government that recognizes and guaranties freedom. Deny this principle, maintain that private rights, whether of persons or things, are creatures of the political power, and subject to the will of the legislature, and you convert the government at once into an arbitrary government, a government of mere will, under which there is no real liberty, no solid security, for either person or property; and this just as much where the will that obtains is the will of the majority, as where it is the will of only one man, — just as much where the form of the government is democratic as where it is monarchical.

The real excellence or glory of our institutions, we take it, lies in this principle; not, as is too often assumed, in the form of our political organization. If we have not misapprehended Mr. Webster, the Common Law in its principles, maxims, and definitions is with us both logically and historically anterior to our political constitutions, as well as the legislative bodies instituted under them, and is to be regarded as common right, or, in a word, as law for the convention in framing what we call the Constitution, and for the legislature in its enactments. It is for us really and truly the “higher law,” and in the temporal order the most authoritative expression, which we as a people have, of the Divine law, from which all human laws derive their legality. It is the supreme civil law of the land, and

although the legislature may undoubtedly modify or abrogate such of its special provisions as are temporary or local in their nature, or depend on time and circumstance for their wisdom and justice, or utility, and therefore such as are not essential to it as a system of law, yet no special enactment, whether by the convention or the ordinary legislature, that is repugnant to any one of its essential principles, is or can be law for an American citizen. All such enactments are unconstitutional, and the courts have the right, and are bound, to set them aside as null. The Common Law is the fundamental constitution of the country, older than the political constitutions, and able to survive them. The political constitutions presuppose it, must conform to it, and be interpreted by it; for what we call our political constitutions are in their essence only a part — the more fundamental part if you will — of our written law, not that which creates and sustains us as a living people. They are the source of our political rights or franchises, but all our other rights, what we call our natural rights, both the rights of persons and the rights of things, are prior to and independent of them, and exist and are determined by the Common Law. They cannot be touched by the political power without usurpation, tyranny, and oppression, from which the Common Law courts, if suffered to remain in their legitimate independence, are competent to relieve us. Thus Mr. Webster contends that the courts of New Hampshire ought of themselves to have declared the law essentially modifying the original charter of Dartmouth College invalid, unconstitutional, as violating common right and the well-settled principles of the Common Law in the case of eleemosynary institutions. It would follow from his doctrine, too, that no State in our Union would have the right to pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts, even if not forbidden to do so by the Constitution of the United States. It is enough that such laws are repugnant to the Common Law. The courts of this State may then, unquestionably, set aside the recent enactment of our legislature in regard to the sale of spirituous liquors, as infringing the rights of property as defined by the Common Law, which is law for the legislature as well as for the courts.

Such we understand to be the principle of law in all the States of the Union in which the Common Law obtains, and it is only in this principle, administered by an inde-

pendent judiciary, that there is under our system of government, any more than under the most despotic governments of the Old World, any reliable support for the rights of person or property. Mr. Webster has labored long and earnestly to bring out and establish this doctrine, and the services in this respect which he has rendered the country deserve even a far higher appreciation than they have yet received, and entitle him to the warmest gratitude of his countrymen. Their importance may be judged of by the efforts of all our radicals and experimenters in politics and law to get rid of the Common Law, and to destroy the independence of the judiciary. These men follow their instincts, which are all in favor of anarchy on the one hand, and despotism on the other. And the simple fact that they are hostile to an independent judiciary and to the Common Law proves of itself that these are essential alike to the maintenance of order and of liberty.

The distinguishing excellence of the Common Law system is, that it is *lex non scripta*, unwritten law, that is, a living tradition, in the reason, the conscience, the sentiments, the habits, the manners, and the customs of the people, and therefore in some sense independent of mere political organizations, and capable of surviving even their most violent changes, and of preserving a degree of order and justice among individuals, when the political authority is for the moment suspended or subverted. It is probably owing chiefly to the fact that the Common Law is an unwritten law, a living tradition preserved by the people themselves, and administered by an independent judiciary, that political revolutions in England and in this country preserve a character of sobriety and reserve in comparison with those of the Continent of Europe. The Continental nations have inherited the Civil Law, the old Roman Law, which is a system of written law, and theoretically in the keeping of the prince, beginning and ending with the political sovereign. Under this system of law the sovereign is the fountain of justice, as he must be under every system of mere written law; the people are trained for the sovereign, and have no established law to guide or regulate their conduct where he fails to express in a formal manner his will. The state everywhere takes the initiative, and the people without it are incapable of any orderly or regulated civil activity. Hence, whenever the political power receives a shock,

all law is suspended, and the judiciary can perform legitimately none of its functions. Consequently, political revolutions in the Continental nations throw the whole of society into disorder, and subvert all social as well as political relations. The people receiving the law immediately from the sovereign, or written codes promulgated by the sovereign, and not having it in their own life, living in their own traditions, in their own habits, manners, and customs, are without law, and destitute of those habits of thought and action which would restrain them within moderate limits, and consequently are left liable to run into every imaginable excess.

But the Common Law, being an unwritten law, and living in the habits and manners of the people, gives them a sort of self-subsistency independent in a degree of the mere political power, and operates to restrain and regulate their social conduct, even when that power is temporarily overthrown or suspended. As long as the people remain in any sense a living people, the law survives, and survives as law, and preserves among them, in the midst of the most violent political convulsions, the elements of liberty and social order. England has gone through many changes, religious and political, but we have never seen English society wholly dissolved, or the main current of private and domestic life wholly interrupted, or even turned far aside from its ordinary channel. She has survived all her changes, and amid them all she has preserved her private and domestic life, social as distinguished from political order, but slightly impaired. She preserved a certain degree of individual freedom, to some extent the rights of persons and things, even under the Tudors, and something of social order under the Commonwealth, which she has continued to do even under the modern Whig rule and a Reformed Parliament. Much the same may be said of this country during what we call our Revolution. There was a time when our political constitutions were suspended, when the political authority was, as we may say, in abeyance, latent, undeveloped, potential, not actual; yet we did not fall into complete social disorder. Irregularity there certainly was, but the courts and the Common Law remained, and justice still continued to be administered, in the way and in the sense with which our people were familiar, and to which from time immemorial they had been

accustomed. In France and other Continental countries, the case has usually been different. The subversion of political power there subverts society itself, save so far as it may be preserved by religious institutions, and the people seem destitute of all recuperative energy, or power in themselves to reëstablish order; and if they do it at all, it is either through a military chieftain, or by a restoration. These different results, we think, are owing, not to difference of race or blood, or to different degrees of intelligence or moral virtue, as some in our time pretend, but mainly, if not solely, to the difference there is between a system of written and a system of unwritten law.

The great disadvantage of the European Continental nations is in the fact that they have no Common Law, and no Civil Law but written law. These nations are the heirs of the Roman empire, and their Civil Law is substantially the old Roman Law, and like all law embodied in codes is inflexible, and depends for its operation entirely on the political sovereign, who is supposed to prescribe and to administer it, either in person or by his ministers. It has no power to adapt itself to unforeseen emergencies, and to operate regularly in the midst of disorder. Between the written Civil Law and the unwritten Common Law, or between the Roman and the English systems, there is a fundamental difference. The Roman Law extends only to cases foreseen and provided for, the Common Law to all cases not taken out of its jurisdiction; the former is of gentile origin, simply modified by the Christian Emperors so as not to exclude Christian faith and worship; the latter is of Christian origin, and grew up among the Anglo-Saxons as they were converted from paganism and entered under the guidance of the Church upon the career of Christian civilization. The Common Law starts from the principle that society and the state are for man, and it seeks primarily the protection of private rights, the rights of persons and of things; the Roman Law starts from the heathen principle that man is for society, and society for the state, and it seeks primarily the protection of public rights, or the rights of the prince. The former abhors despotism, the latter abhors anarchy; the one makes the state absolute, supreme, omnipresent, the other presupposes a power above the state, limits the political power of the state, and asserts a law to which the state itself owes obe-

dience, which subsists, and can, when need is, operate without the express sanction of the political sovereign. The Roman Law knows no people but the state, the Common Law recognizes the people, so to speak, as a power distinct from, and capable of surviving, the state. A nation that has been trained under the Common Law system may become an orderly republic; a nation trained under the Roman Law system can never be other than monarchical in effect, whatever it may be in name and pretension, or at farthest a close aristocracy. These are some of the characteristic differences between the two systems, and they sufficiently explain the different results of English or American revolutions from those of Continental Europe.

The essential difference between the two systems does not consist in the mere difference between their respective special provisions, which could easily be made the same in both, but in their general principles, the one as the written law of the prince, and the other as the living traditional law of the people, originating and living in their very life as a people. That the advantages are all on the side of the latter, or the English system, we think must be obvious to every lawyer and every well-informed statesman. It is therefore with pain that we find our politicians ascribing what is excellent in our institutions, what constitutes the chief protection of liberty and order among us, to our mere political organization, and overlooking the merits of the Common Law, the immense superiority of an unwritten over a written law, and seeking to abolish it, and to substitute a written code in its place. The Common Law, as an essentially unwritten law, living in the traditional life of a people, can never be introduced into a nation whose character is already formed. It must be born and grow up with the nation. Consequently, when once eliminated from the life of the people, it can never be replaced. Once gone, it is gone for ever. It was born with the birth of England as a Christian nation, and grew up with it as the civil part of its Christian life. It became the public reason, the English common sense, and to it must we attribute the marked superiority of England and her institutions in the Middle Ages, and even in modern times, over the Continent of Europe. Happily England, in casting off, in the sixteenth century, the religion which gave her the Common Law, did not cast off the Common Law itself.

She preserved it; slightly marred, no doubt, in its beauty and symmetry, yet she preserved it in its substance; and from her we have inherited it, and it should be our study, as we detest anarchy and love liberty, to transmit it unimpaired, in its purity and integrity, to our latest posterity. A richer legacy, aside from the Christianity which gave it birth, we could not even wish to bequeathe to future generations.

But we had no intention, on setting out, to enlarge as we have on either of the topics we have taken up. It was not our intention to speak of Mr. Webster either as a statesman or as a lawyer, for his merits in both respects have been dwelt upon till the public, perhaps, are growing tired of hearing them extolled, and some may be beginning to feel with the poor Athenian who would ostracize Aristides because tired of hearing him always called the Just. As a statesman we do not think that Mr. Webster has upon the whole been overrated. He was educated in the school of Washington and Adams, the old Federalist school, which, though not without its defects, was the only respectable political school we have ever had in New England. Its error was in copying from the English Whig, instead of the English — we say not the *Irish* — Tory, and acceding to the Jacobinical definition of popular sovereignty. It had too great a sympathy with the urban system of government, or government resting for its main support on the commercial and manufacturing classes, and did not sufficiently recognize the importance of a permanent class of landed proprietors to the stability and permanence of government. But, except in the planting States, its errors were all shared, and in an exaggerated form, by the rival or Democratic school, or if not, were opposed by worse errors, and the worst of all errors, — by that of giving to the government a proletarian basis, whether urban or rustic. In the main Mr. Webster has remained faithful to his school, although he seems, as he has grown older, to have departed from some of its best principles, and approached the party it opposed. He seems latterly to have become almost a democrat. Whether from conviction, or because the country is so hopelessly wedded to democracy, that he considers it the part of wisdom to accept democracy and endeavor to regulate it, we cannot say. However this may be, few who know Mr. Webster will question the elevation



or honesty of his views, or suspect him of being capable of adopting any line of policy which he does not believe for the time and under the circumstances wise and just.

No man can question Mr. Webster's attachment to the Union, or his ardent love of country. His patriotic addresses prove this, no less than the general character of the measures to which he has always given his support during his connection with the general government. He is warmly attached to the political institutions of his country, — no man more so, — and this attachment sometimes, perhaps, blinds him to the danger of certain popular tendencies amongst us. In his masterly speech on the basis of representation, in the convention called for amending the constitution of this State in 1820, and in his address at Plymouth, December 22 of the same year, in commemoration of the landing of the Pilgrims and the first settlement of New England, he discusses at great length and with rare sagacity the importance, in a political point of view, of laws regulating the descent and distribution of property, and shows that, with our laws on the subject, monarchy becomes an impossibility. But it does not appear to have occurred to him to ask, if, with such laws, — laws which distribute property in minute parcels, which prevent its accumulation in any considerable masses, and thus render impossible the growth and preservation of families, — even a well-ordered republic can long survive, and if the only government that will ultimately be practicable is not mere military despotism. Family with us is destroyed, and the man who can boast a grandfather may think himself fortunate. Family influence there is none, family ties are broken, and we have only a mighty mass of isolated individuals. It may not be long before nothing but military force under a military chieftain will be able to keep them in order.

But leaving the field of politics, it may not be unpleasant to meet Mr. Webster in the department of literature. It was mainly of his works in a literary point of view that we intended to speak when we set out, and probably we should have done so, only we have lost, if ever we possessed, the faculty of treating any man's works as mere literary productions. We are forced to admit to ourselves, which by the by we will not do to the public, that we have ourselves very little of what is called literary taste or lit-

erary culture. We do not mean to say that we have not read the chief literary works of modern, if not of ancient times; but we cannot understand literature for its own sake, or say much of the form of a literary work without reference to its contents. This is no disqualification for writing essays, but it is, very likely, a serious disqualification for writing literary reviews, that will pass for such with our contemporaries, and hence we seldom have much to say of books, except as to their principles. The principles of literature, or which should govern the literary man in the production of literature, we can understand; we can appreciate the principles of art; we can even admire a work of art, whether a poem, a symphony, a picture, a statue, a temple, or an oration; but we could never describe a work of art, or even our raptures on beholding it. We can enjoy it, take in its full effect, and thank God for the genius and talent that has created it; perhaps we could in a homely way tell what it is in it that we enjoy, and in some instances why we enjoy or ought to enjoy it; but we cannot tell it so as to reproduce in our hearers our own emotions, or rather, so as to make them fancy they feel very much as they would on beholding it, which is, if we understand it, the great aim of the modern critic on art. We have not enough of German subjectivity for that, and we always find it difficult to express what we do not distinctly apprehend as objective, and independent of our own subjective state. We cannot pass off our own emotions for criticism, nor for the object criticized, and consequently are unable to aspire to a rank among our modern approved literary critics.

The form of artistic productions, of course, is not a matter of indifference, but it has little separate value, and is seldom worth dwelling on, except in a school for learners, as detached from the merits of its contents. We like to see a man well dressed, but we cannot value the man for the dress, or the dress without the man. We do not undervalue purely literary taste or culture, but we never esteem works merely for the literary taste and culture they display. As merely literary works, having no end, answering no moral purpose, beyond that of gratifying the literary tastes of the reader, no works are worth the labor of criticism. The orator must always have some end beyond that of producing a beautiful oration, the poet beyond that

of producing a poem according to the rules of poetic art, and the logician beyond that of producing an argument, and the first thing in one or another of these to be considered by the critic is the end the author has had in view. We utterly protest against the doctrine that excludes morality from art, or the German doctrine of æsthetics, that art itself is moral, nay, religious, and that the chief merit of the artist is to work instinctively, with no distinct consciousness of the end for which he works, as the bee builds her cell, or the blackbird sings her song. We cannot say with Goethe, —

“ Ich singe wieder Vogel singt  
Der in dem Zweigen wohnet,  
Das Lied das aus der Kehle springt,  
Ist Lohn der reichlich lohnet.”

Art may be used for purposes either good or bad ; genius may prostitute itself, and display its charms but to corrupt, as any one may see in reopened Pompeii, or in many a modern gallery, — as any one knows who has read *Don Juan* and *Childe Harold*, by Byron, or *The Loves of the Angels* and *Lalla Rookh*, by Thomas Moore, to say nothing of works transmitted to us from ancient classic authors. Art, restricted in its application to exterior forms, or to the reproduction of exterior beauty, is indifferent to good or evil, and is as readily employed in the service of the one as of the other. Moreover, nothing is moral, save as it is done for the sake of an end. Morality is predicable not of the procession of existences from God, for in that procession God is the sole actor, and existences are created and simply prepared to be actors ; it is predicable alone of the return of existences to God, as their final cause, and even here only of such existences as are endowed with free will, and capable of voluntarily choosing God as their ultimate end. If even these merely act instinctively, without apprehension and choice of the end, that is, without acting for the sake of the end, they are not in such actions moral, and their productions have no moral character. The German doctrine of the essential morality of all art is therefore inadmissible. Art must be for an end, and for a good end, or else it either has no moral character, or is immoral.

Our nature, again, is fallen, and, except so far as restored by grace, is the slave of concupiscence and corrupt pro-

ions. It has been turned away from God as the true Cause of all creatures, and instead of instinctively turning to him as the Supreme Good, it instinctively turns from him, towards the creature, and through the creature, which has being only in God, towards death and decay. Consequently, when man foregoes reason, which demands a final no less than a first cause, and simply follows his instincts or his perverted inclinations, he necessarily produces that which is bad, immoral, corrupt, and depraving. The song of the blackbird which she instinctively is not immoral, nor of an immoral tendency, because it does not spring from a perverted or corrupt instinct. External nature is indeed cursed for our sake, but not in itself, for it has never transgressed the law of its being, and the curse is to us, in the use we make of it, in the power which our sin gives it to afflict us. In fact it has no moral character, for it has no free will, and is subjected to a physical and not a moral law. Its beauty, its harmony, the song of birds, the flowers of the fields, the silent groves, the dark forests, the lofty mountains, the majestic rivers, the laughing rills, the broad lakes and vast plains, may all be to us occasions of virtuous affection or fruitful passion. All depends on ourselves and the use we make of them. To the pure all things are pure, to the impure all things are corrupt. The saint finds in all nature incentives to virtuous action, inducements to love and praise the glorious Maker of all; the sinner finds in all nature occasions of evil, or incentives to sin.

The artist, whether orator or poet, painter or sculptor, musician or architect, must have, then, an end in whatever he does beyond the mere doing, and also a good end, an end which lies in the moral order, and is referable to God, the Supreme Good and ultimate End of all things. When we have ascertained the end of a literary production, and ascertained it to be one which a wise and just man can approve, we may proceed to consider the literary taste and style with which the author has sought to accomplish it. detached from its end, the work is no proper subject of criticism. As referred to its end, even its adaptation to that end, its form, its style, its diction, are proper and not unimportant considerations for the critic; for whatever is well done is worth doing well. We are not purely intellectual beings, and it is not enough that he who writes

for us should have the truth, and be able to state it in a strictly logical form. We have will as well as intellect; we have imagination, affections, passions, and emotions,—a perception of the beautiful as well as of the true and the good,—and we can be pleased as well as instructed, and generally we refuse the instruction if not presented in a form that pleases, or at least in one that does not displease. Now, we are far from considering this form under which we present the true or the good to be a matter of mere indifference. A correct literary taste, a lively sensibility to the fit and the beautiful, the command of an easy and noble style, of appropriate, expressive, and graceful diction, are matters of great importance, and which no man who writes at all is at liberty entirely to neglect. Here we prize literary taste and culture, as highly as any one can, for here they are not for themselves, but for a legitimate purpose beyond themselves, and are prized as means to an end.

Tried by the standard implied, if not distinctly exhibited, in these remarks, we shall look in vain in the whole range of American secular literature for works that can rival these six volumes before us. In general, the end is just and noble, and, with fewer exceptions than we could reasonably expect, the doctrines set forth are sound and important. No man has written amongst us who has given utterance to sounder maxims on politics and law, and no one has done more to elevate political and legal topics to the dignity of science, to embellish them with the charms of a rich and chaste imagination, and to enrich them with the wealth accumulated from the successful cultivation of the classics of ancient and modern times. The author has received from nature a mind of the highest order, and he has cultivated it with care and success. We see in every page, every sentence, of his writings, vast intellectual power, quick sensibility, deep and tender affection, and a rich and fervid imagination; but we see also the hard student, the traces of long and painful discipline under the tutelage of the most eminent ancient and modern masters. Nature has been bountiful, but art has added its full share, in making the author what he is, and the combination of the two has enabled him to produce works which in their line are certainly unrivalled in this country, and we know not where to look for any thing in our language of the

kind really superior to them. As an orator Mr. Webster has all the terseness of Demosthenes, the grace and fulness of Cicero, the fire and energy of Chatham, and a dignity and repose peculiarly his own.

In these times a man is to be commended for the faults he avoids, as well as for the positive excellence to which he attains. Mr. Webster is free from the ordinary faults of even the more distinguished of the literary men of his country. American literary taste is in general very low and corrupt. Washington Irving and Hawthorne have good taste, are unaffected, natural, simple, easy, and graceful, but deficient in dignity and strength; they are pleasant authors for the boudoir, or to read while resting one's self on the sofa after dinner. No man who has any self-respect will read either of them in the morning. Prescott is gentlemanly, but monotonous, and occasionally jejune. Bancroft is gorgeous, glowing, but always straining after effect, always on stilts, never at his ease, never natural, never composed, never graceful or dignified. He has intellect, fancy, scholarship, all of a high order, but no taste, no literary good-breeding. He gesticulates furiously, and speaks always from the top of his voice. In general we may say of American literature that it is provincial, and its authors are uncertain of themselves, laboring, but laboring in vain, to catch the tone and manner of a distant metropolis. They have tolerable natural parts, often respectable scholarship, but they lack ease, dignity, repose. They do not speak as masters, but as forward pupils. They take too high a key for their voice, and are obliged in order to get through to sing in falsetto. You are never quite at your ease in listening to them; you are afraid they will break down, and that the lofty flights of oratory they promise you will turn out to be only specimens of the bathos. They fail to give one confidence in their strength, for they are always striving to be strong, and laboring to be intense. From all faults of this kind Mr. Webster is free. He inspires you, whether you are listening to his words as they fall from his lips, or read them as reproduced by the reporter, with full confidence in his ability to get through without any break-down, and he seldom disappoints you. He appears always greater than his subject, always to have the full mastery over it, and never to be mastered or carried away by it. In him you see no labor

to be strong or intense, no violent contortions, or unnatural efforts to escape being thought weak, tame, or commonplace. He is always himself, collected, calm, and perfectly at his ease. He is so, not only because he really is a strong man, and has thoroughly mastered his subject, but because he is also a modest man, and is not disturbed by a constant recurrence of his thoughts to himself. He has through his natural modesty, which is one of the most striking traits in his character, and through cultivation, the power of forgetting himself, and of not thinking of the impression he is making on others with regard to himself, and consequently is able to employ the whole force of his intellect, imagination, and learning in stating, illustrating, and embellishing his subject. Being at his ease, having all his powers at his command whenever he rises to speak, and naturally a delicate taste, chastened and refined by the assiduous study of the best models, ancient and modern, he without difficulty avoids the ordinary faults of the orators of his country, and reassures, pleases, instructs, and carries along with him his whole audience.

We know not how Mr. Webster compares as an orator with the great orators of other times or other countries, for mere descriptions of oratory are rarely reliable; but he comes up more nearly to our ideal of the finished orator for the bar, the senate, the popular assembly, or a patriotic celebration, than any other to whom our country has given us an opportunity of listening. His elocution and diction harmonize admirably with his person and voice, and both strike you at once as fitted to each other. His majestic person, his strong, athletic frame, and his deep, rich, sonorous voice, set off with double effect his massive thoughts, his weighty sentences, his chaste, dignified, and harmonious periods. Whatever we may say of the elocution, the rhetoric is always equal to it. Mr. Webster is perhaps the best rhetorician in the country. No man better appreciates the choice of words or the construction and collocation of sentences, so as to seize at once the understanding, soothe the passions, charm the imagination, and captivate the affections. He is always classical. His words are pure English, and the proper words for the occasion, the best in the language; and his sentences are simply constructed, never involved, never violently inverted, but straightforward, honest, sincere, and free from all

modern trickery. We know in the language no models better fitted than the orations and speeches in these volumes for the assiduous study of the young literary aspirant who would become a perfect rhetorician, or master a style at once free and natural, instructive and pleasing, pure and correct, graceful and elevated, dignified and noble. Mr. Webster's artistic skill is consummate, and evidently has been acquired only by great labor and pains; but you must study his works long and carefully before you will detect it. Such writing as we have here comes not by nature, and no genius, however great, can match it without years of hard labor in preparatory discipline.

The casual reader may be apt to underrate Mr. Webster's merits as a logician, and we recollect hearing a distinguished Senator, who ought to have known him well, characterize him one day as "a magnificent declaimer, but no reasoner." He is not of a speculative turn of mind, nor does he appear to have devoted much time to the study of the speculative sciences, though he evidently has not wholly neglected them,—and he seldom reasons, as we say, in form; but he gives full evidence, after all, of possessing the logical element in as eminent a degree as he does any other element of the human mind. His style of expression and habits of thought are strictly logical, and his conclusions always follow from his premises. The only thing to be said is, that very often one of his premises is understood and not expressed, and sometimes rests on the prejudice, conviction, or actual common sense of his countrymen, not on a true ontological principle. His defect is not a defect of logic, but a defect of original apprehension, resulting from the neglect to go back from the common sense of his countrymen to first principles. In consequence of this, his conclusions are sometimes unsound, not because they do not follow from his premises expressed or understood, but because one or the other of his premises is unsound. This is more or less necessarily the case with all Englishmen and Americans, who follow what is called common sense; for the common sense of Englishmen and Americans, as we have already remarked, is made up from modern innovations, as well as from the traditions of our ancestors, and is therefore on one side untrue. But where his principles are sound, as in his law arguments, and in the greater part of his speeches in Con-



gress, and in several of his diplomatic letters, his logic is sound and invincible, although it is presented in a popular form, the most suitable for his purpose. Ordinarily he strikes us as comprehensive rather than acute, but he can be as acute, as nice in his analyses and distinctions, as need be, as we may know from his argument to the court and jury in the trial of the Knapps for the murder of Captain White of Salem, which upon the whole is one of the most finished of his performances, as they stand in the volumes before us.

Some readers, again, will regard Mr. Webster as chiefly remarkable for his pure intellectual power; and be disposed to deny him much power of imagination. But this would be in the highest degree unjust. He possesses an uncommonly strong and vivid imagination. Take up any one of his speeches, if but tolerably reported, on any subject, no matter how dry or uninteresting in itself, and you find that he at once informs it with life, elevates it, and invests it with a deep interest. This no man destitute of imagination can ever do. The test of imagination is not a florid style, abounding in tropes and metaphors. Such a style indicates fancy, not imagination, and, in fact, it is the general tendency of our countrymen, nay, of our age, to mistake fancy for imagination. Washington Irving and Hawthorne have imagination, though not of the highest order; Bancroft has fancy, a rich and exuberant fancy, but very little imagination. To test the question whether a man has imagination or not, let him take up a dry and difficult subject, and if he can treat it so that without weariness, and even with interest, you can follow him through his discussion of it, although he uses always the language appropriate to it, and seems to employ only the pure intellect in developing it, you may be sure that he has a strong and fervid imagination, so strong and active as to impart life and motion to whatever he touches. Mr. Webster has an exceedingly rich and active imagination, but he does not suffer it to predominate; he makes it subservient to his reason, and so blends it in with the pure intellect, that you feel its effect without being aware of its presence. No matter how apparently dry and technical the subject he has in hand, the moment he begins to unfold it, and to indicate its connections with other subjects, and through these its high social or moral relations, his hearer's

or reader's attention is arrested, fixed, and held till he closes. He no sooner speaks, than the dry bones of his subject assume flesh, move, and stand up, living and breathing, in proper human shape, well formed and duly proportioned, not misshapen monsters, that frighten by their hideous or disgust by their grotesque appearance.

What we most admire in the style of Mr. Webster is its simplicity, strength, and repose. The majority of our writers who study to be simple in their manner are plain, dry, or silly. They are simple in a sense in which simplicity is not a compliment. Those who wish to escape this charge become inflated, bombastic, and unable to say any thing in an easy and natural manner. They select high-sounding words, pile up adjective upon adjective, and send their fancy over all nature, and through all its departments, animal, vegetable, and mineral, over all nations, among the English, the French, the Italian, the Dutch, the Russian, the Tartars, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Hindoos, the Egyptians, the Abyssinians, the Negroes, the Malays, the savages of Oceanica and of North and South America, and through all times, from the entrance of Satan into the garden of Eden to seduce our great-grandmother Eve, down to the battle of Buena Vista, in which General Taylor flogged General Santa Ana, or the last Baltimore Convention for nominating a Whig or a Democratic President, to cull flowers and collect images to adorn and illustrate some poor, commonplace thought, or some puny conceit, that might have proved stillborn without in the least affecting the flux and reflux of the ocean tides, interrupting the course of nature, or changing the general current of historical events. Mr. Webster avoids both extremes, and speaks always in accordance with the genius of his native idiom, and in his natural key. Take, for instance, the opening paragraph of his speech on the completion of the Bunker Hill Monument.

"A duty has been performed. A work of gratitude and patriotism is completed. This structure, having its foundations in soil which drank deep of early Revolutionary blood, has at length reached its destined height, and now lifts its summit to the skies." — Vol. I. p. 83.

Or this from the same speech : —

"The Bunker Hill Monument is finished. Here it stands.

Fortunate in the high natural eminence on which it is placed, higher, infinitely higher in its objects and purpose, it rises over the land and over the sea ; and, visible, at their homes, to three hundred thousand of the people of Massachusetts, it stands a memorial of the last, and a monitor to the present and to all succeeding generations. I have spoken of the loftiness of its purpose. If it had been without any other design than the creation of a work of art, the granite of which it is composed would have slept in its native bed. It has a purpose, and that purpose gives it its character. That purpose enrobes it with dignity and moral grandeur. That well-known purpose it is which causes us to look up to it with a feeling of awe. It is itself the orator of this occasion. It is not from my lips, it could not be from any human lips, that that strain of eloquence is this day to flow most competent to move and excite the vast multitudes around me. The powerful speaker stands motionless before us. It is a plain shaft. It bears no inscriptions, fronting to the rising sun, from which the future antiquary shall wipe the dust. Nor does the rising sun cause tones of music to issue from its summit. But at the rising of the sun, and at the setting of the sun ; in the blaze of noonday, and beneath the milder effulgence of lunar light ; it looks, it speaks, it acts, to the full comprehension of every American mind, and the awakening of glowing enthusiasm in every American heart." — p. 86.

With the exception of the phrase "the milder effulgence of lunar light," which we cannot much admire, this is simply and naturally said, and yet it is in the highest strain of genuine oratory, and we shall not easily forget the emotion with which we heard Mr. Webster, standing in front of the monument, pronounce it, or the deep and prolonged applause it received from the some two hundred thousand of our citizens assembled in honor of the occasion. All true greatness is simple and sedate. It affects no display, for it is satisfied with what it is. It speaks and it is done, commands and it stands fast. Take another passage, of a different description indeed, but illustrating the same simplicity of style and expression. The extract is from the opening of his speech on the trial of the Knapps for the murder of Captain Joseph White of Salem.

"I am little accustomed, Gentlemen, to the part which I am now attempting to perform. Hardly more than once or twice has it happened to me to be concerned on the side of the government in any criminal prosecution whatever ; and never, until the present occasion, in any case affecting life.

"But I very much regret that it should have been thought necessary to suggest to you that I am brought here to 'hurry you against the law and beyond the evidence.' I hope I have too much regard for justice, and too much respect for my own character, to attempt either; and were I to make such attempt, I am sure that in this court nothing can be carried against the law, and that gentlemen, intelligent and just as you are, are not, by any power, to be hurried beyond the evidence. Though I could well have wished to shun this occasion, I have not felt at liberty to withhold my professional assistance, when it is supposed that I may be in some degree useful in investigating and discovering the truth respecting this most extraordinary murder. It has seemed to be a duty incumbent on me, as on every other citizen, to do my best and my utmost to bring to light the perpetrators of this crime. Against the prisoner at the bar, as an individual, I cannot have the slightest prejudice. I would not do him the smallest injury or injustice. But I do not affect to be indifferent to the discovery and the punishment of this deep guilt. I cheerfully share in the opprobrium, how great soever it may be, which is cast on those who feel and manifest an anxious concern that all who had a part in planning, or a hand in executing, this deed of midnight assassination, may be brought to answer for their enormous crime at the bar of public justice.

"Gentlemen, it is a most extraordinary case. In some respects, it has hardly a precedent anywhere; certainly none in our New England history. This bloody drama exhibited no suddenly excited, ungovernable rage. The actors in it were not surprised by any lion-like temptation springing upon their virtue, and overcoming it, before resistance could begin. Nor did they do the deed to glut savage vengeance, or satiate long-settled and deadly hate. It was a cool, calculating, money-making murder. It was all 'hire and salary, not revenge.' It was the weighing of money against life; the counting out of so many pieces of silver against so many ounces of blood.

"An aged man, without an enemy in the world, in his own house, and in his own bed, is made the victim of a butcherly murder, for mere pay. Truly, here is a new lesson for painters and poets. Whoever shall hereafter draw the portrait of murder, if he will show it as it has been exhibited, where such example was last to have been looked for, in the very bosom of our New England society, let him not give it the grim visage of Moloch, the brow knitted by revenge, the face black with settled hate, and the blood-shot eye emitting livid fires of malice. Let him draw, rather, a decorous, smooth-faced, bloodless demon; a picture in repose, rather than in action; not so much an example of human nature in its

depravity, and in its paroxysms of crime, as an infernal being, a fiend, in the ordinary display and development of his character.

"The deed was executed with a degree of self-possession and steadiness equal to the wickedness with which it was planned. The circumstances now clearly in evidence spread out the whole scene before us. Deep sleep had fallen on the destined victim, and on all beneath his roof. A healthful old man, to whom sleep was sweet, the first sound slumbers of the night held him in their soft but strong embrace. The assassin enters, through the window already prepared, into an unoccupied apartment. With noiseless foot he paces the lonely hall, half lighted by the moon; he winds up the ascent of the stairs, and reaches the door of the chamber. Of this, he moves the lock, by soft and continued pressure, till it turns on its hinges without noise; and he enters, and beholds his victim before him. The room is uncommonly open to the admission of light. The face of the innocent sleeper is turned from the murderer, and the beams of the moon, resting on the gray locks of his aged temple, show him where to strike. The fatal blow is given! and the victim passes, without a struggle or a motion, from the repose of sleep to the repose of death! It is the assassin's purpose to make sure work; and he plies the dagger, though it is obvious that life has been destroyed by the blow of the bludgeon. He even raises the aged arm, that he may not fail in his aim at the heart, and replaces it again over the wounds of the poniard! To finish the picture, he explores the wrist for the pulse! He feels for it, and ascertains that it beats no longer! It is accomplished. The deed is done. He retreats, retraces his steps to the window, passes out through it as he came in, and escapes. He has done the murder. No eye has seen him, no ear has heard him. The secret is his own, and it is safe!

"Ah! Gentlemen, that was a dreadful mistake. Such a secret can be safe nowhere. The whole creation of God has neither nook nor corner where the guilty can bestow it, and say it is safe. Not to speak of that eye which pierces through all disguises, and beholds every thing as in the splendor of noon, such secrets of guilt are never safe from detection, even by men. True it is, generally speaking, that 'murder will out.' True it is, that Providence hath so ordained, and doth so govern things, that those who break the great law of Heaven by shedding man's blood seldom succeed in avoiding discovery. Especially, in a case exciting so much attention as this, discovery must come, and will come, sooner or later. A thousand eyes turn at once to explore every man, every thing, every circumstance, connected with the time and place; a thousand ears catch every whisper; a thousand excited minds intensely dwell on the scene, shedding all their light, and ready to kindle the slightest circumstance into a blaze of dis-

covery. Meantime the guilty soul cannot keep its own secret. It is false to itself; or rather it feels an irresistible impulse of conscience to be true to itself. It labors under its guilty possession, and knows not what to do with it. The human heart was not made for the residence of such an inhabitant. It finds itself preyed on by a torment, which it dares not acknowledge to God or man. A vulture is devouring it, and it can ask no sympathy or assistance, either from heaven or earth. The secret which the murderer possesses soon comes to possess him; and, like the evil spirits of which we read, it overcomes him, and leads him whithersoever it will. He feels it beating at his heart, rising to his throat, and demanding disclosure. He thinks the whole world sees it in his face, reads it in his eyes, and almost hears its workings in the very silence of his thoughts. It has become his master. It betrays his discretion, it breaks down his courage, it conquers his prudence. When suspicions from without begin to embarrass him, and the net of circumstance to entangle him, the fatal secret struggles with still greater violence to burst forth. It must be confessed, it will be confessed; there is no refuge from confession but suicide, and suicide is confession." — Vol. VI. pp. 51 – 54.

We continue the extract from this same speech, for the sake, not only of the style, but of the sentiment it expresses with regard to the detection of crime, and the merited rebuke it quietly gives to our romantic philanthropists, whose sympathies are all for the criminal, and who would deem it very low and illiberal to make any account of the sufferings of the innocent which his crimes inevitably occasion. The community in which we live is coming to a strange pass. Crimes are daily and hourly multiplying in our midst, both in frequency and magnitude, and yet the great study is to mitigate punishment, and to convert the criminal into a hero. Virtue goes unhonored, and we are doing our best to have crime go unpunished.

"Much has been said, on this occasion, of the excitement which has existed, and still exists, and of the extraordinary measures taken to discover and punish the guilty. No doubt there has been, and is, much excitement, and strange indeed it would be had it been otherwise. Should not all the peaceable and well-disposed naturally feel concerned, and naturally exert themselves to bring to punishment the authors of this secret assassination? Was it a thing to be slept upon or forgotten? Did you, Gentlemen, sleep quite as quietly in your beds after this murder as before? Was it not a case for rewards, for meetings, for committees, for the united efforts of all the good, to find out a band of

murderous conspirators, of midnight ruffians, and to bring them to the bar of justice and law? If this be excitement, is it an unnatural or an improper excitement?

"It seems to me, Gentlemen, that there are appearances of another feeling, of a very different nature and character; not very extensive, I would hope, but still there is too much evidence of its existence. Such is human nature, that some persons lose their abhorrence of crime in their admiration of its magnificent exhibitions. Ordinary vice is reprobated by them, but extraordinary guilt, exquisite wickedness, the high flights and poetry of crime, seize on the imagination, and lead them to forget the depths of the guilt, in admiration of the excellence of the performance, or the unequalled atrocity of the purpose. There are those in our day who have made great use of this infirmity of our nature, and by means of it done infinite injury to the cause of good morals. They have affected not only the taste, but I fear also the principles, of the young, the heedless, and the imaginative, by the exhibition of interesting and beautiful monsters. They render depravity attractive, sometimes by the polish of its manners, and sometimes by its very extravagance; and study to show off crime under all the advantages of cleverness and dexterity. Gentlemen, this is an extraordinary murder, but it is still a murder. We are not to lose ourselves in wonder at its origin, or in gazing on its cool and skilful execution. We are to detect and to punish it; and while we proceed with caution against the prisoner, and are to be sure that we do not visit on his head the offences of others, we are yet to consider that we are dealing with a case of most atrocious crime, which has not the slightest circumstance about it to soften its enormity. It is murder; deliberate, concerted, malicious murder."—pp. 54, 55.

Other extracts in abundance we might make, full of interest in themselves, and illustrating the several features of Mr. Webster's style and manner which we have indicated; but we must refer our readers to their own recollections, or, where these fail, to the volumes themselves. The extracts we have made will serve to illustrate, not only the simplicity of his language, but the strength of his expressions, and the repose of his manner. The quiet majesty of his style in the more felicitous moments of the orator, or when the reporter has been the more competent to his task of reporting his speeches word for word as delivered, has seldom been surpassed, if equalled, by any American, or even English writer. Burke is the English writer with whom we most naturally compare him. As an orator he is far superior to Burke, as a profound and comprehensive think-

er, perhaps, he falls below him ; as a writer he is as classical in his style, as cultivated, and as refined in his tastes, and simpler and more vigorous in his expression. In many respects Burke has been his model, and it is not difficult to detect in his pages traces of his intimate communion with the great English, or rather Irish statesman, who, perhaps, taken all in all, is the most eminent among the distinguished statesmen who have written or spoken in our language. We have no thought of placing Mr. Webster above him ; but he surpasses him in his oratory, for Burke was an uninteresting speaker, and in the simple majesty and repose of his style and manner. Burke is full, but his fancy is sometimes too exuberant for his imagination, and his periods are too gorgeous and too overloaded. Now and then he all but approaches the inflated, and is simply not bombastic. His work on the French Revolution is a splendid work, a vast treasure-house of historical lore, of sound political doctrines and wise maxims for the statesman, but it frequently lacks simplicity, and is sometimes a little overstrained in its manner. The effort of the author to sustain himself at the height from which he sets out is now and then visible, and his voice, in executing some of the higher notes of his piece, wellnigh breaks into falsetto. His strength, though sufficient to carry him through, is not sufficient to carry him through with ease. Our countryman appears to us to possess naturally a stronger and more vigorous mental constitution, and to carry himself more quietly, and more at his natural ease. The only modern writers, as far as our limited reading extends, who in this respect equal or surpass Mr. Webster, are the great Bossuet and the German Goethe, though we must exclude Goethe's earlier writings from the comparison. The simple, natural majesty of Bossuet is perhaps unrivalled in any author, ancient or modern, and in his hands the French language loses its ordinary character, and in dignity, grandeur, and strength becomes able to compete successfully with any of the languages of Modern Europe. Goethe is the only German we have ever read who could write German prose with taste, grace, and elegance, and there is in his writings a quiet strength and a majestic repose which are surpassed only by the very best of Greek or Roman classics. Mr. Webster may not surpass, in the respect named, either of these great writers, but he belongs to their order.



We have dwelt the longer on these features of Mr. Webster's style, because they are precisely those which our authors and orators most lack. The American people have no simplicity, no natural ease, no repose. A pebble is a "rock," a leg or arm is a "limb," breeches or trousers are "unnamables," a petticoat is a "skirt," a shift is a *chemise*, the sun is the "solar orb," the moon the "lunar light." Nothing can be called simply by its proper name in our genuine old Anglo-Saxon tongue. We are always striving to be great, sublime; and simple natural expressions are counted tame, commonplace, or vulgar. We must be inflated, grandiloquent, or eccentric. Even in our business habits, we strive after the strange, the singular, or the wonderful, and are never contented with old fashions, quiet and sure ways of prospering. We must make or lose a fortune at a dash. We have no repose, are always, from the moment we are breeched till wrapped in our grave-clothes, in a state of unnatural excitement, hurrying to and fro, without asking or being able to say why or wherefore. We have no homesteads, no family, no fixtures, no sacred ties which bind us, no hearths or altars around which our affections cling and linger. We are all afloat upon a tumultuous ocean, and seem incapable of enjoying ourselves save amid the wildness and fury of the storm. Our authors and orators, as was to be expected, partake of our national character, and reproduce it in their works. The best thing we can do is to give our days and nights to the study of the volumes before us, which present us admirable models of what we are not, but of what we might and should be.

It is very evident from Mr. Webster's writings that his reading has not been confined to Blackstone and Coke upon Littleton, nor to Harrington, Sydney, and Locke,—that he has made frequent excursions from the line of his professional or official studies among the poets and in the fields of polite literature, and that literary or artistic cultivation has been with him a matter of no inconsiderable moment. He is perfectly familiar with the British classics, whether prose or poetry, and well read, if not in the Greek, at least in the ancient Roman literature. His style is to no inconsiderable extent formed after those very different writers, Cicero and Tacitus; but perhaps it owes still more of its peculiar richness and beauty to his diligent reading,

— whether for devotion or literary purposes we know not, — of the English Protestant version of the Holy Scriptures. This version is of no value to the theologian, for it has been made from an impure Hebrew and Greek text, and is full of false and corrupt renderings, but in a literary point of view it has many and rare merits. As an accurate rendering of the sacred text it cannot as a whole compare with our Douay Bible, but its language and style are more truly English, or at least present the English with more idiomatic grace, and greater purity and richness. The Douay Bible borrows terms from the Latin, which, though more precise, are less familiar, and less expressive to the ordinary English reader; at least, so it seems to us, who first studied the Scriptures through the medium of the Protestant version. The English language had reached its fullest and richest development in the sixteenth century, and the men who made the Protestant version of the Scriptures, whatever they were as theologians, were among its most accomplished masters. Hence their version has become the first of English classics, and perhaps we have no work in the language that can be so advantageously studied by the orator or the poet, so far as relates to pure English taste, to the formation of style, and richness, aptness, and beauty of idiomatic expression, though we think there is at present a tendency among some of our Catholic scholars to underrate the literary merits of the Douay Bible, and we find ourselves appreciating them much higher in proportion as we become better acquainted with them.

But we have exhausted our space, and must bring our remarks to a close. We have intended to be fair and just towards Mr. Webster, and our readers will readily perceive that we have written on the principle of saying the best we can, and not the worst, without violating the truth. We have done so, because we have never been one of Mr. Webster's partisans, and have on more occasions than one expressed in strong language our dissent from his particular measures, or the line of policy he has recommended. We have also done so, because Mr. Webster is really a great man, and our country is not so rich in great men as to permit us to overlook or to deal harshly with one so eminent as he unquestionably is. He is one of the few survivors of a generation of distinguished men, who are passing away without leaving any successors. Lowndes,

Hayne, Calhoun, are gone, Clay is dying, and may be dead before this sees the light, and of the great men who commenced public life with him, and who might claim to be his peers, Mr. Webster alone survives, and at farthest can survive but a few years longer. We could not well forget his merits, and remember only his faults; in doing so, we should have shown little patriotism and less Christianity. There are so few of our authors, orators, and statesmen that we can honor at all, that we are disposed to honor fully every one who does not strike us as being wholly unworthy.

Our great men are dying, and who is to take their place? The tendency with us is downward. The generation to which Mr. Webster belonged was inferior to the generation of great men who achieved our independence and founded our national government, and he is perhaps the only man born since the Declaration who could compare favorably with the Washingtons, the Adamses, the Hamiltons, the Madisons, and others of the same class, and in many respects not even he can do it. The generation next in time, and the one to which we ourselves belong, is of a yet lower grade of intellect and still more superficial attainments, and the best thing, perhaps, that can be said in our favor is that some of us feel and lament our inferiority. The generation that follows gives no promise of not falling still lower in the scale. Thus we go on, falling lower and lower in the intellectual and moral order with each new generation, and to what depths we shall ultimately sink, it is impossible to foresee. The democratic order is exceedingly unfavorable to either intellectual or moral greatness. If it has a tendency to bring up a degree or two the very low, which may be questioned, it has a still stronger tendency to bring all down to a low and common level. There is no use in quarrelling with this statement, for it is a fact so plain that even the blind may see it. If, then, a man amongst us rises superior to the unfavorable circumstances created by the political order of his country, and places himself on a level with the great men of other times and other countries, let us cherish him, and yield him ungrudgingly all merited honor.

We have written without any reference to the fact that Mr. Webster is or may be a candidate for the Presidency of the United States. Who will be the candidate of either

of the great parties of the country, it is impossible to say at the time we are writing, though the question will be settled before our Review issues from the press. In questions of domestic policy Mr. Webster is anti-sectional and conservative, and is unobjectionable to us and our friends; but his foreign policy has been such as we cannot approve. Ostensibly directed against foreign despotism, it has been really directed against our Church, and the liberty and peace of Continental Europe. The sympathy and support Mr. Kossuth obtained here were obtained on the supposition that he represented the Protestant cause, and that he was in league with Mazzini and others, not only for the overthrow of monarchy, but also of the Catholic Church. Hence it is that our Catholic population have almost to a man refused all sympathy with the eloquent Magyarized Slave. But Kossuth is Mr. Webster's *protégé*; Mr. Webster liberated him from prison and brought him here, and Mr. Webster is the man who in his behalf has insulted Austria, and compelled her representative to retire from the country. It were suicidal in any Catholic to vote to raise him to the Presidency of the United States. He would in so doing, if left to the choice of a better man in this respect, be false to his religion and to his country.

We love our country and delight to honor her really great men; but our God before our country, and our country before men, however great or distinguished. What we have censured in Mr. Webster he owes to his age and country, what we have commended he owes to himself and the traditional wisdom of our ancestors, and we honor him all the more that he is one of the very few of our countrymen who respect that wisdom, and do not believe that whatever is novel is true, and whatever is a change is an improvement. We have read his writings from time to time and as here collected, we would fain hope not without profit, for which we owe and would willingly pay him a debt of gratitude. If not all that we could wish, they are among the best things which our country has given us. The author has done something, more than any other man in our day, to sustain and enhance the true glory of the American name, and while we live we shall cheerfully honor him, and we shall delight to see him honored by his countrymen. We would willingly see the

laurel that binds his brows remain green and fresh, for the honor it bestows is identified with our common country, and is a patrimony to be inherited by our children.

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ART. IV. — *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis*, Auctore JOANNE PETRO GURY, S. J., in Collegio Romano et in Seminario Valsensi prope Anicium Professore. Lugduni et Parisiis. 1850. 2 vols. 18mo.

COLLEGIANS who assemble in the class-room, on the first day of the term, to hear the preliminary discourse, can always form a tolerably accurate conjecture as to what the Professor will say to them. It is morally certain that they will be favored with an elaborate demonstration of the great importance of that scientific branch which he professes to teach. When an exception occurs, it commonly signifies that the speaker is *doctor utriusque juris, totiusque scibilis magister*,—a universal genius, prepared, at a moment's warning, to sit in any chair, and to fill it with credit to himself and with profit to his disciples. Yet even he, in his opening lecture, will be very prone to insist upon the transcendent importance of the matter selected for his discourses, partly because such is the custom, partly because the young men before him are by all means to be urged to acquire as much knowledge as will enable him and them to make a creditable display at the close of the term. Professors who are *homines unius scientiæ*—and any man in these would-be encyclopedic and therefore superficial days may be content to know one science, few can know more—are generally enthusiastic in their language when they speak of the dignity of their science, and of its importance to the world of scholars. Their earnestness is natural, for their thoughts are seldom far from the discipline which gives them employment, bread, and a name. The student, nevertheless, if he be a real student, is sorely puzzled at the end of the first scholastic day, because he has listened to perhaps seven grave men, professors of seven weighty sciences, all of which are of transcendent interest, all of them to be mastered in a space

hardly sufficient for the thorough digestion of the prolegomena of one.

We were accustomed to hear earnest, though not always effective, preliminary discourses of this sort, but we remember one which appeared to our inexperience as an unusual and extravagant estimate of the science which the lecturer professed to impart. It was spoken before the class of Moral Theology. The professor said, in substance, that Moral Theology was the very queen of sciences. A thorough knowledge of it would make of any man a theologian, *veri nominis*, which no amount of learning in the other branches would do. This language seemed to imply a slight upon the coördinate objects of theological inquiry, and it afforded us matter for serious reflection, while our doubts were by no means solved on hearing the contradictory testimony of two eminent men, whom we consulted for a settlement of the conflicting claims of the sciences which were contending, through their representatives, *quæ earum videretur esse major*. "*Caro figlio*," said the first, "*il uomo è matto!*" That which is the source of things is more important, more noble, than the things which descend from it. But faith is the beginning, root, source, and foundation of all science, whether concerning human or divine things. Dogmatic theology deals with those things that are of faith; it is therefore the science of sciences." The speaker was professor of dogmatic theology, and his answer was a *résumé* of what he had said to his pupils on the morning of the first day. He was a man who ignored all theologians later than Tournely, and seemed to be unaware that heretics had arisen who knew not Arius and cared not for Luther. We sought another professor, an old man, who was regarded as a good universal scholar. "*Il professore ha ragione*," said he. "In a very important sense it may be truly said that moral theology is the queen of sciences, for it governs them. All sciences, even that of dogmatic theology, would be unsound, and therefore worthless, without its presence."

In discussions like those of which we have been speaking, the state of the question is generally unsettled, and hence both disputants may be right. Objectively, theology is more noble than any mixed science, like metaphysics, or any human discipline, not only because it presses them into its service, and because it gives them their first and

last principles and their method, but because its object is God, or, if it considers the world and man, it is with direct reference to God. The object of theology is God, or God in his creatures. The object of other sciences is, or should be, the creation in God.

The dispute between moral and dogmatic theology, as to the respective nobility of each, covered a wider ground, inasmuch as in all theology the discourse is upon God. Yet it was useless discussion. Each party considered his favorite discipline, not as it is in the concrete, but in the abstract. Dogmatic theology refers primarily to the intellect; moral theology, to the will. So the dispute resolved itself into the old and not very grave question, as to which is more noble, the intellect or the will. Much ink and many words have been wasted in the abstract consideration of two sciences which cannot, after all, be separately considered, inasmuch as each depends upon the other, and, in rigor of terms, both form one science viewed under diverse aspects. Dogma gives to moral science its elements, moral theology gives to dogmatic its method.

Moral theology belongs to the second cycle; to palingenesis, — the return of beings to God without being absorbed in him. It is the second cycle, regarding the latter in its formal acceptance. In the first cycle creatures in the physical order, beings in the intelligible order, proceed from God, and are manifested by and in him through the creative act. Things belong to the first cycle inasmuch as they *are*, — inasmuch as they have a *being*. Things, beings, exist, — *are*, in so far as they are true, — in so far as they conform to the eternal ideas in the Divine mind. The first cycle, then, formally considered, is created truth. The things, beings, created and manifested by God must return to him in the second cycle, as is clear from the first principles of the Catechism, from which we learn that all things made by God were made for himself alone. No other end for creatures than God is possible. They return to him through the force of LAW. That law constitutes palingenesis, — the second cycle, in its formal acceptance. And moral theology embodies and applies the law.

Several notable truths are demonstrated from these principles, thus briefly stated. The law which it is the province of moral theology to declare and apply to all human

acts, and by virtue of which all things return to God, their final cause, is a law which admits no exception whatever. No exception is conceivable. Even the perverse will that stubbornly turns itself away from God, and so passes into the hidden world, glorifies the justice of God in hell. The great heresy of the age,—which, in its full development, is Atheism, the negation of God in every order; which, in its most ordinary development, is Protestantism, the illogical assertion of God in the religious order, and the negation of God in every other; and which, in a too common development, is Catholicism, the logical admission of God in the religious order, and the illogical negation of God in the political, scientific, and other orders,—the great heresy of the age, which never deceived so many, never appeared to men so like an angel of light, as in these latter times, is met, indeed, and refuted from principles furnished by dogma, but the weapons for its effectual overthrow are to be found only in the armory of which moral theology is the key. “A man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still.” If a mere speculative assent to the truth would save men from eternal damnation, the road to hell might be as broad as ever, but it would not be so crowded as it is. Affected or supine ignorance is a great evil. It is the sin of the professed atheist. Yet even the atheist will admit that it is very wrong to conceal from himself the truth, either by racking his brain to invent reasons why he should not receive it, or by studiously neglecting to consider reasons which might disturb his boasted indifference to the things which are good for his soul. The Protestant is often thrown, sometimes by the mercy of the Holy Ghost, in a state of doubt. Alas! how many answer the call by saying that they have bought oxen, taken farms, and married wives! Pride or avarice opposes their clinging to the Rock whereon is inscribed the promise that hell shall never prevail against it. Procrastination is the sin of the unworthy Catholic. His day of salvation is always to-morrow. To-day he listens to the preacher, assents to all that he hears, and promises himself that he will repent and confess to-morrow. To-day closes too frequently with the night in which no man can work. These unhappy men, the atheist, the doubting Protestant, the impenitent Catholic, who know their duty and do it not, need the moral theologian,



—the judge, the teacher, and the physician. They die within reach of the bread of life, knowing well that it is bread, but wanting strength to arise and eat.

The truth upon which we are now insisting was treated, in one of its aspects, in our last number, where we discoursed concerning the Two Worlds. The difficulty which we are now considering arises from the fact, that the position of the world towards the Church has been gradually changed within the last three centuries. The Church is a kingdom, and her tribunal is supreme and infallible in faith and in MORALS. Ancient heresy admitted the Church to be a kingdom, — a visible kingdom, moreover; the dispute was, Who is the king? Not the Patriarch of Rome, said they, but Father Nestorius; or Patriarch Photius. The necessity of obedience was and is strongly inculcated among them, but they were loyal to the wrong throne. And, as always happens with heretics, the virtue of obedience, transplanted from Rome to the East, and made to grow in a strange garden, became a vice. Obedience, always enlightened in the Church, became mental slavery among heretics. We need not go to the East for examples, for we have them at hand, furnished by Protestantism, which exhibits a mental slavery, an ignorance and superstition, which are scarcely equalled among the old-fashioned Eastern heretics. And these not only admitted that the Church is a kingdom, but they held, and do hold, that its decisions concerning faith and morals are binding upon the conscience. They, in common with some few Protestants, profess to believe that the Church is a real government. It is not very long since they gave an interesting proof of their belief. The Anglican Establishment, knowing that the Greek Church, as well as itself, had been thrust out from the city of God, that the gates were barred, and that only one mode of reëntrance was left, a small wicket, near which sat Moral Theology, whom they could not pass, unless one at a time, and with a sincere and humble confession of sin, besought the Greek Church to unite with it in a war against the Pope. Perhaps the experiment might have succeeded, but the English heretics sent to the Greeks a document which they called a Confession of Faith. The Patriarch answered the request for union with an anathema, conceived in as forcible terms, and asserting the principle of authority and the necessity of

obedience on the part of the Anglican heretics as strongly, as if the excommunication had been fulminated by the Successor of St. Peter.

In the Protestant world we occasionally hear a faint assertion of the principle of authority, and a whining remonstrance against the temerity of laymen who demand a share in the government of their religious establishments, and who not seldom succeed in obtaining the lion's share; but the unhappy clergymen are commonly silenced by acts of Parliament, by judicial decisions, by resolves of lay committees and vestries, and even by newspaper articles. The unhappy men climbed into the church by a window, and no clinging to the horns of the altar can save them from the slavery entailed upon them by the principles which, as Protestant ministers, they must profess to teach. Modern gentilism asserts the right of private judgment, declares the inborn privilege of men to believe as much or as little as they choose, and, having declared men independent of God, of course asserts their independence of ministers. Yet some appearance, at least, of subordination is necessary to save the unfortunate Protestant bodies from anarchy, and one of the most amusing chapters in the history of Protestantism is that which records the illogical and almost unavailing efforts of the reverend window-climbers to keep their congregations from reversing the order of things by barring out the minister, and resolving themselves into a self-taught and self-governed church. Sometimes the ministers *are* literally barred out,—it has more than once happened here, in Boston, within the last few years. Most of the unfortunate pretenders to the ministerial office compromise the matter by canonizing all the extravagances of their hearers; by giving, each Sunday, some theological reason for the lay vagaries of the previous week. Thus Kossuth becomes a second Messiah, thus Lola Montes is transformed into a missionary for the conversion or extinction of the Jesuits, and thus every insane device of the hour becomes a part of the Divine scheme for the renovation of the world.

Protestants, therefore, who talk of platforms, confessions of faith, churches, spiritual authority, and the expediency, even, of obedience, are immeasurably behind their age; for it has declared itself independent, not only of these, but of God. Here, we repeat, is a consideration worthy the ear-

nest attention of theologians. There have been, and there are now, some ecclesiastical seminaries in which dogmatic theology occupies a trifling space, in comparison with the time given to moral science. In those institutions moral theology was really queen. Of course, — *oportet unum facere et alterum non omittere*, — dogma should not be neglected in favor of moral theology, and it cannot, without causing evil, for dogma furnishes principles, and without these moral theology is not a science. Yet the system of instruction which we have mentioned, when reasonably applied, has many good points. Dogma, when it is not governed by moral theology, from which it receives its method, becomes heresy. The doctrines revealed and proposed in the first cycle, and which come from God as First Cause, must return to him as the Final Cause, and they return to him by the act of faith in which the disciple assents to all those things which God has revealed, and which the Church teaches. To believe these things is to love God with the whole *mind*. The mind returns to God, — is united to him through the assent which it is enabled by Divine grace to give to revealed truth. Dogma shows what is to be believed; moral theology shows how belief is made real. Dogma enables man to recite an act of faith, moral discipline shows him how to *make it*. In a certain sense, one is the science, the other the art, of believing. It is indeed an art! *Ars artium, regimen animarum!* Devils believe and tremble; heresiarchs believe and scoff; mere students of dogmatic theology believe and dispute. It is noticeable that young men, who are almost ungovernable in the class-room of dogmatic theology, are very submissive in the moral circle. From all this, we gather that the system of instruction which makes the most of moral theology is not to be lightly judged. If dogma is the science of the procession of truth from God to man, moral theology is the science of the return of the same truth from man to God. Gentilism prevents the truth from reaching man, by clouding his mind, and by distorting his will. The angel that will not accept the truth, or, assenting to it, will not refer it to God, becomes a devil. The man who does likewise becomes a heretic. A thing is unintelligible when it denies its first and final cause. Moral theology, which is the science of the final cause of all things, is the director and guardian of dogma.

The apostate always begins, not with denying his obligations, but with neglecting his duties. An humble, sacramental confession might have postponed the rebellion of the sixteenth century, for it would have done more for the unhappy Luther than the Papal bulls and the Tridentine decrees did for him and his. The science of the return of creatures to God is the queen of sciences, because that return is the end of creation. It is worse than useless to see the truth unless the beholder accept it. It is fatal to proceed from God, as creatures, unless we also return to him.

The knowledge of the True does not necessarily infer the pursuit of the Good. This should not be so, but it is; for the apprehension of the First Cause does not coerce the admission, in the world of human acts, of the Final Cause. Man is free, because, although his will cannot disturb the order of things in the first cycle, and although it cannot prevent even itself, or any thing else in the universe, from glorifying God, the Final Cause, in the second cycle, yet it can be perverse, it can turn itself away from God, it can refuse to coöperate intelligently with God in the great work of declaring the Divine glory, and it can degrade itself to the condition of an instrument, used by God, as all unintelligent creatures are, for the accomplishment of his great purposes, and then thrown aside, and destroyed, as a tool that has fulfilled its purpose. The human tool is not physically destroyed, but it is cast aside, and so it is damned. A thorough knowledge of dogma does not include necessarily even a tolerable skill in moral theology; it gives to the latter its principles, but principles which are not reduced to application do little service in the world. On the contrary, a good moral theologian must be a respectable master in dogmatic science. One reason is, that, in moral discipline, references to dogmatic theology are habitually made. Perhaps another reason may be given. The good dogmatic theologian is a man of science. The good moralist must be a man of prayer. Now, *Deus est scientiarum Dominus, et ipse præparat* COGITATIONES. If it be true, then, that no science can be really mastered without an earnest prayer to the Lord of sciences, it is eminently true of theology, the more especially of that part which is the *artium ars*. Ecclesiastical experience has verified this thing. The student who reads, *learns*. The

student who also prays, *knows*. It is a remarkable circumstance, that the love of the ecclesiastical student for moral theology, and his greatness therein, increase in a direct ratio with his love of prayer. Whence it has frequently happened that theologians, decorated by universities with degrees, carry their doubts to some man of prayer, whose only book is the crucifix.

It may be inferred from this that the priest, in his character of a moral theologian, is more useful in the Church than he is in the capacity of a mere controversialist. We do not care to dispute the inference. Two heads of evidence, both of them very practical, may be cited in its support. Many dogmatic controversies have been instituted within the last century. Few conversions have resulted from them, and in no case, we believe, did the dispute end in the retraction, on the part of the Protestant antagonist, of his error. Purely controversial sermons seldom result in the conversion of Protestant hearers. Of the ecclesiastics, concerning whom it is said that the grace of winning souls to heaven had been poured upon them, we believe that by far the greater number were in the habit of giving only simple, plain homilies, setting forth the duties of a Christian, expounding in a familiar way what he must do, and in a catechetical style what he must believe, in order to be saved. In one of the old, quaint *seicentisti*, a receipt, piously hoped to be infallible, is given for curing heretics. The principal ingredient is the battery of prayer, to be fired at heaven, in incessant volleys, for nine days. The patient to take part in the exercises, but never to fire his own guns, but ours. That is, his prayers must be conceived in the spirit of the publican's prayer. His pride is to be purged by pills compounded of fasting, mortification, alms-deeds, confession, and the Catechism, while the presence of controversy is to be strictly interdicted. His questions are to be fairly answered, but disputing with him is not to be tolerated for a moment, while he is to be encouraged to seek light in his doubts in humble prayer to the Father of lights. We believe that this prescription suggests a moral which may be very profitably made the subject of earnest meditation by our younger laborers in the vineyard of the Lord.

It would be an inquiry leading to curious results, if one could ascertain whether missionaries, who have gathered families, villages, towns, whole nations, to Christ, or who

have recovered lost missions, were expert controversialists, or rather skilful moralists. We suspect that the latter would prove to be the true state of the case. We apprehend that the authorities of the Church, in sending missionaries to benighted or strayed people, are prone to regard excellence in moral science as of transcendent importance. Most excellent missionaries are sent from the seminaries elsewhere mentioned, in which the professor of moral theology, when he declares his to be the queen, nay, the sum of sciences, has no one to gainsay his words. Deacons, and even laymen, catechists, are permitted, under certain circumstances, to help the missionary in teaching the people those things which are to be believed. But the priest ordinarily reserves to himself the imparting of instruction as to those things which are to be done, or left undone, and only he, as judge, master, and physician, can sit as one having authority to guide and govern souls.

The truth is, that, under ordinary circumstances, the Church has much less to fear from heresy than from other sins. We mean, that the overwhelming majority of her children who love their souls incur damnation for other sins than that of heresy. Formal heretics, Protestants, and Gentiles universally are practically out of her jurisdiction, and she is in no wise answerable for their damnation. Men within her pale are not, as a general rule, exposed to the peril of apostasy. The most important exception to this rule occurs when the singular phenomenon which, for the sake of analogy, we may call a *stampede*, takes place among Christians, when men appear to lose their reason, to be seized with a sudden and unaccountable madness, and to rush like wild animals, whither, they know not, — very likely, and in the present case certainly, to the brink of a fatal precipice. It has happened several times within the memory of the Church, once, when *totus orbis ingemuit se Arianum esse*; again, on the occasion of the great Protestant *stampede*. Against occurrences of this sort, no human prudence, no theological skill, no precaution on the part of the Church, not even the ordinary means of grace, have proved sufficient barriers. The question has been raised, whether moral theology, had it been fairly treated, would not have prevented, either wholly or partially, the great Protestant rebellion. We dare not offer an opinion hereon. Our own age is as wicked, to say the least, as any preced-

ing age, and yet no one contemplates the possibility of a *stampede*. Nay, in most of the great nations, we hear of a revival of Christianity, and strong hopes are expressed that the Queen "will hae her ain again," a circumstance which would seem to indicate that this has been the worst of ages. "When things can grow no worse, they begin to mend," — a self-evident proposition, by the way, inasmuch as nothing can be stationary; whatever is, acts, either for good or for evil. It is worth while to note, as facts in themselves striking, as well as connected with our present thesis, that during the ages of faith the preponderance of moralists over great dogmatists was remarkable. At no time within the memory of the Church were there more or greater dogmatic theologians than during the period immediately preceding, following, and marking the great Arian and Protestant *stampedes*. The revival of Christianity, after these storms had spent their force, was and is a time distinguished more than any other period for the number and excellence of moral theologians.

God forbid that any one interpret our words as uttered in disparagement of the divine science which elucidates dogma! We trust that we have made it plain, in our preliminary remarks, that such is not our meaning. We simply offer a comment upon the rule, *Oportet unum facere et aliud non omittere*. We wish to note that some have unwisely depreciated the study of moral theology, and our plea, which is addressed by a student to young students, is that moral theology may not be ranked beneath any other science. If it be, the world will suffer greatly.

We repeat, that, under ordinary circumstances, the Church has less to fear from heresy than from other sins. Christ came not to preach a new doctrine, but to give a new commandment. He annexed to the keeping of the commandments the promise of eternal life. His people were to walk in holiness; to imitate him, to hear the Church, to remember the beatitudes. *Non omnes doctores*. The different mental habits of men will always render it certain, that, at any given time, there will always be a number, sufficient for the purposes of the Church, of ecclesiastics who make a particular study of dogmatic theology, and of these some will be excellent; one at least will leave his mark upon his age. The study is absolutely necessary to the priest for three purposes, — to be able for himself to

distinguish truth from error, to be competent to teach the true doctrine to his people, and to be equal to the defence of it against enemies, not that they may be converted, for that result is in the hands of a just God, but that he may see to it, as far as in him lies, *ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*. He must repulse wolves. Now the first two of these objects may be attained by a thorough study of moral theology, joined with a moderate proficiency in dogma. And this is enough to satisfy the ordinary requirements of the Christian world. Exceptional times, such as those to which we have alluded, when Catholics apostatize in masses, require exceptional attainments in dogmatic theology, and accordingly God raises up great men to meet the emergency. At other times, the knowledge of which we have spoken is generally found to be quite sufficient, the more especially as really great masters in dogma are never wanting to satisfy the occasional and local necessities of the Church.

One fact is continually recurring in ecclesiastical experience, and it is worth while to describe it, it is so clearly *ad rem*. In many ecclesiastical colleges, although moral theology is not neglected, yet dogma is regarded as the great occupation of the course, which lasts four years, during all of which dogma is studied continuously, while moral theology is confined to a certain space within the first two years. Under the most favorable circumstances, the time given to moral, as compared with dogmatic theology, is as one to four. It should be, under ordinary circumstances, as two to one. The student learns somewhat concerning the Arian, Nestorian, Eutychian, and Macedonian controversies; hears something, but less than he might, about the Pelagian and Manichæan heresies, which, after all, under different modifications, are the great heresies of every age, and are as prevalent, to say the least, in the nineteenth century as they ever were; he hears about the heresies of Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius; disputes concerning the orthodoxy of Zozimus, Honorius, Liberius, and John, and — *voilà tout*. His text-book might as well, for aught he knows, be Petavius, Ariaga, or Gonet, as Perone or Kenrick. In his world, no such men as Hermes, Strauss, Schleiermacher, La Mennais, or Gioberti, ever lived. So the student gets his degree, goes out into this wicked nineteenth century, and finds, to his no small aston-



ishment, that Nestorius is actually dead, that Arius is forgotten, that Luther is by no one regarded as a saint, and that our adversaries do not care whether a Pope may or may not have been a heretic. He finds their liberality so astounding, that the whole argument, major, minor, and *consequentia*, every thing but the *status questionis*, the *elenchus*, and here and there the *consequens*, is conceded to him. The tactics of the enemy are new, quite transcending his dogmatic experience. The old issues are abandoned, the Church is admitted to have been right in her struggles with the world during the first fifteen centuries, inasmuch as, although she may have made some mistakes, yet her general action was for the advancement of humanity, and therefore in a healthy direction. Hence, although some jests are perpetrated at the expense of the Church, in that she was always accustomed to attach too much importance to the opposition of her ancient enemies, yet it is generally conceded that they were busybodies, nobodies, pretenders, or hypocrites. Neologists do not care to defend even one of the ancient heretics, and with regard to the moderns, Audin may, for aught they care, demonstrate that Luther and Calvin were bad men. The whole state of the question between the Church and the world is changed. The adversaries whom the student met in the class-room, and demolished, were men who believed, or rather pretended to believe, in a fixed, immutable doctrine. They professed to be willing to repeat with the Apostles, Though we or an angel bring you another doctrine, let him be anathema, — regardless of the consequences which the adjuration might bring upon their own heads. Whereas the enemy who now lives and moves believes in progress, — believes the Church to have been once, and until lately, the pillar of truth; thinks that he himself is now, and suspects that some one else will be to-morrow. Moving in accordance with received school-room tactics, what can one do with such an adversary? One has not to learn his alphabet over again, it is true, but the collocation of letters, words, and sentences is changed.

We do not, of course, intend to say any thing in disparagement of the present method of teaching dogmatic theology, still less to recommend a new system. We dislike change, unless when made by those who are in authority, and can legitimately make it. And a method

which is approved by so many venerable and learned professors, who know what is the state of the question between the two worlds better than we do, is not to be gainsaid by us. *Qui potest majora, minora certe potest.* It is a great mistake to depreciate the men of ancient times, orthodox or even heretics, in an intellectual point of view, or to suppose that modern heretics are greater men than those of the ancient world. Catholic theologians have, do, and will acknowledge no higher authority, after that of the Church and of the Scriptures, than that of the Holy Fathers. A clear decision, say of St. AUGUSTINE or of St. THOMAS, cannot be ruled out of court. Modern heretics need never expect to equal the men whom the giants of Catholic theology met and overcame, and the student who, under the guidance of the Fathers, detects the weak points of the ancient heretics, need not fear their descendants, whose strongest men are scarcely equal to the weakest of early times. Heresy has not grown stronger, it has changed its method. Whether a partial change should be made in our schools, is a matter concerning which we do not venture an opinion. Considering that the student who pursues his course according to the received method is well grounded in theological principles, and has, or should have, made up his catechism from the Council of Trent, perhaps it is as well that he should upon his entrance into real life find his adversaries wearing a mask so different from that which they wore in the school-room, and the consequent exercise of his wits should do him no injury, particularly as their right exercise will certainly show him that his living adversaries are but *simulacra*,—counterfeits of the dead men whose *Dies iræ* he used to chant in the school-room,—lesser in degree, differing only in form.

We wish to direct the attention of students, in an especial manner, to this branch of our subject, partly because we have no intention of conveying the idea that we are disposed to advocate any substantial innovation upon the received method of training theological beginners, a conclusion which we are so far from accepting, that we should be delighted to find the rule of St. Ignatius faithfully observed in every school of dogmatic theology, and St. THOMAS practically recognized, not only as the Angel of the Schools, but the Master in them,—the THEOLOGUS.

*Ipse Sanctus Alphonsus dixit*, is a reference in the school of moral theology, where the professor is a safe man, which commonly silences doubts. We should be glad if an *Ipse Sanctus Thomas dixit* were heard as often, and to as effectual a purpose, in both class-rooms. Some persons may say that this is going too far back for the requirements of the times. No, good friends, no! So far as theology is concerned, the requirements of the times are always substantially the same. Error is not only always error, but it is always in reality *the same error*, — it has little invention, less originality, and its utmost evidence of progress is a newly fashioned garment, which a close examination will finally discover to be made of old, worn-out materials. If St. Thomas be not so often cited, so habitually consulted, in many schools, it is from some motive arising out of convenience, custom, or the difference in theological *tact* among professors of the science; but the respect which a pertinent citation from the writings of the Angelic Doctor, *qui de Christo Deo et homine tam bene scripsit*, receives, is sufficient to prove that, if, as happens with all guardian angels, his presence is not always sensibly felt, or his voice continually heard, his influence is there, living and potent, and his words, whenever uttered, are commonly sure to fall upon respectful and confiding ears. Every student knows that St. Thomas cannot lead him astray, — a knowledge which is very comfortable in the pursuit of any science, and is of the utmost importance in theological studies. A school which does not own him as decisive authority will be found to be of suspicious orthodoxy. And his guidance is of the utmost value for another reason pertinent to our present subject. We were speaking of the different masks which heresy wears, from time to time, somewhat to the perplexity of young students. Talk of authors suited to the age! Why, there is not a question even among questions the most modern, among those which our wildest neologists are forcing upon the attention of theologians, which may not be disposed of in the light of principles set forth in that wonderful book, the *SUMMA*. It is indeed a *Summa*! Heresy cannot, we verily believe, assume a form which will not be found, on examination, to have been detected and refuted in advance by St. Thomas. No master of theology, since the days of the Angelic Doctor, understood the wants of his own age as

well, or met them as forcibly, as the great Dominican does in his *Summa*. It is as new as it was four hundred years ago, and we fear even more so. But some one may say: "If you wish for old authorities, why not go still farther into antiquity. Great theologians lived before St. Thomas!" Granted, most learned friend! It is true, that in proportion to one's knowledge of the great Master, one is the more disposed to say of him, with a slight alteration of terms, what the Church says of St. John the Baptist:—

"Non fuit vasti spatium per orbis  
Doctior quisquam genitus Thoma!"

Yet, if that suggestion were adopted, and the very ancient masters were brought, not only textually, but *corporaliter*, into the schools, a result might be obtained that would startle many people. We should find, for example, that we are no wiser than our fathers, and that the world has not made much progress after all. We venture to say that from St. Augustine and St. Clement a text-book might be compiled that would not only *meet* current wants, but would even look astonishingly modern, nay, some portions of it would convey the idea that the saints knew all about Hermes, Strauss, La Mennais, Gioberti, and other Titans of the present age of mutual admiration tendencies. We cannot pursue this topic now,—perhaps it will be made the subject of a future paper.

Some one has said that the nerve of a theological student is more severely tried during the three or four years succeeding his exit from college and his entrance into the vineyard than at any other period of his life. This is certainly true of many young priests. As we have said, the enemies whom they knew in the school are dead, and lesser men have arisen, who know not Arius or Luther, who discourse strangely, vaunt themselves loudly, and endeavor, in as far as in them lies, to satisfy the Athenians, who are not yet dead, and *advenæ hospites, qui ad nihil aliud vacant nisi aut dicere aut audire aliquid novi*. If the young theologian treat them as if they were old or consistent heretics, as if they cared aught for antiquity, precedents, logic, or heresiarchs older by twenty-four hours than themselves, he finds that the state of the question has changed. Nay, he discovers that, such is the activity of the heretical intellect, new and hitherto unheard of adversaries present themselves at every turn, and he does not always

discover that their strength is very like the strength of a theatrical army, made up of one man who runs across the stage an indefinite number of times, changing some article of his dress each time before he issues from the side scenes. "What am I to do with my four years of dogma, and my two years of moral theology?" *ait, tacitus*. "Where are the well-known adversaries, — who are *these*, — what are they, — what are they talking about, — what means this gibberish concerning humanity, solidarity, universal love, infinite progress, people-god, etherology, mental dynamics, spiritual communications? Where is Berengarius, Luther, or even Jansen?" Now it is certain that, if the student has made a respectable course of theology, he need not be long at a loss, inasmuch as he has laid the foundations of a *habitus* which will enable him to dispose of these, and any number of the like adversaries, with sufficient ease. If he knows the *title-pages* of the Fathers, and the *indices* of St. Thomas, — no trifling acquisition, by the way, — his work will be the more easily done, for these masters knew, at least, quite as much as is dreamed or likely to be dreamed of in modern philosophy. But here occurs a difficulty which many students experience on issuing from college. It lies in forgetting that they have only laid the foundations, more or less securely, of the theological *habitus*; in supposing that they have acquired it, that they have finished their studies, that they are theologians. The title of D. D. does not always produce the beneficial result it might, if all its possessors would remember that he who would be at all times prepared to teach must never be unprepared to learn. So it happens that the aspect of the battle-field is so different from that which he led himself to expect, that the young soldier is, for the moment, more or less puzzled. If he immediately recall to mind his principles, it is well; but this is not always done, and a superficial observation would scarcely show its necessity. How many persons are aware that even the latest developments of heresy — even such problems, if they be problems, as Mesmerism and Spiritual Communications afford, to say nothing of the apparently less silly questions furnished by the heterodoxy of the last fifty years — find a ready solution in St. Thomas or St. Augustine? It sometimes happens, therefore, that the student begins to conceive a disrespect for a method of teaching which he erroneously supposes

to contain little suited to his present exigencies; he begins to study the world, and gradually to form for himself a method of treating its diseases. Sometimes he looks at it under only one, and that the least important, of its aspects, and so arranges his order of battle. He satisfies himself as to what the real evil of the world is, and so he gallantly sets his face against that evil;—he becomes a controversialist, or a hospital or asylum builder, a designer of magnificent churches, a constant visitor of the wicked rich, or an habitual eater with the wicked poor, a metaphysician, a controversialist, an apologist—in the modern sense of the word—for the faith, a book-maker, an editor, *et sic usque ad finem*. All very well, if, *faciendo hoc, aliud non omittat*, if he does it in the Catholic spirit which prompted division of labor in the old monasteries, and which is one of the elements of the greatness of the Order of Jesus. *Non omnes doctores*, we say again. All not very well, if he regard his theory as a *compendium totius cursus*. And this is by no means an imaginary danger; it is precisely the rock on which young and gifted minds, particularly if pride or vanity be active, are prone to bruise, and not very seldom to ruin themselves. Hermes, La Mennais, Gioberti, and others, fell; Ventura barely saved, if he have saved, himself; Rosmini escaped, yet so as by fire, while several others, whose names it is not necessary to mention, toyed with themselves upon the brink of the precipice. The Athenians, we say again, are not yet dead, and the desire of saying or hearing something new is as strong as ever it was, and quite as fatal. In an age, too, when every body reads, few *think*, and most people quarrel for liberty of thought,—a liberty as inane as some other species for which men quarrel,—the passion for saying something new is perhaps stronger than ever. Quacks, professing to cure all diseases with one nostrum; adepts, promising to teach an art in a few hours; philosophers, dreaming that they can remedy all evil, and bring about all good by one formula,—were never so numerous, and Catholics, theologians even, being in the world, are *exposed* to the danger of becoming of the world.

Some one may say that, if the young student attend to his ordinary parochial duties, he need not encounter any of these difficulties. His duties are simple and plain, and perils like those described await only the great, and more

especially the would-be great, among us, as also those in whom pride or vanity is a motive power. It may be so, yet we again repeat that every body reads in these days, and every thing is read. The great problems of religion, politics, society, life, and the like, *were* discussed only in the schools; now, they are talked of in the shops. The little village of Porkington has its literary, scientific, philosophical, and religious circles, as well as Cambridge, in which all imaginable things are treated, and perhaps treated no worse than at Cambridge. *Omnis mens corruptit viam suam*. It is well for the student, particularly if he be gifted, when he does not become in any way infected with the spirit of the age; for he certainly has to meet it everywhere, and to fight with it. If he wishes to find among the people the simplicity of Catholic ages, he need not enter upon the missions in what are called civilized nations. He must retire to a monastery, or go and preach Christ to savage men.

We have made it sufficiently plain, we believe, that in our plea in behalf of moral theology we neither depreciate the study of dogma, nor advocate any substantial change in the method of treating it, nor favor any thing like what is miscalled progress, or mischievously termed development in theological science. Our argument, thus far, suggests the following inquiries:—1. Whether it may not be expedient, in the dogmatic class-room, to give somewhat more time to the application of dogma to the current heresies of the age,—Manichæanism, Pelagianism, the negation of God in every order, and carnal Judaism. 2. Whether the problems which we have, in these days, to meet, may not suggest the expediency of returning to the old masters,—to St. Thomas, St. Augustine, and others. True, they have always been used; but as lighthouses, scarcely as lanterns. 3. Whether somewhat more time might not be conceded to the study of moral theology. Or, 4. Whether that science might not occupy a portion of the time, as is the case in the Sulpician seminaries, during the whole scholastic course. The last two questions only appertain directly to our present subject, but we do not intend to treat them here. Their discussion, certainly their settlement, falls within the province of the professor. We continue our discourse concerning the young theologian.

We think that, in some quarters, an almost impercepti-

bly growing disposition is apparent to a close observer, not of neglecting the study of moral theology, but of ranking it as of less importance than other sciences. Some suppose that it is easily acquired. Others suspect that its application is comparatively limited. Others, again, think that it is a confused mass of positive decisions. Some object to the study of necessary portions of it, because of the uninviting nature of the subjects treated, while others, of a mathematical turn of mind, regarding the diversity of opinions manifested by those who are masters in the science, and imagining that *quot doctores, tot sententiæ* obtain in the schools, suppose that in moral theology no certainty can be had. We have heard all these reasons assigned by students as an excuse for not bestowing great attention upon the science. Of course, these reasons indicate that their authors know not what moral theology is.

Its application is absolutely universal, as we have seen in the first portion of the article. The world, once created, returns to God through human acts. The lower creatures return to God,—fulfil the end of their creation, by ministering, each after its own manner, unto man, that he may glorify God, in whom and for whom all live. Every human act must end in God, and this law includes words and thoughts also. Moral theology contains, nay, *is* the law by virtue of which all things return to God, their Final Cause. As every thing must return to him, and as the last term of the returning series, in which all others unite, is the will of man, specificating all his voluntary acts as human acts,—as God cannot rightfully be defrauded of any thing, not even of a thought or word, which he threatens to remember and punish, if idle,—as, in one word, every thing falls under the great law of the second cycle,—it follows that the dominion of moral theology is imperative, as wide as the universe, as high as heaven, as deep as hell. The human heart has no recesses, however hidden, which are exempt from that jurisdiction. The moral theologian must know what constitutes sin; what is lawful, what unlawful; the commandments of God and of the Church, and the laws appertaining to the administration of the Sacraments, are things which he must declare and apply to Christian life. He must know whether any given act leads the soul to God, or turns it away from him; he must know what should be done and what undone by men in every



state or condition of life; he must be ready to sit in judgment upon the acts of men, with their endless variety of circumstances and accidents; he must teach the Christian soul the things it should know for eternal life, and he must be prepared to apply the remedies ordained by Christ for the healing of spiritual maladies. And, as man has but one life here to live, but one soul to lose, the confessor must do all this with the knowledge of the duties of *his* state, and of the penalties which follow neglect. God commands the penitent to hear him, and God commands him to hear, teach, and heal the penitent. It is his duty to direct souls to God, and if he criminally misdirect a soul, it will be required at his hand. He must have common sense, prudence, knowledge, and piety. A dreadful responsibility rests upon him;—on no point are the Councils and Fathers more explicit than on this. Look at the knowledge required in moral theology. It may well be called, as it is, *artium ars*. It is the science of sciences, the science of human acts, the science of the Final Cause, the science, therefore, of the universe. No science or discipline so imperatively requires its professor to aim at the mental possession of the index to encyclopedic knowledge. And the confessor, in sitting in judgment upon human acts, should know an almost endless number of positive decisions, any one of which, at any moment, may be required to meet the case before him; or, at least, he must know that such decisions exist, and where to find them. The consequence of any misdirection on his part may be an entire or partial aversion of the soul from God, its Final Cause. Certainly, all this knowledge, in its perfection, is not required in the young theologian,—scarcely in the old and experienced one; but all are bound, each according to his measure of gifts, to aim at it, and to be content with nothing less. Masters of the science, after St. Liguori, never tire of saying to the young theologian, that if, in this holy science, he has learned enough to doubt in graver matters, he may safely regard himself as being likely to fall into few serious mistakes. A young priest who decides all cases, simple and intricate, hastily and confidently, who never doubts, who cuts all knots in the Alexandrine manner, is an unsafe person. Such are too prone to leave their books of reference on the shelf unopened. It is not easy to excuse the confessor who does not, in some way, review his moral

theology from time to time; and, in the judgment of many, two years, the time ordinarily given to the course in schools, are quite sufficient for the purpose.

In view of these things, it is easy to see that those seminaries which provide a course, the greater portion of which is given to moral theology, if they err at all, err on the safer side. A respectable knowledge of dogma, perhaps almost sufficient for ordinary parochial purposes, must, from the very nature of the case, be obtained by the student who devotes even his whole time to the faithful pursuit of moral science. And no priest has failed to remark, that, whereas extraordinary dogmatic attainments were not required in his professional life for several years, perhaps never, a respectable proficiency in moral theology was required in him from the moment of his first decision in the confessional, and that, although days, weeks, and months might pass without bringing a case requiring very high attainments in moral science, yet at any moment he might be called upon to deal with a matter calling for the highest proficiency in the *artium ars*. And — it is a common experience, but very singular withal — the inexperienced theologian may have more weighty difficulties to dispose of during the first week of his professional life than he will have during the remainder of the first year. The fact has been often noticed, explain it who can.

And the young theologian, if he be a conscientious man, finds that, where he has to consult his dogmatic authorities once, he must refer to his moral text-book, or ask advice, ten, twenty, or a hundred times. The explanation of this fact — which proves that respectable attainments in moral theology, or at least the capacity of doubting in difficult cases, are of supreme necessity to the priest who has the care of souls — is found in the peculiar form or mark which heresy wears in our age, which is carnal Judaism, — practical atheism. We have said that the heresies of our day are by no means as intellectual as were the ancient heterodoxies. The fact which we have just stated is the best proof of it. Few men not Catholics care for articles of faith, and, whatever may have been the sentiments of the Protestant world in former times, it is certain that they do not now object to any extravagance which affects only doctrine, while they are willing to recognize Catholics as men and brethren, if these will simply stifle that element

of Catholic life which makes it really life, — we mean that article which declares the Church to be a kingdom, which affirms its universal sovereignty, and makes it, on earth, supreme judge in morals as well as in faith. Protestants will bear any thing but that. Hence, no men are better received in Protestant society than they who declare that their faith is sound, but that they find nothing in it which forbids them to rail at the Pope, or which compels them to take their political, social, or scientific opinions from any bishop or priest. The Pope and the Confessional form the sum of Protestant objections against the Church, because by these she is a living, universal, and imperial power. Lukewarm, liberal, or nominal Catholics never, if we are to believe them, dream of denying the faith. Like the Roman followers of Mazzini in 1848, they protest that they are Catholics, but that their religion, for which they are ready to die, though not to live, does not compel them to uphold the temporal power of the Pope, or to allow priestly interference in their secular affairs. These unfortunates fall, of course, into the great heresy of the age, which denies that all human acts must end in God, and that he is the Final Cause of all things. The real obstacle or trouble is the necessity of sacramental confession, which is an intolerable grievance, and not the less so, in that a few good, humble confessions ordinarily suffice to eject the devil which rails at the Pope and at priestly interference in secular concerns. Take from Catholic faith the truth that the Church is supreme judge in morals, proclaim it to be an obsolete pretension, and the great objection of the gentiles and of their baptized imitators to Catholicity would disappear. They can tolerate *dead* articles of faith, but a living authority is too much for their nerves. Hence the work of a priest, as a dogmatic theologian, is almost as nothing, compared with his duties as a moralist. The confessional is the stumbling-block to nominal Catholics and to Protestant adversaries. The problem of his life is solved when he induces the former to frequent the holy tribunal. Nay, if he can bring the Protestant into the same predicament, the work of conversion is done. The truth is, our boasted civilization is based upon the predominance of the animal over the man, in human nature. *Omnis caro corrumpit viam suam*. Speculative dogmas are universally tolerated; practical commandments are systematically violated. Our

age is the age of the reign of matter over spirit, — of the flesh over reason. It is useless to quote the Council of Trent against the evil, for men have lost their logic; they will admit the premises, or say to them, *Transeant*, but they sturdily deny the conclusion, admitting, nevertheless, the *consequentiam*. The confessional is a sovereign remedy for the evil; priests, then, must, above all, be enlightened confessors. Q. E. D.

Kings, in former times, contended that they, being sovereigns, were accountable to God alone, and that, therefore, if they were subject to the moral law, a thing which some of them denied, they were not at all bound to listen to the exposition of that law made by popes, bishops, or priests. It was their privilege to interpret the law for themselves, and they, being sovereigns, always interpreted it rightly, of course; whence it followed that they were not sinful men, or, if sinful, that they could obtain absolution immediately from God; wherefore it again followed that they were not at all bound to sacramental confession. They had their confessors, but as necessary or usual puppets in their train. It is true that, when they were mortally sick, these doctrines were not so clear to them, and they ordinarily confessed, like common sinners; but when they were in health, the Church had some trouble with them. She gained her point, however, for she placed the proudest emperors in her presence on a level with the humblest beggars, and not seldom below them. When they relied so strongly upon their sole accountability to God, as to commit open, deadly, and scandalous acts of injustice, — when they ruthlessly violated contracts, of which she was the guardian, whether these were with their lawful wives or with their people, — she stretched forth her arm and dragged them from their thrones. And so *they* fell. The Church created them, — protected them from the lawlessness of the nobles, who had not then lost their faith, until they were able to protect themselves. Presently the nobles became sovereign, and they emulated the conduct of the kings, and received the same lesson at the hands of the Church, their second creator. God permitted kings here, and the populace there, to arise and destroy them. And so *they* fell. The Church created and protected what is now called the people. The people have become either sovereign, or aspiring after the sovereignty, and *one* sure sign

that this new sovereign will fall into the pit into which kings and nobles fell is, that the people treat the Church as the kings and nobles treated her. Like the kings and the nobles in the ages of their revolt, the people are very tolerant of dead creeds, very intolerant of living Popes, practical Catholicity, and thronged confessionals. In speaking of the interference of ecclesiastics with secular affairs, as they call it, they use the same proud language which the sovereigns, their predecessors, the kings and nobles, once used. Poor people! They have mounted their tower, they have fixed their throne above the stars, they will be like the Most High! Poor people! they will fall,—they are falling; their *ignis fatuus* has led them to the precipice over which royalty and aristocracy fell. Ecclesiastical, regal, aristocratic, popular sovereignty,—the cycle is completed; will it begin again, or are we near the day of wrath which is to usher in the visible sovereignty of God over all flesh that has corrupted its way? *Popule Dei, quid fecit Ecclesia tibi, aut in quo contristavit te? Introduxit te in terram satis bonam, propter te Chanæorum reges percursit, dedit tibi sceptrum regale, et magna virtute exaltavit te!*

This is the field into which the priest is sent. It looks dreary,—O, how dreary! In the ages of faith there was sin, alas!—sin abounded, yet did grace abound withal. Because they were ages of faith, they were ages of hope, charity, and contrition. Kings, nobles, and people refused not to do penance in the days when they were Christian. A prophet, too visible to the eye of faith, walks through this Nineveh, this great city of the world, and he cries, Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown! Will the Ninevites do penance? will they put on sackcloth and ashes? Alas! alas! *Vix Sion lugent, eo quod non sint qui veniant ad solemnitatem!*

The confessional is the brazen serpent erected in the wilderness of our days, that the people may live. How to persuade the bitten people to look at it is the problem. Contrition comes from faith, faith comes from hearing; the teacher is therefore necessary. But, looking at the present state of the world, of two bodies of men, one composed of only moral theologians, the other made up of only excellent dogmatists, give us the moral theologians. Send the others to monasteries, or to savage tribes,—the world is ready to subscribe to all their dogmatic points, save one!

And so, in every text-book of moral theology, the student finds chapters devoted to the exposition of the duties appertaining to every state of life, from the kingly to the beggarly state. Magistrates, statesmen, judges, merchants, tradesmen, all, all have been bitten by the fiery serpent; its brazen antidote must be set up in the hall, the store, the barn, and the street. All flesh has corrupted its way.

It is plain enough that moral theology is not a science of limited application, but universal in every sense, inasmuch as it deals with the means of removing sin and augmenting grace, two things which are necessary to every man at every time of his life, and in every possible circumstance in which he may be placed. It is plain, too, that moral theology is not an easy science, — the Lord have mercy on the man who thinks that it is. As for the objection that there is little certainty in it, the charge is not well considered. It is made by those who think that the science is easy, and that a little common sense and an acquaintance with the contents of one or two pious books are all that is wanting to make a useful director of souls. Common sense! yes, it is necessary; the condiment would be insipid without it, but it is not the condiment. In the first place, absolute certainty is obtained in all the principles upon which moral theology is based. Those principles are neither few nor of unfrequent application. A decision from the authorities of the Church also imports certainty, and in the administration of most of the Sacraments positive decisions accompany almost every step. So far as the Sacrament of Penance is concerned, as the direction of souls implies that the director must sit in judgment upon human acts, and as every real human act is accompanied by its accidents, absolute, metaphysical certainty is not to be had, neither is it required. What is required in them is a *certain* conscience, — that which prudent men use in their daily actions. No man is positively certain that, if he eat, or if he go out, he may not be poisoned, or killed. Yet this lack of metaphysical certainty alone will not justify him in starving himself, or locking himself within doors. A more or less high degree of probability is all that is attainable in these matters, inasmuch as every act of a man is accompanied by accidents, — circumstances, over some of which he has no control, some of which he cannot foresee, and some of

whose existence he has no suspicion. In the direction of our acts to the Final Cause, God requires, in each act, what we require in ourselves and in others in any act affecting our lives or fortunes ; that is, he requires a prudent judgment, on our part, that the act is expedient, — good, — adapted to obtain the appointed end. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this judgment turns out to be correct, and this probability is the certainty of moral theology in its actual application to human acts, which, being mutable, cannot give the immutable, as metaphysical certainty must be. In moral theology, then, *in actu primo remoto*, to use a convenient formula, metaphysical certainty is always had, because of the immutable principles which constitute the science. *In actu primo proximo* is the region where *speculative* doubt can begin ; metaphysical certainty, owing to the aforesaid principles, and to positive decisions, is frequently attainable, — moral certainty always. *In actu secundo*, or in the actual application of principles and decisions to individual acts, a prudent judgment is necessary, and, being necessary, can always be had. Moral theology becomes here an art, — *ars artium, regimen animarum*. It must not be forgotten, either, that, although in this matter probability only is *per se* attainable, yet frequently such is the clearness of the case, and the evident application to it of immutable principles, that the certainty of the confessor becomes hypothetically metaphysical. One must not suppose that the real cases which he encounters in the confessional are often like those which he finds in books. This result is obtained more frequently than might, at first sight, be supposed, where there is in the confessor judgment, common sense, knowledge, piety, the fear of God, and the love of souls. *Facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam*, — a very comfortable promise, without which few conscientious directors would dare enter the confessional.

It is scarcely worth while to notice the peculiar objections concerning treatises on certain subjects, were it not for the fact that we have heard them repeated by young Levites as a reason for neglecting the whole science. Undoubtedly the subject is a disagreeable one, but such delicacy is not very creditable to a man. Every one admits that these things must be studied by physicians ; — is the cure of bodies more necessary than the cure of souls ?

Protestants overlook this obvious answer; they overlook also the fact, that, while they object to the study by professional men, for professional purposes, of these treatises, they eagerly buy vernacular translations of these very treatises, and allow them, with other obscene publications, to circulate in their families. Protestantism has no moral theology, for it denies the Final Cause; whence we have a key to the excessive immorality of Protestant and Protestantized countries, a sight which urges one to bless God that Catholic countries are, after all, as moral as we find them. Evil communication corrupts good morals. The answer to the objection is briefly this. The soul must be pure, to see God. Impurity averts it from its final cause; it is worthy of hell, and in baptized Christians it can be remedied only in the Sacrament of Penance. The delicacy which is not ashamed to do a thing, but is ashamed to confess it, is the delicacy of a harlot. An excellent practical answer may be given by pointing to the females who frequent the Sacraments, and by contrasting the purity of their lives with the impurity of the world that rejects the confessional. It is to be noted, moreover, that in the Holy Scriptures cases and decisions appertaining to this matter might be collected in sufficient numbers to form a goodly treatise *de sexto, de nono, et de matrimonio*.

This last observation suggests a theme upon which we would like to dwell a little, but we must dismiss it here with a few sentences. We refer to the *history* of moral theology. It is a common error to suppose that, because previous to the Council of Trent there were few books bound and labelled *Compendium, Medulla, or Cursus Theologiæ Moralis*, there was no such thing as the science of moral theology. This is a mistake worse than that which admits in the world no metaphysical science previous to Aristotle's *post-physica*. The necessities of the times, the condition, wants, and facilities of students, the *errores*, or *peccata insurgentia*, the convenience, taste, or judgment of masters, have given to different times differently shaped treatises, but the science remained the same. In the prophetic schools of the old law, and, previous to the invention of printing, in the episcopal houses, moral science was taught orally, and treasured up, for the most part, *memoriter*. The *disciplina arcani* obtained, to a certain extent, in the Jewish and Christian schools, and rigidly, at one period, in the latter. It is noticeable that the earliest



treatises — we mean what moderns would call treatises — on moral theology are the most voluminous, indicating that their authors had no lack of authorities or materials. Truly they had not, and the difficulty with them was, to make a good selection from the abundant matter before them. St. Thomas had done this for theology in general, and in a way that placed him at once and for ever at the head of the schools. Without referring to any doctor of moral theology for the last four centuries, and using the acts of the Roman Congregations for later decisions, one skilled in moral theology might compile from the Holy Scriptures, the writings of the Fathers, the decrees of Councils, the Penitential Canons, and a few other sources, a course of moral theology that would wear a sufficiently modern look. It might be done from St. Augustine and St. Thomas, with the Council of Trent and the Roman decrees. The early students of moral theology had their own method of pursuing the science, and, as we are accustomed to regard them as decisive authorities, it is not very easy to suppose that their method was inferior to ours, to say nothing of the fact that they lived near the sources of the science. The truth is, commandments of God and of the Church were always to be kept, the Sacraments were always to be properly administered, the seven deadly sins were always to be avoided, and Christ, finally, was always to be imitated. Moral theology is the science of the imitation of Christ. From all this it is clear enough that we need not commiserate the early students of moral theology on any lack of means for the pursuit of the divine art. If we do, we betray our ignorance. The *things* created by moral theology, that is to say, the Common Law, Christian kings, nobles, and peoples, Christian institutions of ages heroic in Christ, will arise and silence us.

Text-books on moral theology are growing common, and we are glad that it is so. What were text-books are voluminous, and now serve as authorities, books of reference, particularly since the inimitable *Medulla* of Busembaum, a book so very useful that even the beloved St. Liguori, the great light of the science in modern times, thought that he could render no better service to students than by giving the text of Busembaum, accompanied with copious notes, exceeding the original in bulk, and equalling it in value. This is a work that no moralist can spare from his library. Among the later compilations we have the work of Dr.

Kenrick, now Archbishop of Baltimore, on the three volumes of which the illustrious author has bestowed much thought and labor. It is of especial value to American theologians, inasmuch as it treats questions and cases which are almost peculiar to our own country and times.

The book of Father Gury, a distinguished member of the learned Society of Jesus, which we have cited at the head of this article, is a very remarkable work. It would be presumptuous in us to call it the best text-book in existence, but we like it better than any that we have ever seen, and we hope that, with Liguori, it will find a place in every ecclesiastical library, however small. *Multum, non multa*, is as good a motto for a library of works on moral theology as any other, perhaps better. The book is very small, there being only two octodecimo volumes, of about five hundred pages each, in rather large type. Father Gury has contrived, not to crowd, for the matter has not a crowded appearance, but to embody in this comparatively small space all necessary information concerning his favorite science, and to impart it in a remarkably clear and distinct manner. His method is well chosen. The tracts *De Pœnitentia*, *De Justitia et Jure*, and *De Contractibus*, are full and satisfactory. The little dissertation on the use of probabilism is excellent. If the book be used as a text-book in seminaries, for which it is well adapted, the student may require a more diffuse author for his reading; but from its compact form, clearness, and comprehensiveness, joined with singular brevity, it will be invaluable as a manual for priests. Some few of the decisions of the author strike us as being a little strange, among them that concerning the use of animal magnetism, but we do not venture to criticize them here, our argument being, as we have said, that of a student addressed to students. We beg our brethren to note the summing up, on p. 257, Vol. I., of the question, *De obedientia et reverentia civium erga temporalem auctoritatem*, as a favorable specimen, exhibiting most of the author's good qualities, and as a satisfactory decision on a subject which the wickedness of the times must soon force upon the attention of those having the care of souls.\*

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\* This article is not from the pen of a layman. Another article more especially in review of Father Gury's excellent work is in preparation. —  
ED. B. Q. REVIEW.

## ART. V. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *A History of the Irish Settlers in North America, from the Earliest Period to the Census of 1850.* By THOMAS D'ARCY MCGEE. Second Edition. Boston: Donahoe. 1852. 12mo. pp. 240.

THE author of this interesting work is well known to our Irish American public. He was some years ago editor of *The Boston Pilot*, afterwards one of the editors of *The Dublin Nation*, subsequently to that editor of the *New York Nation*, and is now the editor and proprietor of *The American Celt*, recently removed from this city to Buffalo, N. Y. He is a man of fine talents, a vigorous writer, and a graceful and effective speaker. His career, till within the last year, was one which we could not approve, and many things which he wrote in *The Nation*, at New York, gave great pain to the friends of religion. He was an Irish radical, and of all radicals, an Irish radical, calling himself a Catholic, is to us the least endurable, because he is one who does violence both to his nature and his religion. An Irishman is naturally aristocratic, and Catholicity is conservative. We want no radicals in this country, least of all Irish radicals. Irish radicals here, where the Irish population is so large, and in consequence of the ages of oppression they have endured from Protestant ascendancy in Ireland, predisposed to extreme democratic views, are exceedingly dangerous both to religion and to society. We are, therefore, not a little pleased to find that Mr. McGee, powerful as he is for good or for evil, has through Divine grace been enabled to see the errors into which in the ardor and inexperience of youth he fell, and that he is now disposed and firmly resolved to use whatever of genius, talent, or strength he may have on the side of truth, piety, and sound politics. He has and will have great influence with his countrymen who have come here to be our countrymen also, and we are truly grateful to Almighty God that we are permitted to feel that it will henceforth be used for good, and no longer, as formerly, for evil. We can now freely acknowledge his talents without fearing that we are contributing to strengthen a party with which we have and can have no sympathy. He has learned wisdom from what he has suffered, he has profited largely by experience, and he can hardly fail to be a most efficient laborer in the field of Irish-American literature.

The first edition of the work before us we did not read, and we have only glanced through the second. We see in it the evidence of much industry and research, as well as a genius for historical and biographical writing of a very high order. That the work is always correct or always satisfactory to our individual taste and judgment, we do not pretend. We have, of course, our American nationality, and no Irishman, whatever his intentions, can treat of Irish nationality in a manner to meet in all respects our own national feeling; but though the tone may now and then not accord with our feelings, we can overlook it, if the principle be sound, and the intention just and honorable. We do not set ourselves up as a standard to which all must conform on pain of excommunication.

The Introduction is well written, but the brief sketch it attempts of the state of Europe in the fifteenth century is far from being satisfactory. It is written with too low an appreciation of the Middle Ages, and too high an appreciation of the progress of events since. The author has studied

history in the writings of Protestant, or, at best, of paganized authors. The longer he lives, the less will be his confidence in the current notions, even among Catholics, of Christendom prior to the sixteenth century, and the more and more will he be disposed not to boast of the progress society is supposed to have made during the last three or four centuries.

We confess that Mr. McGee's book has surprised us, and we hardly know what to think of it. If the author is correct, we who have the misfortune to be of English origin, whether Saxon or Norman, cut but a sorry figure in our own country. It would seem that the greater part of the population of the United States are either Irish or of Irish extraction, and that nearly all the names honorably distinguished in our history are the names either of Irishmen or of the descendants of Irishmen. Instead of regarding ourselves as Anglo-Americans it would seem that as a people we should regard ourselves as Irish-Americans. We have ourselves no prejudices against the Irish, and we delight in the glory of Irishmen as much as we do or can in the glory of any other race, but we apprehend that a good many of Mr. McGee's Irishmen were Scotchmen, and not a few of them wholly destitute of Milesian blood. But be this as it may, the book is extremely interesting, and we most cordially recommend it to all our readers, whether of Celtic or Saxon origin, as worthy of their serious consideration, and as proving beyond a doubt that Irishmen have a right to consider themselves at home here.

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2. *Catechism of the Christian Religion; being, with some small Changes, a Compendium of the Catechism of Montpellier, in which, by the Light of Scripture and Tradition, are explained the History, Dogmas, Morality, Sacraments, Prayers, Ceremonies, and Usages of the Church of Christ.* By the REV. STEPHEN KEENAN, Author of the "Controversial Catechism," &c. Boston: Donahoe. 1852. 12mo. pp. 549.

We did not, in consequence of some opinions we found in it, feel at liberty to recommend Mr. Keenan's Controversial Catechism; but in the present work, with the exception of the answer to the second question on page 168, we have in the slight perusal we have given it discovered nothing to object to. The author is evidently a Gallican, and inclining to give a very free interpretation to the dogma of exclusive salvation; but in all other respects, his Catechisms, as far as we have examined them, are excellent, and especially this Catechism of the Christian Religion. It is admirably adapted to the instruction and edification of the faithful. It is published with the approbation of the Right Reverend Bishop of Boston.

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3. *A Tour in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Greece; with Notes and an Appendix on Ecclesiastical Subjects.* By J. L. PATTERSON, M. A. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1852. 8vo. pp. 480.

MR. PATTERSON is a very entertaining travelling companion. One can read his book without much weariness. The Appendix contains much valuable information respecting the Oriental Christians. The author is a convert from Anglicanism.

4. *The Life of Henry the Eighth, and the History of the Schism of England.* From the French of M. AUDIN. By E. G. K. BROWN. New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1852. 8vo. pp. 441.

WE have not had leisure to read and compare this translation with the original. The French work is interesting, and, no doubt, the best work on the subject to be had ; and we are happy to meet it in an English dress. But we must say, very frankly, that we are no warm admirers of any of M. Audin's publications. In the work before us, he makes Henry a hero, and fails in his respect to the Holy See. The impression he leaves on our mind is, that in his opinion Henry was harshly treated, and that Clement the Seventh was weak, ignorant, vacillating, without a single noble or manly virtue. We could write of no Pope as he does of Clement, who was really a learned and an eminent man, and a great, though in some respects an ill-starred Pontiff. We should not insult his memory by charging to him the loss of England. We shall, however, return to this volume hereafter, and make it the occasion of some remarks on the origin and character of the Anglican schism.

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5. *Recollections of a Journey through Tartary, Thibet, and China, during the Years 1844, 1845, and 1846.* By M. HUC, Missionary Priest of the Congregation of St. Lazarus. New York : Appleton & Co. 1852. 2 vols. 24mo.

THIS is a mutilated edition of an exceedingly interesting and valuable work. In consequence of its being a mutilated edition we cannot recommend it. It is true, the parts omitted consist of matter which, to some extent, may be found elsewhere, but not in works accessible to the great mass of readers. If we republish at all the works of an author, we should republish them as he has chosen to leave them. The English edition of Hazlitt's translation appears to be complete, and is sold in New York at only a trifle above the price charged by Messrs. Appleton for their mutilated edition. The work itself is one of great interest and value, as throwing much light on the condition, manners, customs, laws, and religion of the various inhabitants of Eastern Asia, especially the Mongolian Tartars and the Thibetans, of whom so little is known in Western Europe and America. It consists of recollections of a journey made by two Catholic missionaries for the purpose of ascertaining the prospects of establishing missions among the Thibetans, — a journey of exploration in the interests of the Cross, — and is, to a considerable extent, a mere personal narrative, giving us less knowledge of the people among whom the missionaries travelled than we could wish ; but it will, after all, be found to contain a vast amount of useful and curious information not elsewhere accessible. It also gives a vivid picture of the hardships which are endured by the soldiers of the Cross in their efforts to conquer the heathen and barbarous tribes to our holy religion. We should be glad to see a faithful and un mutilated translation of the original French work circulating amongst us.

6. *Madeleine: a Tale of Auvergne, founded on Fact.* By JULIA KAVANAGH. New York: Appleton & Co. 1852. 12mo. pp. 300.

THIS is precisely one of those books which embarrass the Catholic Reviewer. It has so much in it that is really good, that we are not willing to censure it, and so much that we do not like, that we are unwilling to speak well of it. How much of it is fact, and how much of it is fiction, it is not easy to say. The author disturbs us by her long and tedious descriptions of natural scenery, — descriptions fine enough in themselves, but unnecessary to the action of the piece, and therefore out of place. She makes Madeleine engage in her noble enterprise as a relief from the pains of disappointed affection, rather than from true charity, or genuine love of God and of the poor and the infirm for Christ's sake. She represents Madeleine as unable to answer questions the answers to which no Catholic peasant-girl of Madeleine's standing could be ignorant of, and supposes that the poor girl continues through all her labors, which God so wonderfully blessed, to bear concealed in her heart the wound of disappointed love. This might be the case with a Protestant girl, but not with a true Catholic girl. Grace does not merely enable us to bear the pains of wounded affection: it cures them, and enables us to be serene and happy. It is a gentile, not a Christian notion, that the heart early wounded by loving the human object of its affection can never be made whole again. Religion, when it is genuine, can raise, and does raise, us above all grief, save grief for sin. Bating a few things of this sort in the book, it may be read with interest and profit, and, for those who will read works of fiction, perhaps it is as little hurtful as any likely to be read. So, upon the whole, we conclude to approve rather than condemn it; adding merely, that we have ourselves rather dipped into than read it.

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7. *Course of the History of Modern Philosophy.* By M. VICTOR COUSIN. Translated by O. W. WIGHT. New York: Appleton & Co. 1852. 2 vols. 8vo.

M. COUSIN we always wish to speak of with respect, owing to our former correspondence with him, the personal kindness he manifested to us when we were among his disciples, and the real advantages we derived from the study of his writings, however faulty they may be; but his system has had its day, and all attempts to bring it into vogue again, here or elsewhere, are perfectly idle. As opposed to the sensism of Locke and Condillac, his system is sound; as opposed to the idealism or subjectism of Kant, it is meritorious; but as eclectic, or rather syncretic, it lacks unity and true scientific character, and as pantheistic it cannot aspire to so much as to be a philosophy. Its study in this country by our Protestant countrymen, owing to the low state of speculative science among them, may, however, be rather useful than otherwise. But as all M. Cousin's books are placed on the Index at Rome, no good Catholic will read except to refute them. The translation, though in some respects faulty, and borrowing terms from the Scotch philosophers which we are sorry to see adopted into our noble English tongue, is, upon the whole, very well done, and quite creditable to the translator.

8. *Sketches of the Life, Times, and Character of the Right Rev. BENEDICT JOSEPH FLAGET, First Bishop of Louisville.* By M. J. SPAULDING, D. D., Bishop of Louisville. Louisville : Webb & Levering. 1852. 10mo. pp. 406.

THIS is a work of too much interest and importance to be dismissed in a brief literary notice, and we must seize the earliest opportunity to make it the subject of an extended review. At present we can only say that the work contains a considerable mass of information with regard to the labors, trials, struggles, and privations of the early Catholic missionaries west of the Alleghenies. We wish the information had been fuller, and the Right Reverend Author must forgive us if we express our regret that he had not taken the time to give us a full history of Catholicity in the West, instead of simple sketches of it, during the times of the illustrious Bishop Flaget. Nevertheless, we are thankful for the sketches, which give us no little information entirely new to us. They are extremely useful to us of the present generation, to prevent us from forgetting the devotion, the toil and sacrifices of our fathers. The reading of this work has given us a juster estimate of the difficulties under which our earlier missionaries labored, and of their heroic charity, than we had hitherto formed, and made us feel that we must often have said things which could not but seem undeserved and harsh to those who were better acquainted than we with our early Catholic history. Of the illustrious subject of this memoir we have no room now to speak. He was a saintly man, a devoted missionary, a tender, faithful, and vigilant pastor, to whom the Church in this country, and especially in Kentucky, where our religion is so firmly established and so flourishing, owes much, and his memory must for ever continue to be dear to every Catholic American. We hope this little volume, by his not unworthy successor, will find a large circulation, and be attentively read by all our younger Catholics. It will deepen their love for the Church ; it will animate their zeal, and invigorate their faith and piety.

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9. *The Life of St. THERESA.* Written by Herself, and translated from the Spanish by the REV. JOHN DALTON. New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 12mo. pp. 437.

THIS is a work that needs no review. Simply to announce it is enough, for it is a standard work, and to be read and meditated by all who aspire to Christian perfection. All the writings of St. Theresa are classics in Spanish, and the translation of her Life before us appears to be well executed.

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10. *The Way of Perfection and Conceptions of Divine Love.* By SAINT THERESA. From the Spanish by the REV. JOHN DALTON. New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 12mo. pp. 274.

WHAT we have just said of the *Life* of St. Theresa may be repeated of this standard spiritual work.

11. *A Salve for the Bite of the Black Viper. Compounded by DR. EVARISTE DE GYPENDOLE, First Surgeon-Major of the Old Guard, Physician in Ordinary to the King of Lahore, Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, &c., &c.* Translated from the French of the ABBÉ MARTINET, Author of "Religion in Society," &c. By V. D. BARRY, LL. D. Louisville: Webb & Levering. 1852. 18mo. pp. 141.

THIS little work was first introduced to the American public in our Review for April, 1845; and all who have read the original French have recognized the justice of the high praise we then gave it, and have also admired the quiet wit, the sarcasm, the lively and brilliant style, with which the author shows the efficacy of his carefully compounded antidote for the Black Serpent's fatal bite. It is a work we have long desired to see translated into the English language; but the translator, although a man of good literary attainments, does not seem fully adequate to the task, and a difficult one it certainly is, for he has failed to seize the spirit and the tone of the original. It is not that his knowledge of the French language is imperfect, but that, in endeavoring to translate too exactly, — *mot à mot*, — he gives us indeed the words which in English answer to the French; not, however, the phrases. For example, he renders Dr. Evariste's French translation of the Latin words *sunt bona mixta malis*, "every thing on journeys is not a rose"; this is very true, and sounds well in French, but in English it ceases to be expressive. "Every rose has its thorn," is, in our opinion, altogether preferable. We think, also, *serpent* a better translation of *vipère* than *viper*; for *viper*, in the American acceptance, is not the venomous *vipère* whose deadly bite is to the body what infidelity is to the soul. On the 64th page we find *Madame Cardinal* literally translated. Now *Madame Cardinal* is the French for *Mrs. Jones*, *Mrs. Smith*, or any other very common name. Again, on the 14th page, he gives up in despair all hope of translating "*façon de vinaigre des quatre ministres, pardon, des quatre voleurs*." Now *vinaigre des quatre voleurs* is a vinegar so called, highly aromatic indeed, and is used by physicians as a guard against infection; but the play in the French lies in passing by the technical use of the term, and coupling ministers with thieves.

The typographical execution of the work is not creditable to the publishers, nor such as the translation deserves; which, notwithstanding the faults we have found with it, is calculated to do much good, and which will obtain, we trust, a large circulation.

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12. *La Civiltà Cattolica, Pubblicazione periodica per tutta l'Italia il 1° e 3° Sabbato di ciascun Misse.* Roma. All' Ufficio centrale della Civiltà Cattolica. 1850-52. 8vo.

THIS is a periodical published at Rome by members of the Society of Jesus, and devoted to Catholic civilization. It was commenced in March, 1850, and is issued twice each month, each number containing about 120 pages. It is conducted with spirit and ability, and, as a periodical issued in the capital of the Christian world, it deserves the patronage of all who are able to read the Italian language. Its principles with regard to liberty, government, civilization, and its judgment of the various revolutionary and socialistic movements of the times, are sound and just. Much in its pages is no doubt local in its character and interest, but no Catholic can



be indifferent to any thing that affects the well-being in a religious or a political point of view of the Italian peninsula, and most of the articles discuss questions which have their application in every country, and more or less at all times. To us it is an exceedingly interesting and valuable periodical, and we shall take the liberty, from time to time, to translate some of its articles for the benefit of such of our readers as are not able to read the original.

13. *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review.* Conducted by FREEMAN HUNT. New York: Freeman Hunt. June, 1852. 8vo.

WE have for some time been trying to find room to notice *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, which in its way we consider a really meritorious periodical. A notice from us is not needed by the work itself, which has a wide circulation, and is highly appreciated; but we have wished to notice it in order to bear our feeble testimony to the ability and impartiality with which it is conducted, and also to pay our respects to our old friend, its enterprising and industrious editor. There are unquestionably doctrines and views set forth in its pages with which we do not sympathize, and the religious opinions of the editor which now and then peep out in his book notices are such as we abominate; but its discussions on political economy, its commercial and financial intelligence, and its important statistical tables, render it a work of great value to the banker, the merchant, and the practical statesman. In its line it is unrivalled in this country, and, as far as our knowledge extends, in Europe. It is designed for the business man, and our business men and politicians universally ought to patronize it.

14. *History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent.* By GEORGE BANCROFT. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1852. 8vo. pp. 462.

WE are preparing an elaborate review of Mr. Bancroft's *History*, which will probably appear in our next issue, and will only add here, that this long looked for volume fully sustains the reputation the author has acquired by its predecessors.

15. *Essays and Reviews, chiefly on Theology, Politics, and Socialism.* By O. A. BROWNSON. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1852. 12mo. pp. 521.

OUR readers will not expect us to pronounce any judgment on the merits of this work. It would be asking too much of us to ask us to be our own reviewer, although, were we to review our own work, we should have the advantage of reviewing a work which we had at least read, an advantage which does not always fall to our lot, any more than to other reviewers. The volume, however, we may say, is made up of *Essays and Reviews* which have appeared in this journal from time to time, and of such as we have thought the public might like to have collected in a

single volume, and especially since complete sets of our Review are no longer to be had. It contains our general principles on several important questions, and is such as we of course should like to have widely circulated among our countrymen.

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16. *History of the Irish Insurrection of 1798, giving an Authentic Account of the various Battles fought between the Insurgents and the King's Army, and a Genuine History of Transactions preceding that Event, with a valuable Appendix.* By EDWARD HAY, Esq. A new Edition; to which have been added Abstracts from Plowden, Teeling, Gordon, and Madden. Boston: Donahoe. 1852. 16mo. pp. 432.

WE have not read this book, but we are told that it is the best book to be had on the subject.

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17. *The Union of the "Church of God," or the Necessity of the Oneness of Professors of Christianity, and the Evils of Sects amongst them.* By JOHN REIS. "There is one body and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all." Eph. iv. 4-6. "He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me." John xiv. 21. "Thus saying, thou reproachest us also." Luke xi. 45. Hygeia Printing Office, near Cincinnati, Ohio. 1852. 24mo. pp. 519.

WE have done the author the honor of quoting his entire title-page, motto and all: we have not, however, much to say of his book. Were we an astrologer, we should suppose him to have been born when the *Great Dipper* was in the ascendancy, for he is a *great dipper*; he believes in *dipping*; and to bring about the *union of the Church of God*, he wants us all to be dipped, either in clear water or foul, or, if you like it better, in dirt, mire, milk, sand, oil, or tar. We must have no more effusion, no more aspersion; we must be immersed, — dipped. We must confess that he adduces some very potent arguments in support of his position; for instance, on page 168: "The object immersed (dipped) is never governed by a preposition; the object sprinkled or poured is always governed by a preposition."

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18. *The Protesting Christian, standing before the Judgment-Seat of Christ, to answer for his Protest against that PARENT CHURCH, which Christ built upon a Rock, with the Promise: "The Gates of Hell shall not prevail against it."* Matt. xvi. 18. By the Rev. J. PERRY, Catholic Pastor of Aston-le-Walls. Third Edition. Baltimore: Heidan & O'Brien. 1852. 12mo. pp. 46.

THE aim of this small publication is to show *Protesting Christians* upon how weak a foundation rest their pretensions, and how signally they will

be confounded at the judgment-seat of God, whither the author leads them, and there confronts them with their Supreme Judge, who condemns them from out their own mouths. The author writes with equal candor and charity, and with no inconsiderable degree of skill; and we cordially recommend his work to the earnest consideration of all Protestants. Catholics also may derive profit from it; especially those who love to boast of what *they* would do in certain contingencies.

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19. *Correspondance de Rome.* Rome, Feb. 24, 1852.

THIS is a journal printed in French, and appears three times a month at Rome. It is chiefly filled with notices of books, and the publication of the different Roman ecclesiastical congregations.

In the number for February 24, we find a notice of our Review, which we hope we shall be pardoned for laying before our readers. After translating the letter of the Archbishops and Bishops of the United States, so flattering to us, it remarks that such an approval surpasses all eulogiums, and continues:—"We have not yet received the January number. The number for last October contains four articles upon different subjects, but of equal interest and importance. The first is a remarkable article upon the true basis of Theology: Rationalism and the opposite error of the Traditionalists are both here combated. The writer shows that he is a perfect master as well of the different ancient as of the modern philosophical systems, and possesses an intelligent appreciation of facts and doctrines. Our readers can judge for themselves from the analysis of it which we propose to give.

"The last article is an extraordinary dissertation on the temporal power of the Church. We frankly confess, that, to the best of our knowledge, no European writer has treated this question with more freedom and ability. For his own part, Mr. Brownson professes to be an *ultra-Ultramontane*, and admits the little sympathy he has with Gallicanism and the various explanations its adherents have proposed. We should like to give a fuller account of this article, the conclusion of which presents a summary of the whole."

And here it translates a portion of the last two pages.

BROWNSON'S  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1852.

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ART. I.—*History of the United States, from the Discovery of the American Continent.* By GEORGE BANCROFT. Vol. IV. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1852. 8vo. pp. 462.

THE first three volumes of Mr. Bancroft's work, comprising the History of the Colonization of the United States, have been for several years before the public, and, it is unnecessary to add, have obtained for their author a very high reputation both at home and abroad. The continuation of the work has been looked for with a good deal of impatience, especially by the author's own countrymen. The fourth volume, issued recently, and devoted to the first epoch of the American Revolution, or the period of its gestation, extending from 1748 to 1763, has therefore been very cordially welcomed. As far as we can judge, it has generally satisfied public expectation, and we doubt not that it will fully sustain, and even enhance, the reputation already acquired by the author.

Whatever may be thought of Mr. Bancroft as a politician or a diplomatist, he is unquestionably one of our most distinguished men. He is an accomplished scholar, a man of a high order of intellect, and a brilliant and fascinating writer. He is a hard student, enthusiastic in the cause he espouses, devoted to his principles, and ready to sacrifice himself with the zeal of the missionary for their dissemination. But, although he has studied the history of the United States with praiseworthy care and diligence, and although the discriminating reader may obtain much true history

from his learned and brilliant volumes, we are not prepared to assign him the highest rank among genuine historians. Properly speaking, he does not write history, nor even commentaries on history; he simply uses history for the purpose of setting forth, illustrating, confirming, and disseminating his speculative theories on God, man, and society. The history he writes is not written for an historical end, and the facts he relates are grouped and colored in subserviency to his unhistorical purposes.

History is not a speculative science; it deals exclusively with facts, and is simply a record of events which have succeeded one another in time. No doubt, facts or events are not isolated; no doubt, they have their causes, their relations, and their meaning, which are the proper subject of historical investigation; no doubt, the historian with regard to these may have a theory, and arrange and explain his facts in accordance with it. Every historian, who would rise above the dry annalist or bald chronicler of events, does and must so arrange and explain them. But this theory must be historical, not speculative; that is, it must be a theory for the explanation of the purely historical, not the metaphysical, origin, causes, relations, and meaning of facts. It must be itself within the order of facts, and, like all inductive theories, a mere generalization or classification of facts in their own order. That all historical facts have a speculative origin, causes, relations,—a meaning in the world which transcends the world of space and time,—is of course true; but in this sense they are eternal, have no succession, and therefore no history. In this sense they transcend the province of the historian, as such, and pertain solely to that of the metaphysician or theologian. The science which takes cognizance of them is what we ourselves call theology, natural or supernatural, and what Aristotle calls science (*sapientia*), or philosophy proper, not history, which is confined by its own nature to the record of facts or events.

The modern school of history, especially in France and Germany, overlook this important distinction between history and theology,—historical science and speculative science,—and confound the historical with the theological origin, relations, and significance of facts. They form to themselves, from their own fancies, caprices, or prejudices, prior to all study of history, certain theories of the uni-

verse, of God, man, and society, — metaphysical, ethical, and political theories, from which they infer what is and must be in history. They then proceed to apply their theories to the explanation of historical facts, which they adapt to the illustration and support of their previous speculations. Facts encountered which contradict their theories are passed over in silence, denied, distorted, or explained away; facts which are needed to explain and establish them, if not encountered, are invented; and facts which have no apparent bearing on them one way or the other are discarded as unimportant and without historical significance. Herder, Kant, Hegel, Guizot, Cousin, Michelet, and even Carlyle and Macaulay, are instances in point, as all who are familiar with their writings need not to be informed. None of them give us genuine history, or even their own views of history; they merely give us their speculations on what is not history, and what according to those speculations ought to be history.

It is the common error of the modern school of so-called philosophical historians, and to which school Mr. Bancroft belongs, though he is not by any means the worst of the school, to suppose that history may be reduced to the terms of a speculative science, and be written, as it were, *a priori*. Give me the geographical position of a people, says the brilliant and eloquent Cousin, and I will give you its history. Has the geography of Memphis, of Babylon, Nineveh, Tyre, Sidon, Jerusalem, Carthage, Sparta, Athens, Rome, changed from what it was in remote antiquity? Has their history remained at all epochs the same? Herder finds in all history only his Ideas of human progress; Kant finds nothing but his categories; Hegel finds the significance and end of all history, the operations of Divine Providence, of all mankind, and of all nature, to have been the establishment of the Prussian monarchy; Mr. Bancroft finds that the original purpose of creation, of God and the universe, is fulfilled in the establishment of American democracy. No doubt, history has a transcendental plan, and a purpose which it is fulfilling; no doubt, God has a plan in all he does, and is fulfilling a fixed and scientific purpose in every historical event, however great or however small it may seem to us. But the science of this plan and of this purpose is God's science, not man's, and can be shared by us only as he pleases to make it known to us by

his revelation. It is not the historian as such who possesses it, and can unroll it before us. It is only a Bossuet, a Christian bishop, in possession of divine revelation, and speaking from the height of the episcopal chair, that can give to history something of the character of a speculative science, or furnish a philosophy of history; and that philosophy of history is a divine, not a human philosophy. That philosophy is not historical, and can be obtained by no induction from historical or even psychological facts, for induction can never give us causes or principles; and hence the Baconian universe, as has often been remarked, is a universe of effects without causes,—a manifest contradiction in terms. Certainly there is a logic in history, if we could see it from the point of view of the Divine Intelligence; but in relation to our science, from the point of view of the human intellect, the events of history do not all follow logically from a given antecedent. To us the antecedents are many, and include the natural and supernatural providence of God and the free-will of man; and the free-will of man, too, in a fallen and abnormal state, as well as in a supernatural state, to which he is elevated by the grace of Christ. These perpetually interrupt to our apprehension the series of logical sequences, and no human science can determine what new series of sequences may at any moment be introduced by the operations of free-will, either on the part of God or on the part of man. Moreover, with freedom in the antecedent, the conclusion cannot be logically deduced; for logic can deduce only *necessary* conclusions. To the historian history is never a series of logical sequences, for if it were it would not be history, as there would then be no chronological sequence, or succession in time. To him much must always appear anomalous, arbitrary, inexplicable, the result of chance; although in point of fact there is no chance, and though there is freedom, there is nothing arbitrary, or without a sufficient reason. All the so-called philosophies of history, or attempts to reduce history to the form of a speculative human science, proceed on a pantheistic assumption,—are founded on the denial of creation and providence, the free-will of God, and consequently the free-will and moral accountability of man. They all assume virtually that the universe is purely phenomenal, and is to be regarded only as the necessary expression of an inherent principle of Life,

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which evolves, moves, and agitates the whole by an intrinsic law of necessity. They all assume and inculcate the doctrine of absolute and universal fatalism, which binds alike in the same chain of invincible necessity God, man, and nature.

Undoubtedly, he who proposes to pass other than purely historical judgments on historical facts must have a general theological doctrine, of some sort. But no theological doctrine is historical, or historically attainable. It does not belong to the historian as such; it belongs to the theologian, and to be worth any thing is obtainable only as supernaturally supplied by God himself; for he alone can reveal to us his plan, and disclose the purpose he is fulfilling. He who has not been supplied, immediately or mediately, with such doctrine by God himself, and has not infallible assurance that he has been so supplied, must either not write history at all, or else restrict himself to purely historical judgments of the events he relates. If he has borrowed from fallible sources, or has concocted for himself a theory of the universe and the purpose God is fulfilling in universal or particular history, he should either keep it to himself, or avowedly bring it out as theology or metaphysics. He has no right to make history the vehicle of insinuating it into the minds of unsuspicious readers, who are reading for the facts he professes to narrate, not for the speculative notions he may entertain, or philosophical crotchets he may have in his head. He does not deal fairly or honestly with us, when, under pretence of giving us history, he only gives us his speculative theories.

Of all the devices for disseminating falsehood, corrupting youth, and destroying all true intellectual and moral life, this of making history the vehicle of communicating the theological, metaphysical, ethical, and political theories of the author is the most ingenious and the most effective. The novel or romance did very well, but it was in bad odor with the graver part of the community, and often went no farther than to corrupt the heart and disturb the senses. More could be accomplished under the grave mask of the historian than under the light and fantastic mask of the novelist or romancer. Hence our histories are nearly all written with a view of inculcating, often without the design being suspected, some crude and in general mischievous theory on religion, philosophy, or politics.



The author professes to give you facts, and along with what he gives you for facts, so interwoven with them that none but a disciplined mind can separate them, he insinuates into the ingenuous and unsuspecting reader his false and pernicious speculative theories. Facts are never to be feared, for they can never come into conflict with religion. We wish to conceal the real facts of history neither from ourselves nor from our children. We wish our children to know the history of their own country; we put into their hands Mr. Bancroft's volumes, and before we know it, they have a wholly false view of that history, and have imbibed, with the facts they have learned, speculative theories which are one day to become active in making them false both to their God and to their country. They see not well how they can question the doctrines without denying the facts; and the facts alleged, under some aspect, may be undeniable. The doctrines are imbibed as simply historical doctrines; their reach is neither seen nor suspected, and their hostility to faith becomes apparent only in after years, when they have taken too firm a hold of the mind, and entered too deeply into its habits, to be rejected without extraordinary grace. Thus is generation after generation corrupted, and ruined for time and eternity. This, too, we must presume, is the precise design of the authors of our modern philosophies of history. How often has Mr. Bancroft, for instance, said to himself and to his confidential friends, on hearing his book commended in certain quarters, "They little suspect my design in writing it, or the ultimate bearing of its doctrines." No one who knows the popular theories of the day can doubt that the work is written for a far different purpose than that of presenting a true and faithful history of the United States. The author's speculative purpose is visible to the disciplined eye on almost every page. Even its very style wants frankness and sincerity. The statement of facts, the selection of facts to be stated, the choice of words, and the turn given to the expression, all bear witness that the work is written, not for the sake of history, but to propagate the author's own metaphysical, ethical, political, and socialistic theories, and theories which, though plausible to the young and untrained, are unsound and in the last degree dangerous.

We wish to speak with all due respect of Mr. Bancroft

as a man, and the more especially because time has been when he treated us as a friend and laid us under many personal obligations which we have not forgotten, and cannot forget. He has many traits of character which we love and honor. We have no interest in disparaging his merits, for he holds a distinguished place in the affections of our countrymen, and enjoys a wide and in many respects merited popularity. Enemies, certainly, he has, who would delight to see him attacked, but those enemies are not our friends, have no sympathy with us, and can find nothing to gratify them in the objections we bring against his writings. Most of them sympathize with him on the very points on which we dissent from him. But we have long since learned to yield neither private nor public honor to the man, however great or distinguished, who abuses his gifts and opportunities to corrupt the public mind, and to inculcate doctrines which strike at the foundation of religion, morality, government, and even society itself. Mr. Bancroft's method of writing history is manifestly a disingenuous method, defensible on the score neither of morals nor of art, and it were credulity, not charity, to presume that even he would attempt to defend it on any other than the false ground, that the end justifies the means.

Let it not be said that we are hostile to science and opposed to the progress of intelligence. We are not opposed to science or intellectual progress; quite the contrary; but we do not consider that science properly so called consists in being acquainted with the delusive theories men may take it into their heads to concoct, nor do we believe intellectual progress is promoted by feeding the mind with the ravings of insanity, the dreams of the morbid, or the unsubstantial speculations of radical projectors and socialistic reformers. The mind in feeding on these necessarily contracts disease, becomes enfeebled, loses its light, and goes out in darkness. Give us facts and true principles, write books that teach truth, that introduce the reader to reality, and not simply to the miserable crotchets and fancies of your own brains, and we are ready to commend you with all our heart. Be honest, avow openly your real doctrines and purposes, label your pictures truly, so that one may know beforehand what to expect, and we will bring no other objections than such as simply

bear against the statements you make, or the doctrines you advance. But let there be an end to this enormous abuse of history, which has become so common of late, and which is poisoning the whole reading community.

Mr. Bancroft is a democrat, in the modern sense of that word, a philosophical democrat, — not merely a plain, old-fashioned republican, which we claim to be ourselves, — a progressive democrat, who holds that democracy is not only the best, but the only legitimate form of government. The popular will is for him the supreme law, and the popular instincts and tendencies are the infallible criterion of truth, beauty, and goodness. The people are to him the infallible church, and humanity is his God. There is at least no God for man but the God in humanity, who speaks only in and through popular instincts and tendencies. Hence the author defines elsewhere democracy to be “eternal justice ruling through the people.” The race is progressive, and the progress of society is constantly towards the realization of democracy as thus defined. Here, in a word, is the general theory which he writes his *History of the United States* to establish and disseminate. To this end nearly all in his volumes, if we except the first volume, which is more historical and less speculative than the others, is made directly or indirectly subservient, and to accomplish it he omits, misrepresents, miscolors, or invents facts, as he finds it necessary or convenient. He may not do this consciously, with “malice aforethought,” but his theory blinds him, unsteadies or distorts his vision, so that he seems to himself to see all the facts he wants, and only such as he wants, for his theory.

It is not our intention, nor have we either the leisure or the knowledge necessary if it were, to follow the author step by step through his volumes, and sustain our charges by minute criticism. It is not, indeed, necessary. Reference to some three or four matters pretty well known will sufficiently justify us. Those who have read in his second volume the history of the colonization of Carolina, and the constitution framed for its government by Locke and Shaftesbury, will recollect how adroitly he obtains an argument from the failure of that constitution, in favor of his democracy and deification of the people. He brings the failure of that constitution forward as a proof of the superior wisdom of the common people, the illiterate and sim-

ple, to that of philosophers and statesmen. This is to misrepresent the whole case. That failure says nothing in favor of the superiority of ignorance over science; it simply proves, what De Maistre so much insists on, that the constitution of a state must be generated, not made, and grow up out of the circumstances of a people with them, instead of being arbitrarily constructed and imposed upon them. The Carolinians, in rejecting that constitution, the work of philosophers, which had no root in their interior life, in their habits, manners, customs, or circumstances, did not invent a new form of government, create a new constitution for themselves; they simply fell back on that portion of the constitution of England which they brought with them, and which had never ceased to be theirs, and simply modified it to their peculiar circumstances and condition. The lesson of the occurrence is neither in favor of democracy nor against it; it is merely that it is madness to attempt to change radically the constitution inherent in the life of a people, and to impose upon them one made to order in the closet of a philosopher,—a lesson worth reading to Mr. Bancroft's friends, the European Revolutionists, and perhaps also one which he might himself study to some advantage.

The author furnishes us another instance to our purpose in his account of "Salem Witchcraft,"—a delusion not confined to Salem, or the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, but which about the time was common to most Protestant countries, and attended with the most deplorable results, especially among the Puritans of England and Scotland. Mr. Bancroft, of course, does not believe in the reality of witchcraft; but as he holds the people to be infallible, and popular instincts to be the sure test of truth, it will not answer for him to concede that the people ever shared the delusion. So he makes Salem witchcraft all the work of the colonial aristocracy, the ministers and magistrates, and, in the face and eyes of the undeniable facts in the case, represents the people all along as free from it, as opposed to it, and as finally succeeding, by their good sense, humane feelings, and influence, in putting an end to it. This is all pure theory. The people of New England are even yet to a very great extent believers in witchcraft, and more than one poor old woman have we known to be denounced, avoided, and abandoned to wretchedness and want, as a

witch. The belief may not be as common now as it was in the days of our boyhood, or rather it has changed its form. The so-called "spiritual knockings," now so prevalent, erected as it were into a religion, with its places of worship, its priests, priestesses, and journals, is at bottom only a revival of Salem witchcraft under another name. The *people*, who, according to Mr. Bancroft, opposed the severities exercised toward the individuals held to be bewitched, were certain loose livers, libertines, freethinkers, scoffers, who believed very little either in God or the Devil.

The elaborate account of Quakerism and the people called Quakers, in the same volume, chapter sixteenth, is another instance in which the author is led by his theory to depart from strict historical fidelity. He makes a hero of William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, exaggerates his merits even more than Macaulay disparages them, and makes Quakerism the exponent of the inspirations of the Impersonal Reason, whatever that may mean. He had his religious or theological theory to bring out, and he makes Quakerism its vehicle. In order to do so, he gives us for Quakerism, we will not say what Quakerism may not practically lead to, but assuredly what never entered the heads of its founders, George Fox, Robert Barclay, and William Penn. The essential element of Quakerism is its assertion of the universality and sufficiency of the indwelling Christ independent of Christ teaching through historical records or chosen messengers, and bringing us into union with himself in the Church through the Sacraments. But the genuine Quaker never intentionally denied the Incarnation, and never confounded the indwelling Christ, "the light within," with natural reason, personal or impersonal. The Christ in whom he professed to believe was "the Word," the "Son of God," "the true light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world." He held him to be not only, as the Eternal Son of God by whom all things were made, the natural light of reason or the light of the natural order, but also, as the Incarnate Son or Word, the supernatural light, or the light of the supernatural order of grace, and in both orders he distinguished him from the soul and its faculties, as in external vision the light by which we see is distinguishable from the visual organ and even the visual faculty. The error of the Quaker does not lie in the assertion of the indwelling

Christ in the regenerate, for he does dwell in them, and they in him; but in supposing him to dwell equally in the unregenerate, or in supposing that the effect of the Incarnation was to place every man actually in the order of grace, and Christ as an indwelling Saviour in the heart of every one; whence he was led to deny the Sacraments, the Church, the priesthood, and the means by which the sinner receives the application of the Atonement, is brought into union with Christ, and preserved therein. A serious error enough, no doubt, but not an error favoring the doctrine held by Mr. Bancroft, and for which he eulogizes him. Mr. Bancroft thinks he has in this Quaker doctrine of the indwelling Christ, or inward light, his own doctrine of the sufficiency and infallibility of reason as an attribute of humanity, on which he founds his doctrine of popular sovereignty and the infallibility of the people. He thus, to the utter astonishment of Obadiah, makes the Quaker a modern Transcendentalist, and a witness bearing his testimony in favor of "progressive democracy." In this he is an unfaithful historian, a bad philosopher, and a worse theologian.

A more important instance of Mr. Bancroft's infidelity as an historian may be found in the opening chapter of the volume before us. This volume professes, as we have said, to give us the history of the first epoch of the American Revolution, and the author seeks to show that this revolution was conceived and brought forth in the design of introducing a new political and social order into the history of the world, and that it was only a link in that series of revolutions which have convulsed the European continent for sixty or seventy years with vain efforts to introduce into its old monarchical states "*la République démocratique et sociale*." The kings united with the commons in the fifteenth century and suppressed the barons; the commons, uniting with the princes in the sixteenth century, suppressed the Church. Thus emancipated from the nobility and the hierarchy, the commons in England in the seventeenth century deposed the king and beheaded monarchy at Whitehall in the person of Charles Stuart. Defeated for the moment by the Restoration, the commons fled to these Western wilds, where, concealed in the depths of the forest, they grew and prepared themselves by the middle of the eighteenth century to renew and continue their struggles

against monarchy, and in favor of republicanism, the sovereignty of the people, — progressive democracy. Hence Mr. Bancroft's theory of the American movement in behalf of national independence is, that it was only the continuation or resumption of the movement of the English republicans in the seventeenth century, as that was itself only the continuation of the movement in the previous two centuries of the kings and commons against the feudal aristocracy and the Church. His purpose in this is, on the one hand, to adduce historical evidence of his theory of the continuous progress of society, and, on the other, to obtain the authority of the American patriots, justly of great weight with all loyal Americans, for the progressive or social democracy to which he is wedded, — at least in theory, — and which he wishes to see established throughout the world, if need be by Red Republican revolutions, and all the blood, and carnage, and horrors of both civil and international war. These remarks will help the reader to understand the following extract from the commencement of the volume before us.

“ In the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and forty-eight, Montesquieu, wisest in his age of the reflecting statesmen of France, apprised the cultivated world, that a free, prosperous, and great people was forming in the forests of America, which England had sent forth her sons to inhabit. The hereditary dynasties of Europe, all unconscious of the rapid growth of the rising power which was soon to involve them in its new and prevailing influence, were negotiating treaties among themselves to bring their last war of personal ambition definitively to an end. The great maritime powers, weary of hopes of conquest and ignorant of coming reform, desired repose. To restore possessions as they had been, or were to have been, was accepted as the condition of peace; and guaranties were devised to keep them safe against vicissitude. But the eternal flow of existence never rests, bearing the human race onwards through continuous change. Principles grow into life by informing the public mind, and in their maturity gain mastery over events; following each other as they are bidden, and ruling without a pause. No sooner do the agitated waves begin to subside, than, amidst the formless tossing of the billows, a new messenger from the Infinite Spirit moves over the waters; and the ship of Destiny, freighted with the fortunes of mankind, yields to the gentle breath as it first whispers among the shrouds, even while the beholders still doubt if the breeze is springing, and whence it comes, and whither it will go.

“The hour of revolution was at hand, promising freedom to conscience and dominion to intelligence. History, escaping from the dictates of authority and the jars of insulated interests, enters upon new and unthought-of domains of culture and equality, the happier society where power springs freshly from ever-renewed consent; the life and activity of a connected world.

“For Europe, the crisis foreboded the struggles of generations. The strong bonds of faith and affection, which once united the separate classes of its civil hierarchy, had lost their vigor. In the impending chaos of states, the ancient forms of society, after convulsive agonies, were doomed to be broken in pieces; and the fragments to become distinct, and seemingly lifeless, like the dust; ready to be whirled in clouds by the tempest of public rage, with a force as deadly as that of the sand-storm in the Libyan desert. The voice of reform, as it passed over the desolation, would inspire animation afresh; but in the classes whose power was crushed, as well as in the oppressed who knew not that they were redeemed, it might also awaken wild desires, which the ruins of a former world could not satiate. In America, the influences of time were moulded by the creative force of reason, sentiment, and nature. Its political edifice rose in lovely proportions, as if to the melodies of the lyre. Peacefully and without crime, humanity was to make for itself a new existence.

“A few men of Anglo-Saxon descent, chiefly farmers, planters, and mechanics, with their wives and children, had crossed the Atlantic in search of freedom and fortune. They brought the civilization which the past had bequeathed to Great Britain; they were followed by the slave-ship and the African; their happiness invited emigrants from every lineage of Central and Western Europe; the mercantile system, to which they were subjected, prevailed in the councils of all metropolitan states, and extended its restrictions to every continent that allured to conquest, commerce, or colonization. The accomplishment of their independence would agitate the globe, would assert the freedom of the oceans as commercial highways, vindicate power in the commonwealth for the united judgment of its people, and assure to them the right to a self-directing vitality.

“The authors of the American Revolution avowed for their object the welfare of mankind, and believed that they were in the service of their own and of all future generations. Their faith was just; for the world of mankind does not exist in fragments, nor can a country have an insulated existence. All men are brothers; and all are bondsmen for one another. All nations, too, are brothers, and each is responsible for that federative humanity which puts the ban of exclusion on none. New principles of government could not assert themselves in one hemisphere without affecting the



other. The very idea of the progress of an individual people, in its relation to universal history, springs from the acknowledged unity of the race.

"From the dawn of social being, there has appeared a tendency towards commerce and intercourse between the scattered inhabitants of the earth. That mankind have ever earnestly desired this connection, appears from their willing homage to the adventurers and to every people, who have greatly enlarged the boundaries of the world, as known to civilization. The traditions of remotest antiquity celebrate the half-divine wanderer who raised pillars on the shores of the Atlantic; and record, as a visitant from the skies, the first traveller from Europe to the central rivers of Asia. It is the glory of Greece, that, when she had gathered on her islands and among her hills the scattered beams of human intelligence, her numerous colonies carried the accumulated light to the neighborhood of the ocean and to the shores of the Euxine. Her wisdom and her arms connected continents.

"When civilization intrenched herself within the beautiful promontory of Italy, and Rome led the van of European reform, the same movement continued, with still vaster results; for, though the military republic bounded the expansive spirit of independence by giving dominion to property, and extended her own influence by the sword, yet, heaping up conquests, adding island to continent, crushing nationalities, offering a shrine to strange gods, and citizenship to every vanquished people, she extended over a larger empire the benefits of fixed principles of law, and a cosmopolitan polytheism prevailed as the religion of the world.

"To have asserted clearly the unity of mankind was the distinctive glory of the Christian religion. No more were the nations to be severed by the worship of exclusive deities. The world was instructed that all men are of one blood; that for all there is but one divine nature and but one moral law; and the renovating faith taught the singleness of the race, of which it embodied the aspirations and guided the advancement.

"The tribes of Northern Europe, emerging freshly from the wild nurseries of nations, opened new regions to culture, commerce, and refinement. The beams of the majestic temple, which antiquity had reared to its many gods, were already falling in; the roving invaders, taking to their hearts the regenerating creed, became its intrepid messengers, and bore its symbols even to Iceland and Siberia.

"Still nearer were the relations of the connected world, when an enthusiast reformer, glowing with selfish ambition, and angry at the hollow forms of Eastern superstition, caught life in the deserts of Arabia, and founded a system, whose emissaries hurried lightly on the camel's back beyond pathless sands, and, never di-

verging far from the warmer zone, conducted armies from Mecca to the Ganges and the Ebro. How did the two systems animate all the continents of the Old World to combat for the sepulchre of Christ, till Europe, from Spain to Scandinavia, came into conflict and intercourse with the South and East, from Morocco to Hindostan !

"In due time appeared the mariner from Genoa. To Columbus God gave the keys that unlock the barriers of the ocean ; so that he filled Christendom with his glory. The voice of the world had whispered to him that the world is one ; and as he went forth towards the west, ploughing a wave which no European keel had entered, it was his high purpose not merely to open new paths to islands or to continents, but to bring together the ends of the earth, and join all nations in commerce and spiritual life.

"While the world of mankind is accomplishing its nearer connection, it is also advancing in the power of its intelligence. The possession of reason is the engagement for that progress of which history keeps the record. The faculties of each individual mind are limited in their development ; the reason of the whole strives for perfection, has been restlessly forming itself from the first moment of human existence, and has never met bounds to its capacity for improvement. The generations of men are not like the leaves on the trees, which fall and renew themselves without melioration or change ; individuals disappear like the foliage and the flowers ; the existence of our kind is continuous, and its ages are reciprocally dependent. Were it not so, there would be no great truths inspiring action, no laws regulating human achievements ; the movement of the living world would be as the ebb and flow of the ocean ; and the mind would no more be touched by the visible agency of Providence in human affairs. In the lower creation, instinct is always equal to itself ; the beaver builds his hut, the bee his cell, without an acquisition of thought, or an increase of skill. 'By a particular prerogative,' as Pascal has written, 'not only each man advances daily in the sciences, but all men unitedly make a never-ceasing progress in them, as the universe grows older ; so that the whole succession of human beings, during the course of so many ages, ought to be considered as one identical man, who subsists always, and who learns without end.'

"It is this idea of continuity which gives vitality to history. No period of time has a separate being ; no public opinion can escape the influence of previous intelligence. We are cheered by rays from former centuries, and live in the sunny reflection of all their light. What though thought is invisible, and, even when effective, seems as transient as the wind that raised the cloud ? It is yet free and indestructible ; can as little be bound in chains as the aspiring flame ; and, when once generated, takes eternity for its guar-

dian. We are the children and the heirs of the past, with which, as with the future, we are indissolubly linked together ; and he that truly has sympathy with every thing belonging to man will, with his toils for posterity, blend affection for the times that are gone by, and seek to live in the vast life of the ages. It is by thankfully recognizing those ages as a part of the great existence in which we share, that history wins power to move the soul. She comes to us with tidings of that which for us still lives, of that which has become the life of our life. She embalms and preserves for us the life-blood, not of master-spirits only, but of generations of the race.

“ And because the idea of improvement belongs to that of continuous being, history is, of all pursuits, the most cheering. It throws a halo of delight and hope even over the sorrows of humanity, and finds promises of joy among the ruins of empires and the graves of nations. It sees the footsteps of Providential Intelligence everywhere ; and hears the gentle tones of his voice in the hour of tranquillity ;

‘ Nor God alone in the still calm we find ;

He mounts the storm and walks upon the wind.’

Institutions may crumble and governments fall, but it is only that they may renew a better youth, and mount upwards like the eagle. The petals of the flower wither, that fruit may form. The desire of perfection, springing always from moral power, rules even the sword, and escapes unharmed from the field of carnage ; giving to battles all that they can have of lustre, and to warriors their only glory ; surviving martyrdoms, and safe amid the wreck of states. On the banks of the stream of time, not a monument has been raised to a hero or a nation, but tells the tale and renews the hope of improvement. Each people that has disappeared, every institution that has passed away, has been but a step in the ladder by which humanity ascends towards the perfecting of its nature.

“ And how has it always been advancing ; to the just judgments of the past, adding the discoveries of successive ages ! The generations that hand the torch of truth along the lines of time, themselves become dust and ashes ; but the light still increases its ever-burning flame, and is fed more and more plenteously with consecrated oil. How is progress manifest in religion, from the gross symbols of the East to the sublime philosophy of Greece, from the Fetichism of the savage to the Polytheism of Rome ; from the multiplied forms of ancient superstition and the lovely representations of deities in stone, to the clear conception of the unity of divine power, and the idea of the presence of God in the soul ! How has mind, in its inquisitive freedom, taught man to employ the elements as mechanics do their tools, and already, in part, at least, made him the master and possessor of nature ! How has knowl-

edge not only been increased, but diffused ! How has morality been constantly tending to subdue the supremacy of brute force, to refine passion, to enrich literature with the varied forms of pure thought and delicate feeling ! How has social life been improved, and every variety of toil in the field and in the workshop been ennobled by the willing industry of freemen ! How has humanity been growing conscious of its unity and watchful of its own development, till public opinion, bursting the bonds of nationality, knows itself to be the spirit of the world, in its movement on the tide of thought from generation to generation !

“ From the intelligence that had been slowly ripening in the mind of cultivated humanity sprung the American Revolution, which was designed to organize social union through the establishment of personal freedom, and thus emancipate the nations from all authority not flowing from themselves. In the old civilization of Europe, power moved from a superior to inferiors and subjects ; a priesthood transmitted a common faith, from which it would tolerate no dissent ; the government esteemed itself, by compact or by divine right, invested with sovereignty, dispensing protection and demanding allegiance. But a new principle, far mightier than the church and state of the Middle Ages, was forcing itself into power. Successions of increasing culture and heroes in the world of thought had conquered for mankind the idea of the freedom of the individual ; the creative but long latent energy that resides in the collective reason was next to be revealed. From this the state was to emerge, like the fabled spirit of beauty and love, out of the foam of the ever-troubled ocean. It was the office of America to substitute for hereditary privilege the natural equality of man ; for the irresponsible authority of a sovereign, a dependent government emanating from the concord of opinion ; and as she moved forward in her high career, the multitudes of every clime gazed towards her example with hopes of untold happiness, and all the nations of the earth sighed to be renewed.

“ The American Revolution, of which I write the history, essaying to unfold the principles which organized its events, and bound to keep faith with the ashes of its heroes, was most radical in its character, yet achieved with such benign tranquillity, that even conservatism hesitated to censure. A civil war armed men of the same ancestry against each other, yet for the advancement of the principles of everlasting peace and universal brotherhood. A new plebeian democracy took its place by the side of the proudest empires. Religion was disenthralled from civil institutions. Thought obtained for itself free utterance by speech and by the press. Industry was commissioned to follow the bent of its own genius. The system of commercial restrictions between states was reprobated and shattered ; and the oceans were enfranchised for every peace-

ful keel. International law was humanized and softened; and a new, milder, and more just maritime code was concerted and enforced. The trade in slaves was branded and restrained. The home of the language of Bacon and Milton, of Chatham and Washington, became so diffused, that in every zone, and almost in every longitude, childhood lisps the English as its mother tongue. The equality of all men was declared; personal freedom secured in its complete individuality; and common consent recognized as the only just origin of fundamental laws, so that the people in thirteen separate states, with ample territory for creating more, each formed its own political institutions. By the side of the principle of the freedom of the individual and the freedom of the separate states, the noblest work of human intellect was consummated in a federative union. And that union put away every motive to its destruction, by insuring to each successive generation the right to better its constitution, according to the increasing intelligence of the living people." — pp. 3–13.

A fastidious critic might say something of the style of this extract, which is a fair specimen of the author's style in general. He perhaps would object that it wants repose, sedateness, ease, flexibility, and dignity; that it is too picturesque, too florid, and too high-wrought for the gravity of history. But we have more important matters in hand than mere literary criticism. We should, indeed, prefer for ourselves a simpler and less ambitious, a more grave and a less ornate style; but this is a small matter, and, after all, every reader must be struck with the felicity of the author's diction, and his remarkable propriety and delicacy in the choice of single words. His fancy is exuberant, and he clothes his thoughts with a mass of luxuriant foliage, which serves as often to obscure as to adorn them, and which diverts the reader without instructing him. This is no doubt a grave fault, and one perhaps not wholly undesigned; for it is most obvious when the thoughts are of a character to be hinted rather than expressed, and such as it would be hazardous to set forth in their nakedness. Writers of Mr. Bancroft's school not unfrequently find it convenient to regard language as a contrivance for concealing rather than expressing thought. We do not defend this, but we let it pass.

The careful and intelligent reader cannot fail here to remark the admirable dexterity with which the author falsifies history without absolutely misstating facts, and the consummate skill with which he substitutes his theory or

his gloss for the historical fact itself. "The authors of the American Revolution avowed for their object the welfare of mankind, and believed that they were in the service of their own and of all future generations." Nothing more true in the sense of those authors themselves; nothing more false in the sense in which Mr. Bancroft wishes us to understand it. "Their faith was just; for the world of mankind does not exist in fragments, nor can a country have an insulated existence. *All men are brothers; and all are bondsmen for one another.*" Here is asserted the *solidarity* of the human race, as taught by that arch-socialist, Pierre Leroux. "All nations, too, are brothers, and each is *responsible* for that federative humanity which puts the ban of exclusion on none." Here is Mazzini's and Kossuth's doctrine of "the solidarity of peoples," the old Jacobinical doctrine of "the fraternity of nations," on which is founded the pretended right of revolutionists in all countries to conspire together, and to rush to the assistance of each other in any particular country where their aid may be necessary to overthrow the existing government. Is it true that the author, some years since, was one of the Illuminati, or Carbonari, and that he was engaged in a revolution in Naples, and there taken prisoner, and released only with difficulty? We have heard from a Neapolitan source such a report, though we cannot vouch for either its truth or its falsity. But to have been so engaged when a student at a German university would be less incredible than that, at the age of fifty and over, and after having represented his country at one of the first courts in Europe, he should gravely set forth in a History of the United States the principles which would fully justify such conduct. The adventure, if real, might be excused by charging it to the inconsiderateness and impetuosity of youth; the deliberate justification of similar conduct by asserting principles which not only authorize it, but in some sense make it a moral duty in every man, by a scholar and a statesman past middle age, is not easily excused on any ground.

"New principles of government could not assert themselves in one hemisphere without affecting the other." Very possibly, but with this we have nothing to do. Mr. Bancroft has here stealthily advanced to the point he was aiming at, namely, that the faith of the authors of the

American Revolution that they were laboring in the service of their own and all future generations was just, *because* they were laboring to introduce, and did introduce, new principles of government, which could not but react upon the eastern hemisphere. It is evident, from the general tenor of what follows, that he understands by these new principles the democratic, Jacobinical, or socialistic principles, which since the latter part of the last century have been struggling for the mastery in Europe. Thus he connects the American movement with the European revolutions which followed it, and makes the American patriots fellow-laborers with Mazzini, Kossuth, Ledru-Rollin, and the other chiefs of European Red-Republicanism. This the author suggests, and means that we shall all take to be historically true, and yet he nowhere says it in just so many words. He cloaks his historical unveracity, and puts what he means we shall receive as historical truth in the form of abstract propositions, which may or may not be true. This is what we mean by his falsifying history without any express misstatement of facts.

But, whether express or not, there is here a real falsification of history. The authors of the American Revolution neither avowed nor believed themselves the discoverers of new principles of government, and certain it is that they introduced no new principles into political science. They may have indulged now and then in a few rhetorical flourishes, always to be expected from ardent patriots, and to be understood with liberal allowance; but nothing is more certain than that they were moved by no thought of founding a new social and political order for the world. They made the revolution simply to recover their rights as British subjects, of which the mother country had deprived them, and to establish national independence for themselves. They never, as a body, whatever may have been the case with here and there an individual, entertained the views and intentions subsequently proclaimed by the French Jacobins and European Radicals; they never for one moment contemplated a revolution of society, or of the political order of the world. They were, for the most part, republicans, opposed to monarchy; but very few of them, if any, were democrats in Mr. Bancroft's sense of the word. They did not make the revolution because they wanted a republic even, far less because they wanted a de-

mocracy; they made it because they believed themselves oppressed,—because they despaired of justice from the British crown,—because they wanted national independence, and the liberty to manage their own affairs in their own way, without being dictated to or interfered with by another country three thousand miles off; and when by their firmness, their self-sacrifice, and heroic deeds they had achieved their independence, they wisely established the republican form of government, because no other form under the circumstances was practicable or desirable, and because the colonists had been from the first, and still were, republican in their tastes, convictions, manners, habits, and domestic institutions.

For the colonists to establish a republican government, was not to change their principles, to introduce a new order, but was simply to continue what they had always in reality been. But to establish a monarchy would have required a fundamental change in all their habits and interior as well as exterior forms of life, — a social as well as a political revolution, analogous to the one subsequently required to introduce a republican government into France. Such a revolution, we need not say, was foreign to all their purposes. They were patriots and statesmen, not revolutionists; republicans certainly, but not Jacobins. They no doubt believed that, in asserting and maintaining their independence, they were promoting the welfare of mankind, inasmuch as it is always for the welfare of mankind that right be maintained against wrong; and they no doubt also believed that they would be serving their own and all future generations of their countrymen, by establishing and transmitting national independence and popular institutions. All this is most certainly true; but they were wise, practical, and patriotic men, and never could have entertained the wild, visionary, and destructive radicalism the author so gratuitously ascribes to them. We boast our descent from them, not from those who in the hour of trial deserted their country, and we hold their memory too dear and venerable, to suffer them to be ranked with the modern revolutionists of Europe, those infuriated enemies of God and man, those firebrands of hell, without entering our stern and indignant protest.

These instances, taken almost at random, show clearly enough the spirit and untrustworthiness of Mr. Bancroft's



History, and a careful analysis of the passage we have extracted will sustain all the charges we have preferred against it. It would be difficult to find elsewhere in our language so much false doctrine and false history compressed within so small a space. "The hour of revolution was at hand, promising freedom to conscience and dominion to intelligence. History, escaping from the dictates of authority and the jars of insulated interests, enters upon new and unthought-of domains of culture and equality, the happier society where power springs freshly from ever-renewed consent; the life and activity of a connected world." (p. 4.) This is said of the opening of the first epoch of the American Revolution, in 1748, a little over one hundred years ago, and its sense evidently is, that then commenced, or was about to commence, a movement that was to secure freedom to conscience; substitute the dominion of intelligence for that of physical force; abolish all authority claiming a divine origin; effect the fraternity of nations; advance civilization; bring about equality; introduce and establish the purely democratic order, in which no power is recognized but such as springs from the assent of the governed, and from that assent only as ever freshly renewed. Thus much is here implied as historical truth; and yet nothing of all this will bear the test of a moment's investigation, and it would be difficult to find in the whole history of the last thousand years a period in which less of what is here intended was secured and enjoyed than the period dating from 1748.

"The hour of revolution was at hand." But, if Mr. Bancroft may be believed, the revolution that was about to break out was only a continuation of the English revolution of the seventeenth century, as that itself was only the continuation of the revolution in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries by the king and commons against feudalism and the Church. Nay, according to his own doctrine, laid down on the same page, revolution is ever going on, not only in society, but throughout the entire universe of God. "The eternal flow of existence never rests, bearing the human race onwards through continuous change. . . . . No sooner do the agitated waves begin to subside, than, amidst the formless tossing of the billows, a new messenger from the Infinite Spirit moves over the waters; and the ship of Destiny, freighted with the fortunes of mankind,

yields to the gentle breath as it first whispers among the shrouds, even while the beholders still doubt if the breeze is springing, and whence it comes, and whither it will go." This, if it means any thing, means that, whatever are the appearances, revolution never ceases, but goes on continuously. Why, then, say of 1748 especially, "The hour of revolution was at hand"? No doubt it was at hand, but on the author's doctrine revolution is the normal order of the universe, nay, of existence, of *eternal* existence, and therefore of God himself, who never rests, and in reality, then, no more at hand at one epoch than at another. But let this pass.

"Promising freedom to conscience." The author will not resort to the subterfuge of saying that the revolution that was about to burst forth merely promised, but did not secure, freedom to conscience, or at least secured it only in the United States. He is speaking generally, and means, if any thing, that the revolution was to introduce and establish freedom of conscience, in the Old World as well as in the New. The author does not look upon our revolution as an isolated fact; he couples it with the European revolutions which have followed it, and the revolution which he says was at hand is to be understood to mean, not the American alone, but the European also,—all the revolutions, in fact, which have been going on in the civilized world since 1748. Now will Mr. Bancroft assert as a matter of fact, that freedom of conscience had never been recognized and secured prior to that period, or that it has been recognized and secured since in any greater degree than before? Freedom of conscience means simply freedom to worship God according to the law which God himself has established, without any let or hindrance from the state or any human power whatever. But there is no period of equal duration since the time of the Pagan and Arian Emperors of Rome when this freedom of conscience was more insecure, or more frequently or more cruelly violated, especially in those European countries which were the chief seats of the revolution, than from 1748 to 1848. Never did Pagan Emperor of Rome wage a more cruel persecution against Christians, than that waged by the revolutionary party in France, and scarcely an Arian Emperor went farther in his edicts against the freedom of worship than did Joseph the Second, Emperor of Germany.

Indeed, the latter half of the eighteenth century was almost exclusively characterized by hostility to freedom of conscience and bitter and unrelenting persecution of Christians. It was the epoch of the triumph of infidelity, of Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, and the Convention. Joseph the Second suppressed religious houses, assumed wellnigh plenary authority in religious matters, and prohibited all communication of the bishops and clergy of his empire with the Holy See, save through the minister of state, and his infamous laws, in direct violation of the freedom of worship and freedom of conscience, remained in force till since the accession to the throne of the present pious and spirited young Emperor of Austria. In France the revolution abolished Christianity, prohibited by law its free exercise, beheaded the king because he proposed to restore the freedom of worship, stripped the Church of her goods, desecrated her temples, overthrew her altars, massacred her priests and religious in thousands, and even sent its armies to drag the venerable Chief of Christendom from his throne, and exiled him to Valence, where he died a martyr to the freedom of conscience. Talk of freedom of conscience! Where in all Europe was there freedom of conscience under your boasted revolution,—a revolution whose primary object, as you well know, was the suppression of religious freedom, and the establishment of the reign of philosophism, that is, infidelity and atheism, which the world justly calls the Reign of Terror?

Do not say the rights of conscience were secured, because none but Catholics were persecuted, and because heresy and infidelity were freer, or because men had gained the power to deny and blaspheme religion, to enslave the Church, and to drown, behead, or exile her priests and devout adherents. Freedom to deny and blaspheme God and his worship is not in any sense freedom of conscience, for conscience never yet required any man to deny or blaspheme his Maker or his worship. There is no conscience where God is denied, for conscience is nothing but a man's own judgment of what the law of God commands or forbids him to do, accompanied by a sense of his moral accountability to God for whatever he does or omits to do. The freedom the revolutionary party may have acquired to vent their denials and blasphemies, and to oppress and persecute Catholics for their fidelity to their Church, no intel-

lectual alchemy can transmute into freedom of conscience ; and, to say the very least, the prohibition of Catholic worship and the persecution of Catholics are as much a violation of the rights of conscience as is the prohibition of any other form of religion, or persecution of its adherents. We are well aware that unbelievers and misbelievers of all sorts and degrees are very apt to forget that Catholics have rights of conscience, and that to prohibit their worship, confiscate their goods, deprive them of all civil franchises, fine, imprison, exile, massacre, or hang and quarter them for professing and practising their religion, is persecution, or any thing incompatible with religious liberty ; but in this they are mistaken. We have at the least equal rights, and if freedom of conscience can be violated at all, it certainly can be violated in the persons of Catholics, and is violated whenever the freedom of their religion in any degree is denied, or in any manner interfered with, either by the state or the mob. So long as the free exercise of the Catholic religion meets with any obstacles, or finds any let or hindrance in any country, however free may be the sects and unbelievers, freedom of conscience is not secured, and the liberty of religion is not recognized and maintained.

Everywhere, it is well known, the revolution of which Mr. Bancroft speaks has been directed against the Catholic religion, and is so directed even to-day. All the changes it has sought or introduced have had, and still have, for their primary object the destruction of the Catholic Church. The education of youth is a religious function, the right and the duty of the clergy, and yet everywhere, and in most countries with complete success, during the last hundred years, it has been wrested from religion, and placed under the supreme control of the state. The state may, undoubtedly, provide the funds for the maintenance of schools, and, with some limitations, regulate their prudential affairs ; but when it undertakes to educate, to determine what the education shall be, and to appoint or dismiss teachers, it usurps the rights of parents and of religion, and thus directly infringes the rights of conscience. This sort of violation of the rights of conscience is practised to no inconsiderable extent, and, in the persevering attempt of our modern philanthropists to obtain laws making it compulsory on our people who are unable to edu-

cate their children in private schools to send their children to the state schools, threatens to be practised to a much greater extent, even in our own country. There is no Protestant, and scarcely a professedly Catholic country, on the face of the globe, where the Catholic religion is perfectly free. In Great Britain and Ireland, some years since, a Catholic Relief Bill was passed, removing some of the disabilities Catholics labored under; but it fell far short of securing to Catholics complete religious liberty. It repealed the chief penalties the laws had previously imposed on the persons, but not the penalties it had imposed on the property, of Catholics. But even the partial freedom secured by this bill has been restricted, and no longer ago than last year a law was enacted, which, if it means any thing, declares the practice of the Catholic religion illegal in the United Kingdom, and renders null in the civil courts every Catholic marriage. Even while we are writing, the Queen has issued a proclamation denying in the plainest terms the freedom of the Catholic religion. In Prussia, but a few years since, we saw the venerable Archbishops of Posen and Cologne imprisoned by order of the government, for no other offence than that of fidelity to their consciences as Catholics; in Denmark and Sweden it is a heinous crime, punishable with confiscation of goods and banishment from the kingdom, to abandon the state religion and to become reconciled to the Catholic Church; in Holland, where nearly one half of the population are Catholics, Catholicity has no legal rights, but is merely connived at, not even legally tolerated. Our present Holy Father was driven by the revolutionists into exile, and the saintly prelates of the sees of Geneva and Lausanne, Turin, and Cagliari have been banished by the same party, and are even now languishing in foreign lands, forbidden to return and exercise their spiritual functions in the midst of their flocks. The revolution, as in the last century, so in this, is notoriously directed against the rights of conscience, as is evident from the expulsion of the Jesuits and other religious orders from Switzerland on the triumph of the Radical party, and of the Redemptorists from Vienna on the success of the Red Republicans in 1848. Idle, then, is it to speak of the revolution that was at hand in 1748 as promising freedom to conscience, and Mr. Bancroft only perverts history when he speaks of it as having secured the rights of

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conscience as one of its results. He would have been far nearer the truth, if he had said, "The hour of revolution was at hand, promising to infidelity freedom to trample on the sacred rights of conscience"; and this he would have said, if he had not meant, by freedom of conscience, freedom *from* conscience, or the freedom, not of religion, but of irreligion.

"Promising dominion to intelligence." The revolution, the author must mean, was to be in favor of intelligence, and has substituted for the governing power in society intellectual or moral power as distinguished from mere physical force. Yet he has studied the history of the last hundred years to little purpose, if he does not know the fact is precisely the reverse of what he insinuates. We know no period since Europe began to recover from the shock received from the irruption of the Northern Barbarians, in which society was less under the control of intelligence, or more under that of physical force, combined with ignorance and brutality, than during the period from 1748 to 1848. The French Revolution subjected society to the Reign of Terror, which is that of physical force, and every government on the continent of Europe maintains, and is forced to maintain, itself at this moment only by means of its immense standing armies, kept up on a war footing even in time of peace. Let the European states disband their armies and trust society to the power of intelligence and to the moral force of law, and social order would not be preserved for a single week. Society itself, in by far the greater part of the civilized world, is sustained now only by sheer physical force, by the bayonet or sabre. And what farther from the truth than to pretend that the revolution has given dominion to intelligence? Bankers, stockbrokers, and generals are now the only governors and conservators of society, and these the author will hardly contend represent moral and intellectual power as distinguished from physical force.

"History, escaping from the dictates of authority and the jars of insulated interests, enters upon new and unthought-of domains of culture." By *history* the author here means the subject of which history treats, that is, the human race, or the several nations of mankind. More specially, perhaps, he means the general tendency and policy of modern nations. That the tendency of modern nations has

been to reject the maxims of ancient wisdom, to reject the authority of law, and to rush into unbounded license, we are not disposed to deny. This is necessarily the case with a revolutionary epoch. "And the jars of insulated interests." If there are any fewer jars of insulated interests than for a brief period prior to 1748, it is not owing to any advance in fraternal affection, but to the universal prevalence of the credit system, which enslaves each particular nation to the money power of all, which is stronger than each individually and than all put together. The wars growing out of the revolution involved all European nations in debt; and the necessity of keeping up large standing armies for the maintenance of social order, peace within and peace without, induces an annual expense beyond the public revenues, which tends to increase annually the national indebtedness and administrative dependence on bankers and brokers. This itself is a far greater evil, and more fatal to the morals and real welfare of modern nations, than any state of isolation and of independent interests known to modern history.

"Enters upon new and unthought-of domains of culture and equality." We are not quite certain what this means, but we suppose it means that the effect of the revolution has been to throw off the authority of the old monarchical and hierarchical governments, to give a new impulse to intellectual progress, and to introduce an equality of political rights and social conditions hitherto unthought of. This may have been the result aimed at by the revolution, it may be what revolutionists have promised, but we need not tell Mr. Bancroft that it is not the result obtained. It is hardly allowable to treat the fantastic dreams and wild and visionary projects of reformers and radicals, or even their seductive promises, as historical facts. The old authorities are all yet standing, or supplied by others equally offensive to the revolutionists; and intellect, as the physical frame, has rather deteriorated than otherwise during the last hundred years. Superficial instruction may be more diffused than it was in 1748, and a larger proportion of the people may be able to read, but it is ridiculous to pretend that the intellectual culture of the eighteenth or nineteenth century can begin to compare even with that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The century dating from 1748 is probably the most superficial age of which

we retain any record. Equality of political rights or franchises has been sought, but has made little or no progress. We have gained national independence, but under the head of equal rights we have gained nothing. France has had her sixty years of revolution and her nearly thirty years of war, and has fewer guaranties for equal rights than under Louis Quatorze. Absolute power has increased in Russia, Austria, and in the larger German states, and the freedom of the subject has received a severe blow in the destruction of the *fueros* in Spain, and in the British empire through the Reform Bill and the abolition of the forty-shillings-freehold suffrage. As to equality of conditions, we have less than we had in 1748, and the disparity of conditions, we say not of ranks, has increased in Great Britain. Her proletarian population in 1748 was about one third of her whole population; it is now five sevenths. In France there may have been an increased equality of conditions, mainly, however, by the general impoverishment of the kingdom, impoverishing the wealthy without enriching the poor, and even there the equality is not greater than was ever before *thought of*, nor so great as among our North American savages.

"Enters upon the happier society where power springs freshly from ever-renewed consent." That is, the revolution has destroyed all government but such government as springs freshly from the ever-renewed consent of the governed, and has and claims no foundation in historical right. This Mr. Bancroft and his friends may have dreamed of, but history has as yet entered upon no such "happier society," for no such society exists on the face of the globe,—not even in this country; for even here the government plants itself on historical right, no less than in Austria or Russia, and the people, as distinguished from the government, have not one particle of political power but as prescribed by law, which it is treason to conspire permanently to resist. Democracy of the most pure, and therefore the most anarchical sort, may be aimed at by revolutionists and political dreamers, but it has as yet no foothold on the earth, and it does not answer to treat their dreams as realities.

We have no space to continue our analysis, but we have said enough to show that the author asserts as historical fact, not what really is so, but simply what his theory re-



quires should be. Yet it is unpardonable in a man like Mr. Bancroft to allow himself to make such loose and incorrect statements, — statements so obviously unfounded, that, with a slight degree of reflection, the most ordinary reader need not fail to detect their falsity. As to the doctrine which underlies these statements, we have at present little to say. We can pardon boys, and even rhetoricians, for admiring a state of society in which there is no authority founded in historical right, and no power but the unrestrained will of the multitude, but we cannot pardon so great simplicity in a grave historian or a practical statesman.

“To have asserted clearly the unity of mankind,” says the author, “was the distinctive glory of the Christian religion.” If this means that no religion but the Christian has ever clearly asserted the unity of the human race, it is true, if we consider that all other religions derive whatever of truth they may have from the Christian; but if it be intended to insinuate, as we suspect, that it is the chief and distinguishing glory of the Christian religion that it has asserted this unity, it proves that the author's conceptions of Christianity are very low, and that he aims to disparage while seeming to praise it. Certainly the Christian finds something more in his religion than its assertion of the unity of the human race, true and important as that assertion undeniably is. But let us proceed. “The world was instructed that all men are of one blood.” Good, very good; we are glad to find that Mr. Bancroft does not fall into the impious absurdity of denying, with Agassiz and other infidel pretenders to science, the unity of the human race. “That for all there is but one divine nature, and but one moral law.” “But one *divine* nature.” What does that mean? That for all there is but one God to be adored? No; for that has already been insinuated in the sentence, “No more were the nations to be severed by the worship of exclusive deities.” What then does it mean? That all men have but one and the same nature, and that this one nature is *divine*? We had supposed that the nature of man was *human* nature, not divine nature. But here breaks out the author's pantheism, the divinity of humanity, the identity of the human and divine, on which he bases his democracy. He here teaches us that Christianity instructed the world that human nature is divine, that man is God. But this

is a mistake. It was not Christianity that taught this; it was Satan, when, in the form of a serpent, he said to our first parents, "Ye shall be as gods."

"The renovating faith [Christianity] taught the singleness of the race, of which it embodied the aspirations and guided the advancement." So the office of Christianity is not to reveal the will of God, to make redemption for sin, to give spiritual life to men and elevate them to God and celestial beatitude as their ultimate end, but to embody the aspirations and to guide the advancement of the race! The Christian religion is the expression of human nature, and the Christian teacher does only ascertain and embody in a creed what springs up spontaneously in man, and guide, not the soul in its efforts after salvation, but the race, the species, in its advancement in civilization, — "culture, commerce, and refinement"! What more in fact could be asked of him, since human nature is *divine* nature? Whence but from the human race should the Christian teacher receive his inspirations, or what better could he do than to embody the aspirations of a *divine* nature, supposing that aspirations can be predicated of a divine nature, that is, of God, which indeed some may imagine to be absurd and blasphemous. This is enough to show us what we ought to think of the author's Christianity and the compliments which he affects now and then to pay it.

Christianity taught the unity of the race; the Northern Barbarians were called in to reduce the doctrine to practice. "The roving invaders [of the Roman empire], taking to their hearts the regenerating creed, became its intrepid messengers, and bore its symbols even to Iceland and Siberia." This was something, and did somewhat towards bringing nations together in a common bond of brotherhood. But "*still nearer were the relations* of the connected world, when an enthusiast reformer, glowing with selfish ambition, and angry at the hollow forms of Eastern superstition, caught life in the deserts of Arabia, and founded a system, whose emissaries hurried lightly on the camel's back beyond pathless sands, and, never diverging far from the warmer zone, conducted armies from Mecca to the Ganges and the Ebro." Does the author mean by this, that, although the Christian religion claims the glory of having first clearly taught the unity of the race, yet the higher glory of reducing it to practice is due to

Mahomet and his followers? Would he have us regard Islamism as a development of Christianity,—a step forward in the progress of the species,—and teach us that it is more glorious to be a Turk than a Christian? If not, we are unable to perceive the appositeness of his reference to the Arabian impostor in this connection.

But enough. It is evident from what we have said, that Mr. Bancroft writes to be read and believed, not to be criticized. He does not appear to have foreseen the troublesome questions that might be asked him, and probably flattered himself that his readers would swallow down his speculations without inquiring into their wholesomeness or unwholesomeness. Yet we do not wish to single him out as the grossest offender among contemporary authors. His writings are offensive, deeply offensive, to the sincere and intelligent Christian, but he offends only in common with the whole modern humanist or humanitarian school. The worship of humanity has taken, in the uncatholic world, the place of the worship of God, and become the dominant idolatry or superstition of the age. It is to be feared that this superstition is soon to lapse into demon-worship, if indeed in Mesmerism and spiritual knockings it has not already so lapsed. Men cannot abandon the worship of God for that of humanity, without sooner or later falling below humanity into the worship of the Devil. The author repeats and insists on those absurd doctrines, the progress of the species and the divinity of humanity, so prevalent a few years ago, but which have now become only a disgusting cant, avoided by every man, we had supposed, of good taste, and a tolerable stomach. We are sorry to find Mr. Bancroft—a man of real ability and much solid learning—so far behind the times, if we may so speak, as to insist on theories which the revolutions of 1848 have for ever stamped with imbecility and disgrace, and which can henceforth be tolerated only in unfledged radicals and beardless Fourth-of-July orators. We are sorry to see him repeating the cant of modern sciolists and misnamed liberalists as solid truth and unquestioned fact, when, if he would but open his eyes and use the judgment Almighty God has given him, he could not fail to detect its unreality and ridiculousness. We hope he will revise the volumes he has already published, purge them of his humanitarian errors and superstition, and henceforth con-

fine himself to the legitimate province of a Christian historian. Let him do so, and he will find his account in it, both for his conscience and his fame.

Some of our Catholic friends, finding Mr. Bancroft apparently praising the early Jesuit missionaries among the Indians, and extolling Lord Baltimore, the founder of the Colony of Maryland, have been disposed to think favorably of his History, and to suppose it a work they might conscientiously patronize. They can never have taken the pains to ascertain its real character, and have had no suspicion of the poison with which it is surcharged. It is true, the author gives a glowing picture of the labors, privations, sacrifices, and martyrdom of the early Jesuit missionaries among the Indians; but he has no sympathy with their cause, and praises them with a sort of sneer on his lips. He beholds them only from the human point of view, and represents their heroic virtues as mere human virtues. He despises their religion, and looks with pity or contempt on the motives of their conduct. He praises their zeal, their devotedness, their self-denial, if you will, but not as springing from divine grace and directed to the greater glory of God in the salvation of souls. His praise, moreover, is worth nothing, for he praises the Jesuits as simple men, not as Catholics and Catholic priests, and with equal warmth the Quakers of Pennsylvania, the Puritans of New England, and the Huguenots of Carolina. What does the Jesuit care for the praise that is awarded to him simply as a man? He does not live for himself; he makes no account of himself, and can only feel insulted or grieved by any commendation he may receive at the expense of his religion. He seeks and can accept no honor distinguishable from the honor of the Church, his holy Mother, or that is his except for the reason that he is her dutiful and affectionate son.

Mr. Bancroft, we grant, awards Lord Baltimore the high honor of being "the first in the history of the Christian world to adopt religious liberty as the basis of the state, and to seek religious security and peace by the practice of justice" (Vol. I. p. 262); but this at best is honoring a Catholic at the expense of Catholicity. We have no disposition to pluck a single leaf from the laurel that binds the brows of Lord Baltimore, or to detract in the least from the many merits of the noble and peaceful Catholic Colony of

Maryland; but we cannot award to either the credit of being the first to recognize and adopt religious liberty as the basis of the state, or to seek the security and peace of religion by the practice of justice. We can be flattered or seduced into no admission which would require us either to deny religious liberty or to renounce — which is impossible — our faith as a Catholic. We are far from being prepared to concede that among the holy popes, the saintly prelates and enlightened and pious Catholic princes, magistrates, and statesmen, from St. Sylvester and Constantine down to the first Lord Baltimore and the Colony of Maryland, there was not one to adopt and establish religious liberty, not one who sought the security and peace of religion save in the practice of injustice, or the unjustifiable exercise of power. Religious liberty, we are disposed to believe, was born somewhat prior to the year of grace 1632, and it was not reserved for George Calvert, the first Lord Baltimore, nor for any man who lived at his late day, to discover and adopt the just and proper method of dealing with heresy and unbelief. Religious liberty means, if it means any thing, as we have already said or implied, the absolute freedom of religion from all human authority, or the full and unrestricted right of every man, without let or hindrance from the state or any human power whatever, to worship God in the way and manner God himself ordains. In this sense, religious liberty is an inalienable natural right, — a right held immediately from God himself, anterior and superior to the state, which the state does not grant or confer, and which it is bound to recognize, respect, guaranty, and, when need is, vindicate with all its power, moral and physical. This right, or religious liberty in this sense, its true and only true sense, the Church and all good Catholics have asserted, with even supernatural energy and constancy, from the first. The blessed Apostles asserted it against the magistrates who forbade them to teach in the name of Jesus of Nazareth, in that noble answer, "We must obey God rather than men"; the whole army of Christian martyrs asserted it, in choosing to be cast to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre, to be torn in pieces, to die under the most lingering and excruciating tortures, rather than to offer one grain of incense to Caesar; St. Ambrose of Milan asserted it, when he refused to give up, at the command of the Empress, the tem-

ple of the Lord to be desecrated by the Arian heretic, and when he forbade the Emperor Theodosius to enter the church till he had done public penance for his wrath and injustice to his subjects; St. Gregory the Seventh asserted it, when he smote with the sword of Peter and Paul the infamous and brutal Henry, king, not emperor, of the Germans, for his violation of his oaths, his oppression of his subjects, and his wars upon religion; St. Pius the Fifth asserted it, when he excommunicated and deposed the haughty Elizabeth of England for her apostasy, her murder of Mary, Queen of Scots, and her cruel persecution of Catholics; and Pius the Seventh reasserted it, when he fulminated his anathema against Napoleon for his tyranny, hurled him from his throne, and sent him to die a prisoner on the barren rock of St. Helena. The Church in all her struggles with the temporal powers, whether in mediæval or more recent times, whether in the East or the West, in Germany or England, France or Spain, Venice or Genoa, Lombardy or Naples, has asserted it, and had nothing else in view but its successful vindication. Indeed, from her going forth from that upper room in Jerusalem, to the escape of the noble Pius the Ninth from the assassins of Rome to Gaëta, she has been the continual object of the unrelenting hostility of all who would lord it over conscience, enslave religion, and give loose reins to lawless passion or arbitrary will, solely because she has never ceased for one moment to be the champion of religious liberty, and at all times, in all places, against all classes of enemies, and with all her power, to struggle to maintain the freedom of conscience, the perfect freedom of every man to believe and practise religion, to worship God as God himself prescribes. Talk not to us of Lord Baltimore and the Maryland Colony; they come fifteen hundred years too late for your purpose. It is a foul libel on the Church to pretend that either was the first to adopt religious liberty, or to "seek the security and peace of religion by the practice of justice." The Church had nothing to learn from either, whether as to doctrine or as to practice. She does not acquire wisdom and sanctity with the progress of the ages; she was born perfect in both.

No doubt, Mr. Bancroft understands by religious liberty, not the liberty of religion, freedom to believe what religion teaches and to practise what she commands, but the lib-

erty of heresy and unbelief, the liberty to deny and blaspheme religion. But if he does, that is no reason why we should. The age in which we live no doubt agrees with him, but we are not obliged to err because the age errs. We do not consult the age in which we live in order to learn what is or is not truth. The freedom of religion is one thing, the freedom of heresy and unbelief is another, and we cannot fall into the gross folly of confounding the one with the other, because an heretical and unbelieving age, or an heretical or unbelieving historian, does. The two liberties are essentially distinct, and rest on very different grounds, and should never be confounded one with the other, or called by one and the same name. It is their confusion that creates the mischief, and gives to heretics the effrontery to call themselves the friends of religious liberty, and to pretend that the Church is a spiritual despotism. Religious liberty is the natural and inherent right of every man, for both by the natural and divine laws man has the right to render unto God what God requires of him,—the right to do his duty; but the liberty of heresy and unbelief is not a *natural* right, for by the law of nature, as well as the divine law, every man is bound to be of the true religion, and has no right to be of any other. All the rights the sects have or can have are derived from the state, and rest on expediency. As they have, in their character of sects hostile to true religion, no rights under the law of nature or the law of God, they are neither wronged nor deprived of liberty if the state refuses to grant them any rights at all; for wrong is done, liberty is taken away by the state, only when it violates rights which are held under the law of nature or the law of God, independent of the state, and which it is instituted not to concede, but to protect. The protection of the sects in the practice of their heresies is never on their side a question of right, or of what they may claim as a right, but is always a question of simple expediency; and so it must be, till you can obliterate all distinction between right and wrong, and establish the indifference of truth and error. Heresy and unbelief, if really heresy and unbelief, are contrary to the law of God, and therefore have and can have no rights of their own, and then none that the state is, for their sake, bound to concede or to protect.

Lord Baltimore, it is true, opened his colony to the sev-

eral Protestant sects, and placed them on an equal footing before the state with the Church of God. For this, *under the point of view of religious liberty*, we neither blame nor praise him, because his liberality to the sects has no bearing on the question of religious freedom, or the freedom of religion, one way or another. There was nothing in his religion to forbid, or in religious liberty to require, him to do as he did. He may have done so because he believed he could by so doing best subserve the interests of religion, or he may have done so because, under the circumstances, he could not obtain liberty for his own Church except on condition of placing the sects on an equal footing with her before the law. In either case his measure was justifiable, religious, and statesmanlike. But whatever were his motives, his policy has, as touching the question of religious liberty, not the slightest interest for us. We yield to no man in our devotion to religious liberty, but we have yet to learn that, in order to defend the liberty of religion, we must defend the equal liberty of heresy and unbelief, and maintain that the state is bound in all cases to place error and blasphemy on an equal footing with truth and piety.

A Protestant state, or a state like our own, professing no religion, is unquestionably bound to place all the forms of religion professed by its subjects, not directly opposed to the existence of society itself, on a footing of perfect equality before the law; not indeed because in themselves considered they are all equally respectable, or entitled to equal legal protection, but because, having no infallible authority by which to distinguish the true from the false, it is incompetent to discriminate between them, and is liable, under pretext of suppressing false religion, to suppress the true, and thus make itself guilty of the horrid crime of persecution. That a Protestant state, and *a fortiori* a state that professes no religion, has no infallible authority by which to distinguish the true religion from its counterfeits, is evident, for all the sects confess with one voice that they are fallible, and have no infallible means of determining which is the true religion. Since, then, the state is bound to maintain the absolute freedom of religion, that is, the absolute freedom of the true religion, a Protestant state, or a state that professes no religion, has no other alternative than either to run the hazard of being a persecutor, or to copy the example of Lord Baltimore, which



is to protect all its subjects in their respective forms of religion, whether they be true or false. No such state has ever in fact taken the latter alternative; none ever will do so. They have all persecuted, and to a greater or less extent will continue to persecute, the true religion. They all have an instinctive hatred of it, for it always asserts the supremacy of the spiritual order; and if our lot is cast in any one of them, we must expect to be persecuted, and make up our minds to bear persecution with patience and resignation, or rather with joy that we are counted worthy to suffer for the name of our Lord, knowing that, if we suffer with him, we shall reign with him.

As it regards the Catholic state, or a state professing the Catholic religion, we have not much to say, and little occasion to say any thing, for the question has here no practical bearing. Such a state may, no doubt, for sufficient reasons, afford equal civil protection to the sects; but it is not bound *to them* to do so, and in no case is bound to do so for the same reason that Protestant states and states professing no religion are, because it has an infallible criterion to appeal to, by which the true religion can be distinguished from the false. It can be bound to do so only for the sake of the true religion itself. It may be that the interests of true religion are better promoted by leaving open than by closing the field to its adversary; and undoubtedly, when so, the state, out of regard to religion, is bound to place the sects on a footing of equality with the Church before the law. Whether such is always the case, or not, it is not our province to decide, and we shall not attempt to decide. But be this as it may, the duty of the Catholic state is always to respect and maintain the perfect independence and freedom of the Church, and with regard to the sects to follow her direction, which, since she is God's Church, infallibly protected and assisted by the Holy Ghost, is sure to be always wise, just, and charitable.

We insist on this distinction between the freedom of religion and the freedom of heresy and unbelief, because it exists in nature, and is highly important. It is by confounding the two, and advocating the latter under the sacred name of the former, that the bitterest enemies of religious liberty, European Red Republicans and English Protestants, pass themselves off on a credulous age as the friends of religious liberty, and impudently pretend that

all who are not prepared to condemn all Catholic antiquity are in favor of persecution and spiritual despotism. It is only the liberty of heresy and unbelief which Mr. Bancroft defends under the name of religious liberty, and it is with the hope, no doubt, of promoting the cause of heresy and unbelief that he praises Lord Baltimore and the Colony of Maryland. He would persuade us to condemn our Catholic ancestors, and seduce us from our allegiance to our Church. We trust no Catholics will suffer themselves to be caught by his insidious flattery.

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ART. II. — *Essays and Reviews, chiefly on Theology, Politics, and Socialism.* BY O. A. BROWNSON, LL. D. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1852. 12mo. pp. 521.

It is not our custom to reply to the remarks of the newspaper press, secular or sectarian, on the doctrines we set forth, or the reasonings by which we sustain them; for they are seldom worthy of much notice, and we have rarely the time or the space to do it. Yet we are disposed to depart from our general rule in favor of *The Christian Register*, a weekly paper, published in this city, as one of the organs of the Unitarians; for it is an old friend, and in a notice, in its issue of the 3d of last July, of our *Essays and Reviews* recently collected and published, it has spoken of us personally in terms not wholly uncivil, and has really made a serious attempt to offer some logical reasons against us. It is so seldom that we meet any thing, either in the secular press, or in the papers especially devoted to some one of the Protestant sects or to the defence of Protestantism in general, that is tolerable, on the score either of civility or of logic, that we cannot but feel that this effort at both on the part of *The Christian Register* deserves to be frankly acknowledged and generously encouraged.

The *Register* begins by awarding us high praise as a writer, philosopher, and logician. Speaking of our *Essays and Reviews* it says: "They are written with great

logical acuteness, with remarkable simplicity, precision, earnestness, and power." "In his own field," it continues, "and with his own weapons, there are no abler writers among us than Mr. Brownson. As an adroit dialectician he has no equal. He has analyzed and thoroughly possessed himself of more systems of philosophy than other reputed scholars have even looked at. He has been no superficial student among the greatest masters of thought, and his mind is hardly inferior to the ablest of them in subtilty, in force of argumentation, and in extreme ingenuity." This is high praise, and although it says nothing of breadth or comprehensiveness of intellect, it still gives us a high and honorable rank with "the greatest masters of thought." "Yet," adds the *Register*, "we know of few able men whose writings do so little to carry us with them. There is such a show of dialectic skill, that, when we see no fallacy and have no disposition to dissent from his conclusions, we are not convinced. . . . The wonderful dexterity with which Mr. Brownson proves every thing, makes us sometimes doubt whether he has really proved any thing. Instead of placing us where he professes to stand, on a basis of undoubting faith, he for the time creates in us a distrust of all logical deductions." That is, Mr. Brownson is, after all, no solid reasoner, — is but a shallow sophist, whose logic is mere show, dexterity, or sleight of hand. How will the *Register* reconcile this with what it has just conceded us? This implies any thing but real logical ability, and is deserving of any thing but respect. It implies that we are a mere logical juggler or trickster, and by no means that we are an able man, who "in force of argumentation" is hardly inferior to "the ablest" of "the greatest masters of thought." It may serve the purposes of those against whom we direct our arguments to represent us as a mere dialectic juggler, and as able to cheat people out of their senses and make "the worse appear the better reason," but it can hardly be done consistently after having awarded us the praise of "simplicity, precision, earnestness, and power," of having "analyzed and *thoroughly possessed*" ourselves "of more systems of philosophy than other reputed scholars have even looked at," and of being "hardly *inferior* to the greatest masters of thought in *force of argumentation*," as well as in subtilty and ingenuity. The two characters are incompatible one with the

other, and our friends outside must make their election between them. Which of them they ought to elect, or whether either of them is our true character, it is not for us to say.

The *Register* complains that our reasoning, instead of convincing it, creates in its mind for the time "a distrust of all logical deductions"; that is, we suppose, a distrust of reason itself. This tends to confirm what we have so often asserted, and for which we have been blamed by some of our Catholic friends; namely, that Protestants, sooner than admit the conclusiveness of our arguments for the Church, will distrust or deny reason itself. We are rather agreeably surprised to find the *Register* virtually conceding it. It cannot accept the Church, or abandon its inveterate prejudices against her; consequently, when it finds in our writings arguments for her which it is unable to convict of any fallacy, it is led, not to conclude that its prejudices are unwarranted and that she may after all be God's Church, but to distrust all logical deductions, that is, reason itself. Let the writer in the *Register* analyze his own mind, and weigh well the statement he makes, and he will hardly fail to perceive that he has really conceded that it is easier for him to deny reason than to embrace Catholicity.

The *Register* apparently would insinuate that our reasoning cannot be solid because it does not convince its mind, and place it on a basis of undoubting faith, where we ourselves profess to stand. We are only a dialectic necromancer, because our arguments do not generate in its mind full and unwavering conviction. But it should bear in mind, that to such convictions something more than argument, or the exhibition of solid reasons to the understanding, is necessary. In faith there is assent of the will as well as of the intellect, and, whatever the reasons presented to the understanding, faith never results if the will resists; for

"A man convinced against his will  
Is of the same opinion still."

It is not the office of logic to produce faith, but simply to remove the intellectual obstacles to it; not to motive assent, but to demonstrate that there is no solid reason for withholding it, and that it ought to be yielded. There it stops even in human faith, much more in divine faith, or faith in the Christian sense of the term. We never rely

on logic to produce this faith, or to make misbelievers or unbelievers true believers. If nothing but logic were needed, the whole world had long since been thoroughly Catholic, and no infidel or heretic had remained to be converted. Man is not pure intellect; he has will, affections, passions, appetites, and, through these, dispositions and prejudices which can resist the most solid reasons addressed to the understanding, and which are overcome only by the grace of God. Logic has its place and its use, both of which are no doubt highly important, but it is never of itself alone sufficient to produce conviction. The most it can do, and all that it is expected to do, is to remove the intellectual objections that may be urged against believing, and to prove that one ought to believe and is in an abnormal state if he does not. The undoubting faith in Catholicity we profess is not illogical, is not opposed to reason, and has all the conditions reason can demand; but it is the effect of no reasoning, of no discursive process whatever. It is the free gift of God, the product of Divine grace, obtained for us through the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. If the writer in the *Register* had been well aware of this, he would have seen that he was himself very illogical, when he concluded that our arguments must be unsound, because they failed to convert him. Faith is a virtue, and inelicitable without the voluntary act of the believer, and consequently it was absurd for the writer to expect our arguments to make him an actual believer, while he remained himself purely passive, or totally inactive in relation to faith.

It appears to be an impression entertained by our non-Catholic community, that the primary object of our Review is to convert heretics and unbelievers, and that we rely solely on our logic as the instrument of their conversion. We of course desire the conversion of heretics and unbelievers,—to see all our Protestant and unbelieving countrymen good practical Catholics; but that is not the special end we have proposed to ourselves in our humble labors. Our Review is intended for Catholics, not for Protestants or infidels, and its more immediate object is the edification of our own Catholic community. We seek to be useful to Catholics, and in our discussions we consult what in our judgment will best serve their interests here and now. It is, for the most part, only indirectly and

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remotely that we seek the conversion of those without. Our first duties are to our own brethren, and our first affections are theirs, and we seek to correct such false notions of literature, philosophy, politics, and society, as, owing to their exposed condition in an unbelieving and heretical age and country, may occasionally creep in among them, — to urge and encourage them to aim at what we may call a high-toned Catholicity, at a firm and bold profession of their faith, and an independent and fearless, though quiet, assertion of their rights, as Christians, as citizens, and as men. We aim, as far as possible with our feeble abilities and limited attainments, aided by the best advice we can obtain, to conduct just such a journal as our Catholic friends themselves need in such an age and country as our own. They and their interests, not Protestants and their conversion, are therefore first in our thoughts and affections, and occupy our chief attention.

Certainly we are not indifferent either to the temporal or spiritual welfare of our Protestant and unbelieving countrymen. We are firmly persuaded that the temporal prosperity of our country, the preservation of its civil institutions and its republican form of government, and the maintenance of liberty, as distinguished from license, are dependent on the maintenance and spread of the Catholic religion amongst us; and we are even more firmly persuaded that there is no spiritual freedom, no spiritual good, in any sense whatever, for our countrymen, but in proportion as they become united to the body of the Church, as undoubting Catholic believers, and good practical Catholics. With these convictions, it cannot be a matter of indifference to us whether they are converted or not. But we have believed, and still believe, that logic can do very little towards their conversion. Arguments directly for the Church, or directly against the doctrines they profess, are in our judgment of very little utility. The evil lies in the heart, rather than in the head, and motives addressed to the affections are far more likely to be efficacious than those addressed to the intellect. It is to the conscience that we must chiefly speak, and it is only as we can make them feel that they have souls to be saved, that religion should be the great affair of their lives, that they are in a lost condition, and should cry out speedily, "Lord, save us, or we perish," that we can effect much for their conversion.

Then, again, conversion is the work of Divine grace, and we can do little towards effecting it, except by our prayers. Logic and controversy are feeble instruments, but the fervent effectual prayer of the just availeth much. God will grant any thing to the humble prayer of faith. The best way to convert those without, the only way in which we can effectually labor for their conversion, is to live ourselves so as to merit the blessing of God upon our prayers. Hence whatever tends to make Catholics faithful, obedient, humble, devout, prayerful, has an indirect, if you will, but a powerful, tendency to convert the unbelieving and the sinful. If all the Catholics here were what they should be, their prayers would obtain the conversion of the whole country. This is the doctrine we have always insisted on, and it is to mistake us entirely to suppose that our sole or our chief reliance is on logic, and therefore very unreasonable to pronounce us a mere juggler or sophister because men can read our arguments without becoming believers. Our arguments have their use, and seldom fail of accomplishing all we propose to accomplish by them. But we must tell our friends outside, that there is no power on earth, or even in heaven, to convert them against their will, or without their voluntary concurrence. They must be willing, and must themselves take part. The grace of prayer is given unto all men. Let them ask, and they will receive; seek, and they will find; knock, and it will be opened unto them. If they beg of God grace to open the eyes of their understanding, and to move and incline their will to the truth, they will find our arguments sufficiently conclusive; but without the grace which enlightens the understanding and inclines the will, no argument can affect them, and their conversion is impossible.

"This," continues the *Register*, "is our first impression as we pass rapidly over his [Mr. Brownson's] pages, without stopping to analyze what we read. But when we stop at the most essential points in the argument, the wonder ceases. The adroitness of the dialectician becomes visible, and the single fallacy by which the whole train of argument becomes useless is detected. The engine is there. The cars are there, in admirable order. Every thing seems perfect. But in the single link which connects the engine to the cars is a fatal flaw, which the practised eye is sure to find." This is pleasant, but it is not

what we should expect from a really skilful dialectician, who is remarkable for his "simplicity, precision, earnestness, and power," and "in force of argumentation" is hardly inferior to "the ablest" of "the greatest masters of thought." May there not be some mistake, Mr. Register? You surely are too modest to claim for yourself the high intellectual character you ascribe to Mr. Brownson, and may it not be that you are the party mistaken, and that you have imagined a flaw where none is? If you are right in your estimate of the ability and earnestness of the author, whom you cannot regard as sporting with his readers, it is far more reasonable to conclude that you imagine a flaw where there is none, than that he should leave his argument so fatally defective as you allege. It is far more probable that you should misapprehend or fail to appreciate his argument, than that he, if your account of him be correct, should turn out to be a mere shallow sophist. Suppose you reëxamine the matter; perhaps you may find that the "fatal flaw" exists only in your own imagination.

But let us consider the proofs the *Register* offers, to establish the fallacy of our reasoning. "We take," it says, "an important example from the first article in the volume, entitled *The Church against No Church*. For nearly fifty pages, with syllogisms enough to supply a whole treatise on logic, the author has been preparing us for the conclusion, that Jesus Christ 'did commission a *body or corporation* of teachers, which, beginning with the Apostles and continuing the identical body they were, must subsist unto the consummation of the world.' Admitting what has gone before, we are prepared to receive this proposition, provided *sufficient evidence* is given." Provided *sufficient evidence* is given, the *Register*, we would hope, is prepared to receive this, whether he admits what has gone before or not; for it ought to be prepared to receive any proposition for which there is sufficient evidence. But the writer is mistaken in asserting that nearly fifty pages are devoted to a preparation for this conclusion, for at most only eight pages are so devoted, and thirty-six pages out of the nearly fifty he refers to are taken up with establishing substantially the same proposition by a process of rigid deduction from principles which are and must be conceded by every one who professes to be a Christian at all, — a process sufficient of itself, without the subsequent process



in which the *Register* professes to have discovered a "fatal flaw." This mistake is not calculated to inspire full confidence in the *Register* as an acute and candid critic. But we will cite the passage objected to, as it stands in our *Essays and Reviews*, not as condensed and mutilated by the *Register*.

"In proof of our position, that Jesus Christ has appointed, commissioned, a body of teachers with authority to teach, we quote the well-known passage in St. Matthew's Gospel, xxviii. 18, 19, 20, 'All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, . . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold, I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world'; also, St. Mark, xvi. 15, 'Go ye into all the earth, and preach the Gospel unto every creature'; and, Eph. iv. 11, 'And some indeed he gave to be apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and others pastors and teachers.'

"These are conclusive as to the fact that Jesus Christ did commission a body of teachers, or institute the *ecclesia docens*. The commission is from one who had authority to give it, because from one unto whom was given all power in heaven and in earth; it was a commission to *teach*, to teach all nations, to preach the Gospel to 'every creature,'—equivalent, to say the least, to all nations and individuals,—and to teach *all things whatsoever* Jesus Christ himself commanded. The commission is obviously as full, as express, as unequivocal, as language can make it, and was given by our Blessed Lord after his resurrection, immediately before his ascension.

"That this was not merely a commission to the Apostles personally is evident from the terms of the commission itself, and the promise with which it closes. It was the institution and commission of a body or corporation of teachers, which, beginning with the Apostles and continuing the identical body they were, must subsist unto the consummation of the world. For they who were commissioned were commanded to teach all nations and individuals, and in the order of succession as well as in the order of co-existence; for such is the literal import of the terms. But this command the Apostles personally *did* not fulfil, for all nations and individuals, even using the term *all* to imply a moral and not a metaphysical universality, have not yet been taught; they *could* not fulfil it, for during their personal lifetime all nations and individuals were not even in existence. Then one of three things:—1. The Apostles failed to fulfil the command of their Master; 2. Our Blessed Lord gave an impracticable command; or, 3. The commission was not to the Apostles in their personal character. We can say neither of the first two; therefore we must say the last.

"But the commission was to the Apostles, and therefore the body of teachers must, in some way, be identical with them, as is evident from the command, 'Go ye,' indisputably addressed to the Apostles themselves. But they can be identical with the Apostles in but two ways:—1. Personally; 2. Corporately. They are not personally identical, for that would make them the Apostles themselves, as numerical individuals, which we have just seen they are not. Then they must be corporately identical. Then the commission was to a corporation of teachers. The commission gave ample authority to teach. Therefore Jesus Christ did commission a body of teachers with ample authority to teach,—and, since commissioned to teach all nations and individuals in the order of succession as well as of coexistence, a perpetual or always subsisting corporation. Thus the very letter of the commission sustains our position.

"The *promise* with which the commission closes does the same. 'Behold I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world.' They to whom this promise was made, and with whom the Saviour was to be present, were identical with the Apostles, for he says to the Apostles, 'I am with *you*.' They were to be in time, that is, in this life; for he says, I am with you all *days*,—*πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας*,—which cannot apply to eternity, in which the divisions of time do not obtain. They were not the Apostles personally, because our blessed Lord says again, 'I am with you all days unto the *consummation of the world*,' which is an event still future, and the Apostles personally have long since ceased to exist as inhabitants of time. But they were identical with the Apostles, and, since not personally, they must be corporately identical. Therefore the promise was to be with the Apostles, as a body or corporation of teachers, all days even unto the consummation of the world. But Jesus Christ cannot be with a body that is not. Therefore the body must remain unto the consummation of the world. Therefore our Blessed Lord has instituted, appointed, commissioned, a body or corporation of teachers, identical with the Apostles, continuing their authority, and which must remain unto the consummation of the world.

"The same is also established by the blessed Apostle Paul in the passage quoted from Ephesians, iv. 11, 'And he indeed gave some to be apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and others to be pastors and teachers,' taken in connection with 1 Cor. xii. 28, 'And God indeed hath set some in the Church, first, apostles, secondly, prophets, thirdly, teachers; after that miracles, then the graces of healings, helps, governments, kinds of tongues, interpretations of speeches.' These texts, so far as we adduce them, clearly and distinctly assert that God has set in the Church, or congregation of believers, pastors and teachers as a perpetual

ordinance. They prove more than this, for which at another time we may contend; but they prove at least this, which is all we are contending for now. 'God hath set,' 'God gave to be.' These expressions prove the pastors and teachers to be of Divine appointment, and therefore that they are not created or commissioned by the congregation itself. They are set in the Church, given to be, as a perpetual ordinance; for the rule for understanding any passage of Scripture, sacred or profane, is to take it always in a universal sense, unless the assertion of the passage be necessarily restricted in its application by something in the nature of the subject, or in the context, some known fact, or some principle of reason or of faith. But obviously nothing of the kind can be adduced to restrict the sense of these passages either in regard to time or space. They are, therefore, to be taken in their plain, obvious, unlimited sense. Therefore the institution of pastors and teachers is not only Divine, but universal and perpetual in the Church.

"We may obtain the same result from the end for which the pastors and teachers are appointed; for the *argumentum ad quem* is not less conclusive than the *argumentum a quo*. If the end to be attained cannot be attained without assuming the authority and perpetuity of the body of pastors and teachers, we have a right to conclude their authority and perpetuity; since they are appointed by God himself, who cannot fail to adapt his means to his ends. For what end, then, has God instituted this body of pastors and teachers? The Apostle answers, 'For the perfection of the saints, for the work of the ministry, unto the edification of the body of Christ, till we all meet in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ; that *we may not now be children tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, in the wickedness of men, in craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive*; but, performing the truth in charity, we may in all things grow up in him who is the head, Christ.' Eph. iv. 12-15. This needs no comment. The end here proposed, for which the Christian ministry is instituted, is one which always and everywhere subsists, and must so long as the world remains. But this is an end which obviously cannot be secured but by an authoritative and perpetual body of teachers. Therefore the body of teachers is authoritative and perpetual. Therefore, God, or God in Jesus Christ, has appointed, commissioned, a body of teachers, the *ecclesia docens*, as an authoritative and perpetual corporation, to subeist unto the consummation of the world.

"We have now proved the first part of our proposition, namely the fact of the institution and commission of the *ecclesia docens* as an authoritative and perpetual corporation of teachers. Its authority is in the commission to teach; its perpetuity, in the fact

that it cannot discharge its commission without remaining to the consummation of the world, in the promise of Christ to be with it till then, which necessarily implies its existence unto the consummation of the world, and in the fact that the promise is to it as a corporation identical with the Apostles. The proof of this first part of our proposition necessarily proves the second, namely, the *infallibility* of the corporation. The Divine commission necessarily carries with it the infallibility of the commissioned to the full extent of the commission. It is on this fact that is grounded the evidence of miracles. Miracles do not prove the truth of the doctrine taught; they merely accredit the teacher, and this they do simply by proving that the teacher is Divinely commissioned. The fact to be established is the Divine commission. This once established, it makes no difference whether established immediately by a miracle, or mediately by the declaration of one already proved by miracles, as was our Blessed Lord, to speak by Divine authority. Jesus, it is conceded, spoke by Divine authority, even by those who, with the *Christian Examiner*, deny his proper Divinity. Then a commission given by him was a Divine commission, and pledged Almighty God in like manner as if given by Almighty God himself directly. The teachers were, then, Divinely commissioned. Then in all matters covered by the commission they are infallible; for God himself vouches for the truth of their testimony, and must take care that they testify the truth and nothing but the truth.

"Moreover, the command to teach implies the obligation of obedience. The commission is a command to teach, and to teach all nations and individuals. Then all nations and individuals are bound to believe and obey these teachers; for authority and obedience are correlatives, and where there is no duty to believe and obey, there is no authority to teach. But it is repugnant to reason and the known character of God to say that he makes it the duty of any one to believe and obey a fallible teacher, one who may both deceive and be deceived. Were he to do so, he would participate in the same fallibility, and be the false teacher's accomplice, which is impossible; for he is, as we have said, *prima veritas in essendo, in cognoscendo, et in dicendo*, and therefore can neither deceive nor be deceived. Therefore they whom he has commissioned must be infallible." — pp. 52 – 57.

"Here," says the *Register*, "the whole force of the reasoning by which the authority of the Church of Rome is sustained depends on the word *corporation*, which Mr. Brownson has quietly slipped in with a meaning in no wise demanded or authorized by the words of Scripture which he has brought forward as the only decisive evidence in the case." But here are three mistakes at least. The

whole force of the reasoning does not depend on the word *corporation*, for we give the reader his choice between the word *corporation* and another, since we say "a *body* or corporation of teachers." We do not slip the word in *quietly*, that is, without any attempt to justify its use, for we undertake to prove its propriety; and, furthermore, we do not bring forward the words of Scripture as the only decisive evidence in the case, but expressly state our ability to prove the proposition without citing the Scriptures at all. Thus we say (p. 51), "We do not depend on the Bible for the historical facts from which we conclude the commission of the *ecclesia docens*, or body of pastors and teachers; for these facts we can collect from other sources equally reliable [that is, equally reliable with the Scriptures regarded simply as historical documents], and do so collect them, when we reason with unbelievers." The *Register*, again, has not cited the formal statement of the proposition we were defending. "The question before us, distinctly stated," we say (p. 50), "is, Has Jesus Christ commissioned a body of pastors and teachers, and given this body the promise of infallibility and indefectibility?" But let this pass.

"There is," proceeds the *Register*, "no such word as body or corporation of teachers used by Christ." Expressly used, in the text cited, we concede; implied, we deny, for we have in the passage in question clearly proved the contrary. "As to Mr. Brownson's syllogism that the body of teachers can be identical with the Apostles in but two ways, 1. personally, 2. corporately, it is only one of those unwarrantable but imposing assumptions which he is constantly making under the forms of logic." But as you cite us, there is here no syllogism at all, that we can discover, and, if you will do us the justice to regard what we ourselves wrote, you will concede that we made here no assumption, imposing or otherwise. The texts cited from St. Matt. xxviii. 18, 19, 20, and St. Mark, xvi. 15, clearly prove that Christ did commission pastors and teachers. This point the *Register* does not deny. The second point we establish is, that the commission was not merely a commission to the Apostles personally. We do not assume this; we prove it, and the *Register* virtually concedes it. But the commission was evidently a commission to the Apostles, for our Lord is evidently addressing them,

and he says, Go *ye*. In some way, then, the teachers commissioned must be identical with the Apostles. Teachers were not to cease in the Church with the Apostles, and the commission evidently contemplated others who were to succeed them, for he says, "Behold, I am with *you* all days unto the consummation of the world." Here, then, we have a commission to the Apostles in a sense in which they could and would remain *as teachers* unto the end of time. You cannot, on the one hand, separate the teachers in every sense from the Apostles, nor, on the other, in every sense identify them with the Apostles. You cannot identify them with the Apostles personally, because in this sense the Apostles are no longer living on the earth, and because they who received the commission were to remain as teachers unto the consummation of the world, an event still future. The commission, then, though given to the Apostles personally, must have been given to them in some other sense also, in which they still survive and will survive to the end of time. So much must be conceded on all hands. Now pray tell us in what sense the Apostles can be said so to survive as Divinely commissioned teachers, save as a body, or corporation of teachers, which preserves its identity though the individuals composing it are successively changed, as our bodies preserve their identity, though the material particles of which they are composed are constantly changing? The individuals die, the body, the corporation, survives.

This reasoning is solid; but even if it were not, even if it would not justify the use of the word *corporation*, the *Register* would not be justified in its criticism. It charges us with quietly slipping in the word *corporation*, that is, with assuming it without offering or attempting to offer any thing in justification of its use, and making the whole argument turn on its meaning. This is not the fact. The argument does not turn at all on the meaning of the word, but turns on the meaning of the texts cited, which meaning necessarily implies the commission of the Apostles not only as teachers in their personal or individual capacity, but also as a body or corporation of teachers. Whether such is really the meaning of the texts, or not, is the point in question, and we have not quietly assumed that it is; we have attempted to prove that it is. It is competent for the *Register* to show, if it can, that our proof is

insufficient, or that the reasons we assign are inconclusive; but it has no right to assert, that we have merely assumed that such is the meaning by adroitly slipping in the word *corporation*, for that is not true. We prove, first, that the commission was the commission of pastors and teachers; secondly, that the commission was given to the Apostles; and thirdly, that it was given to them in a sense in which they can and do survive to the consummation of the world. These three points are shown to be evident from the very terms of the commission. But as the Apostles as individuals are dead, and no longer survive as individual teachers, we conclude it was not given to them merely in their individual capacity; and as they can be said to survive only as a corporation or body of pastors and teachers, we conclude they were commissioned as such, that is, the commission instituted or constituted an Apostolic body or corporation of pastors and teachers. Each of these conclusions is absolutely logical and necessary from the premises, and the premises themselves are undeniable. There is here, then, no assumption at all, unless it be that what our Lord promised must be fulfilled, or, in other words, that God is true, and cannot promise and fail to perform. What has misled our no-Church critic is, probably, the fact, that we state our particular thesis prior to presenting the demonstration, — at the beginning, instead of reserving the statement of it to the end of the argument, — which we believe is not to be regarded either as a fault of logic or of rhetoric.

We say the teachers and pastors who are commissioned must in some way be identical with the Apostles, and that they can be identical with them in only two ways, 1. personally, 2. corporately; that is, they must be either the same individuals, or the same body or corporation, as the Apostles. The critic is indignant at this very evident proposition, and scouts it as if it set bounds to the power and wisdom of God. "He who 'of these stones can raise up children to Abraham' is not cramped and limited in his operations by our narrow and arbitrary assumptions." Nothing in the world more true; but the question here does not turn on what God, metaphysically, can or cannot do. The question is, whether certain commissioned teachers can be identical with the Apostles in other than two ways, namely, either as the same individuals, or as the

same body or corporation. If the critic says they can, we should be much obliged to him if he would tell us what that way is. God can give any commission he pleases, and to whom he pleases, but he cannot give a commission without giving one, nor a commission to a subject in a sense in which that subject does not exist, or to continue and operate unto the consummation of the world in a sense in which the subject cannot and does not exist until that consummation. He could not commission the Apostles save either as individuals or as a body or corporation, for save in one or the other of these two senses they are inconceivable, and he could give them a commission under which they were to act until the consummation of the world only as a body or corporation, for in no other sense were they to exist in time until that event. What unwarrantable and imposing assumption is there here?

"Christ," says the *Register*, "sent forth his teachers. As they perished, he raised up others to take their place and carry on their work. . . . While they all received the same words of divine truth, while they all looked up to him as their common Lord, and he in fulfilment of his promise was with them as their living head, they were all united in him, *one spiritual body*, under his authority teaching all nations to observe whatsoever things he commanded them. This interpretation quite as naturally fills out the meaning of our Saviour's words as either of the suppositions which Mr. Brownson has assumed as the only suppositions which are possible. And so the labored argument of sixty-eight pages falls to the ground." And so, with the writer's permission, it does *not* fall to the ground. We make no suppositions in the case, and present the reader no alternative, as the *Register* pretends; and if the critic understands the natural force of the words he has used, he has in his own interpretation conceded substantially all that he objects to, and consequently has refuted, not us, but himself.

"Christ *sent* forth his teachers." Then he commissioned them, gave them authority to teach, and commanded them to go forth and teach; for so much is implied in the word "sent." "Sent forth *his* teachers." Then none except those he thus commissions and orders forth are his teachers. These teachers "all receive the same words of divine truth," are "one spiritual body," with one "common Lord,"



one "living head," and under the authority of this "common Lord," "living head," "teaching all nations whatsoever things he commanded them." They are not only one body, but a persisting body. "As they perished, he raised up others to take their place and to carry on their work." What are these, except the body or corporation of pastors and teachers we asserted as commissioned by our Lord, only described in looser and less accurate terms than we used? It is remarkable that no Protestant ever attempts to reason against Catholicity without formally or virtually refuting himself! Christ sent forth his teachers, the Apostles, united as one spiritual body, with authority to teach all nations to observe whatever he commanded, and perpetuates the body by raising up, as individuals perish, new individuals to take *their* place and carry on *their* work. If this is not asserting that our Lord commissioned a body or corporation of teachers, and a persisting body or corporation, we confess we know not what would be. The critic blames us for using the word *corporation*, accuses us of slipping it in quietly, and asserts that "there is no such word as corporation or body of teachers expressed by Christ, and no such meaning implied." Yet he himself uses the word *body*, denominates the teachers sent or raised up to be "one spiritual *body*," in order to express what he conceives to be the meaning of our Saviour's words cited by us. The critic was for the moment off his guard. Nevertheless, let him not be too much cast down. Homer sometimes nods.

Perhaps the *Register* thinks that it escapes what is on its part a fatal concession by certain statements it introduces, which we have omitted; but what we have cited is positive, direct, and it would not be respectful on our part to suppose that the writer explains or qualifies it all away into a no-meaning in the same short paragraph. Nevertheless, here is the whole statement:—"Christ sent forth his teachers. As they perished, he raised up others to take their place and to carry on their work. *They may have been united under no visible organization. They may often have had no personal knowledge of each other's existence. They may have been scattered in distant parts of the earth, so as to have no communication with each other. They may have acted under different forms of church polity.* Still, while they all received the same words of divine truth,

while they all looked up to him as their common Lord, and he in fulfilment of his promise was with them as their living head, they were all united in him, one spiritual body, under his authority teaching all nations to observe whatsoever things he commanded them." Now, let the additional statements which we have italicized mean what they may, it is here clearly and unequivocally asserted that the teachers receive the same words of divine truth, that is, have unity of faith; are one body, united in Christ their living head; and teaching *under his authority* alone, that is, by virtue of his commission, all nations whatever he commanded the Apostles to teach. This is substantially all we attempted to prove by the texts of which the *Register* here gives its interpretation in opposition to ours. We might thus pass over the other matters introduced, as not *ad rem*. "They may have been united under no visible organization." This we know historically was not the fact, but we did not attempt from the texts the *Register* is interpreting to prove the contrary. We attempted, indeed, to prove the visibility of the body of teachers, but in another place, and by other evidence, of which the Protestant critic as a matter of course takes no notice. The visibility follows necessarily from the office of teaching, because if not a visible body the teachers could not discharge the duties imposed by their commission. "They may often have had no personal knowledge of each other's existence." If this means that there might have been a Christian teacher who had no knowledge of any Christian teacher or teachers besides himself, the *Register* will oblige us by proving it; if it means that there were often Christian teachers who were ignorant of the existence of certain other Christian teachers, we can very readily concede it. "They may have been scattered in distant parts of the earth, so as to have no communication with each other." Save through the one body in which they are all united, this may, no doubt, sometimes have happened, as for longer or shorter periods it sometimes happens now to our missionaries. "They may have acted under different forms of church polity." If this means that they may have acted under different church polities, it is false and absurd, because the *Register* concedes that they were "one body," with one and the same faith, under one authority, with one Lord and one living head, and different polities implies different bod-

ies, diverse authorities, lords, and heads. According to the *Register*, Jesus Christ is the immediate Lord and head of the body, and as he is one, and as there can be no polity without a head, it follows necessarily that there can be only one Christian church polity, and all polities distinguishable from that one have another than our Lord for their head.

"Here is one instance of fatally bad reasoning, just at the vital point of the argument." The bad reasoning, we are afraid, is the *Register's*, not ours, and it is clear that its own interpretation, as far as consistent with itself, accords with our own. The *Register* has done as well as it could, and deserves the credit of having labored hard to convict us of fallacious reasoning; but the nature of the case was adverse to its success. It did not take the pains to master our own reasoning, and imagined a flaw where none can be found. He finds himself obliged to concede that our Lord did send forth his teachers with full authority to teach all nations whatsoever he commanded them, and that these teachers constitute "one body" under Christ, their living head; therefore that Christ did commission a body or corporation of teachers, with full authority to teach. He is obliged to exclude from Christian teachers all who call themselves Christian teachers and are not of this body, and, as he holds, as well as we, that Christian teachers must continue until the consummation of the world, he is also obliged to concede the indefectibility of the body. As the first teachers perished, "he raised up others to take their place and to carry on their work," and continues, he must concede, and will continue, to raise up new teachers as the old pass off, till time shall be no more. These new teachers are the successors and continuators of the old, because they take *their* place and do *their* work. Hence the *Register* concedes every point except one that, under this head, we contended for; namely, the infallibility of the body of teachers. But if he concedes the rest, he must also concede that, for the infallibility follows necessarily from the commission to teach, and the promise of Christ to be with the body of pastors and teachers "all days unto the consummation of the world." The practised eye does not therefore find a "fatal flaw" in the link which "connects the engine to the cars."

"We detect something of the kind in every form under which Mr. Brownson has attempted to prove the exclusive

authority of the Roman Catholic Church. 'We can establish,' he [Mr. Brownson] says, 'the regular succession of Pontiffs from St. Peter to Gregory the Sixteenth, (now Pius the Ninth,) and this establishes the unity of the corporation in time, and therefore its identity.' *He can prove no such thing.*" We have before us a complete list of all the Popes from St. Peter to Pius the Ninth, with the date of each one's accession to the Pontificate, and the length of his reign, and with the exception of the last, yet living, the year and day of his death, taken from official and authentic records. This is at least *prima facie* evidence, and sufficient till something is introduced to produce a contrary presumption. "He cannot prove that St. Peter ever saw Rome, still less that he exercised any authority over the other Apostles like that which the Bishop of Rome exercises over the other bishops." The first assertion here is simply ridiculous, and the *Register* might just as well say that we cannot prove that there was ever such a personage on earth as Jesus of Nazareth. There is, as the *Register* well knows, if it has studied the question, precisely the same kind of evidence to prove that St. Peter was at Rome, and was bishop of that see, that there is that our Lord was crucified at Jerusalem, and to deny its sufficiency in the former case is to deny its sufficiency in the latter. You have in the latter case only uniform tradition and institutions growing out of the fact, and dating back to the time, and in the former you have the same. The See of Rome has existed uninterruptedly from the time of St. Peter, has always been called by his name, and its uniform tradition is that he was its founder. This tradition has been recognized by the whole Christian world, in every age, uncontradicted save by here and there an individual in very recent times. This is proof enough.

The second assertion of the *Register*, namely, that we cannot prove that St. Peter "exercised any authority over the other Apostles like that which the Bishop of Rome exercises over the other bishops," amounts to nothing, even if true. All the Apostles had each an extraordinary mission, and were, like St. Peter, inspired and directed by the Holy Ghost, and he had no occasion to exercise an authority over them of the kind which his successors exercise over other bishops. The other bishops succeed not to the extraordinary mission of the Apostles, that is, to the Apostle-

ship, which each of the Apostles received, but simply to the episcopate. The successors of St. Peter alone succeed to the Apostleship, and their authority is not authority over Apostles, but over bishops. But that St. Peter was the prince or chief of the Apostles is clearly proved from Scripture and uninterrupted tradition, and, if our Lord had not established the primacy of authority and jurisdiction in him and his see, the Bishop of Rome as his successor could never have caused himself to be acknowledged as supreme visible head and ruler of the Church. The supremacy of the See of Rome is distinctly recognisable throughout the Christian world prior to Constantine, as has been amply proved by our authors, and therefore before the Popes were able to exercise or call to their assistance one particle of temporal power. It was not, therefore, and could not have been, by the aid of the temporal power that they established their supremacy. Since the governments of Europe became Christian, the general and almost uniform tendency of their action has been, not to strengthen, but to weaken, the authority of the Pope over the bishops. How, then, came the supremacy of the Popes to be established? Were they ambitious, greedy of power? Suppose they were; they cannot be said to have been more so than were the other bishops, and the tendency in each bishop must have been as strong to resist Papal encroachment as in the Pope to encroach, and the tendency of all united must have been incalculably stronger. How, then, did the Pope alone, who according to you must have been in the beginning only the equal of any other bishop as to his office, impeded rather than aided by the temporal powers, succeed, against the united tendency of all the bishops throughout Christendom, in usurping an unjust authority over them all? He could have established his authority only by a miracle, and a miracle can never be wrought in favor of usurpation and injustice. It is impossible to explain the possession or exercise of the supreme authority of the Bishops of Rome, except on the supposition that it was a part of the original constitution of the Church. It evidently was not and could not have been acquired little by little, through the strength of the Roman Pontiff and the weakness of the other bishops.

"In the historical, as in the logical argument, an important link is wanting." A decided mistake; for no link

is wanting in either. "We recognize the Church under the original Apostles." Are you sure of that? "There is no intimation of any supremacy or superiority of Peter over others." By what authority do you say that? You cannot read even the New Testament without perceiving the contrary. Peter is always there represented as first, and receives from our Lord a special commission,—"Feed my sheep," "Feed my lambs," "Confirm thy brethren,"—which necessarily implies, not only a superiority, but a very great superiority. "Afterwards we see the Church submerging [emerging?] from a period of which we know scarcely any thing; but with features so changed that we can hardly resist the belief that it had departed from its original simplicity, and had already begun to borrow largely from human inventions and from a heathen worship." That is, you paint a fancy-piece which you call a portrait of the Church under the Apostles, and, because subsequently you find it is not a likeness, you gravely conclude that the Church must have changed her features! Admirable logic! It would not be unreasonable to ask you to prove that your fancy-piece is a true likeness of the original features of the Church, before you conclude from the fact, that, as she emerges from the period of persecutions into the full historical light of the third and fourth centuries, she differs from it, she has changed, and no longer resembles herself. Then, again, it is not to reason very wisely to suppose that the Church in the martyr-age, when Christians were in their greatest fervor, faith was strong, and love invincible, rejoicing to suffer for Christ's sake, would depart from her original simplicity; and that then, when she was suffering the most severe persecutions from the heathen and from wicked men, she would be in the temper to borrow largely from human inventions and a heathen worship. Adversity purifies, instead of corrupting, and if the Church could be corrupted at all it would be in her seasons of worldly prosperity, not in her seasons of temporal adversity. Moreover, the features which the *Register* would contend were borrowed from a heathen worship were hers before they can be found in any form of Gentilism. It is a favorite theory with the Unitarians and with some German authors, that those doctrines and practices of Christianity to which they object were introduced into the Church through Neo-platonism; but, unhappily for this

theory, they were all in the Church before Neo-platonism was born, and as a matter of fact were borrowed by Neo-platonists from Christianity. Neo-platonism was born with Plotinus, who commenced philosophizing in 260, and who was accused by the Gentiles of Christianizing. The Emperor Julian the Apostate reorganized paganism throughout the Empire, and gave it some features in common with the Christian hierarchy; but those were features which you shall in vain look for in the heathen world prior to the Christian Church. A little acquaintance with chronology is sometimes a convenience. The *Register* made a slight mistake; it is his logic, not ours, that fails for want of historical evidence.

But the *Register* brings up another and a still more important instance of ~~our~~ defective logic. To place this new instance fairly before our readers, we must cite the passages at length from our *Essays and Reviews*, from which the instance is professedly taken.

“ Finally, it will, perhaps, be alleged, inasmuch as all Protestants did at first, and some of them do now, appeal to the written word, or the Holy Scriptures, in justification of their dissent, that they have in these a real or a pretended authority, external to and independent of the dissenter, distinct from and paramount to that of the Church. But a moment's reflection will show, even if the Scriptures were not in favor of the Church, that this is a mistake. The Holy Scriptures proposed, and their sense declared, by the Church, we hold with a firm faith to be the word of God, and therefore of the highest authority; but, if not so proposed and interpreted, though in many respects important and authentic historical documents, and valuable for their excellent didactic teachings, they would not and could not be for us the inspired, and, in a supernatural sense, the authoritative word of God. To the Protestant they are not and cannot be an authority external to the dissenter; because, denying the unwritten word, the Church, and all authoritative tradition, he has no external authority to vouch for the fact that they are the inspired word of God, or to declare their genuine sense. If there be no external authority to decide that the Bible is the word of God, and to declare its true sense, the authority ascribed to it in the last analysis, according to the principle we have established, is only the authority of some internal principle in the individual dissenting; for, in that case, the individual, by virtue of this internal principle, decides, with the Bible as without it, what is and what is not God's word, what God has and has not revealed; and therefore what he is and what he is not bound to believe, what he is and what he is not bound to do.” — pp. 217, 218.

"If we assert the right of private judgment to interpret the Holy Scriptures, we must assert its right in all cases whatsoever; for the principle on which private judgment can be defended in one case is equally applicable in every case. Will it be said that private judgment must yield to God's word? Granted. But what is God's word? The Bible. How know you that? Do you determine that the Bible is the word of God by some external authority, or by private judgment? Not by some external authority, because you have none, and admit none. By private judgment? Then the authority of the Bible is *for you* only private judgment. The Bible does not propose itself, and therefore can have no authority higher than the authority which proposes it. Here is a serious difficulty for those Protestants who set up such a clamor about the Bible, and which shows them, or ought to show them, that, whatever the Bible may be for a Catholic, for them it can in no conceivable contingency be any thing but a human authority. *The authority of that which is proposed is of the same order as that which proposes, and cannot transcend it.* This is a Protestant argument, and is substantially the great argument of Chillingworth against Catholicity. Nothing proposes the Bible to Protestants but private judgment, as is evident from their denial of all other authority; and therefore in the Bible they — not we, thank God! — have only the authority of private judgment, and therefore only the word of man, and not the word of God. If the authority on which Protestants receive the word of God is only that of private judgment, then there is for them in the Bible only private judgment; and then nothing to restrict private judgment, for private judgment can itself be no restriction on private judgment." — pp. 223, 224.

The *Register* attempts to retort the argument we here use, and from our own principles of reasoning to show that, if Protestants have in the Bible taken and interpreted by private judgment only private judgment, we have in the Church only private judgment; for we ourselves, it contends, have nothing else on which to take the Church, or by which to interpret her teachings. This is not original with the *Register*. Chillingworth attempted the same retort, and Dr. Edward Beecher in the *Christian Alliance*, and the *Episcopal Observer*, in replying some time since to this same article of ours, also attempted it. It would seem, therefore, that Protestants really imagine that the retort is allowable, and capable of being sustained. "How am I," says the *Register*, "a Protestant, out of the Roman Catholic Church, to recognize it as a supernatural and infallible authority? Through my own private judgment, no other way is possi-



ble with the Church any more than with the Bible. Hence the authority of the Church can be . . . . . only private judgment."

We have answered this objection time and again in our pages, and it is answered substantially in the essay entitled *The Church against No-Church*, in the volume before us, where we establish the infallibility of reason in her own province. But our Protestant friends are poor philosophers, and very slow to understand distinctions which are not in their favor. The objection asserts that we take and must take the authority of the Church to teach on private judgment, because we have and can have nothing else on which to take it. This we very explicitly deny. The authority of the Church to teach rests on the Divine commission. "But the fact of her commission, you take that on private judgment." Not at all. We take it on historical testimony. "But that historical testimony is taken on private judgment." Wrong again; for that testimony is addressed to the common reason of all men, and not simply to the private judgment of the individual. Here is the error of our Protestant friends. They recognize no distinction between reason and private judgment. Reason is common to all men; private judgment is the special act of an individual, an individual judgment, formed not by virtue of a principle common to him and other men, but by a principle of judging proper or peculiar to himself. Where the judgment is formed by a standard, criterion, rule, or principle of judgment common to all men, or by testimony addressed to the common reason of all men, the judgment is Catholic, not private. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time; every contingent existence must have a cause not contingent, — are not private judgments, but belong alike to all men. That there was such a city as pagan Rome, and such a man as Julius Cæsar, are historical facts provable to the common reason of all men, not private judgments. In all matters of this sort there is a criterion of certainty beyond the individual, and evidence is adducible which ought to convince the reason of every man, and which, when adduced, does convince every man of ordinary understanding, unless through his own fault. Private judgment is not so called, as the *Register* appears to imagine, because it is a judgment of an individual, but

because it is a judgment rendered by virtue of a private rule or principle of judgment. Are the planets so many worlds inhabited as is our earth? You say, Yes, or No. Either on your part is a private judgment, because it is based on no principle of reason, and is supported by no testimony, — in a word, supported by nothing out of yourself as an individual, — and is therefore nothing but a private opinion, and would be nothing else, even though the mass of mankind should entertain it. The distinction here is sufficiently obvious, and from it we may conclude that nothing is to be termed *private judgment* which is demonstrable from reason or provable by testimony.

Now we take, in our argumentative process with unbelievers, the Church on reason and testimony, and therefore not on private judgment, as we show in our *Essays and Reviews*.

“Taking the facts in the case to be as here supposed, the only points in the process to which exceptions can possibly be taken, or which can by any one be alleged to be not infallibly certain, are, — 1. The competency of natural reason from historical testimony to establish the fact that the miracles were actually performed; 2. Admitting the facts to be infallibly ascertainable, the competency of reason to determine infallibly whether they are miracles or not; 3. The competency of reason to conclude from the miracle the Divine authority of the miracle-worker; 4. Its competency from historical documents to ascertain infallibly the fact of the appointment of the body of teachers, and the promise made to them. These four points, unquestionably essential to the validity of the argument, are to be taken, we admit, on the authority of reason. Can reason determine these with infallible certainty? But if you say it can, you affirm the infallibility of reason, and then it of itself suffices, without other infallible teacher; if you say it cannot, you deny the possibility of establishing infallibly the infallibility of your body of teachers.

“Reason is infallible within its own province, but not in regard to what transcends its reach. To deny the infallibility of reason within its province would be to deny the possibility not only of faith, but of both science and knowledge, and to sink into absolute scepticism, — even to “doubt that doubt itself be doubting,” — which is impossible; for no man doubts that he doubts. Revelation does not deny reason, but presupposes it. The objection to reason is not that it cannot judge infallibly of *some* matters, but that it cannot judge infallibly of *all* matters. But, because it cannot judge in-

fallibly of all matters, to say it can judge infallibly of none, is not to reason justly. As well say, I am not infallibly certain that I see the tree before my window, because I cannot see all that may be going on in the moon. It is infallibly certain that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time; that two things respectively equal to a third are equal to one another; that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; that what begins to exist must have a creator; that every effect must have a cause, and that every supernatural effect must have a supernatural cause, and that the change of one natural substance into another natural substance is a supernatural effect; that every voluntary agent acts to some end, and every wise and good agent to a wise and good end. These and the like propositions are all infallibly certain. Reason, within its sphere, is therefore infallible; but out of its sphere it is null.

"Human testimony, within its proper limits, backed by circumstances, monuments, institutions, which presuppose its truth and are incompatible with its falsehood, is itself infallible. I have never seen London, but I have no occasion to see it in order to be as certain of its existence as I am of my own. History, too, is a science; and although every thing narrated in it may not be true, or even probable, yet there are historical facts as certain as mathematical certainty itself. It is infallibly certain that ~~there were~~ in the ancient world the republics of Athens, Sparta, and Rome; that there was a peculiar people called the Jews, that this people dwelt in Palestine, that they had a chief city named Jerusalem, in this chief city a superb temple dedicated to the worship of the one God, and that this chief city was taken by the Romans, this temple burnt, and this people, after an immense slaughter, subdued, and dispersed among the nations, where they remain to this day. Here are historical facts which can be infallibly proved to be facts.

"Now, the miracles, regarded as facts, are simple historical facts, said to have occurred at a particular time and place, and are in their nature as susceptible of historical proof as any other facts whatever. Ordinary historical testimony is as valid in their case as in the case of Cæsar's or Napoleon's battles. Reason, observing the ordinary laws of historical criticism, is competent to decide infallibly on the fact whether they are proved to have actually occurred or not. Reason, then, is competent to the *first* point in the process of proof, namely, the fact of the miracles.

"It is equally competent to the *second* point, namely, whether the fact alleged to be a miracle really be a miracle. A miracle is a supernatural effect produced in or on natural objects. The point for reason to make out, after the fact is proved, is whether the effect actually witnessed be a *supernatural* effect. That it can do this in every case, even when the effect is truly miraculous, we do

not pretend ; but that it can do it in some cases, we affirm, and to be able to do it in one suffices. When I see one natural substance changed into another natural substance, as in the case of converting water into wine, I know the change is a miracle ; for nature can no more change herself than she could create herself. So, when I see a man who has been four days dead, and in whose body the process of decomposition has commenced and made considerable progress, restored to life and health, sitting with his friends at table and eating, I know it is a miracle ; for to restore life when extinct is no less an act of creative power than to give life. It is giving life to that which before had it not, and is therefore an act which can be performed by no being but God alone. Reason, then, is competent to determine the fact whether the alleged miracle really be a miracle. It is competent, then, to the second point in the process of proof.

"No less competent is it to the *third*, namely, the divine commission of the miracle-worker. In proving the event to be a miracle, I prove it to be wrought by the power of God. Now, I know enough of God, by the natural light of reason, to know that he cannot be the accomplice of an impostor, that he cannot work a miracle by one whose word may not be taken. The miracle, then, establishes the credibility of the miracle-worker. Then, the miracle-worker is what he says he is. If he says he is God, he is God ; if he says he speaks by divine authority, he speaks by divine authority, and we have God's authority for what he says. The third point, then, comes within the province of natural reason, and may be infallibly settled.

"The *fourth* point is a simple historical question ; for it concerns what was done and said by our Blessed Lord in regard to the appointment of a body of teachers. It is to be settled historically, by consulting the proper documents and monuments in the case. It is not a question of speculation, of interpretation even, but simply a question of fact, to which reason is fully competent, and can, with proper prudence and documents, settle infallibly." — pp. 47 – 50.

The *Register* may reply, that it may vindicate the authority of the Scriptures by reason and testimony, and therefore that it is not true to say that it has in them only private judgment. May thus vindicate their authority as historical documents, we concede, and also contend ; but as divinely inspired documents, we deny, because divine inspiration is a supernatural fact, remaining in all senses in the supernatural order, and therefore not cognizable by natural reason. But if by the miracles we establish the divine commission of the sacred writers, why may not we

infer their inspiration as writers from it, as well as you infer from it the authority and infallibility of the Church or body of pastors and teachers? Because, 1. In the case of the greater part of the sacred writers, to say the least, you cannot establish by miracles the fact of their divine commission; and because, 2. You have in the case even of those whose divine commission to teach you can through the miracles historically establish, if such there are, no declaration of their own that they were divinely commissioned or divinely inspired to write. Whether the Scriptures are inspired or not must, therefore, be for your mere private judgment; but that the Church has authority to teach rests on the express declaration of our Lord himself, proved by the miracles he performed to be sent from God and to speak with divine authority, even on the ground as to his divinity assumed by Unitarians.

It may be objected, after all, that, since the authority never transcends the authority on which it is received, the authority of the Church, being taken on natural reason, is only the authority of natural reason, which is not sufficient for faith, for the Church is the witness to the fact of revelation, and we contend the witness to that fact must be supernatural. That we have in the argument only the authority of reason for asserting the supernatural authority of the Church, and therefore only the authority of reason that what she teaches of the supernatural order is true, we frankly concede, and never have pretended and never do pretend to the contrary. But this is enough for all the purposes of the argument. This proves to reason that the authority is supernatural and infallible, and therefore that whatever the Church teaches is infallibly true. This is all that reason can ask, because it answers every objection that reason can urge. It is enough for rational proof, enough to render the logical process complete. Of course, it is not enough to enable us to elicit an act of supernatural faith. It is sufficient for what theologians term human faith, — *fides humana*, — and it were absurd to ask more than human faith from any rational or logical process whatever. This human faith does not, indeed, make one a Christian; it does not bring him into the supernatural order, and enable him to elicit the Christian virtues. It leaves him still in the order of nature, without doing any thing positive to translate him into the order of grace. Supernatural faith

in the subject — divine faith, as theologians term it, *fides divina*, as distinguished from human faith — is the gift of God, an infused virtue, and is elicited only by supernatural grace, or, as it is termed, the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith. The creditive subject must be elevated by this gift above nature to the plane of the supernatural credible object, in order to elicit what we call the act of faith. This is the case with every Catholic believer; and when so elevated by grace he believes without any discursive process whatever. But this supernatural faith, proceeding from a supernatural principle infused into the subject and seizing the supernatural object with supernatural energy and firmness, belongs solely to the believer, and is never the result of any logical process whatever, and is never demanded of un-elevated or natural reason. Conceding, then, that in the argument for the Church we do not rise above the principle of natural reason, it is no objection, because nothing more is necessary to the conclusiveness of the argument, although something more, and even of a different order, is essential to conversion or to eliciting an act of supernatural faith.

The retort of the *Register* cannot be sustained, and its third instance of fallacious reasoning on our part exists only in its own misconception. But the *Register* continues, and attempts to retort upon us the argument we use to prove that the Protestant, in the Bible interpreted by private judgment, has only private judgment.

“Again, Mr. Brownson maintains the necessity of an infallible Church, because faith is essential to salvation, and faith is a belief in all the truths that Jesus taught. But no man, without such an infallible guide, can be sure that he has the truth and nothing but the truth, and therefore without such a guide no man can be saved. We may read the Bible, he says, but no fallible man can be sure that he receives the truth there as it was in the mind of Jesus and his Apostles, and therefore a true faith [from reading the Bible] is impossible. But how is this? There must somewhere be a point of contact between the infallible supernatural teacher and the weak and fallible disciple, and wherever that point is *there is liability to mistake*. If I may not receive the words of Christ, the supernatural, infallible teacher, in the sense in which he spoke, neither can there be any certainty that I receive the interpretation put upon them by the Church in precisely the sense which my infallibly supernatural teacher, the Church, attaches to them. The argument here is as strong against the Church as against the Bible.

With Mr. Brownson's definition of the faith, essential to salvation, there is no such thing as faith or salvation possible, except with those who belong to the infallible order, and even they as individuals are fallible, and therefore as individuals cannot be saved."

Faith that can be deceived is not faith, but merely persuasion, or opinion, unless we are to change at our own caprice the established sense of words. We defined faith as it is usually defined by theologians, in the sense in which it is generally received, and if the *Register* denies that sense, he must forego the use of the word, for he has no right to use it in an arbitrary sense of his own. The first remark, therefore, which we make on this extract is, that it denies all faith and even the possibility of faith. Let this not be set down to the Unitarianism of its author. The same argument of ours has been commented on by Unitarians, Episcopalians, and Calvinists, and they all take the ground of the *Register* in opposition to it. We commend this fact to those of our Catholic friends who think us too severe and sweeping in our remarks, when we allege that Protestants have no faith, and even contend that faith is not possible. "There must somewhere be a point of contact between the infallible supernatural teacher and the weak and fallible disciple, and wherever that point is there is liability to mistake." If this be so, then there can, of course, be no infallible faith, and therefore all Christians may have been deceived, may have been mistaken in their belief that Christ has come into the world and suffered and died for them, — that there is a future life, a future judgment, a heaven and hell; and, notwithstanding their cheering hopes of immortality, they may have been like the beasts that perish. How true it is that they who are out of the Church have lost, not only faith, but all conception of faith in the proper sense of the term!

The *Register* is misled by its unsound philosophy, which makes the truth of all knowledge depend entirely on the subject knowing, or teaches that the light by which objects are apprehensible is a purely subjective light, and therefore that the object derives its intelligibility from the subject apprehending it. This is a mistake. We intellectually apprehend objects because they are intelligible, instead of their being intelligible because we apprehend them; and hence the light by which they are intelligible is objective, not subjective. Consequently, if that light is

infallible, the apprehension, as far as it goes, is infallible. Thus St. Thomas, who we dare cite even to the *Register* as a philosopher, maintains that the intellect is always true. It is very true, that there must always be somewhere a point of contact between the teacher and the disciple, but not therefore is there always liability to mistake on that point, because the affirmation is made by the teacher, and not by the disciple, by the virtue of the objective, and not the subjective light, and if the teacher is infallible, it is precisely on the point of contact that the disciple cannot mistake or be deceived. To deny this is to fall into universal scepticism, and a man who avows universal scepticism is not permitted to attempt to reason, for to reason is to affirm reason, and to assert the principle of certainty. If the *Register* falls back on universal scepticism, it cannot open its mouth to us, or say a single word for or against us; if it admits certainty at all, it must concede that on the point where the infallible teacher and the disciple come in contact there is no liability to mistake.

As to the attempted retort of our argument, we answer, there is a disparity. The Church is a living teacher and interprets her own words, the Bible is a dead book and does not interpret itself. If Christ were present speaking as he was present speaking to his Apostles, there would be necessarily no more liability of mistaking his words than those uttered by the Church. But when his words and those dictated by the Holy Ghost to the Apostles are not spoken by a living voice, but merely recorded, and recorded as they are in the Bible, no man of common sense and common honesty can pretend that they are no more liable to be mistaken than the teachings of the Church, always present, if there is any difficulty to explain it, and if any misapprehension to correct it. The retortion therefore fails, and again it is the *Register's* logic, not ours, that is at fault. It is it, not we, that should be accused of leaving "a fatal flaw" in the link that connects the engine to the cars. That was a rash accusation on the part of the *Register*.

"Such is the absurdity involved in Mr. Brownson's reasoning on the most momentous of all subjects." The absurdity is in the *Register's* own fancy. As yet it has not detected a single flaw in our reasoning, or substantiated its charges on a single point. "Yet because we



cannot acknowledge the monstrous assumptions of a Church which . . . . claims such a power, there is no end to the abuse that is poured upon us." No such thing, Mr. Register. In the first place, you are not abused at all; and in the second place, you are complained of, not because you cannot acknowledge "monstrous absurdities," but because you shut your eyes to plain truth, reject God's Church, and refuse to yield to solid reasons,—because you propagate doctrines as Christian truth which you know repose only on your private opinions, in regard to which you are well aware you may be mistaken, and for which you must yourself confess you have no adequate authority. You preach your own words instead of God's word, and thereby err yourself, and lead others into error to the ruin of their souls. This is why the severe language you cite from our pages against Protestants is used. That language is not complimentary, we concede; it is plain, strong, energetic, and very much to the purpose; but it is not abusive, for the conduct of Protestants even more than justifies it. Nor is it, as you insinuate, uttered in an angry tone. "This sounds to us like angry abuse poured out by an unsuccessful and disappointed assailant." The *Register* can hardly say this seriously of any language we have used. It cannot read our pages without being well aware that we never write under the influence of passion, that we write always with a perfect command of our own temper, and with words chosen with due deliberation. And in what have we been unsuccessful or disappointed? We have been unsuccessful in no controversy we have waged, and have been disappointed in nothing, or if in any thing, only in the feebleness and want of candor in our Protestant opponents. Compare our language with that habitually used by Protestants when speaking of Catholics and Catholicity, and it is the very quintessence of mildness itself. Even the *Register* itself, in this very article on which we are commenting, unconsciously uses language far more offensive to Catholics than any we have used is to Protestants, and yet we have selected it to reply to, because it is the least faulty in that respect of any article of the sort that has fallen under our eyes, save in the *Mercersburg Review*, the only Protestant periodical in the country with which we are acquainted, that does not feel itself at liberty to outrage common decency when it speaks of us

or of our Church. We suppose the *Register* calls a sentence like the following very polite and respectful: "When we think of Mr. Brownson, with his commanding intellect, his great intelligence and fearlessness of thought, his once Christian views of spiritual worship as due to God only, it is with painful humiliation and sadness that we find him *the victim of the low superstition* which is implied in language like the following from his preface: 'Placing this volume, though all unworthy, under the protection of Our Blessed Lady, as I do myself and all my labors and interests, I send it forth to the public,' &c." Here the critic plainly charges us with having become the victim of idolatry and superstition, when, poor man! it is doubtful whether he can give even an intelligible definition of either. "When once a man has wandered from the simplicity of the Christian faith, and given up the truth as it is in Jesus, there is no end to the degradation and delusion into which he may be led." Nothing more true, and if the *Register* has any doubts on the subject, the study of Protestant heresiarchs and sects will remove them. "The history of such a mind is one which we look upon with profound pity and sorrow." We look upon it with the same feeling. "The mournful absurdities into which the powerful intellect has involved itself is the least painful part of the picture." No doubt of it.

Now all this lamentation over us is mere affectation, and the *Register* cannot even hope to deceive even the most credulous of its readers by it. Unitarians, generally, entertain a far higher and a far sincerer respect for us personally than they did when we were one of themselves. Their very deportment to us when we meet any of them proves it. The profound pity and sorrow the *Register* speaks of on our account is all moonshine. Why should its excellent editor feel either? He does not doubt that we are at least as safe as a Catholic as we should be as a Unitarian; for he and his Unitarian brethren hold a man can be saved in any religion, or in none at all. None of them believe in the eternal punishment of the sinner. In the Christian sense, they believe in neither heaven nor hell, and the only future state they acknowledge, unless they have very much changed of late, is the continuance of the soul in a future natural life. As to idolatry, the *Register* well knows that our views of worship are, to say the least, as spiritual as

ever they were, and that no Catholic believes it right to pay supreme worship to any but God alone. As for superstition, we were in the habit of praying to the Blessed Virgin and the saints when a Unitarian minister, and also for the dead. It *was* superstition in us then, we fear, but it is not now ; for now we have authority for doing so, and we ask nothing of the saints that they are not able to do. If we had dedicated our volume to our natural mother, and placed it under her protection, the *Register* would never have dreamed of calling it superstition. Let him remember that Our Blessed Lady, our spiritual mother, is equally near and dear to us, and loves us with a purer and far more tender love. If the Blessed Virgin had been still alive on earth, the *Register* would not have called us the victim of superstition if we had placed it under her protection. Well, let him know that the Blessed Virgin is as truly living as when she stood by the foot of the cross, and has none the less power to grant us the protection we ask of her. We call her Blessed ; will the *Register* dare deny that she is blessed, and the most blessed among women ?

But enough. The remainder of the article contains nothing calling particularly for remark. We have considered and replied to every thing like argument we have been able to detect in the *Register's* article, and we have aimed to reply fairly and logically to every point it has made. We trust we have replied with at least as much candor and courtesy as the *Register* itself has observed. We have replied to the article, notwithstanding it appeared in the columns of a weekly paper, because it seemed for the most part to be seriously written, and because, though short, it contains the best that Protestants can say against us or our Church, the sum and substance of all that approaches to argument they ever have said or ever will say. They may write volumes, but they will say no more than the *Register* has said. We trust, therefore, our readers will pardon us the space we have given it, and not accuse us of making too much of a small thing. Our logic was assailed, and we have chosen to indicate it, because in so doing we could show how weak and insignificant is all that Protestants have to allege against the Church, and therefore how unimportant it is to pay any attention to their objections.

ART. III. *Resolutions unanimously adopted by the Democratic National Convention which assembled at Baltimore, June 1, 1852.*

It is not so easy to comprehend American politics, and to form a tolerable judgment of the respective merits or demerits of the two great political parties which have divided, or now divide, the country, as many of our learned newspaper editors appear to imagine. We live under a complicated political system, — a general government for certain specified purposes, and State governments for all the remaining purposes of government. Under one aspect we are one independent national sovereignty, with only a single government; under another, we are thirty-one independent sovereignties, with thirty-one independent governments. Foreigners, and even many native-born citizens, are very liable to mistake the mutual relation of the Union and the States, and to assume that the general is in all respects the supreme government of the country, and that the States are only prefectures or subordinate governments, dependent on the Union, deriving their powers from it, and instituted by it for the purposes of local administration. But such is not the case. The general government, both in law and in fact, is subsequent to the States, and in all respects their creature. It derives its existence, its constitution, and all its powers from them, not they theirs from it.

The two governments, again, rest on different bases, and demand different rules for the construction of their respective powers. The general government is founded by the States, originates in compact, and has only the powers expressed in the compact, and such incidental powers as are necessary to their exercise. The State governments originate in that social necessity in which all governments, in the last analysis, originate, and hold under the law of nature, or, more properly, under the law of God, from which all human governments derive their legitimacy, their legal powers, or their right to command and to coerce obedience. They have all the rightful powers of government not denied them by their own constitutions or expressly delegated to the Union. The general government, before acting, must inquire whether the power it proposes

to exercise has been granted ; the State government, before exercising a power, has only to inquire whether it has been forbidden.

The State governments have a character of their own, as republican, democratic, aristocratic, free states or slave states ; the general government has no character of its own, and takes whatever character it has from the States creating it. It is not necessarily democratic or aristocratic, in favor of popular freedom or opposed to it. True, Congress is bound to guaranty to each State a republican constitution ; but whether the guaranty is to the Union that each State shall be republican, or a guaranty of the Union to each State of a republican constitution, if such be its choice, may perhaps be a question. If the latter interpretation be admissible, the States may, if they choose, adopt the monarchical form of government, and the Union be thus a union of monarchical instead of simple republican states, without any change in its own character or constitution. But if this interpretation, as generally held, and most likely correctly held, be inadmissible, and it is obligatory on every State to adopt and maintain the republican form of government, still no State is bound to adopt a democratic constitution. A republican government does by no means necessarily imply a democratic government. Rome was a republic, but it was never a democracy ; Venice was a republic, but it was an aristocracy, nearly, if not quite, an oligarchy ; Switzerland and Holland were both republics at the time of our Revolution, but neither showed any inclination to a democracy. France, while we are writing, is a republic, but the whole positive power of the nation is vested in the prince-president, and the people have, even with universal suffrage, only a qualified negative on the acts of government, similar in its nature, though not in its form, to the tribunitial veto under the republican constitution of ancient Rome. According to the usage of writers on government at the time the Federal Constitution was framed and adopted, a republican government is any government without a king or emperor. Under any interpretation of the Constitution, then, the States have reserved to themselves the right to adopt any form of government not monarchical. They may vest the whole power of the state in an hereditary aristocracy, in the class of rich men, of poor men, in two or more classes combined, or govern-

ing as separate estates, or they may vest it in the whole people, whether noble or ignoble, learned or unlearned, rich or poor, and whichever they do the government will be republican, and perfectly compatible both with the letter and the spirit of the constitution of the Union.

Political parties, consequently, under our system, are to be considered in a twofold relation,—in relation to the general government, and in relation to the State governments, or, as we may say, to government in general. The two relations have no necessary dependence on one another. The principles and policy of a party in relation to the constitution and administration of the general government do not necessarily determine its principles and policy in relation to the constitution and administration of the State governments, nor the principles and policy of a party with regard to the latter determine its principles and policy with regard to the former. The terms *republican*, *democratic*, *aristocratic*, when applied to the general government, have no meaning, as the terms *Federalist* and *State Rights* have no meaning when applied to the several state governments. A *national democratic* party is under our system an absurdity, for all the questions which pertain to the constitution of government in general are reserved to the several State governments. Questions of aristocracy, of democracy, oligarchy, of liberty or slavery, universal or restricted suffrage, social equality, and the like, belong to a party as a State party, not as a Federal or national party. To a national party can belong only such questions as relate to the respective powers of the general and State governments, to foreign policy, to commerce, finance, national defence, and the general welfare of the Union. It would save some confusion, and many serious mistakes, if the two classes of questions were kept distinct, and parties were considered separately in relation to each, and not as necessarily right or wrong in regard to the one because right or wrong in regard to the other.

The parties in this country were at first, after the Revolution, named in reference to the general government. From 1787 to 1798, they were named Federalists and Anti-Federalists; from 1798 to 1820, Federalists and Republicans; from 1820 to 1824, Republicans only; from 1824 to 1832, National Republicans and simply Republicans or Democratic Republicans; from 1832 to the present

time, the two great leading parties have been called Whigs and Democrats. Here the only party names in use since 1798 at all applicable to a national party, or a party in regard to the Union, are *Federalist*, and perhaps *Whig*. The other names designate, if any thing, the views of parties in relation to government in general, and therefore belong to the parties only as State parties.

The names *Federalist* and *Anti-Federalist* originated at the time of the formation and adoption of the Federal Constitution. When the Colonies met in Congress and declared their independence of the British crown, they drew up and adopted certain Articles of Confederation. These articles were found by experience to be inadequate to the wants of the country, and wholly insufficient for the purposes of a firm and efficient national government. The several States, consequently, appointed delegates to meet in convention to revise and amend them. The convention met in Philadelphia in 1787, and, instead of revising and amending the old Articles of Confederation, drew up and proposed to the States for their ratification a Federal Constitution, creating a *union* instead of a *confederation* of the States, — a general government empowered to act, within its prescribed sphere, immediately on the people of the several States, instead of a Congress able to act on them, as under the old Confederation, only through the medium of the several State governments, which it had no power to coerce into obedience. Those who were in favor of ratifying this Constitution by the several States were called Federalists; those who were opposed to it, as Patrick Henry in Virginia and Samuel Adams in Massachusetts, whether on the ground of its reserving too little power to the States or giving too much power to the Union, especially to the Federal executive, were called Anti-Federalists. The two parties, as parties with regard to the Union, were appropriately enough named, and the name *Federalist* designated a friend and supporter of the Union. Happily for the country, the Federalists were able to obtain the ratification of the Constitution by the several States, and to organize, in 1789, the government, under George Washington as President, and John Adams as Vice-President. They continued in power, and to administer the government, till March 4, 1801, when Mr. Jefferson and his party came in.

Under General Washington's first Presidential term party spirit did not run high in the country ; but under his second term it raged with great violence, embittered by new questions which had been raised by the French Revolution, and the war between England and France growing out of that Revolution. Mr. Jefferson took the lead in the opposition, and in his private correspondence at home and abroad denounced the administration in no measured terms, hardly sparing, if indeed he did spare, the Father of his Country himself. The opposition to the Constitution had pretty much disappeared ; several amendments had been proposed and adopted, which removed the principal objections of Mr. Jefferson and the Anti-Federalists ; but opposition to the administration took the place of opposition to the Constitution, and in 1798, after the election of Mr. Adams instead of Mr. Jefferson to the Presidency, it became formidable. This opposition, organized under Mr. Jefferson's lead, took the name of *Republican*, a name that belongs, and under our system can properly belong, to no party in relation to the Union. The name was insidiously chosen, with the usual disingenuousness of party, and designed to imply, not only that the party bearing it were in favor of the republican form of government, which would have been well enough, but that the Federalists, their opponents, were anti-republican, and in favor of monarchy. Here was gross injustice. Mr. Jefferson and his party were undoubtedly republicans, if not democrats ; but so also were the Federalists. There never has been a monarchical party in this country. The people, indeed, did not make the Revolution and achieve national independence because opposed to monarchy, or for the purpose of establishing a republic ; but they were, and from the first had been, republican. Even the Loyalists of the Revolution adhered to the mother country from loyalty, interest, habit, association, hopes or fears, not because they were attached to monarchy and opposed to republican government ; at least this was true of the great majority of them. Individuals in the Federalist party may have held that a limited monarchy, like that of Great Britain, where practicable, is preferable to a republic, but none of them ever believed such a government to be practicable in the United States. Such was confessedly the case with Mr. Alexander Hamilton ; but even he, as Mr. Jefferson himself acknowledges,



held that a monarchy was wholly impracticable here, and that it would be the height of folly to attempt to introduce it. George Washington, John Adams, and some other eminent patriots and statesmen, no doubt, agreed with him in his monarchical preferences, but they were as firmly resolved to sustain the republic, and as ready to oppose every attempt to introduce monarchical institutions, as were Mr. Jefferson and his partisans themselves. Individuals, also, there may be now, and not a few too, who, when suffering some pique from the democracy, or alarmed at the mad policy of our radicals, fancy themselves to be in favor of monarchy; but there is not and never has been any monarchical party in the country, and never have our politics turned in any sense whatever on the questions between monarchy and republicanism.

Mr. Jefferson and his party, however, saw proper to accuse the old Federalists of being anti-republican, and of aiming at the establishment of monarchy. They succeeded but too well in making a large portion of the American people believe it, and the prejudices they created still linger in the minds of not a few of our citizens. He who should pronounce himself in favor of the old Federalists would stand a very good chance of being termed by the infallible American press a monarchist, and, as such, of being held up to public indignation. Yet the accusation was false, and known by Mr. Jefferson, as well as others, to be false. He himself confesses it, and says in his first Inaugural Address: "We have called brethren of the same faith by different names. We are all federalists; we are all republicans." Wherefore, then, had he charged his opponents with being monarchists? It was party injustice, and has to be put down to the unscrupulousness of party spirit, from which Mr. Jefferson, we are sorry to say, was not himself entirely free. Both parties, then, agreed as to their general principles of government. Both were republican, both held, after the fashion of the times, the origin of government in compact, in a real or imaginary popular convention, and both asserted the sovereignty of the people. Both, also, agreed that the union, instead of a mere confederation, of the States must be preserved. Wherein, then, did they differ?

This question requires a twofold answer; first, in relation to the general government, and, second, in relation to the

State governments, or government in general. In relation to the general government, the Federalists wished to consolidate its powers, and to give it as much the character of a supreme central government as could be done without transcending its constitutional limits. Their tendency was to develop and confirm the powers of the Union, rather than the reserved rights of the States. Their policy was to render the government strong and efficient at home, and respectable abroad; to protect commerce and navigation, to found a navy and to maintain an army to prevent national insults, and to protect our maritime and national rights. These were, in brief, the principles and policy of the Federalists. The Republicans were more intent on the reserved rights of the States than on the powers granted to the Union, were opposed to making the Federal government a strong government, and in favor of restricting its sphere, and diminishing the patronage of the executive, as far as possible under the Constitution. They clamored for "retrenchment and economy," opposed the accumulation of a national debt, the general fundholding system, the creation of a navy, the maintenance of an army, and the protection of commerce and navigation, otherwise than by diplomacy and bargain. They were in favor of leaving our commerce to foreigners, to be carried on in foreign vessels, and of pocketing national insults, instead of going to the expense of guarding against them or of redressing them. Mr. Jefferson had no very lively sensibility to national honor, and lived in mortal dread of war and national expenditures. If he had been a son of the cold, calculating North, instead of the warm, chivalric South, of Massachusetts instead of Virginia, it is probable we should never have heard the last of his tameness, his meanness of spirit, and his fear of expense; and certain it is, that we owe to him and his party much of that low national character which we still bear abroad, — that common belief among foreigners that an American will do any thing and put up with any thing — for money. Another war with Great Britain, perhaps, is needed to enable us to retrieve our character, and prove that there is something that Yankees prize more than money.

The natural tendency of the Republican party, pushed to its extreme, would have too much restricted the powers of the general government, made the Union a mere rope

of sand, and thrown the country back into that chaotic state from which the Constitution had rescued it. Its policy would, if carried out, have rendered the government inefficient at home and contemptible abroad, exposed our trade, our maritime and national rights, to perpetual insult and injury, and prevented us from ever becoming a great commercial and manufacturing people. It was, therefore, a policy which, with such a bold and enterprising people, and in a country of such rich and varied natural resources as ours, could by no human possibility be practicable, except for a very brief period. The tendency of the Federalists, if pushed to its extreme, might have swallowed up the States in the Union, and deprived us of the advantages of that federative element so essential in our system of government. But the general policy of the party was unobjectionable, and has, with the exception of one or two particulars, been adopted to the letter by the Republican party, and become the settled policy of the country. There was, however, never much danger of the centralizing tendency of the Federalists being pushed to an extreme, and we have been unable to find an instance in which the party while in power transcended its constitutional limits or usurped for the Union any of the reserved rights of the States. The Republican party, after all, was, when in power, more of a State Rights party in profession than in practice. The Federalists may have had the stronger tendency to centralization through the legislative and judicial departments of the government; but the Republicans had much the stronger tendency to it through the executive department; which shows that the Republicans were far more likely to develop into monarchists than were the Federalists whom they charged with being in favor of monarchy. No Federalist ever grasped more power for the Union than did Mr. Jefferson in his purchase of Louisiana, and his Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts. No Federalist document was ever issued containing stronger centralizing doctrines than those set forth in General Jackson's famous proclamation against the Southern Nullifiers. While, on the other hand, the Federalists in the Hartford Convention pushed the State Rights doctrines to the very verge of nullification. In fact, either party, when in power, tended to magnify the powers of the Union, and widen the sphere of the general government as much as possible, while either,

in opposition, fell back more or less on the reserved rights of the States.

In regard to those principles of government which find their application with us only within the sphere of the State governments, there were also important differences, as well as resemblances. Both, as we have said, were republican, both asserted the sovereignty of the people, and the origin of government in convention; but the Federalists inclined to a republic of the respectabilities, and the Republicans to a democracy. The difference between the two parties was analogous to that between the Girondins and the Mountain or Jacobins in France. Both agreed in rejecting monarchy and decapitating the king; but the Girondins were for retaining the power in the hands of the *Bourgeoisie*, — the merchants, manufacturers, tradesmen, and property-holders, who would supply the place of the old nobility; but the Jacobins insisted on placing the power of the state in the hands of the *sans culottes* or the populace, where it would be more generally at the service of the demagogues. The Republicans professed great confidence in popular instincts and judgments, and were in favor of leaving them free to manage the government as they should see proper, without any but self-imposed restrictions on their will, passions, or caprices; the Federalists held that the people might sometimes deceive themselves, and still oftener be deceived by the arts, intrigues, and declamations of demagogues, and therefore that some restrictions should be placed on their power, and some care should be taken to confine its exercise to those who could give a pledge to the public that they would not abuse it. The Republicans were intent on providing for the free and full expression of the popular will in the government; the Federalists thought more of providing against the abuses of power, and obtaining a reasonable security that the popular will in governing would govern justly. The Federalists loved liberty, and were as ready to make any sacrifice for it as were their opponents; but they and the Republicans did not mean the same thing by liberty. The Republican understood by liberty the liberty of the people, unrestrained by kings or nobles, to govern; the Federalist, as distinguished from him, understood by liberty the freedom of the subject, or his free possession and enjoyment of his natural and vested rights as inviolable in

the face of political power. The Republican dreaded the tyranny of the few over the people as the ruling power; the Federalist, the tyranny of the many, and of power in whose hands soever lodged; the former sought the freedom of the people as government to rule, the latter the freedom of the individual to possess. The Republican would remove all restrictions on the power of the people as sovereign, and establish absolute, unlimited government; the Federalist would limit their power as sovereign or as the state, and by wise and wholesome laws secure their freedom as individuals; the former would have a free state, the latter free men. The Republican, perhaps without knowing it, sought to establish social despotism, the Federalist personal freedom, for the state is as despotic when the power is lodged in the hands of the whole people, with full freedom to govern according to their arbitrary will, as when lodged in the hands of a single ruler, under an absolute monarchy. Properly speaking, then, the Federalists were the party of liberty, and the Republicans the party of despotism. The Federalist placed the sovereignty in the people regulated and restrained by law; the Republican placed it in the people without law, and therefore made the government a government of mere human will, which is the very essence of despotism.

Undoubtedly, the pretence, and, we willingly concede, the belief, of the Republican party was the reverse of all this. They no doubt imagined that, if the political power was vested in the whole people, and if all obstacles to the free and full expression of their will in the government were removed, not only the freedom of the people as the state, but the freedom of the people as individuals, that is, the freedom of the people distributively as well as collectively, would be secured. But they forgot that power, in whose hands soever lodged, is always liable to be abused; that there is always a large class of individuals, called courtiers in a monarchy, demagogues in a democratic republic, who make it their business to flatter and deceive the sovereign power, and induce it to abuse its trusts; and that every government of absolute will, whether the will of the many, the few, or the one, is essentially a despotism, and wholly incompatible with the individual liberty or the personal freedom of the subject. The objections to the modern democratic theory are twofold. One objection is, that it leads to

anarchy, because it derives the right to govern from a human source, and denies the divine origin of all legal power. Before the law of nature, and even before the eternal law, all men are equal; and if all are equal, no one has any right to govern another, and consequently every government of man over man, or of men over men, must be founded in usurpation, and every one has an indefeasible right to resist it whenever he pleases, which is anarchy. But this is not the greatest objection to the theory. The greatest objection is of a contrary character, namely, that pure, unlimited democracy is social despotism, and enslaves the people distributively to the people collectively. Under a pure democracy the individual has a certain nominal freedom as a part of the governing body, but not a particle as a part of the body governed. The will of the community, of the majority, is unlimited, and governs as absolutely as the will of an Oriental despot. There is no redress, whatever wrongs it may inflict on the individual, because it is all-powerful, and has no conscience, — as an individual despot may have, for conscience pertains to the individual, never to the people as a collective body. Hence, democratic governments are always the most arbitrary of all governments, and the most oppressive and merciless of all tyrants in every land are always the democrats who happen for a moment to find themselves in power, as was abundantly proved in the old French Revolution, and as has been fully confirmed by the horrors of the recent Red Republican revolutions. The world has no name for the complete democratic *régime* but the Reign of Terror. It must be so, because the heart of man in every individual is naturally corrupt, and men in masses are infinitely more corrupt than as individuals. Who knows not that men in crowds will do acts without compunction, from which, if thrown on their individual responsibility, they would shrink with horror?

The great objection to the old Republican party was its tendency to establish the unlimited authority of the people as the governing power, and therefore social despotism. Its activity was constantly exerted to render the government a government of supreme popular will instead of a government of law. It labored incessantly to abolish all the restrictions it found established by law on the will of the people, and to reduce all to a common level. It would suffer nothing to remain inviolable, or above the power of

the people as the state. Thus it attacked and sought to abolish all vested rights. It reduced all corporations to the same category, and maintained that their charters, for whatever purpose granted, might be altered, modified, repealed, or vacated at the will of the legislature. And because the Common Law protected vested rights, it proposed its abolition, and with it, that there might be no power in the state to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign people, they sought, and their continuators still seek, to destroy the independence of the judiciary, by making the judges elective by popular suffrage for a short term of office, and reëligible. Their doctrine, carried out, would place all vested rights, and indeed the possessions of every man, at the mercy of the sovereign people, or rather of the unprincipled and noisy demagogues who for the most part control them. The Federalists, on the contrary, asserted the sacredness of vested rights, the inviolability of contracts, the whole Common Law doctrine of corporations, and the obligation of the government to protect and vindicate the rights of property. They contended for the Common Law and an independent judiciary, as the surest, and in fact the only, safeguard for personal freedom against the encroachments of power, and in so doing justly deserved against the Republicans the title of the party of freedom.

Such were the two great parties, and such their respective tendencies, principles, and policies, — their agreement, and their differences. The Republican party, after a violent struggle, came into power, as we have said, in 1801, under the lead of the sage of Monticello, and they or their successors have remained in power most of the time since. The war with Great Britain, in 1812, compelled them to abandon Mr. Jefferson's policy, his gun-boat system and all, and to adopt substantially, as to the general government, the policy of Washington and Adams, the old Federalist policy. In consequence of the adoption of their policy by the general government, the Federalists, after the peace of 1815, offered them but a feeble opposition, and in 1820, on the reëlection of Mr. Monroe, disbanded, and have since ceased to exist as a party. Under Mr. Monroe's second term, and during the election of his successor, in 1824, there was, nominally, only one party, the Republican, in the country. All the divisions claimed to be Republican, and all the candidates voted for in the Presidential election,

Mr. Crawford of Georgia, Henry Clay of Kentucky, Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, and John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, were all members of the Republican party, and only the last mentioned had ever been a member of the Federalist party. After the election of Mr. Adams, the administration party began to be called National Republicans, and the opposition, who rallied under the lead of General Jackson as a second Jefferson, were called simply Republicans, and occasionally Democratic Republicans. Both parties continued to be designated by these names till 1832, when, on the reelection of President Jackson, the National Republicans assumed the name of Whigs, and the Republicans became Democratic Republicans and simply Democrats, as at present.

The Whigs are only the National Republicans, and the Democrats only the Democratic Republicans, under other names; but the Whigs are not precisely the same with the old Federalists, nor do the Democrats continue in all respects the old Republicans. In their principles and policy as to the general government the Democrats stand on the old Federalist platform, except in one or two particulars, which we shall soon mention; but in regard to government in general, they are the old Republicans developed, or come to maturity, that is, as we find them in the Northern, Western, and Middle States. The Whigs, in relation to the general government, adopt in the main the old Federalist policy, especially those portions of it not adopted by the Democrats; in regard to government in general, they are divided: a respectable minority of them adopt the conservative views of the old Federalists, but the rest are as radical as their Democratic opponents.

The Federalists originally represented the commercial, and in general the business interests of the country; the Republicans the farming and planting or agricultural interests. The Federalists may be said to have been the urban party; the Republicans, the rural or country party, and if the landed estates had not in general been small and nearly equally divided, they would have corresponded to the Tory party in England in the reign of Queen Anne. They were for an economical government, and opposed to the fundholding and banking system, and consequently to the accumulation of a national debt. They wished the people to live independently on their own lands, cared little



for trade and commerce, and looked with distrust on the system of industry inaugurated by the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, which has placed Great Britain at the head of the industrial world, and nearly ruined the agricultural class in all Western Europe. This was the good side of the Republican party, that which gave it its preponderance, and has hitherto maintained it in power. The agricultural interests were, and perhaps still are,—at the polls,—the stronger interests of the country. It was the fact that the Democratic party, in 1838, took decidedly its stand on the side of the landed interests, and sought to arrest the growth of the modern industrial system, which must sooner or later ruin every nation that encourages it, that led us to give it our own feeble support, although in most other respects we had not, and never had had, much sympathy with it.

We have spoken of the good points in the Federalist policy; but that policy, after all, had its objectionable features. The Federalists wished to consolidate the government, to render it strong and efficient, and to check the tendency to democratic excess. So far they were right. But, unhappily, they were bred in the school of English Whiggism, and sought to strengthen the government, to consolidate the Union, and to guard against the excesses of democracy, mainly by means of the moneyed, as distinguished from the landed, interests of the country. They were not the aristocratic party properly so called against the democratic party, the party of the rich against the poor, but properly the business men against the producers. They were conservative, but they sought the conservative force needed by subjecting the government to fundholders, bankers, brokers, traders, merchants, manufacturers,—in a word, to what we call the business classes of the community, and in making it the instrument of their special interests. This policy, avowedly the policy of Mr. Alexander Hamilton, and a dominant tendency in the whole Federalist party, has been fully developed and adopted by the present Whig party, though the Democrats in the Northern, Western, and Middle States also adopt it, to no inconsiderable extent. It is an exceedingly objectionable policy. The business classes of society, merchants, traders, manufacturers, bankers, stock-brokers, &c., may be as honest and as intelligent as the other classes of society, but they are not a permanent class, with always the same general in-

terests. They and their interests fluctuate with all the fluctuations of trade, change with the ever-changing markets of the world. They can never be relied on as an independent national party, because their interests are rarely identical with those of the nation. They are mixed up with the interests of the corresponding classes of other nations, and affected by every measure of government which affects the business interests of a foreign country. In the Revolution they were patriotic, ardently devoted to national independence, because they were the chief sufferers by the colonial policy of the mother country; during the European wars growing out of the French Revolution of 1789, they urged upon Congress the importance of maintaining a navy, and protecting our maritime rights, because it was their particular interests that were exposed, and would thus be protected; but they would be the last to support the government in case it had serious injuries to redress against Great Britain, or any other nation whose business interests are intimately connected with our own.

The grand error of the Federalists was not in seeking to restrain the democratic excesses, for that is what every party in favor of liberty should seek, but in seeking the necessary restraints in the business classes and moneyed interests of the country, instead of seeking them in a powerful and permanent class of landed proprietors;—not indeed because landholders are wiser or more honest than business men, but because they are more independent in their position, and their interests are less fluctuating, subject to fewer sudden changes, and more permanent. It was natural that the Federalists should fall into this error, for they were at the time, as we have said, the representatives of the business interests of the country, and were, moreover, perverted by the urban system of the English Whigs. But the error was none the less grave on that account. The government can never be stable and permanent, save when it reposes on the stable and permanent interests of land, and perhaps one of the greatest mistakes of American legislation has been in throwing land into the market as a mere article of merchandise.

Experience has sufficiently proved that no state can long survive as a free and well-ordered state, which makes no account of families. A nation of isolated individuals, or of families which in one generation emerge from obscurity to

fall into obscurity again in the next, stands on the brink of ruin, if not ruined already. We are in this country rapidly approaching this state of things. We have no families; we are little more than a huge mass of individuals, without family influence, family ties, affections, or associations. We have no ancestors; we can hope for no descendants. We have no ancestral home or fame to preserve, and can count on no posterity to whom we can leave our own worth or glory as an inheritance. Few of us had grandfathers, few of us will have grandsons. Many of us are early torn from the home of our parents, and live, though in our own country, in the midst of strangers. Even the very wife we press to our bosom not unfrequently was a stranger to our youth, and has no early associations and affections in common with us. The warm household feelings and the love of home are early withered or stunted in their growth; we grow up cold and solitary, and seek indemnification for the pleasures of the heart, in the gross and loathsome pleasures of the senses. No fear of breaking a father's or a mother's heart, no dread of disgracing ourselves in the eyes of the companions of our early life, restrains the great, active mass of our community; and we find ourselves ready for any adventure that offers,—open to every vice or crime that tempts us. Such we are, or are hastening to become, and therefore have we lost, or are rapidly losing, all those family ties, family affections, those moral elements of character, without which it is impossible to maintain stable, permanent, wise, and efficient government.

The principal remedy for the frightful state to which we are so rapidly hastening is in a speedy and ample provision for the permanence and influence of families. Our statesmen believed that they were doing wisely in abolishing the old colonial laws which favored the growth and influence of families, in passing statutes of distribution, and in providing for the equal distribution of intestate property. They saw that in so doing they prevented the growth of a landed aristocracy; but they did not sufficiently consider, that, in guarding against one evil, we not unfrequently open the door to another and still greater. A republic no more than a monarchy, nay, far less than a monarchy, can subsist without a numerous and permanent class of landed proprietors, with a distinct representation in the state.

The consequences of the hostility to a landed aristocracy, early manifested by our statesmen, have been, to subject the country to what may be called the urban aristocracy, the aristocracy of business, cotton-mills, and money-bags, and to substitute soulless corporations for living and breathing families. The effect has been to destroy the only tolerable aristocracy, and to build up the most intolerable aristocracy that is easily conceived. There is no use in making wry faces at this, or calling hard names; the fact is as we state it, and any man with half an eye can see it, if he will.

The true policy in such a country as ours, destined to be a great commercial and manufacturing as well as a great agricultural country, is not in universal suffrage, as the Democrats hold, nor in restricted suffrage, as the Federalists contended; but, as we hold to be very certain, in separating the business classes and the agricultural, and representing them in the government as distinct estates, each with a negative on the other. A proposition of this sort was made by Mr. Gouverneur Morris in the Convention which framed the Federal Constitution. In a speech on the basis of the Federal Senate, speaking of the business — whom he regards as the wealthy — classes of the community, he remarked that we must expect them to abuse power if they can get it, for that is in human nature, and get it they surely will, if you leave them to mingle and vote with the other and poorer classes. To prevent their undue influence, you must form them into a separate interest, that is, in principle, erect them into a separate estate, which would prevent them from being enslaved by the democracy, and also from establishing their exclusive dominion and enslaving the rest.\* The speech proves that Mr. Morris had hit upon a principle both true and profound; but it is very clear from the application he proposed to make of it, that he was far from having fully mastered it. To have constituted the Federal Senate on property with members for life would have done nothing to restrain either the democracy or the business classes in the several State governments, where is to be sought the source of both dangers. The danger in either respect is to be guarded against principally by the mode of constituting the several State governments, not by

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\* Madison Papers, 1018 — 1020.

the Constitution of the Union, — a fact which too many of our statesmen overlook.

Some respect, we dare assert, is due to the experience of mankind, and that experience in all countries and in all ages has directed them to seek the independence of the state and the freedom of the subject in organizing the government as a government of estates. Nothing hinders us, if we choose, from so organizing our own several State governments. We have in the possessions, conditions, and occupations of our people lying ready to our hand the elements of three estates, which we may term respectively the Agricultural, the Urban, and the Proletarian, understanding by this last term the laboring classes, as distinguished, on the one hand, from the urban or business classes, — the *Bourgeoisie*, — and, on the other, from the landed proprietors, whether large or small. The professional classes may rank, the clergy with the agricultural class, and the lawyers and medical practitioners with the urban. These three estates should sit, not in one house, but each estate in a house of its own, with a negative on the other two. Suffrage might still be universal, but each class should vote only for members of its own house. Representatives in Congress might be chosen indifferently from any one of the classes, by the concurring vote of all three estates; the President of the United States, and the Governors of the several States might be chosen by all the classes voting in common, as now, and the other officers of government, State or national, might be appointed by the executive, the legislature, or the executive and legislative branches in concurrence, very much as they have been hitherto. Such a constitution would not be essentially different from the one really intended by our fathers, and would have its root in what is the internal constitution of American society. It would be only rendering significant and practical the principle which led to the separation of the legislature in all the States into two houses, and would incorporate into our system of government the best features of the English system, and of the constitution of ancient Republican Rome, while it would give to the laboring classes a security, a protection, and an importance, which, so far as we are informed, they have never yet enjoyed under any system of government. Such a modification of our constitution of government would protect the rights of

all classes, and restrain us from the excesses in either direction into which we are now running. But we cannot expect our statesmen to favor it, or even to entertain it for consideration, and therefore, though we suggest it in passing, we take good care not to propose it as something to be seriously contended for. The framers of our constitutions, placing an undue confidence in written constitutions, which experience proves, in so far as they are only written constitutions, to be worth less than the parchment on which they are engrossed, thought they might secure the great ends of government in a different way. It is pretty evident now that they erred. The Federalists erred in seeking to provide for the preponderance of the urban classes; the Republicans erred still more in opposing a government of estates, in laboring to prevent the growth and permanence of families, and in seeking, as far as possible, the division and the equalization of landed property. Equality of political rights is, perhaps, practicable, but equality in property, in social position, and in influence, is an idle dream,—never was realized in any civilized community, and never can be. It is not only idle, but undesirable, and the degree of equality we have attained in this country has been attained only by levelling downwards, and producing a lower general average of manners, morals, intelligence, and worth. The business of life must go on, and if it does, some must be up and some down, some must be captains and some common soldiers, and some presidents, governors, and judges, and some cooks and shoeblacks, and those qualified for the higher stations will be disqualified for the lower, and those qualified for the lower will not be qualified for the higher. Place your whole community on a level with its topmost round, and society must come to an end through default of classes to perform its lower offices; and place all on a level at the lowest, and it must also come to an end through default of classes qualified to perform its higher offices. In government both property and men should be represented, and so represented that the one cannot swallow up the other. In order to secure this end, you must classify and represent both property and men, so that each class may have the means of protecting itself against the other. It is then always rather the equality of classes we should aim at than the equality of individuals, save in mere personal rights, in

regard to which the lowest should be placed on the same footing with the highest. The sooner, therefore, we give up our dreams of an equality of social condition and influence, the better for all concerned.

But the Federalists, though they took in some respects a wrong direction, were not so exclusively wedded to the business interests of the country as are the present Whigs. The Whigs on purely constitutional questions are, as a federal party, at least as sound as the Democratic party, and we find in their platform as drawn up by their late Baltimore Convention very little to object to on this head. The grand objection to the Whigs is, that they seek to administer the government too exclusively in favor of the business interests of the country, to make it in some sense the slave of the money power, or rather of that huge credit system through which the Rothschilds, the Barings, and other great bankers, principally Jews, become the real sovereigns of the modern world, and bring the destinies of nations to be decided on 'Change,—the meanest and the most ruinous system ever invented,—the most fatal to the independence of the nation and to the freedom of the subject, as well as to public and private morals. We do not object to the Whigs because they are in favor of a protective tariff. The question of protection or free trade admits of no universal solution. It is a practical question, to be decided by each nation for itself, according to its particular interests and circumstances at the time. Whenever its circumstances permit, it is no doubt the duty of every nation to encourage and protect its own industry, so as to render its well-being as independent of foreign nations as possible. We are not in favor of copartnerships with nations for copartners, and we look with as little affection on the commercial brotherhood of nations preached by Cobden, Bright, & Co., as on the Jacobinical brotherhood contended for by Messrs. Mazzini, Kossuth, & Co. Then, again, the Democratic party do not on the question of a protective tariff differ in principle from the Whigs. The protective system, or the American system, as it was called, originated with the Republican party, and was fastened on the country in opposition to the Federalists, especially of New England, who were, as their interests led them to be, free-traders. The Democratic party, when in power, with individual exceptions, have always supported a protective

tariff. The present tariff, imposed by a Democratic administration and a Democratic Congress, is a protective tariff, and the only difference on the subject between the two parties, at least in the Northern, Middle, and Western States, is merely a difference of more and less. The Whigs would be satisfied with the present tariff, if home valuation for foreign, and specific for *ad valorem* duties, were substituted, two changes which, we confess, we are not prepared to oppose. No; the real objection to the Whig party is that it is the business party, the party of the fundholders, bankers, brokers, traders, and manufacturers, — in a word, of the modern credit and industrial systems, against which we are bound to be on our guard.

But this same objection applies, at present, with nearly equal force to the Democratic party, unless it be in the slaveholding or planting States. The urban system, the system of the English Whigs under the reign of Queen Anne, so strenuously, but ineffectually, opposed by Swift and Bolingbroke, has been adopted by both parties, and in respect to this system the two parties are mere divisions of one and the same party. The main question at issue between them is, which shall get the lion's share of the spoils. The country party, save in the planting States, has ceased to exist. The agricultural interest has no representative out of those States, and though it still counts for something in the election of President, it has little power to influence the general policy of the administration, or to determine the action of Congress. The policy of the government rests on the business interests of the country, and will, let which party may succeed in the election, be determined by Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, St. Louis, and Cincinnati. The present election, under this point of view, is of comparatively little importance, and it makes little difference which party succeeds. The reasons which should decide us to vote for the one party rather than the other must be sought elsewhere.

A respectable minority of the Whig party, as we have said, is conservative in the good sense of the term; but these are unable to decide the action of that party. The action of the Whig party will be determined by the majority, and that majority adopt as radical views of government as the Democratic party, and in some sections even more so. The Democratic party in their resolutions



avow the purely democratic theory, without a single qualification. So here we are. Which party shall we support? Really, if we were not in some sense obliged to support one party or the other, or throw away our votes, we would support neither. Indeed, there is now no organized party in the country that a really intelligent and loyal citizen can support without great reluctance. The Democrats proclaim in their creed the whole Jacobinical theory of government without any reserve, and in principle declare illegal and tyrannical all the governments of the world not democratic, that is, all except our own, and, consequently, the right of the people, in every country except ours, to resist and overthrow the existing government, and of our own government and people to run, whenever we choose, to their assistance. They lay down the principle that authorizes the Jacobinical intervention preached by Kosuth, and as many *fillibuster* expeditions against Cuba, Mexico, or any other country, as the desperadoes among us, foreign and native, may find themselves able or disposed to fit out. They also adopt a resolution asserting the justice of the late Mexican war, so that whoever votes for the party candidates must subscribe to the assertion that that most unnecessary and iniquitous war was just. The Whig platform in these respects is less objectionable, and asserts no abstract doctrines, or general principles, that we cannot, without much difficulty, accept. Both parties profess adhesion to the Compromise Measures, which is well; but the fact is, that the professions of neither party, save in so far as they favor radicalism either at home or abroad, are deserving of much reliance. The Democrats will be radical from instinct, and the Whigs from policy, in order to outbid the Democrats and obtain the suffrages of the people for themselves. The principal dangers the country has to apprehend are such as result from democratic excess or the abuse of republicanism. They are, in regard to the Union, on the one hand, the danger of consolidation, and on the other, of dissolution; in regard to the States or government in general, they are the tendency to fanatical legislation, which, under pretence of checking vice and promoting virtue, strikes at the rights of persons and property, and establishes social despotism, and the clamor for law reform, which would change the essential elements of the Common Law, destroy its excellence as a

system for the protection of private rights, whether of persons or of things, and with it the last conservative institution now remaining in the country, the independent judiciary. Here are the dangers we have to apprehend in regard to our domestic or internal relations. In our foreign relations, the dangers to be apprehended arise from the spirit of democratic or republican propagandism, manifesting itself in piratical expeditions like those against Cuba, and in popular and governmental intervention in the internal affairs of foreign nations, to aid the Red Republican revolutionists in overthrowing monarchical institutions and establishing — the Reign of Terror. The question to be decided by every loyal American citizen is, Which of the two parties will afford us the best protection against these several dangers? or which is likely to do the least to increase them?

As to foreign revolutionism, the Whigs, as a party, are naturally the least dangerous, but being the weaker party, or at least the less popular party, in the country, and the general sentiment of the country being democratic, they are constantly tempted to court support at home by encouraging the popular party abroad. On nearly all domestic questions, Mr. Webster is conservative, but no Democratic Secretary of State ever proved himself with regard to the foreign revolutionists more radical than he has. The section of the party which has triumphed in the nomination of General Scott is as strong in its sympathies with the foreign revolutionists as is any section of the Democratic party. Mr. Seward of New York, one of its most prominent and influential leaders, is a thorough-going radical, domestic and foreign, and was in 1829 — and he boasted to us, not a great while since, that he had not changed — very much of a Fanny Wright man, and a supporter of the wild schemes of what was called “the Workingmen’s Party.” The leading Scott papers in New York, the *Tribune* and *Times*, are the organs of the Kossuth party and policy. It was also under a Whig administration that the piratical expeditions were fitted out against Cuba, against which the government took such ineffectual precautions, and none of the actors in which has it brought to punishment. It was this same administration that brought Kossuth here, and greeted his arrival with a national salute. It is this same administra-

tion that is busy, apparently, in getting up a quarrel with Mexico about the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and preparing another war with that distracted republic, and the annexation of another slice of its territory to the Union. We cannot see, then, in the success of the Whigs any real security for a wise, just, and neutral foreign policy, although we are disposed to think that, as it regards the internal troubles of other nations, we should have, upon the whole, less to fear from a Whig than from a Democratic administration. A large portion of the Whig party certainly retain a respect for the policy of Washington and Adams, and we have seen in General Scott no Kossuth tendency and no piratical propensities. He is said to be a vain man, but he is a gentleman, a gallant soldier, and an able and accomplished military officer, and his military habits must render him averse to all encouragement of disloyalty and revolutionism, either at home or abroad. The country, as a general rule, is safer under the presidency of a real — we do not mean a sham — military man than under a civilian, — less likely to be involved in war, and less likely to transcend the line of its duty towards foreign powers. Other things being equal, we should in a country like ours, where the deference to the mob is so great, and so few have the habits of authority, always prefer an eminent military man for the executive, to an eminent civilian, for his training is more likely to bring out the proper executive qualities. For the candidate of the Democratic party we have personally great affection and esteem; we know him to be a man of ability, honesty, and warm feelings; but we fear that he will be a mere executive of the will of his party, and that he will feel it his duty to follow rather than to lead it. He has given in his unqualified adhesion to the Baltimore platform, which, save as to the Compromise Measures, at least so far as it is any thing more than abstract nonsense or unmeaning declamation, every American citizen should abominate. We fear that his administration will accept the policy urged upon us by Ludwig Kossuth, *alias* Alexander Smith, the Vice-President of the American Bible Society. He is warmly supported by Senator Douglas, the pet candidate of the Fillibusters, and by that organ of the foreign radicals and revolutionists who have fled hither to save their necks from the halter they so richly merit for

their deeds in their own country, — the *Democratic Review*. We do not suppose the government will send its fleet to Hungary, for Hungary proper, we believe, has no seaport, or that it will declare war either against Austria or Russia; but all that it can do to support the revolutionists of Europe, short of actual armed intervention, we fear it would do, in case of the success of the Democratic party. All appearances indicate that a Democratic administration would favor secretly, if not openly, effective measures to revolutionize Cuba, and detach it from Spain, and very likely kindle another war with Mexico, and annex the greater part of its territory to the Union. It would most likely seek to rival in this respect the Polk administration, and would, without any doubt, find the sentiment of the country sustaining it. "Expansive Democracy" would be in power, and the government would be conducted on the "manifest destiny" principle. We may be mistaken in all this, we shall be most happy to find that we are; but we fear we are not. Under this point of view, a point of view of especial importance to us as Catholics, for the red revolutions and filibuster campaigns are all primarily directed against the Church of God, we think the danger would be somewhat less under a Whig than a Democratic administration. We must also remember, and we beg our Catholic friends not to forget, that it was not a Whig, but a leading Democrat, Mr. Polk's Secretary of the Treasury, who raised the cry of "the Anglo-Saxon Alliance," which, if effected, would prove simply an alliance of the Protestant world against the Catholic.

There is no question, if we turn from the foreign to the internal affairs of the Union, that the tendency of the Whigs is rather to centralization, and that of a section of the Democratic party to an exaggerated view of State rights. But this tendency of either can be pushed to a dangerous extreme only by the financial measures of the government and continued Abolition or Free Soil agitation. The financial policy of the government, we may safely predict, will be substantially the same, let which party will succeed in the election, and therefore calls here for no particular discussion. The Abolition or Free Soil agitation is a serious affair, and if continued will lead either to a dissolution, or, what is more probable, to a centralization, of the Union. Both parties are indeed pledged against this agitation, but

perhaps both are not equally likely to keep the pledge. The Abolition or Free Soil section of the Whig party have got their candidate for the Presidency, and are the controlling section of that party. General Scott personally, no doubt, is opposed to the agitation, and in favor of sustaining the Fugitive Slave Law; but the Free Soil section of his party must be the principal recipients of the executive patronage, and have the preponderating influence in his administration. He will be obliged to administer the government very much in accordance with their views, and consequently there is great danger of its being too favorable to Free Soil agitation. The Democratic party, though strongly tinctured at the North with Abolitionism, is less likely, we think, to break its pledges than the Whig party. General Pierce is well known to be opposed to Abolitionism, and in favor of leaving the whole question of slavery to the States in which slavery exists. His doctrine was, when we knew him personally, and we have no reason to suppose that it has changed since, that slavery is a question the disposal of which has never been conceded to the Union, therefore is reserved to the States, and with it we who live in the Free States have no more to do than we have with it in Cuba or Constantinople. His doctrine here is sound, and so is the doctrine of the leading Democrats in all sections of the Union. So far as the question of slavery is concerned, we feel that the Union will be less unsafe in the hands of the Democrats than in the hands of the Whigs. In regard to foreign intervention or democratic propagandism, whether officially or otherwise, we should give the preference, under existing circumstances, to the Whigs; and with regard to the domestic or internal affairs of the Union, to the Democrats.

In regard to the principles and measures of government in general, and which with us find their application in the individual States, the minority of the Whig party are undoubtedly the soundest part of our citizens, at least in this Commonwealth. As it concerns fanatical legislation, of which the Maine Liquor Law is a specimen, both parties are implicated, but perhaps the Whig party to the greatest extent. Properly speaking, this sort of legislation is neither Whig nor Democratic, but Puritanic. It is only a revival of old Massachusetts Colonial legislation, and part and parcel of that policy which was adopted, and so rigorously

enforced in Geneva, by John Calvin. The system aims to effect by legislation what can be effected only by moral suasion and the influence of religion on the heart and conscience. It strikes at the first principles of individual freedom, and establishes a most odious social despotism. It is in perfect accordance with the political principles of the Democratic party, but, as parties are rarely consistent throughout, probably, so far as it is concerned, it makes not much difference which party is in power. In both parties are men who oppose it; in both are men who will support it from conviction, and a still larger number, who, while despising it, will support it because they believe it popular, or fear that it would be unpopular to oppose it.

With regard to law reform and the judiciary the Whigs are generally less unsound and more conservative than the Democrats. In this State the Whig party on these questions takes the right side; the Democrats generally are as wrong as men well can be. These questions are especially important to us as Catholics, for we are in the minority, and our religion is odious to the majority. We could have no safety under the Democratic doctrine of law, and the power of the legislature over vested rights. The security of our interests, our rights of property, our churches, and our burying-grounds, depends only on the Common Law and the independence and purity of the judiciary, both of which it is a part of the Democratic policy to sweep away, and which it is as yet a part of the Whig policy to preserve. We must be utterly blind to our own interests as Catholics, as well as to the interests of the Commonwealth, if we yield our support to the Democratic party in this State as a State party. As matters now stand, the Whigs, as a State party, seem to us to deserve the preference. Of the party in other States, as a State party, we are not qualified to speak.

As to the questions raised about Protestant test laws, Native Americanism, &c., we have little to say. Catholics as such have nothing to hope from either Scott or Pierce, and no more to fear from the one than from the other. Neither is a Catholic, and neither is a bigot. Pierce is from a State which retains for certain offices a Protestant test, which practically amounts to nothing; but he is well known to have exerted himself to abolish it, though without success. As Catholics, we owe no gratitude to those zealous dema-

gogues who, in order to induce Catholics to vote for Scott against him, make him responsible for it. We think just as much of them as we do of those other demagogues who labor to enlist Protestant prejudice against Scott, because one of his daughters, and we know not but two, has received the grace to become Catholic. We regret to see such things brought into our political contests, and we despise the demagogues who introduce them; but, alas! the fools are not all dead yet, and a new brood is hatched every year. Scott has been accused of Native Americanism, and on this ground it has been attempted to prejudice our citizens of foreign birth against him, and to secure their votes for his competitor; but we have no reason to believe him unduly American. We are not at all disturbed by the pettish letter he is said to have written some years ago, but which he has sufficiently retracted. This question of Native Americanism is one that requires to be treated with great delicacy, and our friends of foreign birth must be careful how they touch it, lest they bring about the very evil they seek to guard against. We, as our readers well know, have not the least conceivable sympathy with political Native Americanism; but, nevertheless, we are American, American born and reared, as our ancestors for a hundred and fifty years before us. We share largely in the American nationality, and we are very much disposed to believe that American interests should dictate and control American politics. Now, there are two classes of foreigners who leave their own country to settle here, towards which we have very different feelings. The peaceful, industrious, and laborious foreigners, like the great mass of the Irish and German emigrants, who come hither to seek a home for themselves and their children, and who quietly study to learn and discharge their duties as American citizens, we greet with a hearty welcome, and would admit them at an early moment to all the rights and immunities of native-born citizens. But there is another class of emigrants, demagogues, revolutionists, desperadoes, who, after having failed to revolutionize their own countries, fly hither either to save their necks from the merited halter, or to abuse the liberty granted them by our government and laws, to renew their anti-social and liberticide projects, and to carry away our government and people in a vain and mischievous attempt to realize their mad schemes, either here or in the

countries they have left behind. These unprincipled and crazy spirits congregate in our cities, form secret societies all through our land, affiliated to like societies all over Europe, gather around our journalists, get the control of newspapers, corrupt the public mind, and through their own countrymen of the other class, naturalized here, attempt to control our politics and shape the whole policy of the government, foreign and domestic. They uniformly attach themselves to the extreme radical party of the country, and hurry it on in the most dangerous direction. Foreigners of this description have been the curse of this country, from the miserable Callender, the foul-mouthed libeller of the government under the elder Adams, to the Hungarian speech-maker, Kossuth, and the radical writers for the *Democratic Review*. Now we grant our American spirit burns, and our American blood boils, to be made in our country, on our own native soil, the slaves or the tools of these foreign desperadoes and cutthroats, who are controlled by the greater criminals they have left in the Old World. If General Scott's Native Americanism strikes only at these, and is intended merely to reduce this political rabble to silence and insignificance, we share it with him, and instead of looking upon it as an objection, we assure his opponents that we regard it as a recommendation. In promoting such Native Americanism, we go with him with all our heart, and so must every loyal American citizen, whether native or foreign born. But if he goes against the other class of our foreign-born population, we go not with him, and very few of the American people will. It is only in case they suffer themselves to be formed into a foreign party, under the lead of these political cutthroats, for foreign purposes, that the American people will ever listen to political Native Americanism; then they may do it, and, of course, applaud the guilty party, and punish the innocent. But we have no reason to suppose that General Scott is at all opposed to the former class we have described, and his dry nurse, Seward, is the bosom friend of the latter.

We sum up then. Of the old Federalist and Republican parties, the Federalists were the party most favorable to personal liberty and social order; of the modern Whigs and Democrats, the Whigs are preferable on the question of foreign revolutionism and its accessories, and on the questions of law reform, the Common Law, and the



judiciary; the Democrats are preferable on the questions of Abolitionism, and, so far as there is any difference, of the internal policy of the Federal government; while in all other respects the two parties are about equal. Which upon the whole is preferable, and should be supported in the coming election, it is hard to say, and we leave our readers to judge each for himself. How we shall ourselves vote, we have not, at the time of writing, made up our own mind. We do not think much is to be hoped for the country from either party. If there were a party organized on really constitutional and conservative principles, resolved to bring the government back to the principles and policy of Washington and Adams,—a party for the Union without centralization, for State rights without dissolution, for republicanism without social despotism, for personal freedom without disorder or anarchical tendency, for a government of law, not for a government of arbitrary will, whether your will or mine,—there would be a party with which we could unite, and which we could conscientiously urge our friends to support. But such a party does not at present exist.

In conclusion, we would say to our Catholic friends, vote for the party you conscientiously believe to be the least likely to injure the country, but do not wed yourselves for life to any party. The salvation of the country and the preservation of its republican institutions, under the providence of God, depend in no small degree on you. Be on your guard against the seductions of political revolutionists, rebels, and radicals who have fled hither from the Old World. You have nothing in common with them. Trust them not till they have proved by their works that they have ceased to be the enemies of your faith and the advocates of social despotism. Be on your guard also against native-born demagogues. Turn a deaf ear to every one who addresses you as Germans or as Irishmen, or in any sense as a foreign party distinguishable in your feelings or interests from the political American people. Hold yourselves at all times free to support the party which, here and now, appears to you, after the best examination you are able to make, to be the most deserving or the least undeserving of your support as simply loyal American citizens. In time you will acquire an influence which you will be able to exert for good, and have a deci-

sive voice in determining the policy of parties, instead of being the mere tools of party leaders and managers. In all cases, however, remember that the destiny of nations as of individuals is in the hands of Providence, and that we can hope for a good issue for our political no more than for any other efforts save as we look to God, and invoke and receive his grace to assist and prosper us.

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ART. IV. — *La Civiltà Cattolica, Pubblicazione periodica per tutta l'Italia il 1° e 3° Sabato di ciascun Mese.* Roma. Vol. IX. 3° Sabato di Maggio. 1852.

WE find in this excellent periodical, for the 15th of last May, a characteristic Letter to the *Heraldo* of Madrid by Donoso-Cortéz, Marquis de Valdegamas, lately, and we believe still, Spanish Ambassador at the Court of France. As every thing from the pen of this eminent statesman and sincere Catholic possesses a high interest, and as the Letter discusses, though briefly, very freely, topics on which American statesmen are seldom suffered to think and speak as freemen, we think we shall gratify our readers by laying it before them. The Letter was written in Spanish; but as we have not seen it in the original, we translate it from the Italian.

“ *Paris, April 15, 1852.*

“ The *Heraldo* of the 8th instant contains an article in defence of Rationalism, Liberalism, and Parliamentarism, in which you review and eulogize the many advantages of discussion, and seek to strengthen your positions by recalling some words spoken by me in the Athenæum of Madrid in 1836, against the divine right of kings, — words which you qualify as eloquent, although they were, at best, only bombast.

“ I think it my duty to remind you that I have not for a long time deserved such eulogiums, or been able to expect from you any thing but abuse or forgetfulness. Between your doctrines, which I maintained in my youth, and those which I now hold, there is a radical contradiction, an insuperable repugnance. You hold that *Rationalism* is the road to the *reasonable*; that *Liberalism* in theory is the way of arriving at liberty in practice; that *Parliamentarism* is the necessary constitution of *good government*; that dis-

cussion is to truth as the means to the end; and finally, that the king is only the representative of human right. At present I hold the contrary of all this. I acknowledge no human right, and hold that, strictly speaking, there is no right but divine right. In God is right and the concentration of all rights; in man is duty and the concentration of all duties. Man calls the utility which he derives from the fulfilment by others of their duties to his advantage his *right*, but the word *right* on man's lips is a vicious expression, and when he goes farther and erects this vicious expression into a theory, the tempest is let loose upon the world.

"Discussion, as you understand it, is the source of all possible errors, and the origin of all imaginable extravagances. As to Parliamentaryism, Liberalism, and Rationalism, I hold the first to be the negation of government, the second, the negation of liberty, and the third, the affirmation of madness.

"Perchance you will ask me, What, then, are you? If you reject discussion as understood by the modern world, if you are neither a liberal, nor a rationalist, nor a parliamentarian, what are you? An absolutist? I reply, that I should be an absolutist, if absolutism were the radical contradictory of these systems. But history shows me rationalistic absolutisms, to a certain extent; also, liberal absolutisms, cherishing discussion, and even absolutist parliamentarism. Absolutism at most is the contradiction of the form, not the essence, of these doctrines, now become famous by the grandeur of their ruins. Absolutism is not their contradictory; for there is no contradiction between things not of the same nature. It is a form, and nothing else; and is it not absurd to seek in a mere form the radical contradiction of a doctrine, or in a doctrine the radical contradiction of a mere form?

"Catholicity is the sole contradictory of the doctrines I oppose, and give to Catholic doctrine what form you please, you will see it instantly transform every thing, and renew the face of the earth. With Catholicity there is no thing or phenomenon which is not arranged respectively in the hierarchical order of things and phenomena. Reason ceases to be rationalism, that is to say, it ceases to be a pharos, which, that it may arrogate to itself the privilege of shining without any borrowed light, claims to be uncreated, and becomes a marvellous light which concentrates in itself and sends forth from itself the most splendid light of Christian doctrine, — the most pure reflection of the uncreated and eternal light of God.

"As to liberty, it is in the Catholic mind neither a right in its essence, nor a covenant in its form; it is not preserved by war, does not originate in contract, and is not won by conquest. It is not a drunken bacchanalian, like our demagogical liberty; it does not walk among the nations with a queenly train, like parliamentary liberty; it has not tribunes and courtiers for its servants, is not

lulled asleep by the buzzing of the crowd, has no standing army of the National Guard, and finds not its pleasure in being borne at its ease on the triumphal car of revolution.

"The commandments of God are the bread of life. Under the empire of Catholicity, God distributes it to governors and governed, reserving to himself the inalienable right of exacting the obedience of both. Under the auspices and in the presence of God, the sovereign and subject are united in a species of wedlock, whose sanctity makes it more like a sacrament than a contract. The two parties find themselves implicitly bound by the commandments of God. The subject contracts the obligation of obeying with love the sovereign placed over him by God, and the sovereign that of ruling with love and moderation the subjects whom God has placed in his hands. When the subjects fail in their obedience, God permits tyrannies; when the sovereign fails in moderation, God permits revolutions. By the first, subjects are reduced to their obedience; by the second, rulers are brought back to moderation, and thus, while man draws evil from the good works of God, God draws good from the evil doings of man. History is the record of the different phases of this gigantic struggle between good and evil, between the Divine and the human will, between a most merciful God and rebellious man.

"When the commandments of God are faithfully observed, that is to say, when princes are moderate and the people obedient (I mean with a moderation and obedience inspired by love), from this simultaneous submission to the Divine commands there flows a certain social order, a certain condition and well-being both individual and common, which I call the *state of liberty*. And it is truly such, since then justice rules, and it is justice which makes men free. See then wherein consists the liberty of the sons of God, that is, Catholic liberty. It is not something definite, particular, and concrete; it is not a part of the political organization, nor a social institution different from others. Catholic liberty is not this, and yet it is more than this; it is the general result of the good disposition of all the organs, of the harmony and agreement of all the institutions. It is as the soundness of man's physical organization, which is not an organ, and yet is worth more than a sound organ; as the general life of the social and political body, which is more precious than the floridness of any particular institution. Catholic liberty consists precisely in these two things (health and life), more excellent than all else, which, as they are for the whole, cannot be in any particular institution. This liberty is so holy that the least injustice offends it; at once so strong and so weak that every thing vivifies it and the least disorder suffices to change it; so tender that its love seizes all men; so sweet that it sheds peace into all hearts; so modest and retiring that, although it came from heaven for the

consolation of all men, it is known only to a very few, and perhaps applauded by none. Indeed, it scarcely knows its own name, or if it knows it, it imparts it to none, and the world is ignorant of it.

"As to discussion, there is more resemblance between Catholic and philosophical discussion than there is between Catholic and political liberty. In this matter, here is the Catholic method. It receives from on high a ray of light which it imparts to man, that he may fecundate it with his reason; and, thanks to the intellectual fecundation, this small ray of light is converted into a torrent of splendor that fills all space as far as eye can reach. Philosophism, on the contrary, astutely throws a thick veil upon the light of truth we have received from heaven, and proposes to our reason an insolvable problem, of which the formula might be: To draw truth and light from doubt and obscurity, which are the only things assigned to the intellectual activities. And thus Philosophism asks of man a solution which he is unable to give without first inverting the immutable and eternal laws. According to one of these laws, fecundation is nothing but the development of the germ according to the conditions of its own nature; and thus the obscure proceeds from the obscure, the luminous from the luminous, like from like,—*Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine*. In obedience to this law, human reason in fecundating doubt has reached denial, and in fecundating obscurity has arrived at palpable darkness; and all this by means of logical and progressive transformations, founded in the very nature of things.

"It is no wonder that Catholicity and Philosophism, starting from such different points and proceeding by such different routes, should come to such different results. For eighteen centuries Catholicity has followed her own method of discussion, and it is precisely this method that has always obtained for her the victory. Every thing passes before her, things in time and time itself; she passes not; she remains where God has placed her, immovable in the midst of the tempest of universal agitation. Death has no power to approach her, even in those deep and dark regions subject to its empire. For a trial of her forces Catholicity once said: 'I will choose a barbarous age and fill it with my wonders'; and, having chosen the thirteenth century, crowned it with the four most magnificent monuments which human genius has ever raised,—the *Summa* of St. Thomas, *Las Partidas* of Alphonso the Wise, the *Divina Commedia*, and the Cathedral of Cologne.

"For four thousand years Rationalism has followed its own method of discussion, and has left to perpetuate its memory two immortal monuments,—the pantheon where all philosophies lie prostrate in the dust, and the pantheon where the ruins of all constitutions lie gathered together.

"Nothing occurs to me to be said of Parliamentarism. O, what

would it become with a truly Catholic people, a people in whose bosom man will learn from his very infancy that he must render an account to God of even his idle words !

“ I am, &c.

“ JUAN DONOSO-CORTÉZ.”

The editor of the *Civiltà Cattolica* regards the epithet vicious (*viziosa*), which the writer applies to the expression human right, as hyperbolical or exaggerated, and in his translation softens it to *imperfetta*, imperfect, and subjoins a note in justification, on which we must be permitted to make a few observations. We insert a translation :—

“ Instead of *imperfect*, the text has *vicious* [*viziosa*]. If our translation should fall under the eye of the writer, we hope he will pardon us for softening his expression. We perfectly agree with him that right in man is very different from right in God, and that it originates essentially in the order which the Creator has established in the universe, and the obligation man is under of conforming thereto. We have explained this at length elsewhere.\* Nevertheless, we do not believe the word *right* is vicious when applied to man, any more than are the other terms which human language adopts *analogically*, as say the theologians, in speaking both of infinite and finite Being ; for no expression in man can be *vicious*, we had almost said *imperfect*, when he speaks according to his nature. Now man's nature is such that he can know things above him only through the medium of the sensible world, — *invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur*. Hence, though God alone is beauty, greatness, wisdom, power, &c., it is not vicious to say that a man is beautiful, great, wise, powerful, &c., when he participates of these divine attributes. To deny this participation is to fall into Hindoo pantheism, which regards every participated being as a Maia, or pure illusion ; or into the system of occasional causes, according to which creatures have no proper causality, and God alone acts in the universe, — a system refuted by the Angelic Doctor, in the first part of his admirable *Summa*.† Man is, in the hands of God, an instrument, like the saw in the hands of the carpenter, and as it is not vicious to ascribe action to the saw, although it cannot act without the carpenter, so it cannot be vicious to ascribe to man a right, or a force to bend the will of another, any more than it is to ascribe to him any other force whatever, although this force depends essentially on God as its first cause.” — p. 443.

\* “ *Idea del Dritto*,” *Civiltà Cattolica*, Vol. II. p. 267 et seq. ; especially p. 277 and n. 22.

† *Summa*, Q. 115, and elsewhere.

We are very far from regarding the word *right* in every sense as a vicious expression when adopted by man, but our contemporary's note fails to convince us that it is not vicious in the sense intended by the author of the Letter, or that in changing *viziosa* into *imperfetta* he has merely softened the expression of the text, without changing the system of the author. The Italian critic and the Spanish statesman do not, as it strikes us, adopt the same ethical philosophy, and explain the ground of rights and duties by the same method. The critic says he agrees perfectly with the author, "that right in man is very different from right in God, and that it originates essentially in the order which the Creator has established in the universe, and the obligation man is under of conforming thereto." But we see not how this can be, for, if we understand him, the Marquis denies all human right, and his precise doctrine is, that man has no rights at all, that all rights are God's rights, and that man has only duties, and of course duties, strictly speaking, only to God. There can, then, be no agreement or disagreement between him and his critic as to the origin of human right, or as to the difference or the sameness of right in man and right in God. The Marquis denies, strictly speaking, all human right; his critic asserts human right, though he concedes that it is only an imperfect right, as all the forces of second causes are imperfect, inasmuch as they all depend on God as their first cause. The difference is not one of exaggeration, but one of system, and the question is, Which system ought to be adopted?

Our contemporary holds that there is human right, and that this right has its immediate origin in the order of nature as second cause, and its remote origin in God as first cause, — which assumes that nature is, in an imperfect sense at least, legislative, and can found rights and impose duties. The question here is not whether we are bound to conform to the order of nature, to keep what is called the natural law, for on this point there is no dispute; it is not any more whether it is necessary to keep the natural law in order to secure happiness and fulfil the end for which we were created, or the design of God in creation, for here, again, there is no dispute. The question relates to the reason or ground of our obligation to conform to the order of nature. Here, again, all agree, that is, all Christians agree, that the ultimate reason or ground is God, and the precise ques-

tion is narrowed down to this : Is God the immediate reason or ground, or is he it only mediately, inasmuch as he is the author and end of the order of nature ? Donoso-Cortéz appears to us to adopt the former, his critic adopts the latter view.

We have examined carefully the article on the Idea of Right, *Idea del Dritto*, to which we are referred in the note. It is elaborate, written with rare ability, by a disciplined mind, but it hardly touches the real question at issue, and in no instance, as far as we have discovered, even recognizes obligation at all in the sense we have been accustomed to understand, or to imagine we understand, it. Why am I bound to conform to the order of nature ? We find several assumptions which we certainly do not dispute, but no distinct answer to this question. We are told that we cannot obtain happiness if we do not ; but this is no answer, because we may ask, Why are we bound to seek happiness, whether our own or another's ? Are we answered that every man is impelled by the very constitution of his nature to seek happiness ? This alleges a fact, but does not assign a reason ; it tells us what the order of nature in this respect is, but not why we are bound to conform to it. Moreover, if we assume that we are bound because impelled by nature, we fall into modern Transcendentalism, whose maxim is, Follow thy instincts, Act out thyself. We are also told that we must conform to the order of nature because God is its author and end, and if we do not conform to it, we oppose his design, and labor to defeat his purposes in creation. Nothing in the world more true, but it only brings us back to the point from which we started. Why am I bound even to seek God, to conform to his purposes, and to conspire to the end he has proposed ? This question, as far as we can discover, our contemporary has not even raised ; and yet it seems to us to be very essential in the discussion of the Idea of Right, that is, of law, of duty. Right in one is duty in another, and law is simply the obligatory phase of right. My right is your law, for what is my right you are bound to perform, and what is against my right you are forbidden to do. In a scientific discussion of the Idea of Right, then, there should be, first of all, a discussion of the ground of obligation, or of law in general.

We have discussed this subject at length in our Review



for April, 1848, in our *Admonitions to Protestants*, and we can offer here only some brief remarks. We regret to find ourselves on any point not in exact agreement with the *Civiltà Cattolica*. We regard this periodical with great deference, and are bound so to regard it, published as it is at Rome, and conducted by distinguished members of the learned Society of Jesus; but we hope, as the question is not one of dogma, it is not temerity in us to say that we are as yet reluctant to abandon the views of the subject before us which we have been accustomed to hold, and which seem to us to be unimpeachable. We are not able to recognize in nature, as created nature, any proper legislative character, or to found rights or duties on instinct or necessity, or in any sense on second causes, for law is always the expression of free will, and second causes are never for themselves. Undoubtedly, we may consult instinct, the necessity of nature, second causes, the whole natural order, when the question is as to what is law, or what does the law command; but not, it strikes us, when the question is as to the ground of right or the obligation of duty. Government is a social necessity, and society could not exist a moment, nor the individual be born, be nurtured, or be buried, without some sort of government. This is a good reason for the existence of government, and for my *de facto* submission to it; but the right of the government, or my moral obligation or duty to obey it, cannot be deduced from this social necessity. Moreover, to found the right of the government, or the duty of the subject, on this social necessity, is to authorize that divorce of politics from religion, that political atheism, which is the characteristic error of our age. If we found rights or duties immediately on second causes, and only mediately on God as first cause, we encourage, in these times, men to stop short with second causes, and to look no farther for their origin or end.

Our contemporary, of course, is as strongly and as ardently opposed to every form of rationalistic or atheistical politics as we can be, and it is only simple justice to him to say that he maintains in his article, *Idea del Dritto*, that there is no conception of right—he says no reverence—without some apprehension of God. But he apparently says this only on the ground that nature proceeds from and tends to God, and such is its scope, design, or end, that we

cannot conform to it without apprehending it, and we cannot apprehend it without some apprehension of God. Since God was infinitely perfect and supremely happy, he could create only for the purpose of manifesting his own glory in the happiness of his intelligent creatures. We were created to find our happiness in admiring and loving him as our Creator. This is our end, and to this end all nature is ordered. To conform to nature is to conform to this order and to conspire to this end. But as this end is our happiness in loving and admiring God as the author of the admirable order established, we cannot of course conspire to it without apprehending him as admirable and worthy of all love. Right is conformity to this order which God has established ; and non-conformity is wrong, because contrary to truth, because it denies that God is admirable and worthy of love, and excludes man from all good. Hence no real morality without a recognition of God, and consequently no atheistical politics or morals are admissible.

This is all very true, and, though much, is not all that is needed to meet fully the errors of our unbelieving age. It states the fact, but does not declare the law. It tells why it is fit, proper, convenient, or useful to conform to the order established by the Creator in the universe, but it does not tell us why we are bound, much less why I have the right to require my neighbor, to conform to it. The age has gone farther in its doubts and denials, we apprehend, than most of those who have had the happiness of escaping its contaminations are prepared to believe. Even St. Thomas, Bellarmine, and Suarez, were they living and writing now, would, we think, find it necessary, not indeed to change their doctrine, but in some respects their form of expression, and to bring out in new and greater prominence certain aspects of the truth which they held than was required in order to oppose the dominant errors of their times. They all had to meet the immediate divine right of government as set up in favor of the temporal prince against the Sovereign Pontiff, on the one hand, and the liberty of the subject, or the common good of the community, on the other. The questions of their day did not demand a special vindication of the authority of government in face of the subject, nor the special vindication of the duty of the people to obey legal authority, because

neither was then specially denied. The "rights of man" had not yet become the watchword of the enemies of God and society, and they had no occasion to insist on the Divine dominion against democratic despotism, or as the ground of allegiance to legally constituted government. Human right, or the right of man to establish law, found right, or impose duty, if asserted, was not then asserted as the denial of the rights of God, and in favor of the absolute independence and self-sufficiency of second causes; and, if denied, it was not denied, as we deny it, for the purpose of vindicating the rights of God and maintaining political authority and liberty, but for the purpose of throwing off all government and giving loose reins to licentious will and passion. The error of all ages is virtually the same error, but it is always changing its form, and we must, in order to meet it, in some respects change with it the expression of the truth we oppose to it. While, therefore, we should feel sure of being wrong, if we found ourselves in opposition to the teaching of these great Catholic doctors, we still think we may, if necessary, so modify its outer form as to adapt it to the present aspects assumed by prevailing errors. Development of doctrine in this sense — and this is all the development that Dr. Newman needed — is lawful and necessary, if the truth is to be preserved in a practical and living form. It seems to us that our contemporary, in his anxiety to adhere to the letter of the great doctors, sometimes misses their real sense, and fails to go far enough back to meet the errors we have now to combat. This is less the case with him than with most writers we meet, and far less than with the excellent Balmez. Prove that this or that is demanded by the order of nature, and the age has so little sense of religion that it will answer, Concede it, what then? Why are we bound to observe the order of nature, or to do what it demands? Because God has established it, and by his eternal law commanded us to preserve it, and forbidden us to violate it. But wherefore are we bound to obey God? Because he is admirable and altogether lovely, infinitely good and holy. But why are we bound to admire and love the admirable and lovely, the good and the holy, or to do what they require? Because we cannot otherwise be happy. But why are we bound to be happy? Why may I not be miserable if I choose? Why am I bound to promote the

happiness of my neighbor; or whence my right to force him to consult my happiness? We are so constituted, that we are impelled by the very force of our nature to seek our own happiness. Very true, but this only states a fact; it does not declare a law; and I repeat, Why am I bound to seek my happiness? God commands you to do so. That is a good answer if he has the right to command me, and I am bound to obey him. Clearly, then, the first point to be established is, even with those who do not deny the existence of God, that we are bound to obey God, and till we have proved this, and determined the reason or ground of our obligation to obey God, we are not prepared to answer the questions of our day, and determine to its mind either right or duty.

No doubt a correct answer may be found to the question, Why am I bound to obey God? in the current teachings of the schools; but we have not met one in so clear, precise, and definite a form that we can easily use it in our controversies with our modern deniers of the obligation to worship God, and of moral accountability. We think, however, that a very simple answer may be given, not chargeable with novelty, or of being original with us,—though seldom stated in the precise shape in which we present it,—and which will meet our wants. I am bound to obey God, whatever he commands, because I am his, and not my own. I am his because he has made me out of nothing, and the maker has the sovereign right of property in the thing made,—the creator in the thing created. God as my creator is my sovereign proprietor, and as the sovereign proprietor is the sovereign lord of his property, God is my Sovereign Lord and Master, and has the right to command me; and if he has the right to command me, I am bound to obey him. I am his, soul and body, reason and will, and therefore am I accountable to him for myself and all my thoughts, words, and deeds. My duty to obey God is the correlative of his right to command me, and his right to command me is in his dominion over me, and his dominion over me is in his right of property in me, and his right of property in me is in his having created me. All dominion rests on ownership, and all real ownership on creation. We found, then, God's sovereignty of the universe on his creative act, by which he has produced it from nothing.

The question of human right, properly so called, is now easily disposed of. The *Civiltà Cattolica* may, perhaps, say here, that man, though not the first cause, is yet a cause, and in the sense of second cause he can produce, create, and therefore have right; not indeed a perfect, but an imperfect right, a right corresponding to the sense in which a second cause is said to cause, is said to act or produce. But the absolute lord or owner owns not only the property, but all its faculties, and consequently all that it by the exercise of those faculties can in a secondary sense produce or acquire; otherwise I should not be accountable to God for my doings, or the exercise of my faculties. This seems to us a complete answer to all those who contend that rights may be founded or duties imposed by second causes. If I belong entirely to God, as assuredly I do, and am his, all I am, all I have, all I can do, then I can owe only him, and can be in debt to no other. There is, then, for me no duty but my duty to God, and therefore no man in his own name, or by the simple virtue of his humanity, can have any right against me. But my neighbor, as myself, owes all to God, for God is his creator as well as mine, and therefore can owe nothing to me. Then I can have no right, in my own name, against him. Then, strictly speaking, man has no rights,—he has only duties, and all his duties are duties to God, and to God only.

But not by this do we deny that what men, when rightly instructed, call their rights are real rights, or that what in the schools are called duties to ourselves and duties to our neighbor are real duties, which no one is at liberty to neglect. God, in regard to these rights, which are his, out of his own goodness transfers them to us, or makes a certain part of our duties to him payable to ourselves and to our neighbor. "It is to God," says Father Avila, as cited by Father Roderiguez in his *Practice of Christian and Religious Perfection*, "that we owe all things; but since he stands in need of nothing, he transfers all the right he has to our brethren, and grants us a full discharge thereof, provided we serve them in all things possible for us to do." This, indeed, expresses the case a little too strongly, for God does not so transfer all his right or make our whole debt to him payable to our neighbor, because a certain portion of it he requires to be paid immediately to himself,

and to himself alone. Nevertheless, it asserts that we owe all to God, and owe our neighbor only because we owe him, and pay duties to our neighbor only by his order. What I call my rights are real rights, and good against my neighbor; but they are mine only as transferred to me, or as I by the will of God, whose they are, am appointed to receive the duties they imply. What are called my duties to my neighbor are real duties, and good against me, but they are due, not to my neighbor in his own right, but to God, who makes them payable to him, so that in paying them to him I pay them to God.

Certainly, I am bound to love my neighbor, though a bitter enemy, as myself; but to whom am I bound? Not formally to my neighbor, but to God. This love of my neighbor is a debt which I owe to God, and if I do not pay it to my neighbor, I do not pay it to God. "As long as ye did it not unto these least ones, ye did it not unto me." We are not bound, strictly speaking, to our neighbor, because, since he owes all to God, he has nothing he can call his own with which to bind me; but we are bound to God to love him as ourselves, because he like ourselves belongs to God, is the property of our master, and we owe the same respect to the property of our master in another that we do to his property in ourselves. We are bound also to respect and not to injure ourselves, — not bound to ourselves, because no being can be bound to himself, but to God, because we are his, and we have no right to injure or not to take care of the property of our master, whether in ourselves or in others. Here is the ground of our obligation to seek our own good or happiness and that of our neighbor. We are bound to seek it, not because it is his or ours, but because it is the right of God, and a duty we owe to him. I am bound in God, for God's sake, to seek my own and my neighbor's good, but out of him I am not and cannot be so bound. I am not bound to seek my good for my own sake, nor my neighbor's for his sake.

Our contemporary, it seems to us, cannot, even with his own definition of right, maintain his doctrine of proper, though imperfect, human right. Right, according to him, as we collect from his article, *Idea del Dritto*, is a moral force which one has to subject another to his will, and which, though it may be violated by material force, whether our own or that of others, is always subsisting, living, and

speaking. This force is based on a practical truth, for "you cannot say, *I have right*, unless you feel in yourself a force capable of obtaining from another compliance with your desires"; and therefore you must have as the basis of right a practical truth to which every man is forced in reason to submit, and which no one can resist without doing violence to his own conscience, and denying his own reason. But it is evident that this force, which is to subdue the will of another to my own, and which is termed my right, is not the force of my will, but the force of the practical truth which I am able to present. Now this truth, whatever it be, is independent of me, is objective to me, and no more mine than it is my neighbor's. How, then, can I call this force mine, or *my right*? My right, if mine, is my right to have my will prevail. If you deny it to be this, you use a vicious expression, when you call it *mine*. But if the force be simply the force of truth, since truth is neither mine nor myself, what you call my right is only the right of the truth or of the law to prevail, and therefore is not my right. If the right were mine, it would need nothing beyond my will to establish it. *Sic volo*, So I will, would be all the reason that could be demanded to bind to obedience. Our contemporary, therefore, having based right on truth, not on will, does not appear to us to be able to assert proper human right at all.

But although this definition of right seems to us to make against the *Civiltà Cattolica*, we are not prepared to accept it. In our judgment, it leaves out the essential element of right. My right, as we have said, binds you, is your law, prescribes your duty to me; for law is only the obligatory phase of right. Now, in this definition of right we find it to be a force which subdues, indeed, but not that it is a force that *ought*, or that has the *right*, to subdue, the will of another to me. To say of a force that it subdues, is one thing; that it ought or has the right to subdue, is quite another thing. The former merely tells the truth, the latter declares a law. Truth convinces the understanding; law commands the will. Here is the defect of the definition. It makes law a simple fact, or a simple truth, and thus places the seat of law in reason instead of will. Law is not *actus rationis*, but *actus imperii*, therefore an act of will, for will, not reason, is the imperative faculty. Reason enlightens will, but will com-

mands reason. Reason is declarative, not legislative, does not found the law, but declares what the law is. It tells us what is good, what is bad, what is desirable, what is undesirable, but does not bind us to seek the one or avoid the other. Law is the voice of authority, and derives its binding force as law from him who commands, not from what is commanded. To know whether it is law or not, we ask not What is said? but, Who speaks? God speaks, — is the ultimate reason of all obedience; for who may say unto him, What doest thou? or, Why commandest thou thus? Law undoubtedly is reasonable, but it is law not because it is reasonable, but because it is the expressed will of the sovereign, of him who has the right to impose his own will as law.

The term *law*, we are well aware, is frequently used in a wider sense than that in which we here use it. It is frequently applied to inanimate and irrational nature. Thus men speak of the *laws* of matter, of motion, of plants, of animals; they speak also of intrinsic laws, and laws of instinct; but in all these instances the word is used in an analogical or metaphysical, not in its true and proper sense. It is never intrinsic, or instinctive, but always objective, independent of the subject, imposed on him, not operating from within him. *Lex necessario requirit aliquem, cui possit imponi*, says Suarez,\* and therefore not only some one on whom it may be imposed, but some one, distinct from the subject, to impose it. *Lex est actus imperii*, as the same Suarez says again. Law is an act of authority over free will, and as such can be imposed only by the Sovereign Lord on persons, or creatures endowed with intellect and free will. Such is the constitution of the will, philosophers tell us, that it always seeks good, but its innate appetency for good is not a law commanding us to seek good; and to seek good through the simple force of this appetency, or as impelled by the natural constitution of the will, is not to seek good in obedience to law, and in so seeking it we are, if innocent, no more moral than the flower in blossoming, or the bee in constructing her cell. To render it an act of obedience to law, we must seek it, not because impelled by nature, but by an act of free volition, because our sovereign wills it.

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\* *De Leg. Lib. II. cap. 1.*



No doubt many have a repugnance to placing law primarily in will and only secondarily in reason. Desirous of sitting in judgment on the law, and to be at liberty to grant or withhold obedience according to the decisions of their own minds on the intrinsic character of what is commanded, many contend for a more ultimate ground of law than the will of the sovereign,—something which shall bind that will as well as their own. Hence some place the ground of right or law in that it is conducive to happiness or to utility, some in the reason or fitness of things, which means we know not what, some in truth, and others in the reason or wisdom of God. That all human and natural laws must always seek their binding force as laws in something that transcends both human will and nature we concede, and most earnestly contend, because, as we hold, neither nature nor human will has any real dominion, or proper legislative character. So-called natural laws and human laws derive all their legality immediately from the law of God, or what is termed the eternal law; but the law of God, the law of all human and natural laws, derives its legality from nothing more ultimate than the will of God; because the will of God is free from all law, and because to place the ground of its legality anywhere else would divest law of its imperative character, and reduce it to a mere measure, rule, or truth of reason. St. Anselm says: *Deum esse omnino liberum a lege, et ideo quod vult, justum, et conveniens esse; id autem quod est injustum, et indecens non cadere in ejus voluntatem, non propter legem, sed quia non pertinet ad ejus libertatem.\** God's commands bind, not because of what they command, but because they are his commands; yet what he commands is always reasonable and good, not because he is restrained by law, but by his own nature, from commanding the contrary; so that his law expresses always his eternal reason, love, and goodness, as well as his authority or dominion. Undoubtedly, the doctors speak of the eternal law, from which natural and human laws derive their legality, but the eternal law is the law of God and is eternal in the sense that creation is eternal, that is, in the eternal will or decree of God to create. In no other sense could it be

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\* *Cur Deus Homo*, Lib. I. cap. 12. Apud Suarez, *De Leg.* Lib. II. cap. 2.

eternal, because prior to creation there was no one capable of law, — *capax legis*.

St. Augustine, indeed, defines the eternal law to be the reason or will of God commanding the order of nature to be preserved and forbidding it to be violated, — *Lex æterna est, ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans*.\* But this makes nothing against the view we have taken. Law may be considered either as it is law, or in respect to its contents and the end to which it tends. Considered simply as law, as a binding force, it has its seat in the will of God; considered in relation to what it commands, and to the end to which it tends, it is Divine reason, or has its seat in the eternal reason of God. In this last sense the law is the subject of profound and pious meditation, and is dwelt upon by all devout minds as a revelation of the wisdom and goodness, the sanctity and love of God, offering us motives sweet as heaven, strong as love, and terrible as hell to keep his commandments. For the law is wise and just, is good and holy, even the law of nature, regarded as God's law, and tends to manifest his glory in the happiness of his creatures. Here is a light in which we should be sorry not to consider the law, for God is beautiful and altogether lovely in all his works, in his works of nature as well as in his works of grace. But when we seek the ground of law, its binding force as law, or consider it in relation to right or duty, we refer it solely to the will of God. But in doing this we do not refer it to will in the abstract, or to will in general; we refer it to the will of God, and to no other will, and to his will as it is, not as it is not and as it cannot be, — therefore to his will inseparable from his reason, his love, and his goodness, for the Divine attributes are indistinguishable, save in our inadequate mode of conceiving them.

It must be clear enough to the reader, that we do not deny our obligation to conform to the order of nature; on the contrary, we establish that obligation by establishing the obligation to obey God. We are not bound to obey the order of nature precisely because it is the order of *nature*; we are bound to obey it because it is created and established by God our sovereign, and because he by his law

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\* *Contr. Faust. Lib. XXII. cap. 28.*

commands us to obey it. The eternal law, as St. Augustine says, commands the natural order to be preserved, and forbids it to be violated, — *ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans*. Whatever is necessary to the preservation of this order is of course authorized, and when we have ascertained that this or that is necessary to its preservation, we may know without further inquiry that God commands it. All we contend for is that the reason of the obligation is not the necessity, but the Divine will. The practical duties or offices of life as set forth in the current teaching of the schools are all affirmed, and declared obligatory, only they are referred immediately, not mediately, to the law of God for their obligatory character. Rights and duties remain, only they are held to be rights of God and duties to God; and what are called duties to ourselves and duties to our neighbor remain real duties, only they derive their character of duties from the command of God, and are strictly duties to him, merely payable by his order respectively to ourselves and to our neighbor.

Undoubtedly, the denial of proper human right denies the proper right of human government, and converts what it usually claims as a right into a trust. But this is only an evidence of its truth. It destroys, in principle, the very basis of despotism, and offers a solid foundation both of liberty and authority. The basis of all despotism is the assumption of human right, or of the power to govern as a right inherent in the human ruler, instead of recognizing and holding it as a trust from God. Of Oriental despotism the basis is the assumption of the inherent right of one man to govern; of democratic despotism, the right of every man, expressed in universal suffrage as a *natural right*; of aristocratic despotism, the right of the nobility; of parliamentary despotism, the right of the parliamentary body for the time. No matter in which of these you vest the power, you have a despotism in principle, if you assert the power to govern as a human right. But when you deny it as a human right, in whose hands soever lodged, and assert it as a trust only, you destroy at once the principle of every species of despotism. We do not deny or weaken the authority of human governments; we only deny that their authority is, strictly speaking, their own, or that of human right. The human government may rightfully govern, but by the authority of God, not by its own;

as the minister of God, not as an independent sovereign, whether independent in a higher or a lower, a broader or a narrower sphere. The government as a fact may sometimes originate in popular convention, but it derives its authority to govern, not from the convention, but immediately from God, and its right to govern is God's right, and not its own, or that of the people. It receives its power from God as a trust, and is of course bound to exercise it in the name of God, and according to the conditions he has annexed. These conditions, since annexed by God, are wise, just, and good, as is his own law, and tend directly to the good of the community. So long as the government conforms to these conditions, it is legal government, governs rightfully, and is salutary in its action; but when it neglects them, violates them, and abuses its powers, it forfeits the trust, and the subject is absolved from his allegiance; because his duty is duty to God, and to the government only as the minister of God, and necessarily ceases to be due to the latter, the moment it has forfeited its trusts and ceased to be God's minister. We are bound to obey government only inasmuch as God authorizes it, and of course no longer than he authorizes it. This cuts off all despotism and asserts a solid basis for true liberty, and at the same time provides, in principle, for the stability of government and the good order of society, for it adds to all the motives usually drawn from social necessities and advantages, the obligations of religion. We are bound to obey the state as the minister of God, because bound to obey God, and we come short in our duty to God if we do not.

The great practical objection, in these times, to the doctrine which asserts proper human right, or that derives right from nature as second cause and from God only as first cause, is that it affords a basis to modern rationalism and social despotism. If you assert human right strictly so called, you must assert the independence of the human will, and its right to refuse assent unless human reason is convinced, and therefore the right of private judgment, which is pure rationalism, that is, human independence, or despotism in the intellectual order. Our contemporary is constantly and earnestly fighting modern rationalism, but has he reflected that, in conceding proper human right, he concedes to his opponents in the outset the very

principle of which rationalism is only a logical development? The error of the rationalists is not so much an error in drawing conclusions, as an error in the premises. Grant them their premises, and you will hardly dispute their conclusions with success, theoretical or practical.

If we allow man or nature, that is, second causes, a proper legislative character, as we must if we assert proper human right, we cannot, in our times, successfully resist despotism, either of the state or of the individual. If the state is permitted, in any other sense than as the minister or trustee of God, to say *my right*, it will invariably include under the denomination of its right all the power it can get. We then necessarily give it an independency, not only in face of its subjects, of which we do not complain, but in face of the spiritual power, and therefore of God himself. Right, if right, is good against every one, and may be defended from every attack, let the attack come from what quarter it may. The state may assert its right, if right it have, in face of the Church of God as well as in face of its subjects; nay, *pro tanto* at least, the Church, and therefore God himself, is the subject of the state. Assume this, and how shall we be able to resist the encroachments on the spiritual power by the present Sardinian government? The state alleges that it is simply exercising its rights as the temporal authority, and defending them against the usurpations of the Church. This in every contest of the sort is what the state always says. What else said Frederic the Second, Henry the Fourth, or Joseph the Second, of Germany? What else said Henry Plantagenet, Henry Tudor, or his daughter Elizabeth, of England? What else said Louis the Fourteenth, the Regency, the Constituent Assembly, or the Convention, of France? It is always on the part of the state, if we may believe it, nothing but the assertion and vindication of its rights. What, on the principles we oppose, has the Church to reply for herself? That the state encroaches, and that she in resisting it is only asserting and vindicating her own rights? But both assert the same principle, each claims the right, and which has the right to prevail? On your principles, both and neither, and you must tolerate usurpation on one side or other in the name of right, without any principle by which the controversy can be terminated. The possession of a right necessarily carries with it the right to define it, or to judge

of its limits and its extent, and therefore of its ~~infraction~~; for if you give to another the right to define your right, you surrender it. I am the judge of my own right, and if you make it necessary to submit its determination to another, you deny it to be my right, and declare it a trust, which I hold subject to the will or the judgment of another. Either, then, you must deny the state all inherent and undervied right, or else you must allow it to be the judge both of the limits and extent of its right, and, then, of the time and mode of exercising it. In other words, right, if right in the proper sense of the word, is absolute, supreme, and universal; and there is no way of terminating a controversy between parties each acknowledged to have rights, for each is independent. The only way of terminating the controversy between the spiritual and the temporal is to regard the rights of the state as trusts from God, and the duties of subjects or citizens to it as duties solely to God. This makes both the rights and the duties religious rights and duties, and brings them within the jurisdiction of the spiritual order, and therefore of the Church as the representative of that order on earth. The state then has no authority, no right in face of the Church, and consequently cannot, under the pretext of asserting and vindicating the temporal authority, oppress religion and enslave conscience. St. Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, Boniface the Eighth, and St. Pius the Fifth all understood very well that the independence of the spiritual order in face of the temporal can be asserted only by asserting the dependence of the state and the supremacy of the Church, and that it is only by subjecting the temporal to the spiritual that civil despotism can be effectually denied, or the freedom of religion and of the people as individuals be maintained. They designated to Cæsar his place, and bid him keep it, and smote him with the sword of Peter and Paul when he left it.

On the other hand, if we allow the individual to say *my right*, and babble of the rights of man, not to say, rights of woman, we must expect every man to understand by his rights the right of his own will to prevail in all things. We cannot, at least in these times, assert right for an individual without conceding the unrestricted right of private judgment, and then not without asserting pure individualism, or the absolute supremacy of the individual. If you assert the rights of man, human right, in favor of

the community, you authorize social despotism, or the despotism of society over its members, as is the tendency of all your modern socialisms, communisms, red-republicanisms, whether as advocated by a Mazzini, a Kossuth, a Ledru-Rollin, a Saint-Simon, a Robert Owen, a Pierre Leroux, a Fourier, a Cabet, or a Proudhon. If you assert the rights of man in favor of the individual, you assert the despotism of the individual, which is anarchy, or the struggle of independent wills each for the mastery, of which every democracy, when not a social despotism, offers an example, and to which our country is undeniably tending, as well as to social despotism. The assertion of the "rights of man" is the denial of all legal authority, and if we make it, we must abandon all hope of government and of society, we must expect demagoguism, revolutionism, anarchy, and military despotism to be the order of the day. All the terrible political and social convulsions of our times originate in the pride of man which terms his duties his rights. In all these convulsions, which have made of all Europe a camp, if not a battle-field, the sole pretence has been the assertion and vindication of the rights of nature and of man. The soldiers in these new wars do not go forth to battle with prayers and hymns to God, in the name of the God of battles, shouting, like the old Crusaders, *Deus vult*; no, they go forth in the name of man, as soldiers of humanity, and their prayers and hymns are songs in praise of man and nature, and execrations on the anointed priests of God, and their shout is, *Populus vult*, the mob wills. In vain you tell them that they exaggerate their rights and forget their duties, in vain you exhort them to take more moderate and less unreasonable views. When was it that you could concede men rights, and have them remember their duties? Since when has it been true that you could give them an inch and they not take an ell? It is not moderate men, reasonable men, you have to deal with; it is unreasonable men, madmen rather. They are madmen indeed, but even madmen reason correctly enough from their premises, and their insanity is in their always reasoning from false premises. Grant them their premises, as you do when you concede them human right, and it is folly to hope to resist their conclusions. If we would resist their rationalism, their atheism, their destructive doctrines, tendencies, and deeds, we must strike their ground

from under them, and leave them nothing to stand on. We must refuse them their starting-point, and prove to them that what they arrogate to themselves as their rights are the rights of God, not theirs, to be exercised only in his name, and only by those whom he authorizes to exercise them, and that they have for themselves duties, only duties, and duties only to God.

Indeed, if our duties are not all duties to God, and to others only for his sake, why are we required in order to discharge our duty to God to refer all our actions to him? If I owe a duty to my neighbor in his own right, my neighbor is the ultimate end of that duty. Why, then, am I bound to refer it to God, and discharge it for his sake? What claim has God to it? Does the universe, or any part of the universe, exist for itself? Has not God created all things for himself alone? How then can there be duty except to him? Second causes have no creative power, and therefore all their activity is confined to the second cosmic cycle, the return of creation to God as its final cause. This return is not a right, it is in all rational creation a duty. It is our duty to return by an act of free volition to God who has made us, in the way and manner he prescribes, and this is our whole duty. It is not our duty because we cannot otherwise secure happiness. That we cannot otherwise secure happiness is certainly true, and is a good reason why we should return, but is not the reason or ground of our obligation to return; for to seek our happiness in any other way is not merely a mistake, but also a sin. If all our activity is confined to this return, and if this return be our duty and our whole duty, as it assuredly is, how can we pretend that we owe any duties but duties to God? If all our duties are duties to God, then all rights are his, and right on human lips, as Donoso-Cortéz says, is a vicious expression, and our contemporary's criticism was uncalled for, and is unauthorized.

We find nothing in this doctrine to favor the system of occasional causes, for it does not deny the proper activity of second causes, or assert God as sole actor in the operations of nature. We assert the activity of second causes; we deny only their creative activity; and we had supposed it lawful to maintain that creatures cannot create, and that to create is the incommunicable prerogative of God alone. It is because creatures cannot create, that we deny them



in their own right all dominion, deny that they have, properly speaking, any right or power to bind others to themselves, and maintain that they have only duties, and duties only to God their creator. My right is my own; and if I have right, I have something I can call my own, something the absolute ownership of which is vested in me. But how can this be when I have not even the ownership of myself? We do not deny the proper activity of nature as second cause; we only deny its legislative character, because to found law pertains to him who has the sovereign dominion, and dominion depends on ownership, and ownership on creation. But as nature is created, not creative, it has no ownership; then no dominion; then no power to found laws. We do not deny the obligation of the law of nature, but we do not call it *law* precisely because without fulfilling it we cannot fulfil the purpose of our existence, nor the law of *nature* precisely because it is impressed upon nature, innate, intrinsic, and operative in all natural actions, but because it is the law of God, the will of our Sovereign commanding us to observe the order of nature, and forbidding us to depart from it. It is law only because the will of God, and therefore it is that there is no atheistical morality, and the denial of God is the denial of all law.

We do not perceive that we are in any danger here of falling into Hindoo pantheism. The essence of pantheism is in denying the proper activity of second causes, and therefore second causes themselves, and is really only occasionalism rendered consistent with itself. In denying human right we do not deny the reality of nature nor the proper activity of second causes. The activity of second causes is none the less activity because confined to the second cycle, or return to God as the end for which they were made. Undoubtedly, all activity is, in a certain sense, productive, otherwise it would not be activity; but the activity of second causes produces only in the order of the end, and in man is termed virtue, which is the product of duty discharged, and therefore is included in the return to God. This return to God is in man more than an instinctive, more even than an intelligent return; it is a free, voluntary return, in which the end is not only apprehended, but freely willed. There is no higher conceivable activity of second causes than this, none which approaches

nearer the similitude of the Divine activity. Man is never more truly or distinctively man, and never performs an act more properly his own, than when performing an act of obedience, or discharging a duty.

It strikes us that there is less danger of pantheism or occasionalism in this doctrine, than in that suggested by our Italian contemporary in his note. Undoubtedly, we must admit participated beings, and most assuredly we may apply to them analogically the terms which language adopts in speaking both of finite and infinite Being. It is not improper to call a man beautiful, great, wise, powerful, although only God is beauty, greatness, wisdom, and power, if he participates of these Divine attributes. The expression is imperfect, that is, expresses what is imperfect, but it is not vicious. But we cannot say therefore it is not vicious to apply the word *right* to man, because it does not appear that right is participable in the sense in which these attributes are. Right is the Divine sovereignty, and, to participate of it is to participate of the Divine dominion, which, since the Divine dominion, like the creative act on which it is founded, is incommunicable, is, if any thing, to be identically God. To assert such participation would place us in the order of the first cause, give us at least a share in the work of creation, and thus assert, if not pantheism, polytheism. The illustration selected by the *Civiltà Cattolica* is not applicable, because right is not, like beauty, greatness, wisdom, power, &c., a participable attribute. The example of the saw in the hands of the carpenter is not, it seems to us, happily chosen. The saw is a mere passive instrument in the hands of the carpenter, and can only in a loose and improper sense be said to act at all. To represent man as such passive instrument in the hands of God, would be to deny his proper activity, all proper human acts, and, if pressed hard, would go far towards representing God as the only operator in nature, — would go far towards the denial of the activity of second causes and the assertion of occasionalism. Pantheism or occasionalism would be more likely, then, to be deduced from our contemporary's doctrine than from the one we oppose to it. Pantheism is the reigning philosophical heresy of our times, but amongst us it has grown out of the habit of regarding the forces of nature, especially of human nature, as Divine laws, because nature is the work of God, and then assuming them to be Divine forces. If Divine forces,

they are God. and then God and nature are identical, and God is the only operator, which is occasionalism : and if second causes have no operative virtue, they are *Maias*, pure illusions, which is pantheism. This is best guarded against by denying man all activity in the first or creative cycle, in confining his activity to the second cycle, and therefore denying him in the proper sense of the term all right, and recognizing in him only duties. The clear and distinct recognition of duty is the practical, as well as speculative, denial of both pantheism and occasionalism.

Nevertheless, we do not object, with proper explanations, to the application ordinarily made of the terms *right* and *natural law*. In the sense in which Donoso-Cortés condemns, and his critic defends them, we cannot accept them, till otherwise instructed than at present ; yet we may call *our right* in the sense that it is a real right against our neighbor, and is made payable by the Divine order to us. Strictly speaking, the right is God's right, not ours, and is ours only as we are its trustees, or his ministers : yet if we bear in mind that we hold it only from God, and mean by calling it ours only that it is a real right, and good in our favor, against our neighbor, it is lawful as well as convenient for us to speak of our rights. So of the law of nature. We may speak of the law of nature, and insist on it as law, if we only bear in mind that it is law not by simple force of nature, regarded as *natura naturata*, but by the will of God our sovereign. It is also necessary to use the term when we wish to distinguish between nature and grace, or between the law by conformity to which we fulfil the purposes of our natural creation and the law by which we attain to the end of our supernatural creation. With these qualifications and explanations well understood, the terms can do no harm, are convenient, and sanctioned by a usage upon which we have as little right as disposition to innovate. All we insist on is, that we shall always, when strictness of language is necessary, assert all right as belonging to God, and for man only duties, and in this, after all, we doubt not, our highly esteemed contemporary will fully agree with us.

As to the Letter itself of the noble Spaniard, we have not many comments to offer. We commend it to the attention of our readers as a specimen of free, bold, manly thought and expression, in a Catholic and a monarchist. They will be struck with the freedom, independence, and

manliness of its tone, so superior to the tameness and servility of thought and utterance of our American statesmen on similar topics. There is no country in the world where the people or the public counts for so much, or is so free and independent as with us, and none where man individually is so little, so servile, so far removed from a real freeman. American Democracy is the most intolerant despot in the world, and will tolerate not the least approach to freedom of thought and utterance on the origin and constitution of government. It strikes with its anathema every public man who refuses to offer it incense. We speak not of laws on the statute-book; so far as formal legislative enactments on the subject are concerned, we are free enough; but the force of public opinion, the clamor of the mob, renders this statute freedom of no avail to any one who would stand well with his countrymen. We ourselves, personally, speak with freedom and independence, for it is in us to do so, and we would do so if the dungeon, the rack, or the scaffold, gibbet, or stake, awaited us, for we do not hold our life worth saving at the expense of liberty or duty; but we are able to do so not without paying the penalty. Happily, we do not happen to desire the votes of our countrymen; but if we did, we should find our views of government, to say nothing of our views of religion, rendering us more effectually ineligible than it could be done by any constitutional provision or legislative enactment. Why, we could not get elected to the humblest popular office in our own town. We care not for this in our own case, for we have deliberately chosen our own course with a full view of the penalty annexed; but the fact operates most injuriously to our country. No discussions on the origin and constitution of power have been entered into by any of our public men since 1794, when John Adams published his very able work in defence of the American Constitutions against M. Turgot, who complained of them for not instituting centralized democracy, of which the world saw so brilliant a specimen in the Reign of Terror in France. No public man among us, however eminent, however patriotic or loyal, could obtain for any office the suffrages of his fellow-citizens, were he to utter the least word in disparagement of the democracy. More freedom of thought and expression on political principles, on forms of government, or the methods of constituting power, are

tolerated under the most arbitrary monarchical governments of the world, than under our liberalism. Our journals mourn over the restraints placed on the French press by the Prince President, and tell us that in "la belle France" thought is tongue-tied. Yet the French press is free to defend and praise the governing powers, and our press dares do no more. The only difference is, a public law restrains the press in France, and servility to the mob controls it in the United States. The consequence is that manly utterance is foreclosed, manly thought expires, and the whole of our political science consists in fulsome panegyrics on the Revolution, more fulsome eulogiums on the integrity, wisdom, and independence of the people, and inane declamations in favor of what is called popular liberty, which means the right of the people to go where they please, and *my* right or power to ride them thither. The instruction needed by the new generations as they come up, the free and manly thought that is to kindle in them a sense of their manhood, render them free and loyal in their souls, must be sought from abroad, from writers born and bred in despotic Spain, priest-ridden Italy, or absolutist Austria. Hence we think it well to lay such Letters as this of Donoso-Cortéz before our readers, although we may not personally adopt every sentiment they may contain.

We do not quite agree with Donoso-Cortéz in condemning parliamentary government, though in its modern degeneracy it is little better than a public nuisance, and our Congress has been called a bear-garden. Let your parliament be a parliament of estates under a strong executive, and let it sit with closed doors, with all publicity to the speeches of its members denied, so as to prevent the members becoming in their legislative character mere demagogues, making, as we say in this country, speeches for Buncombe, and parliamentary government would, wherever in accordance with the habits of the people, be worthy of the praises it has received. We find, or imagine we find, the Marquis leaning to the exclusive legality of the monarchical *régime*. We cannot agree with him in this. Monarchy is the legal order in Spain, republicanism in the United States. Governments are purely national matters. Let each have its own, and abide by it. For ourselves, we can no more admit the exclusive legality of monarchy than of democracy.

## ART. V. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Kossuth in New England: a full Account of the Hungarian Governor's Visit to Massachusetts. With his Speeches, and the Addresses that were made to him, carefully revised and corrected. With an Appendix.* Boston: Jewett & Co. 1852. 8vo. pp. 343.

"As for Kossuth, we care not for him. He is not the man, unless we are greatly mistaken, to make any lasting impression upon Yankees. He is eloquent and clever, and, like all our modern revolutionists, has a great command of words, vulgarly termed 'the gift of the gab'; but he is not a man of the higher order of intellect. He lacks the ingredient of downright honesty of purpose, has too much to say of himself, and wears his principles quite too loosely. He will not elect our next President, nor induce us to engage in a war either with Austria or Russia. We shall have a good time with him, feast ourselves, have our own jollification, let him laugh a little in his sleeve at us, while we laugh a good deal in ours at him, and then — cast him off."

It was with these words that we closed an article last January, written but a few days after Kossuth's landing at New York. The result has verified our prediction. He landed amid salvos of artillery and the shouts of congregated thousands, and proceeded to his quarters, as a nation's guest, with a half-regal train, and amid the pomp and honors due to a conquering hero. He was hailed as the champion of liberty, the confessor, almost the martyr of humanity, termed the great representative man of the age, and by some, — we shudder to write it, — a new Messiah come to regenerate and save mankind. Religious and secular presses, aside from the Catholic journals, were, with singular unanimity, loud, even vociferous, in his praise; only the *New York Courier and Enquirer* and the *Boston Daily Advertiser* having from the first the courage to maintain the truth against him. A few short months passed away, and the nation's guest, — welcomed by President, Cabinet, and Congress, feasted and toasted by members of the Senate and House of Representatives, by State governors and legislatures, by cities, towns, and committees, — under the assumed name of Alexander Smith, crept stealthily on board a steamer at New York bound for England, leaving his board bill to his landlady unpaid. The country had played out its play, had enjoyed all the excitement, fun, and frolic he could furnish them, and thought it time to break up the masquerade. He embarked from New York last June, amid the perfect indifference of the American people, and there is now a very general conviction that he really is — what his

Grace, the Archbishop of New York, so opportunely pronounced him — a humbug. Greeley's *Tribune* and Raymond's *Times* are the only journals of any note that still make a show of adhering to him. The Kossuth plume has drooped, the Kossuth hat will soon go, if it has not already gone, out of fashion, and there will be few willing to remember that they ever shouted a welcome to the Magyarized Slave. All this we foresaw last January, and, knowing him and our countrymen as we did, we could easily foresee it.

The great man, or the great humbug, has gone, and we are not upon the whole sorry that he made us a visit. Our people have seen a live revolutionist, a little above the ordinary grade of those who seek refuge in this country, and they have heard the plans, purposes, methods, and resources of the European liberalists detailed by one of the ablest of their chiefs, and have had an opportunity of hearing the very best that could be said in their favor. This is much. And having heard, they have, to an extent we did not anticipate, condemned; and this is more. The present generation will welcome no more Kossuths. Three or four years must pass away before another such farce can be got up, and three or four years constitute an age in our history, for we live fast. Foreign revolutionists and demagogues have also learned a lesson of some importance to them, that American sympathy with them is not very deep, and spends itself in words, — that we give them good words, because we find it easier than to give them hard words, and because we like to see kings deposed, thrones overturned, and nations convulsed, but that we as a people are not disposed to go out of our way to aid those who are engaged in throwing the world into confusion or back into barbarism. If they succeed, well and good; if they fail, why, if they come amongst us, we will feast them, toast them, make speeches to them, as long as we find such things interesting to us and not interfering with our ordinary business, for such things look generous, and enable us to have a good time for ourselves, which is a great relief to a people who seldom have a holiday; but when they expect us to do more, to make any real sacrifices to help them, or to secure the triumph of their cause, they must remember that we regard liberty as a boon only for those who have the might and the courage to win it, and that we are devoted to it — on paper and in our words only.

The visit of Kossuth must have done something to establish the untrustworthiness of our secular American press in regard to foreigners and foreign affairs. The writer of this two years ago last January in a public address in New York denounced Kossuth and the Hungarian rebellion, and was rewarded with a hiss; last June he did the same thing in the same city, and was applauded to the echo. Time has proved the truth of what the Catholic journals asserted from the first. The whole country now know that they



were correctly informed, and simply told the truth. Yet the secular journals had all the means of arriving at the truth that we had, and had before them all the facts and statements that we had before us, and might just as well have ascertained and told the truth. But they sympathized with and believed the revolutionists, — and were deceived; they pronounced all the statements of the governments and their party false, and misled their readers. We knew beforehand that it was difficult for European liberalists to tell the truth. We knew they had for years been filling the world with lies, especially about Austria and Russia; we rejected their statements, and relied on those of the governments they were fighting against, and do not recollect an instance in which we were deceived. The Austrian and Russian bulletins during the Hungarian campaign were pronounced by our sapient editors to be lies, and yet every one of them turned out to be true. These editors chose to rely on the statements sent them through the *Cologne Gazette*, nearly all of which turned out to be forgeries for that radical journal, and all of them to be false or at least grossly exaggerated. We adopted in the outset the rule, that the fact that a statement comes from a liberal source is *primâ facie* evidence that it is untrue, and following this rule, and relying on official information, we were rarely misled. The conductors of the secular press generally believed in the sincerity, purity, and worth of the European Liberals; we regarded them as a set of lying, profligate villains and cutthroats fit only to be hung. The press regarded their cause as the cause of humanity, of liberty, justice, truth; we as the cause of the Devil, of licentiousness, irreligion, anarchy, demagoguism, and social despotism, deserving the execration of every honest man. Here is the reason why the secular press were deceived and deceived the American people, and why we neither deceived nor were deceived. The most unfavorable estimate you can form of a European Liberal, or Revolutionist, you may always be sure, is the truest. It has turned out so, and the people must now see and know it. They will hereafter know where to look for trustworthy information, if they desire it, and save themselves, if they wish, from being humbugged.

Recent events have also demonstrated how utterly false are the views which have prevailed with regard to the discontent in Hungary. Almost at the moment Alexander Smith — no, Ludwig Kossuth — was predicting here a new rising in Hungary, or speaking of the old as still living and acting, and soliciting “material aid” in throwing off the Austrian yoke, the young Emperor of Austria was making the tour of Hungary, everywhere welcomed, everywhere received with enthusiasm, and with all that intense and chivalric loyalty which belongs to the noble Hungarian character, and proving to demonstration that the Hungarian people have no deep



or wide-spread dissatisfaction with the house of Hapsburg. Events have everywhere proved that the strength of the revolutionists in 1848 and 1849 throughout all Europe was greatly overrated on all sides, and consisted in the panic of the governments. The appearance anywhere of a single strong man, of a clear head, a bold heart, and a firm will, was at any time sufficient to arrest and drive them back to their native obscurity. The governments fell because they were alarmed, because they temporized, because they could not bear to give the order to shoot the rebels down, and because they hoped by prudent concessions to win their revolted subjects back to their allegiance. All rebels are cowards, and become impotent when authority meets them with an unquailing eye and a firm assertion of its rights, and refuses the slightest concession while they have arms in their hands. "A whiff of grape-shot" from authority in the outset is an act of humanity. Louis Philippe needed but to give the order to fire, and the disasters of the contemptible revolution of February would never have occurred. We need but look at what Prince Louis Napoleon has done, in order to see that the revolution was powerless in itself, and that throughout all Europe, with a little manliness or energy on the part of authority, it might have at once been put down. The *coup d'état* of last December proved the impotence of the whole party, and that your Mazzinis and Kossuths, your Lamartines and Ledru-Rollins, are but soap-bubbles, which burst and vanish as soon as touched with the point of the lance. We hope the European sovereigns have learned from the recent experiment how to treat hereafter an insurrection stirred up by demagogues in the name of the people.

Kossuth's visit here has revealed the fact that there is after all a strong conservative element in the American character, which though depressed has not been destroyed by the wild democratic theorizing so much in vogue for the last few years. Every political aspirant who hoped to make Kossuth, through the popular enthusiasm he might kindle, a stepping-stone to the Presidential chair, has been disappointed. Not one of the politicians who publicly sympathized with Kossuth and his policy has been able even to obtain a nomination to the Presidency. Webster, Cass, Walker, Douglas, all have failed, and the candidates selected are both gentlemen, who, if they have any sympathies of the sort, have not expressed them. Mr. Webster owes his failure to his Hülsemann letter and his after-dinner speech and toast at the Kossuth banquet, which turned against him the whole influence of Henry Clay and his friends. Mr. Clay has since died amid the regrets of his countrymen, and we are bound in justice to his memory to say, that his public course during the last two or three years of his life was not unworthy of an American statesman. But he had for a long time two great objects, — the first and foremost was to be himself,

and the other was to prevent Mr. Webster from being, President of the United States. He failed in the first; Mr. Webster's espousal of the cause of Red Republicanism abroad enabled him to succeed in the second, which he could not have done if Mr. Webster had not foolishly given him so fair a chance. When such a man as Mr. Webster condescends to court the mob, he is sure to fail. Had he placed himself, as we trusted in March, 1850, he would, at the head of the conservative party both in reference to domestic and foreign politics, he would at least have been the candidate of his party, and most likely have been elected. But if he had failed, he would still have had the honor and consolation of knowing that he had organized a truly American party, one which every honest and intelligent citizen could with a good conscience support. We hoped this much from him, and we were sadly disappointed when we read his Hülsemann letter.

General Cass we have been glad to see laid upon the shelf, for we can never support a man who turns radical only in his old age. We can pardon radicalism in a young man, and can forgive one for being a "progressive democrat" any time before forty, but not for being one after that age, much less for turning one for the first time after sixty. When Minister at the Court of France in 1840, General Cass wrote well against the European revolutionists; in 1848, he begged pardon for having done so, and became their warm partisan. A man like him does not change his convictions on such a subject at his age, and hence we regard his profession of "progressive democracy" and his sympathy with European radicals as merely a bid for the Presidency. Walker, Mr. Polk's Secretary of the Treasury, has for ever blasted his prospects by his preachment in England of the "Anglo-Saxon alliance," or "England and America against the world." A proposition to fight against England would be much more popular here than a proposition to fight with her against the continental nations of Europe. We shall never as a people consent to an alliance with England for the spread of constitutionalism or democracy till we have compelled her to acknowledge our superiority, both on the land and the sea. Moreover, an Anglo-Saxon alliance would be under present circumstances an alliance of the Protestant world against the Catholic, and therefore an alliance which our government has no right to form; for it is not a Protestant government, and is bound to respect our religion and refrain from all acts prejudicial to it. It cannot make war on the Catholic religion in Europe without making war on the religion of every Catholic in the country, and giving every Catholic citizen the full right to resist it. The law of God is above the law of the state, and I have the full right to resist the state when it makes war on my religion. Douglas is still young, and has been rather a favorite with us personally; he may possi-

bly recover, by prudent conduct hereafter, the character he has lost by his sympathy with Kossuth and the *Filibusters*; but he can never expect to regain the full confidence of the Catholic public.

We are well aware that this is not a Catholic country, but neither is it a Protestant country. The government is neither Protestant nor Catholic; it is bound to extend equal respect to every professedly Christian form of religion embraced by its citizens. Protestants may be more numerous, but they have no more rights, than we, and the government is as much bound to respect our religion, and refrain from whatever is repugnant to its teaching and interests, as it is to respect theirs, and to refrain from whatever might injure it. We do not insist that to receive our votes a man must be a Catholic, — far from it, — but we do insist that he shall not be our avowed enemy, and resolved to use his place against us in favor of Protestantism. If he has leagued himself with foreign conspirators, and makes common cause with those who are plotting by revolution and physical force to overthrow the Church, we mark him, and hold him up as one whom no Catholic can conscientiously support. This is the case with every public man who has avowed himself the friend and supporter of Kossuth.

Kossuth was received in this country as the champion of Protestantism, and we were told expressly that the cause of Protestantism was identified with him, and must stand or fall with him. The liberty of the party he represents is liberty from the Catholic Church, liberty to deprive her of her visible head, and to effect her complete destruction. This is what Mazzini is sworn, in unison with the Protestant Alliance, to effect; this is the object of the party which he represents in Europe, and Kossuth when here told us expressly that we could serve the cause of liberty in Europe only by supporting the party headed by Mazzini. The whole movement, under pretext of love of liberty and hatred of tyranny, is a movement directed primarily against the Catholic religion, or the Catholic Church as divinely commissioned to teach and govern the faithful. How, then, can we be expected to do otherwise than oppose them? How, then, can a man who has sided with them and struck hands with Kossuth expect us not to vote against him?

Our politicians would do well not to take the Lowes, the Shieldses, the Mallorys, and certain custom-house Catholics, as representatives of the Catholic voters of the United States. Those Catholics you find in office have been elevated by Protestant votes, and they feel that they depend on the good-will of Protestants. They are consequently in constant fear that their religion may be thought to have some influence on their official conduct, and are specially on their guard against suffering it to do so. They have heard it said that their religion is hostile to popular institutions, and in their anxiety to refute this silly charge, and to prove that they can be as

good democrats as Protestants, they prove very satisfactorily that they can be a great deal worse. Poor men! they have yet to learn that Protestantism is incompatible with popular liberty, because it must itself follow public opinion and is never able to give a man the moral courage and strength to withstand popular error or injustice; and that Catholicity is favorable to such liberty precisely because it elevates a man above the world, and infuses into him strength and courage to adhere to the truth, to what is wise and just, though he stand alone, opposed by the whole community. Alas! they do not see that by their shouts of democracy, and their servility to the mob, they are doing all in their power to prove the charge against their religion to be well founded.

The sorriest sight to us is a Catholic in this country throwing up his cap, and shouting, "All-hail Democracy!" Perhaps we love liberty, perhaps we are attached to republican institutions, and could ourselves, if need were, hurrah for republicanism as loudly as any of our countrymen, for few of them have stronger lungs; but we cannot believe it wise or prudent to flourish our arms against an imaginary enemy, and to make common cause with the real enemy, of republicanism. It was, no doubt, a pleasant conceit on the part of the present Hellenic government to employ noted robbers to protect travellers from Athens to the Piræus against robbery, but its wisdom is somewhat questionable. The only danger republicanism has to fear in this country is from its own excess, and therefore it seems to us that it is against the danger of this excess, of exaggerated republicanism, that the true republican will be on his guard, and be specially anxious to warn his countrymen. This is what our office-holding and office-seeking Catholics do not seem to understand, and hence they are at best no better than their Protestant countrymen, ordinarily even worse. We want no Catholics in office, unless they can prove themselves as republicans and statesmen superior to Protestants. We want no Catholic demagogues, Catholic radicals, Catholic liberalists, to extend official sympathy to the men banded together for the destruction of our holy religion, as well as the peace and order of society. Over such Catholics angels weep, and devils laugh. Politicians must not judge the great body of American Catholics, whether of Celtic or Teutonic descent, native-born or emigrants from Ireland, France, or Germany, by these office-holding and custom-house Catholics; for, once let us see that a policy is really hostile to our religion, and we will die a thousand deaths sooner than support it. Catholics as a body understand now very well that to prove themselves true Americans it is not necessary to take extreme democratic views, and push the radical tendencies of the country to anarchy or social despotism, and that they can best prove their Americanism, their devotion to American institutions and republican

freedom, by taking their stand on the conservative side, and using their whole influence to restrain the radical tendencies so generally appealed to by our demagogues. It is well for our political aspirants to understand this, and not suppose, because Catholics love liberty, they are so mad as to sacrifice it by pushing it to an impracticable extreme, and by uniting with foreign or domestic demagogues to weaken the influence of the Catholic Church, the only support of either civil or religious freedom.

We are at present a feeble minority, but nevertheless not wholly without influence. We proved last autumn and winter that we have influence, and but for us the "Nation's Guest" had received a far more cordial welcome than was given him. The unanimous voice of three millions of our population cannot speak without bringing an echo. Our numbers are daily increasing, and the time is not far distant when our influence will be incomparably greater. It is well for all parties to understand this; but while we understand this, it is especially necessary that we also understand that we must look, not to the popular sentiment of the country, but to our holy religion, to learn on what side we are to cast our influence. If we take our politics from either American or European radicalism, we shall introduce no conservative element into American politics, and the fact that we are Catholics will not make our influence one whit more salutary. A Catholic radical, a Catholic supporting political atheism, can do no more for the preservation of American institutions than a Protestant radical. We must save the country, but we can save it only by adhering to those great political principles, and pursuing that wise and just policy, enjoined by our religion. Political atheism is as dangerous when professed by a Catholic people, as when professed by a Protestant people.

As a general thing, the American people behaved far better, during the stay of Kossuth amongst us, than could have been expected. The result has given us a confidence in their practical good sense which we had not previously entertained, and inspires something approaching to a hope that our radical tendencies may yet be arrested before it is too late. We are quite sure they could be, if any way could be contrived to neutralize the influence of the European radicals and revolutionists, who, defeated at home, flock hither to urge us on to excesses quite foreign to our American nature. In all our principal cities are gangs of these fugitives from justice, — victims of tyranny they call themselves, — who gather round the press and determine its tone. It is from these — unhappily, the very class of foreigners whom we most warmly welcome and most readily press to our hearts — that our greatest danger is to be apprehended. Still the visit of Kossuth has proved that these, united as they are in secret societies extending all over the country, and affiliated to similar societies in the countries from which

they have fled or been driven, are not all-powerful, and that out of Massachusetts and the large towns they have comparatively little influence. It is pretty manifest now that the Southern States are, to a great extent, conservative. It is beginning to be pretty well understood that radicalism, revolutionism, Abolitionism, and fanaticism are all at bottom one and the same thing. The great West, too, has proved itself far less radical than we supposed it to be. Kossuth's success was arrested at Cincinnati, and was very trifling even in that noble city. Indeed, the great valley of the Mississippi is upon the whole conservative. In a trip last winter to St. Louis and back, we were most agreeably surprised at what we saw and heard. We heard more sound doctrine on government west of Cincinnati than we had ever heard discoursed before in our whole life; and we returned home with the conviction that the real hotbed of radicalism and ultraism of all sorts is our own New England, and that the influences which are ruining the country, so far as they are indigenous, are exerted by New England and New-Englanders. In no part of the Union was Kossuth so cordially received as in Massachusetts, and it must be remembered that he visited this Commonwealth only after his character had been fully unmasked, and the danger and iniquity of his plans fully exposed. This is a painful admission on our part. We are ourselves New England born, though not New England bred, and we have loved and honored Massachusetts as our mother. But alas! the virtues of our Puritan ancestors lie buried with them in their graves, and only their vices, their errors, their objectionable qualities, survive! In practice New York and Pennsylvania may have run to greater extremes than Massachusetts; but if the Coalition, which now misrules the State, remain in power another year, this can be no longer said. Her practice will then be as radical as her speculations. We have in this Coalition the spirit of the Genevan Reformer and the Old French Convention, John Calvin and Jean Jacques Rousseau, combined.

We could easily find, in the volume before us, both in the speeches of Kossuth and the addresses made to him, matter for several articles, but we have neither space nor inclination to review either. The volume is well got up, and it will be prized by many. To us it is a sad book,—sad as disgraceful to our State,—sad as showing the prostitution of splendid talents to base and ignoble purposes,—sad as well fitted to exert a mischievous influence on the generation soon to succeed the one now on the stage. Nobody can read it without recognizing in Kossuth a magnificent declaimer. In some of his speeches there are passages that even we cannot read with a perfectly tranquil pulse. They compel us to award him a higher order of talent than we had before been disposed to concede him, although they only make us the more determined in our utter

condemnation of the man. He is undeniably an orator, but his eloquence is not of the highest order. He has a lively fancy, a brilliant imagination, and great tact in adapting himself to the peculiar passions, foibles, and prejudices of his auditory; but his speeches are made up of the commonplace declamations of all ages in behalf of liberty. All he says is familiar to those of us who have studied the orators of the old French Revolution, and the language and policy of the modern European liberalists. What he tells us of his own country and Austria that is new is not true, and what he says that is true, we knew by heart long before he said it. As a reasoner, as a statesman, as a liberator, he is below criticism. No man of real genius, of genuine intellect, of eminent practical ability, ever, after the days of his boyhood, espouses the side of the question he does. There is not and never has been a genuine man on the side of his party in Europe, or in any other country. A man on his side of the question has no chance for the exercise of great abilities, no scope for enlarged and practical views, or free and lofty speculation. He has no sphere for his mind in its integrity, for the development and application of great and permanent principles. He must narrow his soul down to a point, he must intrigue, and lie, and palter, and cower, work in the dark with foul conspirators whom he despises and cannot trust, appeal to the lowest and dirtiest passions of human nature, be strong only for evil, and be remembered only for the ruin he succeeds in spreading around him. We blush to say that we were once weak enough to be of the same party, but when we came to man's estate we could not but feel its littleness, and demand something more worthy of the nobler aspirations of the soul, something less unsuitable to God's image in which we were created. Bah! the very littleness of the objects of the party, the pettiness of its means, the punyness of its thoughts, the narrowness of its views, disgust us. It is only men of feeble parts and selfish passions, fantastical young men or sentimental young ladies, that can really have any native tendency to espouse the cause of modern liberalism. The very fact, then, that Kossuth is only a liberal, only a colleague of Mazzini, is of itself ample proof that he is not and never can be a great man. He may be great of his class, but his class is the lowest in the scale of humanity, the least removed from the animal world. Let no man who would be thought to have sound judgment honor it, for if he does he will have no occasion to repeat Dogberry's request, — "Write me down an ass." Kossuth will rank in history only with Wat Tyler or Jack Cade, at best only with Catiline or the "Brewer King."

Still Kossuth's speeches have sown some bad seed amongst us, that may yet spring up and bear poisonous fruit. It becomes us to be on our guard. His appeal to the German residents and citi-

zens of the country may have fatal consequences. The Catholic Germans, a numerous body amongst us, are generally conservative, and may be relied on as inferior in loyalty to no class of our citizens; but a large portion of the Protestant Germans settled here are thorough-going radicals and revolutionists of the very worst sort. These Kossuth has labored to band together as a foreign party, to be governed solely in their political action by his foreign policy. If they are mad enough to follow his advice, they will make trouble for themselves and the country. They will compel the formation of a Native American party, which no lover of his country wishes to see formed. It becomes us to be on our guard.

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2. *The Blithedale Romance*. By NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, and Fields. 1852. 16mo. pp. 288.

MR. HAWTHORNE has fully established his reputation as the first writer, in his favorite line, our American literature can boast, and we have nothing to do, when he publishes a new work, but to judge it without judging the general character, merits, or demerits of the author. We said of Mr. Hawthorne in 1842, *apropos* of the publication of *Twice-told Tales*, — "He is a genuine artist. His mind is creative; more so than that of any other American writer that has as yet appeared, with the exception, perhaps, of Washington Irving. He has wit, humor, pathos, in abundance; an eye for all that is wild, beautiful, or picturesque in nature; a generous sympathy with all forms of life, thought, and feeling, and warm, deep, unfailing love of his race. He has withal a vigorous intellect, and a serene and healthy spirit. He is gentle, but robust and manly; full of tenderness, but never maudlin. Through all his writings there runs a pure and living stream of manly thought and feeling. . . . We have wished to enroll ourselves among those who regard Mr. Hawthorne as fitted to stand at the head of American literature. We see the pledge of this in his modesty, in his simplicity, and in his sympathy with all that is young, fresh, childlike; and above all in his originality, and pure, deep feeling of nationality."\* This judgment no doubt betrays the school to which we then belonged, or were laboring to found; but, extravagant as some thought it at the time, the reading public have ratified it, and abating a little as to vigor of intellect and healthiness of spirit, we are willing to abide by it. In the class of literature he has selected he has no superior amongst us, probably no equal, but we owe it to ourselves to say that the class is not the highest.

*The Blithedale Romance* we have read with a good deal of in-

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\* *Boston Quarterly Review*, Vol. V. pp. 251, 252.



terest, for much in it is connected with some of our personal friends. Through them we had ourselves some share in it. The scene of the Romance is laid at Brook Farm in the neighboring town of West Roxbury, where one of the most intimate and dearest friends we ever had prior to our conversion founded an Institute of Agriculture with a half communitarian purpose. He himself avowed in it no general purpose of world reform, although he was moved by the socialistic spirit, which many of us at that time shared, and he probably hoped that Brook Farm in its developments would grow into a model community, and become the germ or nucleus of a new and better social organization. In this point of view we personally never had any faith in it, and from the first discouraged it; but as a practical Institute of Agriculture, where several persons of kindred sympathies might live together in a sort of community, enjoy the pleasures of a highly refined and cultivated society, and sustain themselves by labor in the field or garden and by the instruction of youth, which was all that its founder proposed, we thought not unfavorably of it. But the establishment was no sooner opened than it drew together a strange group of visionary projectors, of wild and lawless spirits of all sorts, weary of the restraints of society, and anxious chiefly to act out without reserve all their instincts, and to give free scope to all the impulses, passions, and whims of their undisciplined natures. It of course soon failed, and with it the hopes that it had excited. The men and women who had been collected together there for a brief period, expecting to find a new garden of Eden, were scattered again, most of them with saddened hearts, and some of them with an experience from which they have since derived a rich harvest of wisdom.

Mr. Hawthorne was for a brief period one of the communitarians, attracted more, we apprehend, by the romance of the thing, than by any real belief in the principles of the establishment, or deep sympathy with its objects. Under the name of Miles Coverdale he sketches in this little volume his experiences during his brief residence at Brook Farm as one of the regenerators of society, mingled with various romantic instances which did, and many more which did not happen, but which might have happened. He has treated the institution and the characters of his associates with great delicacy and tenderness. He enjoys a quiet laugh and indulges in a little gentle satire now and then, and upon the whole makes the experiment appear, as it in reality was, a folly born of honest intentions and fervent zeal in behalf of society. But he brings none of the real actors in the comedy, or farce, or tragedy, whichever it may have been, upon the stage. We can recognize in the personages of his Romance individual traits of several real characters who were there, but no one has his or her whole counter-

